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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • sections 28 and 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act,
  • Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • S. 106 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act.
  • Registration of Business Names Act, 1916
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • sections 28 and 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act,
  • Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • S. 106 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act.
  • Registration of Business Names Act, 1916
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion (Passing Off / Interim Application)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is Mrs. Pampa Kapoor, carrying on business under the name M/s. HIDESIGN at 4, Caserne Street, Pondicherry, engaged in manufacture, processing, export and sale of leather garments, bags, belts, brief cases, wallets etc. The plaint avers adoption of the trade mark "HIDESIGN" on 5-6-1977 and continuous use on products and literature.

The defendant is Bunty Kaiker carrying on business as "HI-DESIGN CREATIONS" from 6A, Yashwant Place, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant manufactured and sold similar goods under (or deceptively similar to) the plaintiff's mark HIDESIGN, and that the defendant had previously purchased HIDESIGN-marked goods from the plaintiff during 1986-87 but continued to use the name after the trade relationship ended.

The plaintiff filed a suit (filed 27-7-1990 according to the record) and contemporaneously applied for interim injunctive relief. The application for interim relief is referred to in the opinion first as I.A. No. 3958 of 1990 (filed under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with S.151 CPC) seeking ad interim injunction without notice; later in the judgment the court refers to and allows I.A. No. 5958 of 1990 and rejects I.A. No. 8171 of 1990 (filed by the defendant under O.39 R.4 to set aside the ad interim ex parte order dated 3-8-1990). By order dated 3-8-1990 the court had initially granted an ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from carrying on business as HI-DESIGN CREATIONS and from putting labels on goods marked HIDESIGN; that injunction was later continued and is the subject of the present interlocutory contest.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an interim injunction should be granted / continued restraining the defendant from using the mark/name HIDESIGN or any deceptively similar mark (i.e., relief in a passing off action concerning an unregistered mark).
  2. Whether the defendant's prior dealings (purchase and resale of plaintiff's goods during 1986-87) amounted to a licence, acquiescence or estoppel permitting continued use of the name after the relationship ended.
  3. Whether the plaintiff's alleged delay (approximately three years between the end of dealings in 1987 and filing suit in 1990) amounts to laches or acquiescence sufficient to defeat injunctive relief.
  4. Whether the plaintiff's non-disclosure (alleged suppression of prior dealings in para 9 of the plaint) disentitles the plaintiff to interim relief and whether that non-disclosure violated pleading duties.
  5. Whether procedural requirements of Order 39 Rule 3 CPC (service of the injunction order) were properly complied with, affecting the validity of the injunction.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff claims prior adoption and continuous commercial use of the mark HIDESIGN since 5-6-1977 and that the mark is unique (not found in English dictionaries) and used on products and literature.
  • The plaintiff asserts she is the prior user vis-à-vis the defendant and that the mark had goodwill and acquired recognition in connection with her leather goods.
  • The plaintiff contends the defendant previously purchased and resold plaintiff's HIDESIGN goods (e.g., a bill dated 16-4-1986) and that purchase did not amount to permission to continue using the HIDESIGN name after the trading relationship ended.
  • The plaintiff denies that HIDESIGN is common to the trade; outlets in UK, Germany and Australia using the name are alleged to be plaintiff's outlets or pursuant to agreements with the plaintiff.
  • On the point of delay and acquiescence, the plaintiff argues that the defendant had actual knowledge of plaintiff's use and that limited advertisements and a single exhibition by defendant do not constitute creation of an independent reputation sufficient to defeat the plaintiff's right.
  • Regarding service under O.39 R.3 CPC, the plaintiff (through counsel) explained the dates and holidays and contended there was sufficient compliance.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant contended that the plaintiff had acquiesced or consented to the defendant's use of the name by prior dealings and therefore should be barred from obtaining injunction.
  • The defendant asserted delay in instituting proceedings (roughly three years after cessation of dealings) which, it was argued, should disentitle the plaintiff to injunctive relief; authorities with much larger delays were relied upon.
  • The defendant alleged suppression of material facts (prior dealings) in paragraph 9 of the plaint and argued that non-disclosure should disentitle the plaintiff to the interim relief.
  • The defendant contended that Order 39 Rule 3 CPC had not been complied with in service of the injunction order, and therefore the injunction should be vacated.
  • The defendant claimed that HIDESIGN was common to the trade, pointing to use of similar names in UK, Germany, Australia and Bangalore as indicative of common usage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1936) 53 RPC 79 Ch D (The Robert Numbering Machine Co.) Where a party had been permitted to use a name under a licence/agency and that licence was revocable on termination, the defendant could not continue using the plaintiff's name thereafter; right to restrain continued use. The court applied this principle to hold that because the defendant had purchased and resold plaintiff's HIDESIGN goods (e.g., bill dated 16-4-1986) he did not thereby acquire a right to continue using HIDESIGN after the dealer relationship ended.
Reddaway v. Banham, 13 RPC 218 ("Camel Hair" belting case) No person has a right to represent his goods as those of somebody else or to falsely represent a connection in trade when none exists. Invoked to support the proposition that defendant could not represent his goods as plaintiff's goods or imply a trade connection once the resale relationship ended.
AIR 1978 Delhi 250 — Century Traders v. Roshanlal Duggar & Co. Right of prior user to continue using a name and to restrain subsequent users. Referred to for the settled position that prior user can claim and be protected against subsequent users; court noted plaintiff is prior user.
1923) 40 RPC 133 — Cordes v. R. Addis and Son Authorities on delay/acquiescence in passing off (example: long delay may imply acquiescence). Cited by defendant for delay; court distinguished facts (longer delays, no prior buyer-seller relationship) and found the shorter delay here did not automatically amount to acquiescence.
1902 RPC 422 — Yost Typewriter Company Ltd. v. Typewriter Exchange Company Authority concerning delay and whether an injunction should be granted where factual meaning of the mark was unclear at trial. Cited by defendant; court observed facts of that case were unclear and found it not helpful for defendant's position.
AIR 1941 Madras 31 — Devidoss & Co. v. Alathur Abboyee Chetty & Co. On delay: no hard and fast rule; effect of delay depends on facts of each case. Referred to for the proposition that delay must be considered on the specific facts; court applied this approach.
(1953) 71 RPC 23 — Electrolux Ltd. v. Electrix Ltd. Discussed effect of delay on rights of a registered proprietor (held ten years' delay did not destroy statutory rights to registered trade mark). Cited from Halsbury's footnote; court distinguished as Electrolux dealt with registered marks whereas present case involves an unregistered mark and common-law passing off.
(1969) RPC 1 — Vine Products Ltd. v. Mackenzie & Co. Ltd. (Sherry case) Example where longstanding foreign usage led to refusal of injunction — illustrates acquiescence or representative usage leading to denial of relief in particular facts. Used to illustrate that acquiescence requires significant, sustained building of reputation by the second user; court found defendant's limited activity was insufficient to amount to acquiescence.
AIR 1965 SC 980 — Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories Passing off is a common law remedy essentially for deceit. Cited to note that this action is a common law passing off suit (unregistered mark) and not a statutory registered mark dispute.
1969 PTC 61 — Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationery Products Co. Consideration of laches/acquiescence in the context of registered marks and advertising/build up of reputation. Referred to by the court in discussing principles of delay and good faith user; court used it to examine circumstances in which delay/inordinate delay affects relief.
R.P. Locks Co. v. Sehgal Locks Co. (oral order of B.N. Kirpal, J., 19-8-1988) Discussion on acquiescence and the effect of sections 28 & 29 of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act for registered marks. Cited as authority (oral) where interim injunction was considered appropriate once prima facie deceptive similarity and S.106 T&MM Act considerations arose; court distinguished registered vs unregistered context here.
Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 38, para 1046 Defines acquiescence in trademark/passing off context and discusses when delay deprives proprietor of remedy. Quoted and considered; court accepted the general propositions but applied them to the specific facts, finding no sufficient acquiescence by plaintiff here.
Registration of Business Names Act, 1916 (referenced in Robert Numbering Machine case) Noted in cited case: registration under Business Names Act does not necessarily confer right to continue using a name against prior user. Used by citation to the Robert Numbering Machine case to show statutory registration of a name does not override a prior user's rights.
Sections/Orders cited (procedural/statutory): Order 39 Rules 1-3 CPC; O.39 R.4 CPC; S.106 and Ss.28-29 of Trade & Merchandise Marks Act Procedural and statutory provisions relevant to interim injunctions, service and defenses under the Trade Marks Act. Court examined compliance with O.39 R.3 CPC and S.106 T&MM Act; found sufficient compliance with O.39 R.3 on the facts and applied S.106 reasoning to deny defendant's plea that he was unaware of plaintiff's prior use.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded in a sequential and fact-focused manner:

  1. Distinctiveness and Nature of the Mark: The court noted that "HIDESIGN" is an unusual word combination (not found in English dictionaries) and can be read/treatment as either "HIDE SIGN" or "HI-DESIGN", especially given the plaintiff's stylised logo (a bull/buffalo face suggesting "HIDE-SIGN"). This uniqueness supported the plaintiff's claim of origin and prima facie distinctiveness.
  2. Prior User and Dealer Relationship: The court accepted the factual premise that the defendant had purchased goods from the plaintiff (evidence included bills such as 16-4-1986) and sold them. Applying the principle in the Robert Numbering Machine case, the court concluded that the defendant's resale of plaintiff's goods did not grant him an irrevocable right to continue using the HIDESIGN name after the commercial relationship terminated.
  3. Identity vs. Deceptive Similarity: The court observed this case involved identity (HIDESIGN v. HIDESIGN Creations) rather than a question of deceptive similarity. Given HIDESIGN was the plaintiff's mark on garments and the defendant's trading style incorporated the same word, the addition of "Creations" was not sufficient to distinguish the two in the marketplace, particularly where the defendant had previously sold HIDESIGN-marked goods.
  4. Commonness to Trade and International Use: The court examined the defendant's contention that the mark was common to the trade (citing use in UK, Germany, Australia, Bangalore). The plaintiff explained these were plaintiff's outlets or arrangements; the court found no material to establish that HIDESIGN was generally common in the leather trade beyond plaintiff-related outlets, and thus rejected the "common to trade" contention.
  5. Acquiescence and Delay: The defendant relied on delay and alleged acquiescence (defendant's use since 1987; suit filed in 1990). The court reviewed authorities on delay but distinguished them on facts (many involved registered marks or much longer delays). The court held that acquiescence requires the plaintiff to have sat idly while the defendant spent significant sums building a reputation — something not shown here beyond a single directory insertion and one exhibition participation. The court therefore found no sufficient acquiescence; the defendant's activities were too limited to deprive the plaintiff of relief.
  6. Good Faith and Prior Use: The court considered whether the defendant acted in good faith to build up an independent reputation. Given the defendant had known the plaintiffs personally and had begun using HIDESIGN in consequence of reselling plaintiff's goods, the court held that continued use after relations ended did not amount to good-faith independent adoption.
  7. Suppression of Material Facts: The court acknowledged that the plaintiff had not made full disclosure in the plaint regarding prior dealings (para 9 was not fully candid). The court stated that while this non-disclosure was a lapse, it did not justify refusal of injunction. However, the court treated this lapse as warranting a monetary consequence.
  8. Compliance with Order 39 Rule 3 CPC: The court examined the defendant's claim of non-compliance with service requirements and accepted the plaintiff's explanation of dates/holidays and the local commissioner's report, concluding there was sufficient compliance with O.39 R.3 CPC.
  9. Interim Relief Assessment: On the cumulative prima facie considerations — distinctive mark, prior user status, defendant's prior purchases and subsequent continued use after termination, insufficient evidence of acquiescence or inordinate delay by plaintiff, and procedural compliance — the court found the balance favoured continuation/confirmation of the interim injunction at the interlocutory stage.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court confirmed the interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the name/mark HIDESIGN (or putting labels marked HIDESIGN) and related trading style conduct. The court expressly rejected the defendant's application to set aside the ad interim ex parte injunction and allowed the plaintiff's interim application (as referred to in the judgment).

Specific orders and immediate consequences:

  • The court rejected I.A. No. 8171 of 1990 (defendant's application under O.39 R.4 to set aside the ad interim ex parte order dated 3-8-1990).
  • The court allowed the plaintiff's interim application (referred in the judgment as I.A. No. 5958 of 1990) and confirmed the interim injunction previously granted.
  • The court quantified costs of Rs. 3,000/- to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant as a remedy for the plaintiff's less-than-full disclosure (to be paid within one month from the date of the order) but declined to refuse the injunction on that ground.
  • The court recorded that I.A. Nos. 5958 of 1990 and 8171 of 1990 stand disposed of.

Broader implications and limits:

  • The judgment is prima facie and interlocutory in nature; the court emphasized that what is stated should not prejudice final determination after trial.
  • The decision protects the plaintiff's right to interim exclusive use of the unregistered mark HIDESIGN against the defendant's continued use pending final adjudication, but does not itself constitute a final determination or create a binding new legal precedent beyond application of settled authorities to the facts.

Order accordingly.

    M/S. Hidesign v. M/S. Hi-Design Creations .

    The plaintiff Mrs. Pampa Kapoor is carrying on the business under the name of M/s. HIDESIGN at and from 4, Caserne Street, Post Box No. 92, Pondicherry. It is stated in the plaint that she is engaged in the business of manufacturing, processing, exporting and selling leather garments, bags, belts, brief cases, wallets etc. for the past several years.

    2. It is asserted by the plaintiff that the plaintiff adopted the trade mark HIDESIGN, which was represented in a special and particular manner, on 5-6-1977. It is stated that the plaintiff used the mark not only as a trade mark but also as a trade description, and it is further stated that the said mark appears permanently on all the products and all the literature of the plaintiff during the course of her business.

    3. The plaintiff claims that she is the prior adopter of the said trade mark vis-a-vis the defendant, and is entitled to use the said name as a prior adopter of the said “design”. It is also asserted that in view of the established business and sale promotion and extensive and continuous regular commercial user, the said trade mark HIDESIGN had acquired secondary meaning with regard to the goods of the plaintiff, and has earned a valuable goodwill and enviable reputation. This plea does not seem to be applicable as the concept of secondary meaning comes into play when the primary meaning is different. As the word combination HIDESIGN is not a word found in English dictionary, secondary meaning) concept is inapplicable.

    4. The plaintiff asserts that in April, 1980, she became aware that the defendants are manufacturing and selling the same goods or description of goods as that of the plaintiff, under the same or deceptively similar trade mark HIDESIGN.

    5. It is also asserted in the plaint that the defendants were (plaintiff was?) unaware of the constitution of M/s. HI-DESIGN CREATIONS, which is a firm carrying on business at Delhi.

    6. The plaintiff, therefore, sought an interim injunction, restraining the defendants from passing off their goods under the offending trademark HI-DESIGN. The plaintiff in the suit also sought other reliefs, like delivery up and rendition of accounts.

    7. Along with the suit the plaintiff also filed an application (I.A No. 3958 of 1990) under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by which the plaintiff prayed that during the pendency of the suit, the defendants, their servants, agents, stockists be restrained from using the trade mark HIDESIGN, or any other deceptively similar trade mark with regard to leather garments etc., and sought an ad interim injunction without notice to the defendants/respondents.

    8. On the averments made in the plaint and in the application, by my order dated 3-8-1990, I granted an ad interim injunction sought restraining the defendants from carrying on the business as HI-DESIGN CREATIONS, and putting labels on the goods mark HIDESIGN. This injunction was in the first instance, issued till the next date of hearing, but it was later on continued.

    9. The respondents put in appearance, filed their reply to the application, and also filed written statement.

    10. I have heard parties counsel, and I proceed to dispose of the interim application.

    11. Prima facie, the word HIDESIGN is a very unusual word combination, once it is kept in view that the articles to which this mark is applied are made of leather. Broken up in a particular way, it may read as HIDESIGN. One of the documents filed by the plaintiff as annexure “A” has a stylised, representation of the face of a bull/buffalo, with horns on the head. In this stylised form - the face of the bull and the horns would indicate HIDE-SIGN or sign of hide.

    11A. Written in another way, the word HIDESIGN becomes HI-DESIGN. The purpose of mentioning of this is that the alphabets selected to make up the trade mark lend themselves to two distinct representation, and meanings, and this by itself makes this a very unusual word combination. It is not disputed that the word HIDESIGN does not appear in English language dictionaries. The way the logo design is made up, (it is split up, and written at two levels) also makes it appear that it is the intention of the maker of the word combination to use it either as HI DESIGN or HIDE SIGN.

    12. It is the contention of the plaintiff that the words HIDESIGN or HI-DESIGN were coined and invented words, and that they were invented or coined by Dwarka Das, who is the husband of Ms. Pampa Kapoor. It is Pampa Kapoor and Dilip Kapoor, her son, who are carrying on the business at and from Pondicherry, and selling their leather goods under the name HIDESIGN.

    13. It is also the case of the plaintiff that Bunty Kaiker defendant who is carrying on business as HI-DESIGN CREATIONS from 6A, Yashwant Place, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi, approached the plaintiff in 1986-87, saying that he wished to sell the goods manufactured by the plaintiff at Delhi. The plaintiff, it is not disputed by the defendant, sold the goods to the defendant uptil 1987, but owing to some disputes, the transactions between the parties were stopped thereafter.

    14. It is further the case of the plaintiff that it came to know in about April, 1990 that Bunty Kaiker is manufacturing and selling same goods as the plaintiff, in the name of HI-DESIGN CREATIONS, which he could not do in view of the fact that the plaintiff was the sole person entitled to carry on the business in the name of HI-DESIGN CREATIONS.

    15. The counsel for the plaintiff also dealt with the contention of the counsel for the defendant, that the word HIDESIGN is an abandoned mark, by saying that this is a mere bald assertion for the reason that the plaintiff continues to carry on the business under the name and style of HIDE SIGN since 1977.

    16. The counsel for the plaintiff also dismissed the contention of the defendant that the word HIGHDESIGN is a commonly used word in connection with leather trade. The counsel for the plaintiff asserts that this contention of the defendant is based upon the fact that Boutique Hidesign was being run at Bangalore. The plaintiff submits that this Boutique Hidesign at Bangalore, was in fact a business which was being carried on by the plaintiff Ms. Pampa Kapoor and her son Dilip Kapoor in partnership with one Jayant Patel. It is also asserted by the plaintiff that Jayant Patel is no more connected with Boutique Hidesign, and that the only person carrying on business under the name of HIDESIGN is the plaintiff and her son.

    17. As regards the contention of the defendant that the word HIDESIGN is common to the trade, and that the word HIDESIGN occurs as trading style in U.K, Germany and Australia, the plaintiff explains, that the businesses in U.K, Germany and Australia, which are being run under the name HIDESIGN, or have the word HIDESIGN in their name, are in fact outlets of the plaintiff's goods. Before conclusion of the arguments, the plaintiff, in fact, showed some copies of the agreements which have been entered into between the plaintiff and the parties in U. K., Germany and Australia in that connection.

    18. The plaintiff's counsel contends that the defendant admits connection between himself and the plaintiff.

    19. This connection, according to the plaintiff, is that of “agent” of the plaintiff. The defendant himself in support of his case, has filed certain bills which have been produced to indicate that the plaintiffs were aware of the fact that he had been carrying on business under the name and style of HI-DESIGN Creations at least in the year 1986. One of the bills produced by the defendant is a bill, indicating purchase of goods from the plaintiff on 16-4-1986. That bill indicates that the goods were a purchased by one Bunty Kaiker. This Bunty Kaiker is none other than the defendant, as it is Bunty Kaiker who is carrying on business under the name of HI-DESIGN Creations.

    20. The plaintiff refers to the judgment reported as (1936) 53 RPC 79 Ch D (The Robert Numbering Machine Co.). In this case the facts were that the plaintiff company was carrying on business in New York, of manufacturers of “numbering machines”. In 1910 they entered into an agreement with the defendant for the sale of the plaintiffs machine in the U.K The relationship was not of agency in the strict sense. Under the agreement, the defendant purchased the machine from plaintiff company and paid for them according to terms. Defendant carried on business in such machines under the same name as plaintiffs. The machines also bore the name of the plaintiff company. After termination of the agreement in 1933 the defendant continued to carry on business under the name and claimed the right to do so. Plaintiff then brought an action for passing off to restrain the defendant from using the name and also for breach of contract. They alleged that it was a term of agreement that the defendant should not deal in such numbering machines or be interested in the business of any competitor of plaintiff company, Defendant contended that the plaintiff carried on no business in the U.K and the same meant his business. He pointed out that since 1917 he had continued to be registered under the Registration of Business Names Act, 1916 under the said name. The Court held that the plaintiff company had acquired sufficient reputation in U.K for its machines to be entitled to protect the use of the name there, and that the defendant merely had a revocable licence to use the name which was revoked on the termination of the agency agreement, and an injunction was granted restraining defendant from using the name of the Roberts Numbering Machine Company or any name so similar to it as to be calculated to cause the belief that defendants business was a branch of, or in any way connected with the business of plaintiff company, and an enquiry was ordered as to damages in respect of the breach of agreement. .

    21. In view of what is stated in the aforesaid judgment, and the admitted position in the instant case that the defendant purchased goods from the plaintiffs as the goods of the plaintiff, and sold such goods, applying the principles of the said case to the instant case, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs had consented and acquiesced the use of the name or the word HIDESIGN in the trading style of the plaintiff.

    22. The plaintiff's claim that, as established by the bill dated 16-4-1986, the defendant had purchased plaintiff's goods for the purpose of resale, and for that reason the plaintiff did not object to the use of the name of HIDESIGN Creations by the defendant has force. When the relationship of dealer of plaintiff's goods came to an end between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant could not continue to use the unique name HIDESIGN as a part of its trading style. In view of the judgment in 53 RPC 79, there is force in the contention of the plaintiff.

    23. The plaintiff also contends that it is settled law since 13 RPC 218 (Reddaway v. Banham), “Camel Hair” belting case, that nobody has any right to represent his goods as goods of somebody else. It is also equally settled that no person has any right to represent that he has a connection in the course of trade with another business when in fact, there is none. In the case before me, so long as the defendant Bunty Kaiker was purchasing goods from the plaintiff for the purposes of re-sale, he could have used the words HIDESIGN Creations as he was selling the HIDESIGN goods, but as soon as the relationship had stopped, following the dicta of the Robert Numbering Machine Co.'s case (supra) (1936) 53 RPC 79 Ch D, he did not have any legal right to continue to use the unique name HIDESIGN in connection with his trading style or goods sold on his trading outlet. The counsel for the plaintiff also referred to AIR 1978 Delhi 250, Century Traders v. Roshanlal Duggar and Co. which deals with the right of the prior user of any name to continue to use the name, and to restrain any subsequent user thereof. It is not disputed by the defendant in the instant case that the plaintiffs are prior user of the word HIDESIGN in connection with their business. In fact, the case of the defendant that he started the business under the name HIDESIGN Creations only in February, 1986, and he stopped buying goods from the plaintiff in the year 1987. There is no serious dispute regarding the plaintiff being a prior user of the word HIDESIGN in connection with his trade.

    24. It is noteworthy that in the instant case, we do not have to deal with the concept of deceptive similarity as the instant case is one of identity, namely, HIDESIGN and HIDESIGN Creations. HIDESIGN being the mark placed by the plaintiff upon its goods, and HIDESIGN Creations being the trading style of the defendant. Since the mark HIDESIGN relates to the garments, the word ‘Creations’ is linked up with the garment trade, and the added matter comprising of the word Creations in the title HIDESIGN Creations, in my view, is not sufficient to distinguish the two, especially when considered along with the fact that the defendant was admittedly buying the goods marked HIDESIGN from the plaintiff for selling it during the period 1986-87.

    25. The defendant has made a bold assertion when he states that the word HIDESIGN is common to the trade. As a justification of it being common to the trade, the defendant contends that some persons in U. K., Australia and Bangalore are also using the same word, as mentioned earlier, the Bangalore enterprise was also of the plaintiff. That was a partnership business between Pampa Kapoor, her son and Jayant Patel. As stated by Mr. S.C Gulati, Advocate during the course of arguments, Jayant Patel is the brother-in-law of the defendant Bunty Kaikar. The defendant was aware of the said Jayant Patel carrying on the business in partnership in Bangalore with Pampa Kapoor and Dilip Kapoor at Bangalore. This partnership, however, lasted for a short while, and has since been dissolved. Since the plaintiff was actively involved in that partnership, the fact that the partnership was carried out in the name of HIDESIGN Boutique, where HIDESIGN marked garments of the plaintiffs were sold cannot, in my opinion, mean that the name or the mark HIDESIGN is common to the trade.

    26. Similarly, as stated above, the word HIDESIGN has been used in connection with the business in U. K., Australia by plaintiffs outlets, which deal in with the goods marked by the plaintiff as HIDESIGN. For this reason, I do not think there is any substance in the contention of Mr. Gulati that the word HIDESIGN is common to the trade.

    27. The defendant strongly urges that the plaintiff is guilty of suppression of the fact of prior dealing between the plaintiff and the defendant in the plaint. It is asserted that the plaintiff ought to have disclosed that the plaintiff and the defendant had known each other for many years; that they were at one time having business dealings with each other, that the said non-disclosure would disentitle the plaintiff from the relief of injunction which is sought.

    28. It is also stressed by the defendant that the plaintiff is guilty of acquiescing in the use of the word HIDESIGN in the trading style of the defendant, and that the plaintiff has made out a new case in the replication regarding the nature of the dealings between the parties, and ought not to be, therefore, read in support of the injunction.

    29. In answer to the contentions, counsel referred to S. 106 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. He submits that it is the requirement of that section that the defendant must be unaware of the fact that the marks which he is using, are being used by the plaintiff. In the instant case, the defendant was purchasing goods from the plaintiff, and he was aware that the plaintiff was selling its goods under the mark HIDESIGN. In my view, the defendant has all along been aware, in view of his dealings with the plaintiff, that the mark HIDESIGN belongs to them. It is not open to him to contend that merely because the fact of these dealings are not mentioned in the plaint, the plaintiff is estopped from mentioning the same in the replication. As I see it, no possible prejudice has been caused to the defendant in non-disclosure of the fact of prior dealings between the parties in the plaint, as the defendant has all along been aware of the same. In any case, having had special and personal knowledge about the use of the word HIDESIGN upon the goods manufactured by the plaintiff, the defendant ought to have, after he stopped purchasing the goods of the plaintiff, ensured that he broke his link to not only between himself and the plaintiff, but also between himself arid the persons who came and sought to buy the Hidesign goods at his shop after 1987, the year he stopped buying the goods of the plaintiff from the plaintiff. The defendant cannot have the advantage of the mark/name HIDESIGN by continuing the use thereof in his trading style and even upon the goods which were got manufactured by defendant, which were not manufactured by the plaintiffs. This is the settled position since Reddaway v. Banham 13 RPC 218 (supra).

    30. The fact that the plaintiffs have outlets in U. K., Australia, would have been known to the defendant, as a result of the dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant.

    31. I shall advert to the matter of pleadings of the plaintiff regarding the alleged suppression of material facts from para 9 of the plaint. Full disclosure has not been made to court it will need to be dealt with specifically.

    32. Now I have to deal with the contentions raised with regard to delay and acquiescence in connection with filing of the suit, and the contention regarding acquiescence made by the defendant with regard to the use of the word HIDESIGN by the defendant.

    33. Regarding the question of delay, it is contended by Mr. S.C Gulati on behalf of the defendant, that whereas the dealings of the defendant with the plaintiff as purchaser of the goods marked with the word HIDESIGN which is evidenced by copies of bills dated 6-5-1986 to 22-7-1986 came to an end in around Sept. 1987, whereafter the defendant ceased to be a dealer of the goods marked with the plaintiff's mark HIDESIGN, and yet he continued to use the words HI-DESIGN CREATIONS with respect to it at shop at Yashwant Place. He started manufacturing leather garments in the name of HIDESIGN from 1987 onwards, and selling them.

    34. It is only in the year 1990, three years later, that the instant suit was filed on 27-7-1990. The cases in which the court dealt with delay, which have been cited by the defendants' counsel, are (1923) 40 RPC 133 Cordes v. R. Addis and Son, (in which delay in filing of the suit is of ten years); and 1902 RPC 422 Yost Typewriter Company, Ltd. v. Typewriter Exchange Company, (in which the delay in filing of the suit was of five years). Mr. Gulati has also cited AIR 1941 Madras 31 (Devidoss and Co. v. Alathur Abboyee Chetty and Co.), in which it was established that the plaintiff had the knowledge of the defendant's use of the impugned mark on 18-4-1931, yet the suit was filed after expiry of more than 4 years on 27-7-1935. In the last cited case, the High Court of Madras dealing with the question of delay, held that no hard and fast rule can be made with regard to the effect of delay. It is on facts of each case that the decision of the Court to grant or not to grant injunction must depend.

    35. In the instant case, the alleged delay is slightly under three years. In 1923 RPC 133, there was no prior relationship of buyer and seller between the parties, inter se, the delay is of 8 years. for such a delay, it may be possible to contend, that in case of passing off action, such a long delay of 8 years may amount to acquiescence.

    36. I do not think that the same principle would apply to a case of passing off, like the present, when admittedly the facts are that the defendant was dealing in the plaintiff's goods after purchasing the same from the plaintiff; that the defendant Bunty Kaiker had been known to the plaintiff on a very considerable period prior to his commencing dealing in plaintiff's goods, and more importantly the plaintiff is admittedly carrying on business at and from Pondichery, exporting its goods to different countries, and the defendant has only one outlet at Delhi, Delhi being at a considerable distance from the place where the defendant is carrying on business, a distance of over 1000 kms.

    37. The case in 1902 RPC 422 (Yost Typewriter Company Ltd. v. Typewriter Exchange Company), relates to certain “yost pads” which were used in typewriters, most probably ink pads. Things are not quite clear from the report, and I would rather not act upon “acquiescence” having been established in connection with an article like “yost pad”, nature of which I am unable to appreciate at present. I am also not able to appreciate how and in what manner they were used in connection with the typewriters. Eversince the typewriters have been known to me, they have used inked ribbons for the purposes of conveying impression upon paper. I note that the plaintiff in that case was Yost Typewriter Co., an American concern, which was selling typewriters manufactured by it in America and in England. The Judge declined to give injunction, as he held that it will be determined at the trial whether “Yost Pad” meant the articles manufactured by the plaintiff company, or whether they mean pads manufactured for use upon Yost Typewriting machine. In these circumstances, that judgment cannot be of any help to Mr. S.C Gulati. He has not brought to my notice as to what happened in the Yost Typewriter Co. case after trial.

    38. During the course of arguments, Mr. Gulati has referred to Halsbury's Laws of England Third Edition, Volume 38, page 635, para 1043. This para, however, merely deals with the defences to action of passing off, and does not advance the case of the defendant in any way. Mr. Gulati also relies upon para 1046, which reads as under:—

    1046. Acquiescence. In general mere delay after knowledge of infringement does not deprive the registered proprietor of a trade mark of his statutory rights or of the appropriate remedy for the enforcement of these rights, at any rate so long as the delay is not of inordinate length. If, however, a person allows another person who is acting in good faith to build up a reputation under a trade name or mark to which the first person has rights, he may lose his right to bring proceedings for infringement or passing off in respect of the use of the mark by the other person, and may even be debarred from himself using a trade name. On the other hand even long user by another, if fraudulent, does not affect the plaintiff's right to a final injunction.”

    39. The said paragraph states that when the delay is of not inordinate length would not deprive the registered proprietor of his statutory rights. One of the cases mentioned in the footnote is the case of Electrolux, Ltd. v. Electrix Ltd. (1953) 71 RPC 23. This case related to a “registered” trade mark. The contention that ten years delay has the effect of destroying the statutory rights to the exclusive monopoly, was rejected by Lord Evershed M.R The instant case, however, relates to an unregistered mark.

    40. The observations in that case relate to registered proprietor of a trade name or a trade mark. That case did not relate to common law passing off action.

    41. The other observation in the aforesaid paragraph 1046 concerns a person, who acts in good faith, and builds up a reputation under a trade name or a trade mark. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not think it is open to the defendant to contend that he has built up his trade, acting in good faith, inasmuch as admittedly the defendant Bunty Kaiker has known the plaintiffs Pampa Kapoor and Dilip Kapoor through family friendship/acquaintance for a long time. The defendant admits to having purchased the goods manufactured by the plaintiff under their mark HIDESIGN during the period 1986-87, when a dispute brought the transaction between the two to an end. Significantly, it is not asserted by the defendant that even prior to his commencing dealings with the plaintiff, and purchasing of the plaintiff's goods under the name HIDESIGN, he was himself using the word HIDESIGN in connection either with manufacture, or sale of any kind of leather articles. In this view of the matter, priority of use of the word HIDESIGN is prima facie with the plaintiff. Had it been otherwise, the defendant would have stated so in the written statement. No such assertion of priority of use of the word HIDESIGN by the defendant, has been made in the written statement.

    42. In these circumstances, continued use of the word HIDESIGN by the defendant after dispute with the plaintiff cannot be stated to be an act of good faith. He was apparently conscious of the distance between New Delhi and Pondichery, and wanted to continue trading as HI-DESIGN CREATIONS to take advantage of the reputation of the plaintiff and transactions between the defendant and the plaintiff during 1986-87.

    42A. In order to make out a case of acquiescence, the defendant states that he spent money in one advertisement which has been made in a telephone directory, and has also participated in a Garment Exhibition, having shop No. 8, Anarkali Bazar, Pragati Maidan, New Delhi. This is evidenced by electricity bill for the period April 1987 to September, 1987. Mr. Gulati has also filed electricity bills regarding participation of the defendant in a “fair” held during 1986-87 in Pragati Maidan, New Delhi.

    43. To my mind, a single insertion of an advertisement, and participation in an exhibition only once, cannot be considered to be such an activity in which a very great deal of money has been spent for the purposes of building up a reputation in the defendant's goods. It is only when the plaintiff sits idly by, while the defendant spends a great deal of time, effort and money in building up of a trade in the goods in the impugned name, to which the plaintiff claims exclusive right, can a contention of acquiescence be raised. For example in the case of Vine Products Limited v. Mackenzte and Company Limited, (1969) RPC 1. “Sherry” had been sold in England for over 100 years. The growers of “Sherry” in Spain in a town called Jerez, from (which the word “Sherry” originated), were denied an injunction, which the Spanish had sought.

    44. Mr. S.C Gulati has cited the case reported as 1923 RPC 133 under some misapprehension. That case related to selling of tooth-brushes, which bore the term “Prophylactic” thereon, and marketing them in a get-up which was of a particular nature. The Court, as a fact, found that the get-up was common to the trade of tooth brushes, and that the word “Prophylactic” was also common to the trade. There is no material on record of this suit which can support such averment regarding HIDESIGN having become common to the trade in leather garments. From the plaint, and the replication, it appears that HIDESIGN is used only in outlets with which the plaintiff is connected.

    45. In any case, I cannot accept the proposition that the word HIDESIGN is common to the leather garments trade, inasmuch as there is no suggestion in the written statement that any person other than the plaintiff or its associates are carrying on the trade by branding their articles as HIDESIGN.

    46. A reference has been made to two oral judgments, delivered by B.N Kirpal, J. of this Court. The first in the point of time, being judgment delivered on 19-8-1988 in the matter of R.P Locks Co. v. Sehgal Locks Co., and the second judgment delivered on 23-1-1989 in the matter of Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationery Products Co..

    47. The first case related to a registered trade mark Harrison in connection with locks. In this case, while dealing with the matter of acquiescence, it was stated that inasmuch as sections 28 and 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, read together, gave an exclusive right to the registered holder of the mark, any infringement of the mark is illegal, and continued user of an infringing mark by the defendant is likely to adversely affect the business reputation of the plaintiff. The Court came to the conclusion that keeping in view S. 106 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, once the Court prima facie comes to the conclusion that the mark of the defendant is deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff, then it would be in the interest of all that interim injunction should be granted.

    48. In the instant case, the word HIDESIGN is not a registered mark. The action which has been brought is one of passing off. Passing off action, as it is well settled, is a common law remedy, being in substance an action for deceit. This was so stated in AIR 1965 SC 980 (Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories).

    49. In the case of Hindustan Pencils, Pvt. Ltd. v. India Stationery Products Co., 1969 PTC 61, B.N Kirpal, J., again by an oral order examined the position of the defence of laches or inordinate delay. That case also related to “registered” trade mark, Natraj. The Word Natraj was registered for pin clips in class 16 under No. 1466 dated 6-11-1989 and the device of the Natraj was registered under No. 283730 dated 27-10-1972. The plaintiff in that suit had got it registered for pencils, refills for propelling pens and pencils, pen, sharpeners, fountain pens, erasers, pin clips and stapples included in class 16. The plaintiff also got it registered for pencils all kinds, erasers, refills for propelling pens and pencils, pencil sharpeners, pens, fountain pens, pins, clips, wire stappled for stappling presses and pins.

    50. The defendants in that case were making pins.

    51. The defendants in that case had obtained copyright registration for a label with a dancing figure with respect to pins.

    52. It is stated in the judgment, that in June, 1985, the plaintiff had applied for rectification of copyright, and the suit for injunction was filed in 1988. Inasmuch as the knowledge of the plaintiff was clearly there in the month of June, 1985, when they sought rectification of the copyright registration, and the suit was filed in 1988, it was contended by the defendant that there was inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff in filing the suit. It was contended by the defendant they had been advertising their pins since the year 1982, and, therefore, the delay was of six years. A large number of English and American cases including “Trade marks and Unfair Competition” by J. Thomas McCarthy were referred to.

    53. Kirpal, J. referred to the observations of Romer, J. in J.R Parkington and Co. Ltd. 63 RPC 171, that “the circumstances which attend to the adoption of a trade mark in the first instance, are of considerable importance when one comes to consider whether the use of that mark has or has not been a honest user. If the user in its inception was tainted, it would be difficult in most cases to purify it subsequently.”

    54. I am in respectful agreement with the said observations of Romer, J. I have also so held in the matter reported as 1990 (3) Delhi Lawyer 329 at 331. I said “the word (AEVIS), is not in a dictionary. Its adoption by the defendants, therefore, needed to be explained, which the defendants have not explained in the pleadings before the court.”

    55. The plaintiff claims to be an originator of the word HIDESIGN. I have mentioned above, the word devised is capable of being read as HIDESIGN as well as Hidesign, which by itself is unique. The word is not found in any English dictionary. The only reason for the defendant's use of the word Hidesign in the name of his shop HIDESIGN CREATIONS was because of he was selling the goods manufactured by the plaintiff under the name HIDESIGN. Once the relationship came to an end, the defendant cannot justify the continued use, not only of the name HI-DESIGN CREATIONS, but also adoption of the name HIDESIGN upon the goods manufactured by the defendant.

    56. The acquiescence over a period of time has to be on the basis of honest concurrent user of the mark. In the instant case, as the matter stands today, it cannot be said that the user of the word Hidesign comes within the meaning of the words honest concurrent user. Besides this, acquiescence also means that the plaintiffs have encouraged the defendant in using the infringing mark. Encouragement may be tacit or, express. One of the essentials of such encouragement has to be that the plaintiff sits idly by, while the defendant spends large amounts in advertisements, and building up goodwill with respect to the plaintiff's name or mark.

    57. No such facts have been averred in the written statement, with the exception of insertion of one single advertisement in a business/telephone directory, and participation in a single exhibition. To my mind, such an expenditure is too insignificant for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of the exclusive use of their name, and mark HIDESIGN.

    58. There is one more matter, which I need to deal with, which is the contention of Mr. S.C Gulati that the plaintiffs have not complied with Order 39 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and on that account, injunction has to be vacated. He asserts that the order of injunction was issued on 3-8-1990, the process-fee for issuing notices was filed on 7-8-1990, which was returned under objections, and which was refiled on 30-8-1990, and the process was issued by the registry on 31-8-1990, and the service was effected on the defendants on 5-9-1990. The Local Commissioner went to the premises on 8th August, 1990 at 3-30 p.m It is contended by Mr. Gulati that the terms of O. 39, R. 3 requiring the service on the “following day”, have not been complied with.

    59. As against this, Mr. R.N Prabhakar contends and replies that 3rd August was Friday, 4th August was Saturday, 5th August was Sunday and 6th August was holiday. The Local Commissioner could only be contacted on 7th August, and the service on the defendant was effected on 8th August of the order dated 3rd August. It is clear from the report of the Local Commissioner that the order of the court was conveyed only on 8-8-1990, though the service was effected on 5th September, 1990.

    60. In view of what Mr. Prabhakar says, I think it was sufficient compliance with the requirements of O. 39, R. 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    61. I have now to deal with the matter for alleged suppression of facts in para 9 of the plaint. It is axiomatic, that every plaintiff before the court must give full, frank and complete facts upon which he has to rely. He should not hide material and relevant facts nor should he suppress them in the plaint before the court. Here the plaintiff has given less than full disclosure. I think he should be made to pay for this lapse. This can be done by imposing costs at this stage. Besides this fact of non-disclosure shall be a relevant fact at the time of final determination of the suit, and appropriate orders regarding costs should be made at that stage too. For the time being, I think it appropriate that I quantify costs to be paid to the defendant at this interim stage, which I quantify at Rs. 3,000/-. This should for the time being “make fine” the lapse of the plaintiff. This amount be paid to the defendant within one month from today. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think that the plaintiff should be penalised by refusal of the injunction.

    62. In the aforesaid circumstances, I reject I.A No. 8171 of 1990 filed by the defendant under O. 39, R. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ad interim ex parte order of injunction dated 3-8-1990. I allow I.A No. 5958 of 1990, and confirm the said interim injunction.

    63. Needless to add that the opinion expressed herein is prima facie, and what is stated herein should not be so construed as to prejudice a final determination of the rights of the parties inter se after the trial of the matter.

    64. I.A Nos. 5958 of 1990 and 8171 of 1990 stand disposed of.

    Order accordingly.
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    M/S. Hidesign v. M/S. Hi-Design Creations .
    (Jan 8, 1991)