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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — P.K. Bahri, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (Plaintiff No.1: a U.S. company; Plaintiff No.2: a Swiss company and wholly owned subsidiary of Plaintiff No.1) sued the defendants for perpetual injunction restraining them, their agents or servants from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale and distributing talcum powders and other cosmetics in Class 3 that infringe the plaintiffs' registered trade mark "JONTUE" or any deceptively similar mark. The plaintiffs alleged that Plaintiff No.2 is the registered proprietor of the trade mark "JONTUE" in a characteristic style (registration No. 306483) in Class 3 since 25 June 1975 and that the plaintiffs have built substantial goodwill and reputation worldwide (including advertising in world famous magazines available in India).

Along with the plaint the plaintiffs moved application I.A. 9377 of 1988 seeking a temporary injunction; an ad-interim injunction was granted on 20 December 1988. The defendants filed I.A. 12/89 seeking vacation of that ad-interim injunction. The defendants contested the suit and applications, denying that plaintiffs' goods were sold in India under the mark, asserting that defendants had been using the mark since 1985, and raising defences including a plea under Section 9(d) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act (that "JONTUE" is phonetically equivalent to Hindi "Jantu") and that defendants' use was honest and concurrent. Arguments on both applications were heard.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants should be restrained from using the trade mark "JONTUE" until the disposal of the suit (i.e., whether the ad-interim injunction should be continued).
  2. Whether, on the prima facie material, the plaintiffs have established a case for interlocutory relief (including questions of infringement, registration validity as prima facie evidence, delay by plaintiffs, and the defendants' pleas of honest/concurrent user and ignorance of registration).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • Plaintiffs are the owners of a registered trade mark "JONTUE" (registered in 1975) and thus have exclusive rights; defendants have no right to use that mark for their goods.
  • The registered trade mark is prima facie evidence of its validity and, unless challenged under the statutory procedure, defendants cannot rely on protection under Section 12(3) (relying on Metro Playing Card Co. v. Wazir Chand Kapoor).
  • Registration confers an exclusive right that is not ordinarily lost by delay; delay in seeking relief may not defeat the proprietor of a registered trade mark (relying on Shri Swaran Singh Trading v. Usha Industries).
  • Plaintiffs have built reputation, spent heavily on advertising, and have made sales worldwide (including in India); the defendants' inferior goods, if not restrained, may damage plaintiffs' goodwill and cause irreparable harm.

Defendants' Arguments

  • Defendants contended they had been manufacturing and selling talcum powder under the mark since 1985 and that plaintiffs' goods were not being sold in India under that mark.
  • They pleaded that the mark "JONTUE" is phonetically equivalent to the Hindi word "Jantu" and therefore could not be registered under Section 9(d) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act.
  • Defendants asserted honest and concurrent user of the mark and relied on Wattan Singh and Sons v. The Registrar of Trade Marks (as authority supporting concurrent user / related reliefs).
  • They argued that plaintiffs had delayed in instituting the suit and thus should be debarred from obtaining injunctive relief.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Metro Playing Card Co. v. Wazir Chand Kapoor, AIR 1972 Delhi 248 Registered trade mark is prima facie evidence of validity; until registration is challenged under statutory provisions, defendant cannot rely on protection under Section 12(3); a pending application for concurrent registration does not entitle infringement while pending. The court relied on this authority to treat the plaintiffs' registration as prima facie valid and to hold that the defendants could not continue to infringe the registered mark merely because an application for concurrent registration (if any) might be pending.
Shri Swaran Singh Trading as Appliances Emporium v. Usha Industries (India) New Delhi and another, AIR 1986 Delhi 343 Registration confers an exclusive right of user; this exclusive right is not ordinarily lost by delay and delay might not non-suit the proprietor of a registered trade mark. The court applied the principle that delay by the proprietor does not automatically defeat injunctive relief in trade mark infringement, and concluded that any delay by plaintiffs was not fatal to maintaining the suit.
Wattan Singh and Sons v. The Registrar of Trade Marks and others, AIR 1977 Delhi 1 Authority relied upon by defendants concerning concurrent registration/user in the context of statutory proceedings under the Trade Marks Act. The court distinguished this precedent as factually inapplicable: that case involved an appeal under statutory provisions seeking concurrent registration, whereas no such statutory appeal/registration proceeding of that character applied on the facts at hand.
Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. v. Vendra Venkanna (Proprietor of Jai Bharathi Cement Works), AIR 1963 Andhra Pradesh 58 The Trade Marks Act does not admit a defence that the defendant used the trade mark unaware of its registration; ignorance is not a valid defence to infringement. The court endorsed this view and treated defendants' claim of ignorance of the plaintiffs' registration as not providing a defence to continued infringement once defendants knew of the registration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first observed that the defendants had, on the material before it, infringed the plaintiffs' registered trade mark. The narrow question posed was whether the defendants should be restrained from using the mark until the suit's disposal. The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, as recorded:

  1. Prima facie case: The court found that plaintiffs held registration since 1975 and had established prima facie reputation and goodwill for goods sold under "JONTUE", supported by pleaded advertising and international sales (including material indicating sales/availability in India). This supported a prima facie case of infringement.
  2. On registration as evidence: Relying on Metro Playing Card and related authority, the court treated registration as prima facie evidence of validity and held that, absent a successful statutory challenge, defendants could not rely on Section 12(3) or similar defences to continue infringing.
  3. On defendants' pleas of concurrent use and Section 9(d): The court examined defendants' claim of prior or honest concurrent use and found it not established on the prima facie material — the plaintiffs' registration dated from 1975 while defendants' use allegedly began in 1985, so concurrent user was not made out prima facie. The court also treated the Section 9(d) plea (phonetic equivalence to "Jantu") as a pleaded defence but did not find it sufficient on the present record to defeat interlocutory relief.
  4. On delay: The court addressed the contention that plaintiffs' suit was belated. Relying on Shri Swaran Singh Trading, the court observed that the exclusive right conferred by registration is not necessarily lost by delay and concluded that there was no material to show plaintiffs were aware of the infringement earlier; therefore any asserted delay was not fatal to the suit.
  5. On ignorance as a defence: Endorsing the view in Indian Hume Pipe, the court held that ignorance of the existence of a registered trade mark is not a defence permitting continued infringement once the defendant knows of the registration.
  6. Balance of convenience and irreparable harm: The court concluded that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiffs and that absence of an interim injunction would likely cause irreparable harm by enabling defendants' inferior goods to damage plaintiffs' reputation and goodwill.

On these bases the court dismissed the defendants' application to vacate the injunction and allowed the plaintiffs' application to continue the interim injunction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the defendants' application I.A. No. 12 of 1989 and allowed the plaintiffs' application I.A. No. 9377 of 1988, thereby confirming the ad-interim injunction granted on 10/20 December 1988 (the opinion records the grant on December 20, 1988 and confirms the injunction till the disposal of the suit).

Implications: As a direct effect of the decision, the defendants are restrained (by continuation of the interim injunction) from using the impugned trade mark "JONTUE" on their talcum powder and related cosmetics until final disposal of the suit. The court did not purport to establish any new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities (as cited) to the facts; no broader precedent or novel rule was announced in the reasoning beyond the application of established principles on registration as prima facie evidence, the limits of ignorance as a defence, and the considerations relevant to interlocutory relief in trade mark infringement cases.

    Rev. On Inc. v. Hosiden Laboratories (India)

    P.K Bahri, J.:— Plaintiffs have brought have a suit seeking perpetual injunction against the defendants restraining them, their agents, servants or any person on their behalf from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale and distributing talcum powders and other cosmetics goods falling in class 3 and thereby infringing plaintiffs registered trade mark ‘JONTUE’ or any mark deceptively similar to the plaintiff No. 2's registered trade mark and using the said offending mark ‘JONTUE’ on Talcum Powder and to pass of their goods as those of plaintiffs' goods. Some other reliefs are also sought in the plaint. Along with the plaint, an application I.A 9377 of 1988 was moved seeking temporary injunction till the disposal of the suit and an ad-interim injunction order was granted on December 20, 1988 against the defendants. Defendants have filed IA. 12/89 seeking vacation of the said ad interim injunction order. Arguments have been heard in both the applications.

    2. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, is that plaintiff No. 1, is a company incorporated in United States of America and plaintiff No. 2 is a company incorporated in Switzerland and it is wholly owned by plaintiff No. 1 company. The plaintiff No. 1 is stated to have been incorporated in the year 1933 and deals in manufacture and sale of various types of cosmetics perfumary and toileteries including talcum powder etc. The plaintiff No. 2 has got registered trade mark ‘JONTUE’ since 1975 and it is averred that the said trade mark has been registered by the plaintiffs in a large number of countries and plaintiff No. 1 and its subsidiaries under the subsidiaries under the said trade mark ‘JONTUE’ produce various types of perfumary, talcum powder and other toilet and cosmetic products and have over the years built up a considerable good-will and reputation in market and the said products of plaintiffs are of superior quality and are considered by the trade and members of the public all over the world as the best of its kind. It is also averred that plaintiff No. 2 is the registered proprietor of the trade mark ‘JONTUE’ in a characteristic style under the trade mark No. 306483 in class 3 since June 25, 1975 and that the application of the plaintiff No. 2 filed since 1985 for getting stylewise written word trade mark registered is still pending It is further placed that huge amount has been spent by the plaintiffs in advertising its products under the aforesaid trade mark by advertising in world famous magazines which are also available in India and over the years the plaintiffs have done considerable business in sale of such products under the said trade mark all over the world including India. The plaintiffs have filed alongwith the plaint annexures showing all these facts. It is averred by the plaintiffs that defendant No. 1 is a firm carrying on business of manufacturing and sale of cosmetics including talcum powder and defendant No. 2 is manufacturing the aforesaid goods for and on behalf of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 3 has been selling and marketing the above goods and various places including Delhi and defendants 4 and 5 are wholesalers and distributors of the goods manufactured by defendants 1, 2 and 3. It was pleaded that in first week of June, 1988, the plaintiffs found in the newspaper Hindu dated June 26, 1988, an advertisement given by defendant No. 1, in respect of talcum powder manufactured by it and being marketed under the trade mark ‘JONTUE’. It was pleaded that defendant's use of the said trade mark is an infringement of plaintiffs' trade mark and defendants have infringed the trade mark of the plaintiffs with the sole intention of the public and trade by passing off their goods as the goods manufactured by the plaintiffs and in that way get themselves enriched fraudulently.

    3. The defendants have contested the suit as well as the application and have taken the plea that the plaintiffs' goods are not being sold in India under the aforesaid trade mark and defendants since 1985 have been manufacturing, selling talcum powder under the said trade mark. It was also pleaded that the word ‘JONTUE’ being phonetically equivalent to Hindi word ‘Jantu’ meaning a living being, no trade mark under the said name could be got registered under Section 9 (d) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act. It has been pleaded that defendants has been honestly using the said trade mark without the knowledge that plaintiffs have got registered the said trade mark in their own name. Lastly it was pleaded that suit has been filed belatedly by the plaintiffs and thus plaintiffs should be debarred from complaining about the user of the said trade mark by the defendants.

    4. It is evident that defendants have infringed the registered trade mark of the plaintiffs. Now the short question which arises for consideration is whether the defendants should be restrained from using the said trade mark or not till the disposal of the suit. Prima facie the plaintiffs have a case in their favour inasmuch as the plaintiffs are registered trade mark owners since 1975 and it is also clear that the goods manufactured by the plaintiffs have acquired a lot of reputation of good quality and they have spent considerable amount in advertising those goods in world famous magazines which are also available in India. Prima facie they have also made out the case that their goods are also being sold in India.

    5. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs has contended that plaintiffs are owners of registered trade mark, the defendants have no right to use the said trade mark for their goods. He has placed reliance on Metro Playing Card Co. v. Wazir Chand Kapoor, AIR 1972 Delhi 248. In this judgment it has been laid-down that registered trade mark is prima facie evidence of its validity and unless the registration is challenged under the provisions of Trade and Merchandise Act, 1958, it is not open to the defendants to plead any protection under Section 12(3) of the said Act. In the said case the defendant had given an application to the authority under the Act for having concurrent registration of similar trade mark but that application was still pending. It was held by the Division bench of this Court that the defendant had no right to infringe the registered trade mark of the plaintiff till its application is allowed. He has also placed reliance on Shri Swaran Singh Trading as Appliances Emporium v. Usha Industries (India) New Delhi and another, AIR 1986 Delhi 343, wherein a Division Bench of this Court has held that the effect of registration is to give an exclusive right of user to the proprietor of the registered trade mark. It was held in that case that since the exclusive right of user of registered trade mark conferred by the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 could not be lost by delay, general principles governing grant of injunctions in other types of cases might not hold good while dealing with cases of infringement of the above statutory right and normally delay in seeking relief might non-suit the proprietor of the registered trade mark. In the present case, it is quite clear that defendants have infringed the registered trade mark of the plaintiffs. There is nothing to show that plaintiffs have been aware of such infringement by the defendants at any point earlier that 1988. So, it cannot be said that plaintiffs have come to the Court belatedly in seeking the necessary relief of injunction against the defendants. Even if there has occurred any such delay, the same, in my opinion, is not fatal to the maintainability of this suit.

    6. Learned counsel for the defendants has contended that defendants have been using the trade mark in question honestly and concurrently and thus no injunction could be granted against them and he has sought support fron Wattan Singh and Sons v. The Registrar of Trade Marks and others, AIR 1977 Delhi 1. The judgment of this Court stated above is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case an appeal has been filed under the provisions of Trade and Merchandise Marks Act seeking concurrent registration of the trade mark. Such is not the case here. Even otherwise, the facts do not show prima facie that the defendants have any concurrent user of the trade mark in question. The trade mark was registered in favour of the plaintiffs in 1975 whereas defendants came into picture for using the said trade mark only in the year 1985. So it cannot be held prima facie that the defendants have been using concurrently the said trade mark.

    7. Even otherwise ignorance of the defendants regarding registered trade mark of the plaintiffs does not give any right to the defendants to continue to infringe the registered trade mark of the plaintiffs after defendants have come to know about registration of trade mark in the name of the plaintiffs. In Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. v. Vendra Venkanna Proprietor of Jai Bharathi Cement Works AIR 1963 Andhra Pradesh 58, a Division Bench of the Said High Court has also laid down that the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, do not seen to admit a plea that defendants had used the trade mark unaware of the fact of its registration. I entirely agree with the said view expressed in the said judgment

    8. So, examined from any angle, it is clear that plaintiffs have prima facie a case and balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiffs and if the relief of temporary injunction is not granted the plaintiffs are obviously liable to suffer irreparable loss as the inferior goods of the defendants being sold to the public may bring down the reputation of the plaintiffs pertaining to their good quality goods. I dismiss the application of the defendants (I.A No. 12 of 1989) and allow the application of the plaintiffs (I.A No. 9377 of 1988) and confirm the injunction granted on December 10, 1988, till the disposal of the suit.

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    Comments

    Rev. On Inc. v. Hosiden Laboratories (India)
    (Jul 24, 1990)