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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal under S. 39, Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

Factual and Procedural Background

The land in question (Plot No. 12, Block No. 10B Western Extension Area, New Delhi) was leased by the Delhi Improvement Trust (predecessor-in-interest of the Delhi Development Authority, “DDA”) to Rattan Lal by lease dated 24 July 1953. Rattan Lal constructed a building and let a portion (one room and a covered verandah) to Narain Das (respondent/tenant) at Rs. 63 per month. Rattan Lal later sold the property to Manohar Lal (appellant/landlord) by sale deed dated 26 November 1961; the tenant attorned to Manohar Lal.

The lease imposed a condition that the land and any building thereon be used only for residential purposes without the lessor’s written consent. The tenant used the premises for a dairy (commercial) business, contrary to that condition. The DDA objected and the landlord filed an eviction application under cl. (k), proviso to Sub-S. (1) of S. 14 of the Act. Parties then compromised: the tenant agreed to pay three-fourths of the penalty/premium levied by the DDA for the commercial use since 27 November 1961; the landlord withdrew the eviction petition, which was dismissed as such.

DDA later served a notice (27-5-74) proposing lease cancellation for breach. A subsequent eviction petition was dismissed because the foundational notice (dated 8 June 1974) was held invalid for not giving the tenant time to stop the alleged misuse. A fresh notice was served and a new eviction petition filed on 4 July 1977 (based on a notice dated 7 May 1977). The tenant admitted the dairy business and receipt of the 7 May 1977 notice but resisted eviction on multiple grounds (including res judicata and objections to notice validity).

The Additional Controller (J.M. Malik) by order dated 17 September 1979 found the notice valid, held cl. (k) ingredients proved (relying on Faqir Chand), and issued a notice to DDA under S. 14(11). After further proceedings, an Additional Controller (H.P. Sharma) directed the landlord to approach the DDA for regularisation and the tenant to pay misuse charges, pending results by 2 July 1981.

The landlord challenged the direction to approach DDA in the High Court under Article 227; this Court (by an order dated "October 32, 1981" as recorded in the opinion) quashed that direction and remitted the matter to the Additional Controller to determine the two alternatives under S. 14(11). After remand, Additional Controller V.B. Gupta (order dated 1 May 1982) held DDA unwilling to regularise permanently and directed the tenant to stop the misuse within one month, failing which eviction would be deemed passed. The tenant appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal which allowed the appeal, set aside that order and remanded the matter to determine any tentative date for temporary or permanent regularisation. The landlord filed this second appeal under S. 39 of the Act challenging the Tribunal's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the ingredients required to claim eviction under cl. (k) of the proviso to Sub-S. (1) of S. 14 of the Act were proved in this case.
  2. What is the scope of the Controller’s duty under Sub‑Section (11) of S. 14 — i.e., whether the Controller must direct the tenant to stop the misuse or may allow payment/regularisation, and how that discretion must be exercised.
  3. Whether the Rent Control Tribunal was justified in remanding the matter to the Additional Controller to seek a tentative date for temporary or permanent regularisation when the DDA had consistently stated it would not regularise the misuse.
  4. Whether the landlord’s present eviction petition was barred by res judicata or by O. 23, R. 1(4) Civil P.C. because of the earlier withdrawal/compromise of a prior eviction application.
  5. Whether the DDA’s past handling or alleged regularisation of adjacent premises created an arguable ground to deny eviction (discrimination allegation) and whether proposed Master Plan changes affect the outcome.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Landlord) — main arguments

  • The DDA had been a party to the eviction proceedings from the beginning and had stated that it was not prepared to regularise the breach; therefore the Tribunal erred in remanding the matter to obtain a further statement or tentative date for regularisation.
  • The earlier eviction petition was withdrawn as part of a compromise; therefore it did not create a bar of res judicata. Provisions of O. 23, R. 1(4), CPC do not apply because the present petition is based on a new cause of action arising after the earlier decision.
  • The law prior to 1973 (as it stood in 1966) had estopped landlords who themselves had let premises for non-conforming use from claiming eviction under cl. (k), but the Supreme Court decision in Faqir Chand (AIR 1973 SC 921) changed that position in 1973; that decision supports landlord’s entitlement to evict notwithstanding prior letting.

Respondent (Tenant) — main arguments

  • The eviction is barred by res judicata and by O. 23, R. 1(4) CPC because a previous application by the landlord on the same ground had been withdrawn without the court’s permission.
  • The premises had allegedly been let and used for commercial purposes since the inception of the tenancy and the DDA had been regularising such commercial use; the misuse could therefore be regularised permanently.
  • The notice dated 7 May 1977 (basis of the present petition) was invalid.
  • The tenant relied on a subsequent public notice (dated 6 April 1985) indicating proposed Master Plan changes that, if adopted, would convert the user to commercial — arguing the proposal supported his position (though no change had been made in Master or Zonal Plan).
  • The tenant contended that DDA had regularised adjacent premises and alleged discriminatory treatment by refusing to regularise the premises in dispute.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, (1973) 3 SCR 454 : AIR 1973 SC 921 Permits a landlord to claim eviction under cl. (k) even if the premises had previously been let for non-conforming (commercial) use; addresses legislative purpose re: protection of lease uses. The Additional Controller and this Court relied on this decision to reject the tenant’s objection that the landlord was estopped from claiming eviction because he had let the premises for commercial use. The Court invoked this precedent when assessing the object of cl. (k) and Sub‑S. (11) of S. 14.
P.V. Subha Rao v. V. Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591 Authority that a dismissal as withdrawn pursuant to a compromise does not operate as res judicata because the matter has not been finally decided on merits. The Court cited this decision to hold that the prior petition, which had been withdrawn on compromise, did not bar the present application by operation of res judicata.
Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madanlal, AIR 1970 SC 987 Interpretation of the term "subject matter" in O. 23, R. 1 — meaning the bundle of facts that constitute the plaintiff’s cause of action; used to determine when O. 23 R. 1(4) applies. The Court relied on this principle to explain that if the cause of action in the subsequent petition differs (e.g., by being based on a later notice), O. 23, R. 1(4) will not bar the fresh suit.
Rajeshwar Dayal Saxena v. Nanak Chand SAO No. 165 of 1981 (decided 20-10-1981) Support for the proposition that each notice to the tenant to stop a breach constitutes a new cause of action for purposes of eviction under cl. (k). The Court referred to this decision to support the conclusion that the present petition, founded on the notice dated 7 May 1977 (issued after the earlier proceedings), involved a new cause of action and therefore was not barred by O. 23, R. 1(4).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a structured legal analysis grounded in the statutory text and the facts as found in the record.

  1. Elements required for eviction under cl. (k): The Court identified and stated the three essential ingredients the landlord must prove (para 12): (i) the land was taken on lease from Government/DDA/Municipal Corporation; (ii) tenant used premises contrary to conditions imposed on landlord by that authority; and (iii) tenant did not stop the breach after service of notice.
  2. Application of elements to the facts: The opinion finds these elements proved on the record: the lease condition barring non-residential use without DDA consent; the tenant’s admission of commercial (dairy) use; and service of the notice dated 7 May 1977 to stop the user which the tenant did not obey (paras 12–13). Consequently the statutory ingredients under cl. (k) were satisfied.
  3. Statutory framework of S. 14(11): The Court quoted Sub‑Section (11) verbatim (para 14) and interpreted its effect (para 15): where the Controller, after notice to the authority concerned, directs the tenant either to stop the misuse within a specified time or to pay compensation to the authority, no recovery order shall be made provided the tenant complies. The Controller’s discretion between these two alternatives must be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily; it must consider facts, circumstances and the object of the provision.
  4. Purpose of the provisions: The Court explained the twofold object of cl. (k) and S. 14(11): (a) to protect the public interest by ensuring that lands leased by authorities are used for the lease‑purpose; and (b) to protect landlords from cancellation of their lease rights resulting from a tenant’s breach while simultaneously protecting tenants by giving an opportunity to stop the breach or pay compensation (para 16). The Court observed that the question of compensation arises only if the authority is prepared to condone the breach.
  5. Procedural history and remands: The Court recounted the High Court remand (dated October 30/32, 1981 as recorded) which required the Additional Controller to determine the two alternatives under S. 14(11). The Tribunal’s remand to call for a detailed explanation from DDA about tentative dates/conditions for temporary or permanent condonation was addressed (paras 17–19).
  6. DDA’s stance and evidentiary record: The Court examined DDA’s replies (recorded in the opinion) and the recorded statement of DDA’s Deputy Director (OSB) that DDA was not prepared to regularise the misuse permanently or temporarily, but would consider only past misuse regularisation subject to payment of past misuse charges and removal of existing misuse (paras 20–31). From these materials the Court concluded that DDA consistently refused permanent or temporary regularisation.
  7. Effect of DDA’s refusal: Given the DDA’s consistent position that it would not condone future misuse and insisted on vacation/removal (and potential cancellation of lease), the Court concluded there was "no alternative but to direct the tenant to stop the misuse" and that failing compliance, eviction should follow (para 23).
  8. Res judicata and procedural bar arguments: The Court analyzed the tenant’s contention that the present petition was barred by res judicata or O. 23, R. 1(4). The prior petition had been withdrawn pursuant to compromise and therefore was not heard and decided on merits; accordingly it did not constitute res judicata (para 36), relying on P.V. Subha Rao. On O. 23, R. 1(4) the Court adopted the principle (from Vallabh Das and related authorities) that “subject matter” is the bundle of facts making up the cause of action. Because an essential fact in a cl. (k) claim is the service of a notice requiring the tenant to stop the breach, each distinct notice gives rise to a fresh cause of action. The present petition was based on the notice dated 7 May 1977 issued after the earlier proceedings; therefore O. 23, R. 1(4) did not bar the present petition (paras 29–31).
  9. On the Tribunal’s remand: The Court considered the Tribunal’s direction to elicit tentative dates or conditions from DDA. Given DDA’s explicit replies and the Deputy Director’s statement refusing future regularisation, the Court found the remand unnecessary and concluded that a direction to the tenant to stop the misuse (with a specified period) was the appropriate remedy.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Holding (direct effect on parties): The Court allowed the landlord’s appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Rent Control Tribunal, and instead directed that the tenant must stop the misuse (commercial/dairy use) of the premises within three months from the date of the order. If the tenant fails to comply within that period, an order for recovery of possession under cl. (k) of the proviso to Sub‑S. (1) of S. 14 of the Act will be deemed to have been passed and the landlord will be entitled to recover possession. Parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Broader implications: The opinion confines itself to the statutory framework of cl. (k) and S. 14(11), application of established precedents (notably Faqir Chand) and the facts showing DDA’s refusal to condone future misuse. The Court did not purport to lay down any novel principle of law beyond application of these authorities to the facts; the decision directly affects the parties by directing cessation of misuse within the specified period and providing for deemed eviction on default.

Appeal allowed.

    Manohar Lall v. Narain Dass And Another

    This second appeal under S. 39 Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short ‘the Act’) is directed against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated October 4, 1982.

    2. By lease deed dated July 24, 1953 the Delhi Improvement Trust, predecessor-ininterest of the Delhi Development Authority, leased out a plot of land No. 12, Block No. 10B Western Extension Area., New Delhi, to Rattan Lal. He constructed a building thereon and let out a portion, consisting of one room and a covered Verandah in front thereof to Narain Das (respondent tenant) on a monthly rent of Rs. 63/- Rattan Lal later sold this property to Manohar Lal (appellant/landlord) by a sale deed dated November 26, 1961. The respondent attorned to him as a tenant.

    3. Under the terms of the lease deed granted by the D.D.A., the lessee was not entitled to use the said land and building that may be erected thereon for any other purpose than for the purpose of a residential house, without the consent in writing of the lessor. The tenant, however, used the tenanted premises for dairy business. This user, being contrary to the terms of the lease, was objected by the D.D.A. The landlord consequently filed an application against the tenant for recovery of the possession of the premises in dispute under cl.(k), Sub-S. (1) of S. 14 of the Act. Parties, however, arrived at a compromise. The tenant agreed to paw 3/4th amount of the penalty or the premium levied by the DDA for the commercial use of the premises since November 27, 1961 up to date. The landlord agreed to withdraw the eviction petition which was consequently dismissed as such.

    4. The D.D.A. thereafter refused to regularise the commercial user and served the appellant with a notice dated 27-5-74 to show cause as to why the lease be not cancelled for the breach of the said term. The landlord consequently filed a second application for eviction of the tenant from the said premises under cl. (k) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 of the Act. This petition was, however, dismissed on the ground that notice dated June 8, 1974, the basis of the eviction petition, was not a valid notice inasmuch as the tenant was not called upon to stop the alleged misuser of the premises and was not allowed any time for this purpose.

    5. The appellant thereafter served a fresh notice on the tenant and filed another eviction petition on July 4, 1977 for recovery of the possession of the premises under cl.(k) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 of the Act. It was alleged that the tenant notwithstanding the previous notice dated May 7, 1977 was using the tenanted premises for commercial purpose which was contrary to the conditions imposed on the landlord by the DDA while granting him the lease of the land on which the premises were situated. The D.D.A. was also made a party to this petition.

    6. The tenant admitted that he was carrying on the business of a dairy in the premises in dispute. He also admitted the receipt of the notice dated May 7, 1977 asking him to stop the commercial user. He, however, resisted the eviction on the pleas that it was barred by the principles of res judicata and also under the provisions contained in O. 23, R. 1(4), Civil P.C; that the premises in dispute had been let out for commercial purpose and were being used as such since the inception of the tenancy and that the DDA had been regularising the commercial user and this user could be regularised permanently, and that the notice dated May 7, 1977 was invalid.

    7. Sh. J.M Malik, Addl. Controller by his order dated September, 17, 1979, observing that the learned counsel for the respondent had not picked up any conflict with the maintainability of the case, held that the petition was not barred by the provisions contained in S. 11, Civil P.C inasmuch as the previous application had not been decided on merits. He further found that the notice dated May 7, 1977 was valid and the tenant notwithstanding the previous notice had used the premises in his tenancy for commercial purpose which was contrary to the condition imposed on the landlord by the D.D.A. while granting the lease of the land on which the said premises had been constructed. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot (1973) 3 SCR 454 : (AIR 1973 SC 921), he rejected the objection of the tenant that landlord having let out the premises in dispute for commercial purpose could not claim eviction under cl. (k). With these findings he held that the ingredients contained in cl. (k) stand proved. He consequently issued a notice to the DDA under S. 14(11) of the Act calling upon it to explain whether the premises in dispute could be regularised temporarily or permanently and if the answer was in positive on what terms and conditions. The matter was thereafter decided by Sh. H.P Sharma, Additional Controller on December 6, 1980. He directed the landlord to approach the DDA and apply for regularisation of the commercial user, awaiting results thereon by July 2, 1981. The tenant was directed to pay the misuser charges for the past misuser within one month of the order.

    8. Feeling aggrieved the landlord filed a petition in the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution. This Court by order dated October 32, 1981 held that the order of the Addl. Controller directing the landlord to approach the D.D.A. for regularisation of the future non-conforming user was without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The said order was consequently quashed and the matter was sent to the Addl. Controller for determining the two alternatives mentioned in S. 14(11) of the Act.

    9. After the remand, Sh. V.B Gupta, Addl. Controller by order dated May 1, 1982 held that the DDA was not willing to regularise the misuser permanently and directed the tenant to stop the misuser within one month from the date of the order failing which the eviction order shall be deemed to have been passed against the tenant.

    10. Dissatisfied the tenant filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. The appeal was allowed, the order of the Addl. Controller was set aside and the case was remanded back to the Addl. Controller to decide it after finding the tentative date by which the temporary regularisation or permanent regularisation could be permitted.

    11. Feeling aggrieved the landlord has filed this second appeal.

    12. To claim eviction under cl. (k) the landlord was required to prove : (i) that the land on which the tenanted premises are situate had been taken by him on lease from the Government the DDA or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi; (ii) the tenant was using the premises contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the said authority (lessor); and (iii) that the tenant had not stopped the breach of the said conditions even after the service of a notice to that effect on him by the landlord.

    13. It has not been disputed and cannot be disputed that all these ingredients stand proved in this case. Clause (4)(C) of the lease deed dated July 24, 1953, whereby the Delhi Improvement Trust, predecessor-in-interest of Delhi Development Authority, granted the lease of the land on which the premises in dispute are situated in favour of Mr. Rattan Lal, predecessor of the present landlord, imposed a condition on the lessee that it shall not use the said land and the buildings that may be erected thereon, during the lease period for any other purpose than for the purpose of a residential house without the consent in writing of the lessor. The tenant has admitted in the written statement itself that he was using the tenanted premises for commercial purpose. It has also not been disputed that he had been served with the notice dated May 7, 1977 asking him to stop the user and he has not yet stopped the commercial user. All the ingredients required under cl. (K) thus stand proved.

    14. Sub-Section (11) of S. 14 of the Act reads :—

    “No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made on the ground specified in cl. (k) of proviso to Sub-S.(1), if the tenant within such time as may be specified in this behalf by the Controller, complies with the condition imposed on landlord by any of the authorities referred to in that clause or pays to that authority such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct.”

    15. These provisions prohibit the making of an order for the recovery of possession under cl.(k) if the tenant complies with the order which the Controller is obliged to make under Sub-S.(1). This Sub-Section requires the Controller to make either of the two orders namely, (i) directing the tenant to stop the misuser within a specified period; or (ii) to pay to the authority concerned such amount by way of compensation as the Controller may direct. No doubt, it gives discretion to the Controller to pass either of these two orders, this discretion, however, cannot be exercised arbitrarily and has to be exercised judicially. The order has to be made keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the object for the enactment of these provisions. It is also a settled law that the order under Sub-S.(1) has to be made after notice to the authority concerned. (lessor).

    16. The object of enacting cl. (k) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 and Sub-S.(11) of S. 14 of the Act, in my view, is two fold. “The legislature had clearly taken note of the fact that enormous extents of lands have been leased by the three authorities mentioned in that clause, and has expressed its anxiety to see that these lands are used for the purpose for which they were leased.” (See Faqir Chand, (AIR 1973 SC 921) (supra). The other object was to protect the landlords, whose right to claim eviction under the ordinary law had been curtailed by the Act, from the cancellation of their leasehold rights of such lands on account of the breach, by the tenants, of any of the conditions imposed on them by these authorities. At the same time by enacting Sub-S.(11) the legislature sought to protect the tenants from eviction by giving a further opportunity to stop the breach or to pay such compensation as the Controller may fix. The question of payment of compensation, in my opinion, would arise only when the authority concerned is prepared to condone the breach otherwise neither of above mentioned two purposes for enacting these provisions would be achieved.

    17. This Court by order dated October 30, 1981, while remanding the case back to the Addl. Controller, directed him to determine the two alternatives mentioned in Sub-S.(11) of S. 14 of the Act. Learned Addl. Controller held that the DDA was not prepared to regularise the misuser permanently and directed the tenant to stop the commercial user. The learned Tribunal in appeal observed :

    “As already pointed out above, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sultan Singh in the civil writ between the parties has clearly held that it is to be found as to what compensation, if any, can be payable by the tenant for misuse charges and this has to be for the past as well for the future. Delhi Development Authority in its reply does state about past regularisation for the misuser and in the reply filed in this Court, stated that the misuser charges up till 30-9-82 are none but for the future misuser charges they are not ready to make any statement. The Delhi Development Authority has been a party to these proceedings and, therefore, is aware of the directions given by the High Court. It must file a detailed reply before the matter can be agitated. If necessary, it is a fit case where the evidence should be recorded by calling an officer of the Delhi Development Authority to spell out as to up to which date they are willing to condone the breaches temporarily or permanently for the future and on what compensation and further what is their general policy with respect to the shop in question.”

    With the above observations the case was remanded with directions to the Addl. Controller to decide, if any tentative date was known up till which temporary regularisation charges could be fixed or permanent regularisation could be permitted.

    18. Mr. B.R Malik, learned counsel appearing for the landlord, strenuously assailed this order of the learned Tribunal. He contended that the Delhi Development Authority was a party to the eviction petition since beginning and had taken the stand that it was not prepared to regularise the breach. In these circumstances, argued the learned counsel, the Tribunal was in error in remanding the case.

    19. Undoubtedly the Delhi Development Authority was a party respondent to the eviction petition filed by the landlord in the year 1977. It filed a written statement. The relevant portions of para 3 of the preliminary objection and para 21 (additional pleas) read as under :—

    “3......... The portion of the premises on this plot is being used for commercial purpose and, as such, the same is in contravention of the terms and conditions and, therefore, the lease is liable to be cancelled. It is further submitted that the answering respondent is not prepared to regularise the misuser of the premises and to accept the consideration money and is interested in the vacation of the misuser...”

    ADDITIONAL PLEAS :

    21. That the answering respondent reserves the right to take action against the petitioner for contravention of the terms and conditions of the lease deed under the provisions of Delhi Development Act, 1957 and the Master Plan and Zonal Plan of Delhi.”

    20. As noticed above Mr. J.M Marik Addl. Controller after holding that the ingredients of cl. (k) had been proved, directed that notice be issued to the DDA under Sub-S.(11) of S. 14 of the Act. The authority filed a reply to this notice. The relevant portion of the para 3 of the reply reads as under :—

    “Question for permanent commercialisation of the premises under reference does not arise till the Zonal Plan of this area is approved by the Central Government. However, the application for the change of the user may be considered afresh under the rules and regulations, if the same is submitted by the lessee.”

    21. After the remand by the High Court the Delhi Development Authority filed another reply dated April 7, 1982. The relevant portion of para 3 reads as under :

    “question for permanent commercialisation of the premises under reference does not arise till the Zonal plan of this area is approved by the Central Govt. However, the application for the change of the user may be considered afresh under the rules and regulations if the same is submitted by the lessee.”

    22. In this second appeal Deputy Director (OSB) Delhi Development Authority was examined. He deposed :—

    “As per the existing policy the DDA is not at all going to regularise the misuse in respect of the said property permanently or temporarily but is keenly interested to get the misuse removed/vacated. However, DDA can regularise only the past misuse subject to payment of misuse charges for the past period provided the lessee removes the existing misuse in the premises”.

    23. From various replies filed by the DDA and the statement of the Deputy Director (OSB) recorded by this Court on 27-1-86 it is clear that DDA was not prepared to regularise the misuse permanently or temporarily. On the other hand it was insisted to get the misuse vacated and in default threatening cancellation of lease. In these circumstances, there was no alternative but to direct the tenant to stop the misuse and in default to face eviction.

    24. Mr. P.K Jaitley, learned counsel for the tenant contended that the DDA had issued a public notice dated April 6, 1985 which had been published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, Part II dated April 6, 1985. It shows that the DDA was proposing to make changes in the Master Plan. According to these changes the user of the premises in dispute would be converted as commercial. Admittedly, no change has yet been made in the Master Plan or the Zonal Plan regarding the user of the property in dispute. Mere proposal is not of much help.

    25. Learned counsel for the tenant also argued that the authority had regularised the commercial user in respect of adjacent premises and its action in not regularising the commercial user of the premises in dispute was discriminatory. I am afraid, this question cannot be gone into in these proceedings.

    26. Mr. Jaitley, learned counsel for the respondent also assailed the finding of the learned Addl. Controller regarding the maintainability of the eviction petition. It was argued that the landlord had earlier filed an application claiming eviction under cl. (k) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 of the Act, i.e on the same ground on which eviction was claimed in the present eviction petition. The application filed earlier was withdrawn by him without the permission from the Court and, therefore, the present application was barred by the principles of res judicata as well as by virtue of the provisions contained in O. 23, R. 1(4), Civil P.C

    27. Mr. Malik, learned counsel appearing for the landlord, on the other hand, contended that the tenant had specifically raised this plea in the written statement but had given up the same as was apparent from the order of the learned Addl. Controller. Even in the appeal filed by the tenant against the said order this finding was not assailed. He, therefore, could not raise this plea now in the second appeal. It was also pointed out that there is no bar of res judicata as the matter had been compromised. Provisions of O. 23, R. 1(4), CPC were not attracted as the present petition has been filed on a new cause of action which arose after the decision of the earlier case. He also pointed out that according to the law which was prevalent in 1966, i.e, at the time of the decision of the earlier petition, the landlord who had himself let out the premises for use for a purpose which was contrary to the terms imposed on him by the authority concerned while granting the lease of the land on which the premises were situate was estopped from claiming eviction under cl.(k). There was a change in this view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Faqir Chand v. Ram Rattan Bhanot, (AIR 1973 SC 921)(supra) which was decided in the year 1973.

    28. I have carefully examined the contentions of the parties. The previous petition filed under cl. (k), as noticed earlier, had been withdrawn as a result of the compromise between the parties. To create the bar of res judicata the matter in the earlier case, inter alia, must have been heard and finally decided by the Court. The petition having been dismissed as withdrawn on the basis of a compromise, the matter had not been heard and decided on merits. There being no decision of the court the previous order based on compromise does not bar the present application. That order did not operate as res judicata See P.V Subha Rao v. V. Jagannadha Rao, AIR 1967 SC 591.

    29. Sub-rule (4) of R. 1 of O. 23, CPC provides that where the plaintiff withdraws from a suit without the permission of the Court under sub-rule (3) he would be barred from bringing a fresh suit in respect of same subject matter. The term ‘subject matter’ means plaintiffs cause of action for a suit. As observed by the Supreme Court in Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madanlal, AIR 1970 SC 987, the term ‘subject matter’ in O. 23, R. 1 means the bundle of facts which have to be proved in order to entitle the plaintiff to the relief claimed by him. Where the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first suit.

    30. To claim eviction under cl. (k), as observed earlier, the landlord, inter alia, was required to prove that the tenant had not stopped the breach of the condition even after the service of the notice on him by the landlord. In other words, one of the essential facts required to be proved in such a case is the service of the notice on the tenant requiring him to stop the breach of the condition imposed on the landlord by the authority concerned. Each such notice furnished a new cause of action. The present petition was based on the notice dated May 7, 1977 which was issued long after the decision of the first case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the subject-matter in the present I application was the same. This view finds support from a decision of this Court in Rajeshwar Dayal Saxena v. Nanak Chand SAO No. 165 of 1981 decided on October 20, 1981.**

    31. In the view I have taken above I need not go into the question whether the landlord had given up this plea and, therefore, could not raise this plea in this appeal.

    32. For the reasons recorded above I allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order and instead direct the tenant to stop the misuser within three months from today. In default, the order for recovery of possession under cl.(K) of the proviso to Sub-S.(1) of S. 14 of the Act would be deemed to have been passed against him and the landlord would be entitled to recover the possession of the premises in dispute. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

    Appeal allowed.
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    Comments

    Manohar Lall v. Narain Dass And Another
    (Aug 5, 1986)