Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 20 A TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT 1987
  • NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT 1985
  • provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 36-A of the NDPS Act
  • Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code)
  • Code the incorporation of Sub-section (5) in Section 173 of the Code
  • Section 20(8) of that Act (quoted above) but Section 439 of the Code
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the amended Code
  • NDPS Act or the old Opium Act or the Excise Act;
  • Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Sub-section (5) and (7) of Section 173 of the Code
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of that Section
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code,
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Code
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Sub-sections (5), (7) and (8) in the 1973 Code
  • provisions of Section 173(2) of the Code
  • Subsection (4) of Section 293 of the Code,
  • Section 439 or Section 482 of the Code.
  • Code in Sub-section (1) of Section 173
  • Code Sub-section (4) of Section 173
  • Section 190(1)(b) of the Code.18.
  • Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
  • Section 37(2) of the NDPS Act
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 173
  • Section 36-C of the NDPS Act.
  • Section 173(2) of the Code.8.
  • Section 190(1)(b) of the Code
  • Section 173(1) (a) of the Code
  • Section 173 (2) of the Code,
  • Section 167(2) of the Code.
  • clause (b) of Sub-section (1)
  • Section 161 of the Code
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 20 A TERRORIST AND DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITIES PREVENTION ACT 1987
  • NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT 1985
  • provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 36-A of the NDPS Act
  • Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code)
  • Code the incorporation of Sub-section (5) in Section 173 of the Code
  • Section 20(8) of that Act (quoted above) but Section 439 of the Code
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the amended Code
  • NDPS Act or the old Opium Act or the Excise Act;
  • Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Sub-section (5) and (7) of Section 173 of the Code
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of that Section
  • Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code,
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Code
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Sub-sections (5), (7) and (8) in the 1973 Code
  • provisions of Section 173(2) of the Code
  • Subsection (4) of Section 293 of the Code,
  • Section 439 or Section 482 of the Code.
  • Code in Sub-section (1) of Section 173
  • Code Sub-section (4) of Section 173
  • Section 190(1)(b) of the Code.18.
  • Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
  • Section 37(2) of the NDPS Act
  • Sub-section (5) of Section 173
  • Section 36-C of the NDPS Act.
  • Section 173(2) of the Code.8.
  • Section 190(1)(b) of the Code
  • Section 173(1) (a) of the Code
  • Section 173 (2) of the Code,
  • Section 167(2) of the Code.
  • clause (b) of Sub-section (1)
  • Section 161 of the Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses two connected petitions arising from arrests under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The petitioners, Kishan Lal and Gurdev Singh, were arrested for offences under various sections of the NDPS Act, denied bail, and remanded to judicial custody. Police reports under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Code) were filed—Gurdev Singh's on the 90th day of arrest and Kishan Lal's before the expiry of 90 days—without the expert opinion from the Central Forensic Science Laboratory. Magistrates took cognizance of the offences based on these reports. During pendency of the petitions, expert reports confirming the nature of seized substances were received and filed. Gurdev Singh sought bail under Section 439 of the Code contending cognizance was taken on incomplete reports, while Kishan Lal filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution claiming unlawful detention after 90 days. The two petitions were heard together.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether investigation of an offence under the NDPS Act can be considered complete in the absence of the expert opinion of a Scientific Officer or Chemical Examiner?
  2. Whether a Magistrate can validly take cognizance of offences under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code based on a police report under Section 173(2) that does not include expert opinion?
  3. Whether the amended Section 37 of the NDPS Act imposes limitations on the High Court’s power to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code?
  4. Whether the Special Court constituted under the NDPS Act exercises powers under Section 439 of the Code or is subject to different bail limitations?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The investigation under the NDPS Act is incomplete without obtaining the expert opinion of the Scientific Officer or Chemical Examiner.
  • The police report filed under Section 173(2) of the Code without the expert’s opinion cannot be considered a complete investigation report.
  • Accordingly, cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code taken on such incomplete report is invalid.
  • The petitioners contended that without the expert’s report, the Investigating Officer cannot form a valid opinion or supply the accused with a copy of the expert opinion, as required by law.
  • They argued that the amended provisions of the NDPS Act, including Section 37, impose new limitations on bail which affect the exercise of power by courts including the High Court.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The police report under Section 173(2) of the Code is complete once the witnesses acquainted with the circumstances of the case have been examined, even if the expert’s opinion is pending.
  • The Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance on such a report, and expert opinion is not a mandatory prerequisite for this stage.
  • The amended Section 37 of the NDPS Act imposes limitations on bail powers of Special Courts but does not restrict the special powers of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code.
  • The Special Court is not a Sessions Court for the purpose of Section 439 of the Code; hence, the power to grant bail under Section 439 is preserved exclusively with the High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441 Police report under Section 173(2) of the Code is complete once investigation is complete except for expert's opinion; Magistrate can take cognizance on such report. Affirmed that expert opinion is not mandatory for completion of investigation report; upheld Magistrate's cognizance on police report without expert opinion.
State of Haryana v. Mehal Singh, AIR 1978 Punjab & Haryana 341 Investigation deemed complete even if expert's report is awaited; police report under Section 173(2) remains valid. Supported the view that absence of expert opinion does not render police report incomplete for cognizance.
Harichand and Raj Pal v. State, ILR (Delhi) 1977 Vol. 2 at 367 Discussed completeness of police report under Section 173(2) of the Code. Distinguished on facts; did not support petitioners’ contention as the reason for report being incomplete was unclear.
Tej Singh v. State, Criminal Law Journal 1988 at 1635 Investigating Officer's duty to forward expert opinion under Section 173(5) is additional and does not affect completeness of police report. Reaffirmed that expert opinion is not a prerequisite for completion of investigation report under Section 173(2).
Usman Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 922 Limitations on bail under a special Act are in addition to limitations under the Code; Designated Courts are not vested with powers under Section 439 of the Code. Used to interpret the scope of bail powers of Special Courts and High Courts under the NDPS Act and Code.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the distinction between the duties of the Investigating Officer under Section 173(2) of the Code and the Magistrate's power to take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code. It held that the investigation is deemed complete once the witnesses acquainted with the circumstances of the case have been examined and the police report is filed, even if the expert’s opinion is not yet received. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Tara Singh v. State and subsequent judgments of the Punjab & Haryana High Court and this Court in Tej Singh v. State to confirm that the absence of expert opinion does not render the police report incomplete.

The Court distinguished the additional duty under Section 173(5) of the Code to forward expert opinions and documents as a procedural requirement to enable the Magistrate to comply with Section 207 of the Code, but not a condition precedent to completion of investigation or filing of the police report.

Regarding bail, the Court examined the amended Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which imposes limitations on bail for offences punishable with imprisonment of five years or more. It considered the status of the Special Court constituted under the NDPS Act and concluded that it is not a Court of Sessions for purposes of Section 439 of the Code, and thus the limitations on bail apply to the Special Court. The High Court’s special powers under Section 439 are preserved and not fettered by these amendments.

The Court rejected the contention that the amended Section 37 limitations restrict the High Court’s power to grant bail. It also clarified that the Magistrate’s cognizance of the offences based on the police reports without expert opinion was proper and valid.

On humanitarian grounds, the Court granted interim bail to Kishan Lal due to serious medical conditions, acknowledging the State’s inability to provide immediate specialized treatment.

Holding and Implications

The petitions are dismissed.

The Court held that under Section 173(2) of the Code, a police report need not include the expert opinion to be considered complete, and a Magistrate may validly take cognizance of offences on such a report. Consequently, the cognizance taken in the present cases was proper and no bail order under Section 167(2) of the Code was warranted on that ground.

The Court clarified that the amended Section 37 of the NDPS Act imposes limitations on the bail powers of Special Courts but does not restrict the special powers of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code. The Special Court is not a Sessions Court for bail purposes under Section 439.

Interim bail granted to petitioner Kishan Lal on medical grounds was extended to enable appropriate applications before the Single Judge.

No new precedent was set; the judgment reaffirmed settled principles regarding the completeness of police reports and the scope of bail powers under the NDPS Act and the Code.

    Kishan Lal v. State .

    Charanjit Talwar, J.:— The settled position in law is that it is open to Magistrate to take cognizance of offences upon a police report submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure even when it does not include the report of experts. The question is sought to be re-agitated in the two connected petitions. The pleas urged before us in Cr. Writ No. 622/88 filed by Kishan Lal and Cr. M. (M) No. 1132/88 filed by Gurdev Singh are that the investigation for the offences under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short the NDPS Act) cannot be held to be complete without obtaining the opinion of the expert and, therefore, the cognizance of the said offences under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) is not permissible.

    2. The petitioners in two different cases were arrested for offences under various sections of the ndps act on two different dates. They were refused bail and remanded to judicial custody. The report under Section 173(2) of the Code in Gurdev Singh's case was filed on 90th day of his arrest and in the case of Kishan Lal, before the expiry of 90 days. Acting on those reports, the Magistrate concerned took cognizance of the offences and remanded the accused to judicial custody. The admitted fact is that opinion of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory by then had not been received by the Investigating Officer. It is the further admitted position that during the pendency of these two petitions before us, the reports of the Government Expert in the respective cases were received and filed before the courts concerned. Those reports show that the samples from the seized commodity in the case of Gurdev Singh were of “Poppy Straw” and in the case of Kishan Lal, “Charas”, both falling within the ambit of the NDPS Act.

    3. Gurdev Singh filed a petition (Cr. M(M) No. 1132/88) under section 439 of the code seeking bail on the ground that cognizance taken by the Magistrate on an incomplete report was vitiated and, therefore, as the investigation was pending, he was entitled as a matter of right to the grant of bail after 90 days of his arrest under Section 167(2) of the Code. The learned Single Judge, before whom the petition was listed, was of the considered opinion that the question raised was of considerable importance and thus referred the matter to a larger bench.

    4. Thereafter the other petitioner, Kishan Lal filed a separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus for his immediate release on the plea that his detention in judicial custody after 90 day's of his arrest, was without the authority of law. We issued Rule and directed that petition to be heard alongwith the bail petition of Gurdev Singh as the pleas in the two cases were common. This judgment disposes of both the petitions.

    5. The question raised by the petitioners in a nut shell is whether the investigation of a case under the NDPS Act can be said to be complete in the absence of the report of the Scientific Officer and Chemical Examiner? The contention is that where the accused person is allegedly found in possession of or transporting a prohibited drug or substance, mainly two facts have to be established by the prosecution viz., (I) that of recovery of the commodity or substance and (2) that the possession of the said recovered material is illegal under the provisions of the NDPS Act. It is submitted that the Investigating Officer would be unable to give his opinion regarding the second aspect till he obtains the report of the expert and, therefore, the report submitted by the Investigating Officer even if purported to be under Section 173 (2) of the Code, must be held to be based on incomplete investigation.

    6. The learned Single Judge in his reference order has noticed that the reported cases in which this question has been settled related to offences under the Indian Penal Code. It was urged before him that the principles enunciated in those cases are not applicable to cases involving an offence under the NDPS Act or the old Opium Act or the Excise Act; To appreciate the contentions raised in these petitions, we have to notice the case law to some extent to highlight the settled principles.

    7. It has been held by the Supreme Court that although the police are not permitted to send an incomplete report under Section 173(2) of the Code, yet the investigation except for the report of an expert like the Sero-logist or Scientific Officer and Chemical Examiner is complete and, therefore, the Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report which does not include the expert's opinion. In Tara Singh v. State, AIR 1951 SC 441, the Police had infact filed a report dated the 2nd October, 1949 terming it an “incomplete challan” and on the 5th October they filed a report which they called a “complete challan”. Thereafter on the 19th October they filed yet another report which was termed as “Supplementary challan”. The objection taken at the trial was that the Magistrate had no power to take cognizance of the case on 3rd October when the incomplete challan dated 2nd October, 1949 was placed before him. It was contended that the Police are not permitted to file an incomplete report under Section 173(2) of the Code.

    8. It appears from paragraph 14 of the reported judgment that the witnesses named by the police in the second report, i.e the report of 5th October, 1949 were not the witnesses who were “Acquainted with the circumstances of the case” but merely formal witnesses who had either examined the injured or recorded the dying declaration. It further appears that vide the report dated 19th October, 1949 which was termed as “supplementary challan”, the report of the Imperia1 Serologist and the drawing of a sketch map of the occurrence were sought to be placed on the record. Negativing the contention that the Magistrate had not taken proper cognizance, it was held that the police report dated 2nd October, 1949 was a complete report within the meaning of Section 190(1)(b) of the Code as the investigation was complete. Thus the challan dated the 5th October, 1949 and the supplementary challan dated the 19th October, 1949 did not vitiate the first report which had been termed as an “incomplete challan”. It is useful to quote paragraph 14 of the reported judgment:

    “When the police drew up their challan of 2-10-1949 and submitted to the court on the 3rd, they had in fact completed their investigation except for the report of the Imperial Serologist and the drawing of a sketch map of the occurrence. It is always permissible for the Magistrate to take additional evidence not set out in the challan.

    Therefore, the mere fact that a second challan was put in on 5th October would not necessarily vitiate the first. All that section 173(1)(a) requires is that as soon as the police investigation under Chapter 14 of the Code is complete, there should be forwarded to the Magistrate a report in the prescribed form:

    “Setting forth the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case.”

    All that appears to have been done in the report of 2nd October which the police called their incomplete challan. The witnesses named in the second challan of 5th October were not witnesses who were “acquainted with the circumstances of the case.” They were merely formal witnesses on other matters. So also in the supplementary challan of the 19th. The witnesses named are the Ist Class Magistrate, Amritsar, who recorded the dying declaration, and the Assistant Civil Surgeon. They are not witnesses who were “acquainted with the circumstances of the case.” Accordingly, the challan which the police called an incomplete challan was in fact a completed report of the kind which Section 173(1) (a) of the Code contemplates. There is no force in this argument and we hold that the Magistrate took proper cognizance of the matter.”

    9. A Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in State of Haryana v. Mehal Singh and another, AIR 1978 Punjab & Haryana 341, after surveying the case law including a judgment of a single Judge of this Court in Harichand and Raj Pal v. State, ILR (Delhi) 1977 Vol. 2 at page 367 on which case, petitioners have placed great reliance, has also held that the investigation of an offence cannot be considered to be un-conclusive merely for the reason that the Investigating Officer when he submitted his report in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code, still awaited the report of the expert. It was further observed that even if the Investigating Officer failed to append to the Police report, the statement under Section 161 of the Code or the opinion of the experts although available with him, yet the investigation was complete and the report filed before the Magistrate was proper. In the said case the accused were seeking bail on the ground that the investigation had not been completed within sixty days of their arrest and the cognizance taken by the Magistrate was vitiated as it had been taken on an incomplete report. Thus although the offence involved was different but the plea was exactly the same as is before us.

    10. A Division Bench of this Court in Tej Singh v. State, Criminal Law Journal 1988 at page 1635 has taken the same view as that of the Punjab & Haryana High Court. In that case also the contention was that it was obligatory on the Investigating Officer to forward to the Magistrate alongwith the police report the opinion of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory and in the absence of the expert's report, the investigation could not be said to be complete and therefore, the cognizance taken not being valid, the accused was entitled to be ordered to be released on bail under Section 167(2) of the Code. In support of the argument it was submitted that Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code cast an additional duty on the Investigating Officer to forward to the Magistrate the expert's opinion. It was unsuccessfully urged that without that opinion, the report could not be termed as a complete report.

    11. Before us Bawa Gurcharan Singh on behalf of the petitioner Kishan Lal and Mr. K.K Sud on behalf of the petitioner Gurdev Singh have also contended that in the old Code, provisions like the one contained in Sub-sections (5), (7) and (8) in the 1973 Code were not there and, therefore, the judgments of the Supreme Court following the law laid in Tara Singh's case (supra), decided under the Old Code, are not applicable in the context of the new provisions incorporated in the 1973 Code. This Court in Tej Singh's case (supra) and the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Mehal Singh's case (supra) have negatived that contention.

    12. The learned counsel laid great stress on the fact that the investigation could not be said to be complete in cases where the expert's opinion was still awaited as in its absence the investigating officer would neither be in a position to form his opinion nor would he be able to furnish to the accused copy of that opinion. In the said two decisions this very contention was repelled. In Tej Singh's case (supra) it was held that:

    “This contention does not appear to be correct for the reason that Sub-section (5) of Section 173 appears to cast on the Investigating Officer only an additional duty of sending alongwith the report documents or extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely and this additional duty cannot be construed as in any manner prejudicing the police report envisaged in Sub-section (5) of Section 173 and this additional duty appears to have been necessitated to enable the Magistrate taking cognizance of the ease to comply with the mandatory provisions of law contained in section 207 of the code for the purpose of furnishing to the accused, free of cost, a copy of such document.”

    13. In Mehal Singh's case (supra), the Full Bench on this aspect held that:

    “In the new Code the incorporation of Sub-section (5) in Section 173 of the Code has in no manner changed or affected the content or concept of the ‘police report’ envisaged in the unamended Code in Sub-section (1) of Section 173 and, therefore, the ratio of Tara Singh's case (AIR 1951 SC 441) (supra) applies to the facts of the present case with full force. The incorporation of Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the amended Code was necessitated by the fact that under section 207 of the amended code a duty was cast additionally on the Magistrate to make available to the accused free of cost copies of the police report and inter alia the documents and statements referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code. In the unamended Code Sub-section (4) of Section 173 cast that duty on the police. The object of such provisions, whether the duty is cast on the police or on the Magistrate, is merely to see that the accused has in his hand the copies of statements and documents which were going to be produced or referred to in evidence against him so that he can offer whatever explanation or defence that he has to the incriminating material against him. If such statements and documents that are referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 173 of the Code are not appended to the ‘police report’, the result would be that at a later stage if they are sought to be produced, then apart from the fact that copies of such statements and documents shall have to be made available to the accused, it would be purely in the discretion of the Magistrate whether to allow such documents and statements to be produced or not and the prosecution cannot, as a matter of right, have them, placed on the record…”

    14. It may be noticed that the old Sub-section (4) of Section 173 of the Code has been replaced by Sub-section (5). The old Sub-section (5) is renumbered as Sub-section (6) and has been redrafted. However, Subsection (7) and (8) are newly inserted. The old Sub-section (4) cast a duty on an investigating officer to furnish or cause to be furnished to the accused before the commencement of the inquiry or trial, free of cost a copy of the report, a copy of the FIR, copies of documents relied upon and copies of the statements of the witnesses. The amendments by way of Sub-section (5) and (7) of Section 173 of the Code do not imply that the prosecution is prevented from calling any witness at the trial whose name had not been included in the police report or whose statement had not been furnished to the accused. The additional duty under Sub-section (5) as has been noticed in Tej Singh's case (supra) has been necessitated because-of the mandatory provisions under section 207 of the code whereby it is the duty of the Magistrate to furnish to the accused the documents and the statements mentioned therein. The amendments have not at all affected the concept or contents of a police report.

    15. We respectfully agree with the earlier decision of this Court in Tej Singh's case (supra). The decision in Hari Chand and Raj Pal v. State (supra) by a single Judge of this Court wherein it has been held that an “incomplete challan” is not a police report within the admit of Section 173 (2) of the Code does not support the case of the petitioners. From the reported judgment it is not clear whether all the witnesses or some of them “acquainted with the circumstances of the case” were yet to be examined when the report was filed. The reason for calling it incomplete is no discernible. But it is safer to assume from the reading of the judgment that the investigation.was not complete. Thus the report as envisaged under Section 173(2) of the Code could not have been filed.

    16. It is unnecessary for us to notice other judgments cited by the learned counsel in support of their plea that the investigation in a case like the present is to be held fo be incomplete. In our view the Supreme Court decision in Tara Singh's case (supra) holding, inter alia, that a police report which is not accompanied by the expert's opinion, is to be held to be complete report as long as the witnesses who are acquainted with the circumstances of the case have been examined, continues to be law in spite of amendments in Section 173 of the Code.

    17. Now to advert to the main plea, It is contended that for offences under the NDPS Act, the report under Section 173(2) of the Code, which in law is complete (the investigating officer having carried out all his mandatory duties), is to be considered “incomplete” in the absence of the opinion of the expert. In our view the submission is entirely misconceived. Apparently the power of the Magistrate to take cognizance of offences upon a police report is being related to the duty of the S.H.O to forward a report on completion of investigation. The duty of the investigating officer under the Code is to complete the investigation without unnecessary delay. On its completion which necessarily means that the witnesses acquainted with the circumstances of the case have been examined, the officer incharge of the police station has to forward a police report in a prescribed form to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. However, no duty is cast on the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence on a report which although complete except for the expert's opinion, does not make out an offence. While exercising his judicial discretion it is open to the Magistrate to seek a copy of the expert's opinion. There may even be cases under the NDPS Act where no public witnesses have been cited but that fact by itself would not show that till such time the Gavernment expert's opinion is received, the investigation is incomplete. The police report if filed in accordance with the provisions of Section 173(2) of the Code would be complete report but the Magistrate in his judicial discretion may not take cognizance of the offence. Thus the provisions of Section 173(2) of the Code have to be considered separate and distinct from Section 190(1)(b) of the Code.

    18. As far as the expert's report is concerned, we may note that by virtue of Subsection (4) of Section 293 of the Code, any document purporting to be report under the hand of the Director or a Deputy Director or’ Assistant Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or State Forensic Science Laboratory can be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. It is true that it is open to the Court where it thinks fit to summon and examine the Government Scientific expert. But he is not a formal witness and, therefore, no duty is cast upon the investigating officer to cite him as a witness.

    19. We thus hold that under Section 173(2) of the Code there is no mandate that a police report must enclose the document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government scientific expert. In the present cases, as cognizance of the offences taken by the Magistrate was proper and valid, no order releasing the petitioners on bail under Section 167(2) of the Code was required to be passed.

    20. There is another aspect which needs to be considered. In the petition filed by Kishan Lal, a miscellaneous application was moved seeking that the petitioner be released on interim bail during the pendency of the petition on the ground that the ailments from which he was suffering, could not be treated while he was in judicial custody. Mr. Teja Singh Sodhi, learned counsel for the State frankly conceded before us that the grievance of the petitioner was correct. We summoned the medical record of Deen Dayal Upadhya Hospital where the petitioner while in judicial lock up was being periodically sent for check up and treatment. It was found that the petitioner, a heart patient, was suffering from Pulminary Tuberculosis and his diabetes was not under control. We are informed that it was not possible for the State to ensure straight away admission of the petitioner in the All India Institute of Medical Sciences or in any other Government hospital for specialised treatment which admittedly was immediately required. We. therefore, directed the release of the petitioner on interim bail. We were prima facie of the view that this Court has jurisdiction to do so. In our detailed order of 15th December, 1988, we recorded so.

    21. During the course of arguments it was pointed out to us that section 37 of the ndps act stood amended but the amended provision had yet not been enforced. We were further informed on 20th April, 1989 that the gazette notification enforcing the amended provisions of the Act was likely to be issued within a week or so. We were of the opinion that while deciding these eases, the ambit of the amended provisions which have added two limitations on grant of bail, required to be looked into. Learned counsel for the parties sought time and thus the cases were adjourned as part heard to be listed after the summer vacation.

    22. In the meanwhile as expected, vide notification of the 29th May, 1989, the amended provisions of the NDPS Act were brought into force. Section 37 of the Act reads as under:—

    “37. Offences to be cognizable and nonbailable:

    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),

    (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

    (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless:

    (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

    (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

    (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of Sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitation under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.”

    23. It was brought to our notice that on coming into operation of the above provision, a learned Single Judge of this Court during the summer vacation while dealing with the application seeking interim bail of an accused, who had been arrested for an offence under section 21 of the ndps act has held that the added limitations in Section 37 of the Act have necessarily to be read as limitations on the powers of the High Court under section 439 of the code. In that case (Cr. Misc. (M) 888/89 entitled Satish Kumar v. U.O.I), the petitioner who was on interim bail granted by this Court and was to surrender on 13th June, 1989, sought extension of the period to enable him to look after his wife who had not yet recovered from the major operation and who, it was so averred, had been recommended another operation. The learned Single Judge after analysing the provisions of the said section 37 concluded that:

    “Since the court has no power to grant bail on the ground of illness of the wife, certainly the court has no power to grant interim bail or extension of the period of the interim bail as already granted by this court. Therefore, the bail petition in such circumstances is not maintainable.”

    24. Learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the counsel for the State and also Mr. D.R Sethi, Advocate who was appointed amicus curiae by us submitted that under the scheme of the NDPS Act, no fetters had been placed on the power of the High Court. Their plea was that the interpretation given by the learned Single Judge was wrong and, therefore, that judgment in Cr. Misc. (M) No. 888/89 dated the 7th June, 1989 required re-consideration.

    25. We may note that at that stage of arguments, Mr. J.S Aurora, Advocate on behalf of the Narcotics Control Bureau sought our permission to address us on the question of power of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to grant bail for offences under the NDPS Act. He told us that he had appeared before the learned Single Judge in opposition to the said interim bail application. In the interests of justice we granted him the opportunity sought for. According to him also, the power of the High Court to grant bail under section 439 of the code has not been taken away by the amended provisions, but his plea is that the two limitations restricting the power of the trial court, i.e, the Special Court are equally applicable to the High Court. He urged that the judgment in Satish Kumar's case (supra) is being read out of context. He maintains that it is a correct decision.

    26. Mr. Aurora's contention is that under the scheme of the NDPS Act, the offences have now to be tried by Special Courts notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, as per its Section 36-A. A Judge of the Special Court, however, is to be a Sessions Judge or an Addl. Sessions Judge immediately before such appointment. The powers of remand of an accused under the NDPS Act are vested in the Special Court and it is this Court which is empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a perusal of a police report or upon a complaint made by an officer of the Central Government or a State Government as the case may be. Thus the committal proceedings by a Magistrate have been bye passed.

    27. Mr. Aurora's submission is that the Special Court is deemed to be a Court of Sessions as per Section 36-C of the NDPS Act. Therefore that court by virtue of being a Court of Sessions is to exercise power vested in it under section 439 of the code for the purposes of bail. According to him the limitation added under section 37 of the ndps act are admittedly limitations placed on the powers of the Special Court which being a Sessions Court, while granting bail is to act only under section 439 of the code. A fortiori he submits that those limitations have necessarily to be read as limitations on the concurrent powers of the High Court under section 439 of the code.

    28. At this stage we may not that all the counsel in support of their contentions are relying on a judgment of the Supreme Court in Usman Bhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 922. That was a case under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. One of the questions which Tell for consideration in that case was whether the the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail of a person accused of an offence under that Act, in exercise of its powers under Section 439 or Section 482 of the Code. In that Act there was no express provision excluding the applicability of section 439 of the code although by virtue of Section 20(7) of the said Act, the power of the High Court or the Court of sessions to grant anticipatory bail had been specifically excluded. The offences under that Act are to be tried by Designated Court, which is to be prescribed over by a Judge who is a Sessions Judge or an addl. Sessions Judge immediately before such appointment.

    29. Sub-section (8) & (9) of Section 20 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 also by down similar limitations as are provided under section 37 of the ndps act. For purposes of comparison. Sub-sections (8) (9) of Section 20 of the said Act may be quoted:

    “(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder, shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless:

    (a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

    (b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

    (9) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (8) are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force of granting of bail.”

    30. It is not necessary for us to analyse that judgment in detail as under that Act the High Courts have been completely bye-passed. It is sufficient for our purpose to notice that one of the arguments urged before the Supreme Court was that the source of power of a Designated Court to grant bail was not derived from Section 20(8) of that Act (quoted above) but Section 439 of the Code which was still preserved because otherwise the Designated Court would have no power to grant bail.

    31. In this context, while discussing the nature of the restraint placed on the power of the Designated Court to grant bail to an accused in view of the limitations placed on such power under Section 20(8) of the said Act, their Lordships held (in paragraph 19 of the reported judgment) that:

    “19. Though there is no express provision excluding the applicability of section 439 of the code similar to the one contained in Section 20(7) of the Act in relation to a case involving the arrest of any person on an accusation of having committed an offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder, but that result must by necessary implication, follow. It is true that the source of power of a Designated Court to grant bail is not Section 20(8) of the Act as it only places limitations on such power. This is made explicit by Section 20(9) which enacts that the limitations on granting of bail specified in Section 20(8) are ‘in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in force.’ But it does not necessarily follow that the power of a Designated Court to grant bail is relatable to section 439 of the code. It cannot be doubted that a Designated Court is ‘a Court other than the High Court or the Court of Session’ within the meaning of section 437 of the code. The exercise of the power to grant bail by a Designated Court is not only subject to the limitations contained therein, but is also subject to the limitations placed by Section 20(8) of the Act.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    32. The limitations placed under section 37 of the ndps act which are exactly similar to the ones under Sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, thus, are applicable to Special Courts. Learned counsel are not doubting that legal position. Mr. Aurora's argument, however, that the Special Court being presided over by a Sessions Judge and by virtue of having been given the status of a Sessions Court under Section 36(C) of the NDPS Act, exercises the power under section 439 of the code to grant bail, is to be negatived. In view of the above observations of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that the Special Court is a Court other than the High Court or the Court Sessions within the meaning of section 437 of the code. Thus it is not vested with the power under section 439 of the code regarding bail. As noticed above, it is admitted by Mr. Aurora that the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under section 439 of the code have been specifically preserved. This submission is based on the provisions contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 36-A of the NDPS Act which is to the following effect:

    “3. Nothing contained in this Section shall be deemed to affect the special powers of the High Court regarding bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and the High Court may exercise such powers including the power under clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of that Section as if the reference to “Magistrate” in that Section included also a reference to a “Special Court” constituted under Section 36.”

    33. Mr. Aurora's effort was to read the two added limitations in Section 37(2) of the NDPS Act in the above provision. That is not permissible in view of the clear intention of the legislature. The limitations placed on the Special Court cannot be read as fetters in exercise of powers under section 439 of the code. We reject Mr. Aurora's contention.

    34. The upshot of the above discussion is that the petitions stand dismissed. The petitioner, Kishan Lal in Cr. Writ Petition No. 622 of 1988 is on interim bail, which is expiring on 22nd September, 1989. In the interests of justice, we extend his interim bail by another two weeks to enable him to make an appropriate application before the learned Single Judge.

    35. As the only question raised before us on behalf of the petitioner Gurdev Singh in Cr. M(M) No. 1132 of 1988 was that cognizance by the Magistrate had not been taken validly and other arguments on merits could not be urged before us, that petitioner is also at liberty to move an appropriate application, if so advised.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kishan Lal v. State .
    (Sep 22, 1989)