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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Mr. Jaspal Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Birla Institute of Scientific Research (the Society) is the petitioner and is a society registered under the West Bengal Society Registration Act, 1961. By a lease dated 17 March 1971 the Society took premises at No. 13, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Lajpat Nagar IV, New Delhi from Mrs. Santosh Chandiok (respondent No. 4) at a monthly rent of Rs. 4,000. The land beneath those premises had been purchased by Mrs. Chandiok from Mr. Sat Prakash Kapur.

The paramount lease for the land had been granted by the President of India on 3 April 1959 and included a covenant (Clause (vi)) prohibiting use of the land and buildings for any trade or business or for purposes other than specified residential use. After the Society occupied the premises, the Land and Development Office (respondent No. 3) issued notices alleging misuse of the premises as an office in contravention of Clause (vi) and claimed misuse (regularisation) charges.

Mrs. Chandiok filed an eviction petition against the Society under Clause (k) of Subsection (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. That eviction petition resulted in a compromise recorded before the Additional Rent Controller: the Society's counsel admitted the grounds for eviction, and the Controller passed an eviction order in terms of the compromise (Ex. CX), granting the Society four years to vacate and setting out obligations regarding payment of regularisation/misuse charges to the Land and Development Office. Pursuant to that settlement the Society made payments (through the landlady) to the Land and Development Office towards the claimed misuse charges.

The Society then filed the writ petition under consideration, challenging that it had never misused the premises (contending the use was for a library incidental to its objects), contesting the manner and quantum of the misuse charges (alleging absence of prescribed formula and inflation), and asserting entitlement to relief on those grounds. The court in this opinion addresses those contentions and the related dispute over the extent of liability for misuse charges.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner Society can reopen and relitigate the question of misuse of the premises after having admitted the grounds for eviction before the Additional Rent Controller and after an eviction order was passed in terms of the compromise.
  2. Whether the Land and Development Office is entitled to recover the full misuse (regularisation) charges claimed, or whether recovery is limited to one per cent of the charges by virtue of Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Birla Institute of Scientific Research) — Principal contentions

  • The premises were not misused for commercial purposes; they were used to house a library incidental to the objects of the Society, and thus did not violate Clause (vi) of the paramount lease.
  • The misuse or regularisation charges claimed by the Land and Development Office are not determined according to any rules or prescribed formula and are inflated.
  • Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76 limits the recovery of misuse charges to only one per cent in relevant circumstances; therefore the Land and Development Office can recover only 1% of the claimed amounts.

Land and Development Office (Respondent No. 3) — Principal contentions

  • The Land and Development Office maintained that the misuse charges had been claimed and calculated as per an established formula and schedule: specifically, Clause 1.7 of a handbook entitled "Information for the Guidance of Lease Holders" and the Schedule of Market Rates of Rent set out by Office Order No. 26/81 dated 23 October 1981.
  • Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76, which provides for recovery of one per cent of charges in certain cases, is not applicable in the present facts because the eviction order was obtained by consent/compromise and time was granted to the tenant; accordingly, full charges could be recovered.

Landlady / Petitioner in the eviction petition (Mrs. Santosh Chandiok) — Position recorded in proceedings

  • Mrs. Chandiok alleged misuse of the premises by the Society in terms of the paramount lease and pursued eviction under Section 14(1)(k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act; this allegation was accepted in the eviction proceedings and formed the basis of the compromise and the eviction order recorded by the Additional Rent Controller.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Order by Mahinder Narain, J., dated 5 November 1986 (in the same writ petition) Directed that only one per cent of the misuse charges could be recovered for the period 15 January 1981 to 22 October 1982 (application of Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76). The court noted this earlier direction and expressly agreed with the view that Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76 applies; the present court applied the same principle and ordered recovery of only one per cent for the period in question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the petitioner's arguments in two distinct strands: (1) whether the question of misuse could be reopened; and (2) the proper extent of recovery of misuse/regularisation charges.

On relitigation of misuse: The court relied on the factual record of the eviction proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller. Counsel for the Society unequivocally admitted the grounds for eviction and a compromise (Ex. CX) recording those admissions was placed on record. The Additional Rent Controller passed an eviction order in terms of that compromise and explicitly recorded satisfaction that the grounds under Section 14(1)(e)(k) were made out by the petitioner. The court reasoned that those admissions and the resulting eviction order have attained finality: because the Society had admitted misuse and the eviction order had been made on that basis, it was not open to the Society to reopen the factual issue of misuse in the writ petition. The court characterized the matter as "irretrievably final" and held the Society must abide by the earlier admission and order.

On the quantum and legitimacy of misuse charges: The court examined the compromise terms (notably paragraphs 6, 7 and 10 of the application) which recorded that the Society had agreed to make payments towards regularisation/misuse charges and had handed over a bank manager's cheque for Rs. 1,30,000 for payment to the Land and Development Office. Those admissions in the compromise strengthened the court's conclusion that the Society had consented to payment of misuse charges.

The Land and Development Office asserted that amounts were computed according to a published formula and a schedule of market rents (a handbook's Clause 1.7 and Office Order No. 26/81). The petitioner countered that Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76 limited recovery to one per cent. Clause 8 was quoted by the court: it specified that where a lessee/ex-lessee files suit for eviction on receipt of notice for misuse and is "successful" in evicting such tenants, one per cent of the charges will be recovered as a token penalty.

The court considered and accepted the reasoning that an order of eviction effected by compromise remains an order of eviction and that "success" in eviction need not be confined to contested litigation decided after a full trial. The court explicitly rejected the argument that Clause 8 applies only where eviction is obtained after contested proceedings: an eviction obtained by compromise, or one that grants time to vacate, does not change the character of the order as an eviction or negate the landlord's success. On that basis, and having noted that Mahinder Narain, J. had earlier applied Clause 8 in the same matter, the court concluded that Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76 was applicable and limited the Land and Development Office's recovery to one per cent of the misuse charges for the period in question.

The court’s order applied that interpretive conclusion directly: the Land and Development Office could recover only 1% of the claimed charges for the relevant period. The court also observed the admissions in the compromise (and the subsequent payments) as bearing on the Society's liability, but reserved the question of precise quantification to implementation in light of the limitation to 1% for the period specified.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that (a) the petitioner Society is bound by its prior admission before the Additional Rent Controller and by the eviction order passed in terms of the compromise and therefore cannot relitigate the factual question of misuse; and (b) in accordance with Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76, the Land and Development Office may recover only one per cent of the misuse/regularisation charges for the period in question. Ordered accordingly.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Society remains bound by its earlier admission and the eviction order recorded by the Additional Rent Controller; the Land and Development Office's recovery of misuse charges for the period at issue is limited to one per cent of the claimed amount. The court left the parties to bear their own costs.
  • Broader implications: The court clarified that an eviction order obtained by compromise is nevertheless an eviction order for the purposes of Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76 and that "success" in obtaining eviction is not confined to contested victories after full litigation. The opinion applied that principle in the present facts. The court did not purport to lay down a novel legal doctrine beyond the application of the cited clause to the facts at hand.

Ordered accordingly.

    Birla Institute Of Scientific Research v. Union Of India & Others

    Mr. Jaspal Singh, J.— The Birla Institute of Scientific Research, which is the petitioner before me, is a Society duly registered under the West Bengal Society Registration Act, 1961. By a lease agreement dated March 17, 1971 the Society took premises bearing No. 13, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Lajpat Nagar IV, New Delhi from Mrs. Santosh Chandiok, who is respondent No. 4 on a monthly rent of Rs. 4000/-. Mrs. Chandiok had purchased the land underneath the said premises from one Mr. Sat Prakash Kapur.

    2. The original lessee was the President of India who had demised the same by a lease in writing dated April 3, 1959. One of the terms and conditions of the said lease and which is relevent for our purpose was as follows:

    “1. The lessee doth to the intent that the burden of the covenants may run with the said land and may bind any permitted assignee thereof hereby covenant with the Lessor as follows:—

    (i) - - - - - - - - - -

    (ii) - - - - - - - - - -

    (iii) - - - - - - - - - -

    (iv) - - - - - - - - - -

    (v) - - - - - - - - - -

    (vi) not without the written consent of the Chief Commissioner, Delhi to carry on or permit to be carried on, on the said land and buildings erected thereon during the said lease any trade or business whatsoever or use the same or permit the same to be used for any purpose other than of a single storeyed building consisting of one or two residential flats in all, with a barsati on top, as may be approved for the locality or as provided in the building already erected on the said land.”

    3. It so happened that after the letting to the Society notices were issued by the Land and Development Office to Mrs. Chandiok alleging that the entire premises were being misused as office by the Society and that the breach was in contravention of Clause (vi) of the lease deed. The Land and Development Office which is arrayed as respondent No. 3 before me also claimed miususe charges. Consequent upon the said notices by the Land and Development Office, Mrs. Chandiok filed an eviction petition against the Society under Clause (k) of Subsection (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. That provision runs as follows:—

    “14. Protection of tenant against eviction—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

    4. Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely—

    (k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or the Delhi Development Authority, or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi while giving him a lease of the land on which the premises are situate.”

    5. The said eviction petition resulted in a settlement between the parties. In view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the learned Additional Rent Controller recorded the statements of Counsel for the parties. The statement made by Counsel for the Society was as follows:

    “We concede to the grounds for eviction of the petitioner. We be allowed four years time as per written compromise Ex.CX to vacate the premises in suit. The compromise is filed by Sh. Suresh J. Desai Director incharge of respondent No. 1 and Harish Chandra Adv. for respondent No. 1 as an Advocate for respondent No. 1. Respondent concedes the grounds of eviction set out in the petition and admit the notice got receipt mentioned under written para No. 18(2). Eviction order be passed against this respondent No. 1 in terms of the compromise Ex. CX. Parties be left to bear their own costs. Ex.CY is correct.”

    6. This was followed by the statement of Counsel for the petitioner and profitably, 1 may reproduce the same also. It runs as under:

    “I have heard the statment of the Counsel for respondent No. 1. The lease is correct. Eviction order be passed in terms of compromise. Ex. CX is signed by the petitioner and her Advocate, myself and Miss. Poonam. The terms are correctly stated therein. In terms of Ex. CX a cheque No. 6182605 dt. 23.10.78 for Rs. 1,36000/- drawn by Manager United Commercial Bank, Parliament Street, New Delhi on its own branch has been received by Sh. F.C Bedi, Advocate for petitioner. Similarly I have handed over a letter dated 23.10.78 written by petitioner to Sh. M.M Bedi, Vice Chairman D.D.A with Advocate for respondent No. 1. Petition be decreed. Parties be left to bear their own costs.”

    7. Consequent upon those statements the learned Addl. Rent Controller passed an order of eviction in the following terms.

    “I am satisfied from the admissions of respondent that grounds u/Sec. 14(1)(e)(k) are made out by petitioner. I pass eviction order in terms of Ex. CX which may be read as part of my order. File be consigned to R.R”

    8. It may be mentioned that before the recording of the statements which have been reproduced by me above, an application was moved before the learned Additional Rent Controller on behalf of the parties. The relevent paragraphs for our purpose are 6, 7 and 10. They run as under:

    “6. That the Land and Development Office has demanded a payment of Rs. 1,30,000/- as charges for regularisation upto 14th July, 1977 of the breaches of the conditions of the lease in respect of the plot on which the premises in suit have been built. The respondent No. 1 has handed over to the petitioner a Bank Manager Cheque for the said amount of Rs. 1,30,000/- for payment to the Land and Development Office, New Delhi to get the breaches regularised.

    7. That the respondent No. 1 will be using the premises for office purposes. During this period of four years and for the period from 15th July, 1977 to the date of eviction order, respondent No. 1 to pay all the regularisation charges that may be demanded by the Land & Development Office in respect of the breaches of the terms of the lease of the plot of land above referred to within one month from the receipt of the letter from the petitioner mentioning the amount claimed by the Land & Development Office to the petitioner alongwith the letter of the Land and Development Office for payment to the Land & Development Office. If respondent No. 1 makes default in this, time being essence of the agreement, the petitioner will be entitled to execute the eviction order forthwith.

    10. That the petitioner jointly with respondent No. 1 will strive to have the charges claimed by the Land & Development Office for use of the premises by respondent No. 1 as its office, set aside, waived or reduced. This is without prejudicer to the payment to be made by respondent No. 1 towards charges for use and occupation, amount demanded by the Land & Development Office for regularisation or by the Delhi Development Authority.”

    9. Consequent upon this settlement and the order of eviction, the Society made payments through the landlady to the Land & Development Office towards its claim for misuse charges. Ordinarily the matter ought to have finished there. It has not.

    10. The Society has now filed this writ petition saying that it had never misused the premises. It claims that the premises were never used for commercial purpose and that the only purpose to which it was put was the housing of a library which was incidental to the objects of the Society, and that, for that reason, no misuse charges could be levied. Secondly, it is contended that the misuse charges claimed are not according to any rules or prescribed formula and that in any case inflated amounts have been claimed. It is this writ petition which has led to this order.

    11. Coming to the first contention it has been submitted before me that as the petitioner Society had been established to, inter alia, foster, promote and sustain the cultivation of science and scientific research in all its aspects, pure, applied and educational and to carry out research on problems in the domain of the arts, including economics, history and sociology and as the premises were used for promoting those very objects by housing therein a library, it could not be said that the user was in any way, in violation of Clause (vi) of the lease granted by the President of India.

    12. I feel that, as far as the first contention is concerned, the entire exercise of the petitioner has been in futility. I have already given a detailed treatment to the past litigation interse the Society and Mrs. Chandiok before the learned Additional Rent Controller. The landlady alleged in unambiguous terms that there was misuse in terms of the paramount lease granted by the President of India. The Society not only in the application referred to above but even in the statement recorded before the Additional Rent Controller unequivocally admitted that claim and the learned Additional Rent Controller relying upon those admissions passed an order of eviction under Clause (k) thereby putting his seal of approval to the claim of the landlady that it actually was a case of misuse within terms of Clause (vi) of the paramount lease granted by the President of India. It is thus not open now to the Soceity to rake up the issue again and try to reopen it. It has become irretrievably final. There cannot now be any how and why to it. The petitioner Society must abide by it. That much as far as the first contention is concerned.

    13. Coming to the second contention, the answer lies within the embryo of paragraph 6 of the application moved by the petitioner Society and Mrs. Chandiok before the learned Additional Rent Controller. Its examination would go to show that the petitioner Society had agreed without any objection, without any demur and without any protest, to make the payments towards misuse charges. This is further borne out from what is incorporated in paragraph 7 of the said application. Of course, paragraph 10 speaks of a joint effort, but that does not wash away the liability. But then, the question is about the extent of the liability. The Land and Development Office has stated in its counter to the writ petition that all the charges were claimed as per the rules and prescribed formula. Obviously they cannot claim any amount arbitrarily. The learned Counsel for the Land and Development Office has drawn my attention to a handbook entitled “Information for the Guidance of Lease Holders” published by Government of India, Land and Development Office, Ministry of Urban Development, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. It contains a formula in Clause 1.7 at page 3 for calculating misuse charges. Besides, he has drawn my attention to the Schedule of Market Rates of Rent in Delhi/New Delhi brought out by Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, Land and Development Office, Nirman Bhawan by its office order No. 26/81 dated October 23, 1981. I am informed that the amounts claimed had been calculated keeping in view the said formula and the Schedule as referred to above. However, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the market rates referred to above and the formula in question have no relevence in view of Clause (8) of Order 23/76. It is argued that as per that clause only 1% of the misuse charges could be levied. The said Clause 8 of the Order No. 23/76 runs as follows:

    “8. In case where the lessee/ex lessee files suit for eviction against defaulting tenants on receipt of our notice for misuse and are successful in evicting such tenants one per cent of the charges will be recovered as token penalty in consultation with the Ministry of Works and Housing and Finance.”

    14. It may be mentioned that this very clause was taken note of by Mahinder Narain, J. on November 5, 1986 in this very writ petition. On its basis he directed that only one per cent of the misuse charges could be recovered for the period January 15, 1981 to October 22, 1982. However, as per the learned Counsel for the Land and Development Office Clause 8 of Order No. 23/76 is not applicable. It is argued that since there was no contest and the order of eviction was passed under Section 14(1)(k) of the Delhi Rent Control Act on the basis of consent of the parties and since time had been agreed to be granted to the tenant Clause 8 would be of no assistance to the petitioner Society. I may mention that these very contentions were raised before Mahinder Narain, J. but were turned down. With respect I find myself in complete agreement with that view. An order of eviction remains an order of eviction whether it is after much fire-work or with amicable settlement. An order of eviction has no different hues. Moreso, when it has not been challenged and has attained finality. Even Clause 8 of the Order No. 23/76 makes no such distinction. What it requires is the filing of a suit by a landlord for eviction against the defaulting tenant on receipt of notice of misuse and his becoming “successful” in evicting such tenant. Where does Clause 8 say that such success must be attained not by compromise but only by hard fought battles in the arena of the law Courts? And pray, does an order of eviction cease to be so merely because it grants some time to the tenant to vacate the premises? Will the landlord in such a case not be termed as “successful in evicting such tenants”? Neither an order of eviction changes its hues on account of its being a compromise decree not it turns the ‘success’ into a failure by grant of time. In such cases it would not be permissible to rob a party of the benefit of the above referred Clause 8. I am, therefore, inclined to hold that in view of the order of eviction referred to above the Land and Development Office can recover only one per cent of the charges for the period in question. I order accordingly but leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    Ordered accordingly.
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    Birla Institute Of Scientific Research v. Union Of India & Others
    (Jul 12, 1993)