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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • 1979 SC 989 (1) wherein the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 along with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act
  • provisions of Sections 11, 32 and 33 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits valuation Act (VII of 1956)
  • Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.9. Relevant part of Section 7 (iv) of the Court fees Act, 1870
  • suit.18. Sections 32 and 33 of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and suits valuation Act (VII of 1956)
  • Order 7 of the Code along with provisions of Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870
  • section 32 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and suits valuation Act (VII of 1956)
  • provisions of Tamil Nadu Court fees and Suits Valuation Act, the provisions
  • provisions of Order 20 Rules 12, 16 and 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 7 (iv) (c) by the Provincial Legislature by Punjab Act 31 of 1953
  • Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act, 1918,
  • SECTION 9 SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • Order XX, Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure.Value: (a)
  • clause (c) of Section 7 (iv) of the Court-fees Act, 1870,
  • Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act,
  • Section 7 (iv) (c) as amended by Punjab Act 31 of 1953
  • provisions of Section 7 (iv) (f) of the Court-fees Act.
  • Order 7 of the Code. Order 7 rule 1(i) of die Code
  • Order 7 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act of 1870.
  • 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887,
  • SECTION 10 DELHI HIGH COURT ACT
  • Order XX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil
  • SECTION 8 SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • Section 7 (iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
  • SECTION 7 COURT FEES ACT
  • Rule 2 of Order 8 of the Code
  • sub-section (2) or subsection (3),
  • Order 7 Rule 2 of the Code
  • Rule 11 of Order 7
  • Section 7(iv)(c)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • 1979 SC 989 (1) wherein the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 along with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act
  • provisions of Sections 11, 32 and 33 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits valuation Act (VII of 1956)
  • Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.9. Relevant part of Section 7 (iv) of the Court fees Act, 1870
  • suit.18. Sections 32 and 33 of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and suits valuation Act (VII of 1956)
  • Order 7 of the Code along with provisions of Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870
  • section 32 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and suits valuation Act (VII of 1956)
  • provisions of Tamil Nadu Court fees and Suits Valuation Act, the provisions
  • provisions of Order 20 Rules 12, 16 and 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • section 7 (iv) (c) by the Provincial Legislature by Punjab Act 31 of 1953
  • Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act, 1918,
  • SECTION 9 SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • Order XX, Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure.Value: (a)
  • clause (c) of Section 7 (iv) of the Court-fees Act, 1870,
  • Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act,
  • Section 7 (iv) (c) as amended by Punjab Act 31 of 1953
  • provisions of Section 7 (iv) (f) of the Court-fees Act.
  • Order 7 of the Code. Order 7 rule 1(i) of die Code
  • Order 7 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act of 1870.
  • 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887,
  • SECTION 10 DELHI HIGH COURT ACT
  • Order XX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil
  • SECTION 8 SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • Section 7 (iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
  • SECTION 7 COURT FEES ACT
  • Rule 2 of Order 8 of the Code
  • sub-section (2) or subsection (3),
  • Order 7 Rule 2 of the Code
  • Rule 11 of Order 7
  • Section 7(iv)(c)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an appeal under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act against the decision of a learned Single Judge dated 24th September, 1985. The appellant (defendant) had filed an application seeking two reliefs: first, that Issue No. I—whether the suit of the plaintiff is properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction—be treated as a preliminary issue; and second, that the plaint be rejected on the ground that the plaintiff had deliberately undervalued the relief for court fee and jurisdiction purposes. The suit was valued by the plaintiff at Rs. 25,00,000 for jurisdiction and Rs. 500 for court fee. The Single Judge dismissed the appellant’s application, holding that the suit was not undervalued and that the valuation was reasonable in the circumstances.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the valuation of the suit by the plaintiff for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction can be questioned or interfered with by the Court.
  2. Whether the plaint should be rejected on the ground that the plaintiff deliberately and arbitrarily undervalued the relief sought for court fee and jurisdiction purposes.
  3. The applicability and interpretation of Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and related provisions under the Suits Valuation Act and procedural rules in suits for accounts.
  4. The extent of the Court’s power to examine and interfere with the plaintiff’s valuation under the Code of Civil Procedure and relevant statutes.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the suit had been deliberately undervalued by the plaintiff for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction.
  • Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in A.KA.CT.V.CT Meenakshisundram v. A.KA.CT.V.CT Venkatachalam Chettiar, arguing that the provisions considered by the Supreme Court are similar to those applicable in Delhi, thus requiring reconsideration of the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court.
  • The appellant argued that Order 7 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure allows the Court to question the valuation put by the plaintiff for court fee purposes.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent relied on the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Smt. Sheila Devi & others v. Sh. Kishan Lal Kalra & others, which held that the Court has no power to interfere with the plaintiff's valuation under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870.
  • It was argued that the plaintiff was not in a position to estimate the exact amount entitled after rendition of accounts, and the valuation fixed was reasonable and adequate.
  • The respondent emphasized that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act considered by the Supreme Court differ materially from those applicable in Delhi.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.KA.CT.V.CT Meenakshisundram v. A.KA.CT.V.CT Venkatachalam Chettiar, AIR 1979 SC 989 Construction of Section 35(1) of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act relating to valuation in suits for accounts. The Court distinguished this decision on the basis that the Tamil Nadu provisions materially differ from Delhi’s, thus not requiring reconsideration of the Delhi Full Bench's ruling.
Smt. Sheila Devi & others v. Sh. Kishan Lal Kalra & others, ILR 1974 Delhi (II) 491 Full Bench decision on the non-interference of Court with plaintiff’s valuation under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act. Followed by the Single Judge and upheld by the Division Bench as binding precedent.
The Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Hansa Chemical Pharmacy, ILR (1979) II Delhi 236 Applicability of Punjab High Court rules under Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act to Delhi suits for accounts. Confirmed the applicability of these rules in Delhi, supporting the valuation approach adopted.
Chillakuru Chenehurami Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenehurami Reddy, I.L.R. 1969 A.P. 1042 Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court holding that Court may inquire into the valuation put by the plaintiff for court fees. Noted but distinguished due to differing statutory provisions in Andhra Pradesh compared to Delhi.
Shri Manohar Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana and others, 1977 PLR 181 Followed the Full Bench decision of Delhi High Court on valuation and court fee. Reinforced the binding nature of the Full Bench decision.
Walaiti Ram v. Sri Krishan, 1975 RLR 501 Followed the Full Bench decision on valuation and court fee. Supported the principle that Court cannot interfere with plaintiff’s valuation under Section 7(iv)(f).
Dabur (S.K Burman) v. Vikas Pharmaceuticals, 1983 Patent & Trade Mark Cases (Vol 3) 169 Followed the Full Bench decision on valuation and court fee. Further affirmed the established principle.
Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 Clarified that in suits for accounts, the plaintiff may put a tentative valuation, which must be reasonable and adequate. Quoted approvingly to support the reasonableness of plaintiff’s valuation in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the legal framework governing valuation of suits for court fee and jurisdiction in the context of suits for accounts. It noted that under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the plaintiff has the right to state any valuation for the relief sought, and the Court has no power to interfere with this valuation. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in Smt. Sheila Devi & others, which had consistently held this position, supported by various High Court precedents from Lahore, Bombay, Madras, and others.

The Court distinguished the Supreme Court decision in A.KA.CT.V.CT Meenakshisundram on the ground that it interpreted materially different provisions under the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, which are not applicable in Delhi. The Court also referred to rules framed under Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, as applicable in Delhi, which allow the plaintiff to put an estimated valuation that must be reasonable and adequate but cannot be arbitrarily or deliberately undervalued.

The Court considered procedural provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure and concluded that these do not empower the Court to question the plaintiff’s valuation where the suit is of the nature contemplated by Section 7(iv)(f). The Court emphasized the legislative intent to avoid manipulation of jurisdiction and court fee by litigants through arbitrary valuation.

Given the binding nature of the Full Bench decision and the absence of any legislative amendment affecting Section 7(iv)(f) in Delhi, the Court held that there was no reason to reconsider the established law. The appellant’s contention that the valuation was deliberately undervalued was not accepted as the valuation was found to be reasonable in the circumstances.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

The Court upheld the principle that under Section 7(iv)(f) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, the plaintiff’s valuation of relief in suits for accounts is entitled to deference, and the Court does not have jurisdiction to interfere with such valuation unless it is shown to be unreasonable or inadequate. The decision reinforces the binding precedent set by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court and clarifies that differing provisions in other states’ statutes do not affect this principle in Delhi.

The direct effect is that the plaint valuing the suit at Rs. 500 for court fee and Rs. 25,00,000 for jurisdiction was held valid, and the appellant’s application to treat valuation as a preliminary issue or to reject the plaint was rightly dismissed. No new precedent was set; rather, the Court affirmed existing law and legislative intent to prevent arbitrary interference with plaintiff’s valuation in such suits.

    Commercial Aviation & Travel Co. (Inc.) v. Vimla Panna Lal

    Yogeshwar Dayal, J. (Rule D.B):— This is an appeal under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act against the decision of learned Single Judge dated 24th September, 1985.

    2. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant (defendant) had claimed two reliefs in his application, I. A. No. 5279/85. The first relief was that Issue No. I, as to whether the suit of the plaintiff is properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction, if not, to what effect, be treated as a preliminary issue; and, secondly, that the plaint be rejected as the plaintiff has deliberately and intentionally under-valued the relief for purpose of court fee and jurisdiction.

    3. In the plaint the suit is valued for the purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 25,00,000/- and for purposes of court fee at Rs. 500/-.

    4. Before the learned Single Judge, the counsel for the defendant referred to various paragraphs of the plaint with a view to show that the plaintiffs have arbitrarily valued the suit for purposes of court fee and he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A.KA.CT.V.CT Meenakshisundram v. A.KA.CT.V.CT Venkatachalam Chettiar AIR 1979 sc 989 (1) wherein the provisions of section 7 (iv) (f) of the court fees act, 1870 along with the provisions of the tamil nadu court-fees and suits valuation act came up for consideration. Learned Single Judge, however, followed the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Sheila Devi & others v. Sh. Kishan Lal Kalra & others, ILR 1974 Delhi (II) 491 (2). Learned Single Judge took the view that the Supreme Court in its judgment was construing the provisions of Tamil Nadu Court fees and Suits Valuation Act, the provisions of which are not similar to the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (f) of the Court-fees Act. Learned Single Judge was also of the view that the plaintiff was not in a position to estimate correctly the amount which she may be entitled to, after the rendition of accounts and the valuation fixed for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction cannot be said to be unreasonable taking into account the circumstances of the case. In view of these findings, learned Single Judge held that, “Suit cannot be said to have been under valued” and in this view of the matter, the application of the appellant was dismissed.

    5. Before us also, Mr. S. K. Mehra, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Sheila Devi & others (supra) requires reconsideration and he insisted in submitting that the provisions with which the Supreme Court was dealing are similar to the one in Delhi and, therefore, the decision of the Full Bench of Delhi and, therefore, the decision of the Full Bench of Delhi High Court require reconsideration.

    6. The Full Bench decision of this Court had noticed the consistent views of High Courts of Lahore, Bombay, Madras, Mysore, Rangoon, Hyderabad and the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Peshwar. In the Lahore High Court the consistent view has been taken right from 1913 including the Full Benches decision in the cases of Barru and other v. Lachman & others, 111 p.m 1913, page 4 (Full Bench), Rattigan, Beadon and Agnew, JJJ., (3) Mt. Zeb-ul-nisa and others v. Choudhury Din Mohd. & others, AIR 1941 Lahore 47 (4), Emperor v. Ralla Ram, AIR 1946 Lahore (5) Ghulam Quadir v. Bulagi Mal and Sons, AIR 1949 Lahore 1 (5) Karam Ilahi v. Muhammad Bashir, AIR 1949 Lahore 116 (7) and Vishwa Nath and another v. Smt. Sita Bai Anand, AIR 1952 Punjab 335 (8) besides numerous other judgements. The Bombay High Court's view was identical with the view of the Lahore High Court in the three decisions noticed in the Full Bench decision, namely. Burjor Pesponji Satna v. Mariman Minoo Todiwalla, AIR 1953 Bombay 382 (9), Chaela CT, and Dixit J., Radbar Buwa v. Umakant Bumrao, AIR 1958 Bombay 310 (10), J. R. Mudholkar, J. and Chhottalal Kalidas v. Laxmidas Mavaram, AIR 1959 Bombay 517 (11), Shah and Gokhale. The Madras High Court (Full Bench) decision was given as late as in the case or Chelasami Ramiah v. Chelasami Ramasami, 18 Indian Cases Courts and distinguished their decisions. The Full Bench had also noticed the observations of Hidayatulla, C.J in the case of Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan† , AIR 1970 SC 1953 (13) to the following effect: —

    “Now, it is well known that in a suit for accounts, the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount which would result after the taking of accounts. He may do so if he is able to; but if he is not, he can put a tentative valuation upon his suit for accounts taking care that the valuation is adequate and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case. But, the rule also obtains that if the amount which is found is larger than the amount at which he stated his tentative valuation, he must file the appeal against the larger amount and in the forum before which an appeal of that valuation can go. This rule does not apply where the amount decreed is below the valuation in the original Court.”

    8. After noticing the entire case law, the Full Bench of this Court took the view that paragraph (iv) of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act gives a right to the plaintiff in any of the suits mentioned in the clauses of that paragraph to place any valuation that he likes on the relief he seeks, and the court has no power to interfere with plaintiff's valuation for purposes of court fees. In view of Section 9 of Suits Valuation Act, the value for purposes of jurisdiction follows the value fixed for purposes of court fees. The value for purposes of jurisdiction was, however, subject to rules, if any, framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.

    9. Relevant part of Section 7 (iv) of the Court fees Act, 1870 reads as under: —

    “7 (iv) In suits —

    (a) for movable property where the subject matter has no market value, as, for instance, in the case of documents relating to title;
    (b) to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property;
    (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed;
    (d) to obtain an injunction;
    (e) for a right to some benefit (not herein otherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and
    (f) for accounts —

    According to the amount at which the relief is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal.

    In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which he values the relief sought.”

    Section 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, read as under:

    “8. Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs v, vi and ix, paragraph x, clause (d), court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same.

    9. When the subject-matter of suits of any class, other than suits mentioned in the Court-fees Act, 1870; Section 7, paragraphs v and vi and paragraph x, clause (d), is such that in the opinion of the High Court it does not admit of being satisfactorily valued, the High Court may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court-fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject matter were of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf.”

    10. So far as suits for accounts are concerned. Punjab High Court had framed rules under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, namely, Rules 3 and 4 for fixing court fee and jurisdictional value for a suit for accounts. Normally in view of section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, value for purposes of jurisdiction follows the value fixed for purposes of court fee but where rules are framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, it will be such value for purposes of jurisdiction as is provided for in the rules. Rules 3 and 4 of the rules framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act are relevant for our purpose.

    Rule 3 reads as under: —

    “Suits in which the plaintiff in the plaint asks for accounts only not being: —

    (i) Suits to recover the amount which may be found due to the plaintiff on taking unsettled accounts between him and the defendant;

    “(ii) Suits of either of the kinds described in Order XX, Rule 13 of Code of Civil Procedure.

    Value: —
    (a) For the purposes of the Court-fees Act, 1870 . . . . Rs. 200/-
    (b) For the purposes of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 . . . . Rs. 1000/-”

    While Rule 4 reads as under: —

    “4 (i) Suits in which the plaintiff in the plaint seeks to recover the amount which may be found to the plaintiff on taking unsettled accounts between him and defendant;

    (ii) Suits of either of the kinds described in Order XX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure: —
    Value for the purposes of court fee . . . . as determined by the Court-fees Act, 1870.

    Value for the purposes of jurisdiction for the purpose of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, as valued by the plaintiff in the plaint subject to determination by the Court at any stage of the trial.”

    11. Prithvi Raj, J. had held in the case of The The Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd…Plaintiff v. Hansa Chemical Pharmacy…Defendant, ILR (1979) II Delhi, 236 (14) that these rules which are embodied in Chapter III-C of the Rules and Orders (Volume J) of the Punjab High Court are applicable to the Union Territory of Delhi. Therefore in view of these Rules, the plaintiff could put his estimated valuation for purposes of jurisdiction. The plaintiff valued this suit for purposes of jurisdiction at a figure which brought this suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court. The grievance is that the value for jurisdiction is higher but that makes no practical difference since the value for purposes of court fee could be different in view of the Rules being framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act and even if the value is fixed for jurisdiction at a higher figure, jurisdiction will remain this Court. So far as value for the purposes of court fee is concerned, learned single Judge rightly followed the decision of the Full Bench of this Court referred to earlier.

    12. It was contended by Mr. Mehra that Order 7 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure shows that the Court can question the valuation put by the plaintiff while valuing his relief for purposes of court fees. Rule 2 of Order 8 of the Code reads as under: —

    “R-2. Where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of money, the plaint shall state the precise amount claimed. But, where the plaintiff sues for mesne profits, or for an amount which will be found due to him on taking unsettled accounts between him and the defendant, the plaint shall state approximately the amount sued for.”

    The Full Bench had been at pains to consider this Rule as well as Rule 11 of Order 7 and even the provisions of Order 20 Rules 12, 16 and 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    14. The Full Bench noted the various words used in various parts of Order 7 of the Code. Order 7 rule 1(i) of die Code speaks of the “value of the subject matter”. Order 7 Rule 2 of the Code speaks of the “amount sued for”. Paragraph (iv) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act speaks of, “the amount at which he values the relief”. The Full Bench considered the entire scheme of Order 7 of the Code along with provisions of Section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 and came to the conclusion that paragraph (iv) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act gives a right to the plaintiff to place any value that he likes on the relief he seeks and the Court has no power to interfere with the plaintiff's value. It was also held that this view is quite inconformity with the nature of the suit mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of paragraph (iv) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act.

    15. Mr. Mehra referred to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K.A.CT.V.CT Meenakshisundaram Chettiar V. A.K.A.V.CT Venkatachalam Chettiar, (1979) 3 S.C.R, 385. (15) This case related to the proper construction of provisions of section 35 (1) of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, XIV, off 1955. Section 35 (1) of the said Act is as follows: —

    “In a suit for accounts, fee shall be computed on the amount sued for as estimated in the plaint.”

    16. While construing this provision, the Supreme Court approved the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Chillakuru Chenehurami Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenehurami Reddy, I.L.R, 1969 A.P, 1042. (16)

    17. It will again be noticed from the said judgment that the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court consisting of P. Jaganmohan Reddy, Chief Justice (as His Lordship then was) Mr. Justice Seshachalapathi and Mr. Justice Chinnappa Reddy (as Their Lordships then were) was considering the provisions of Sections 11, 32 and 33 of the Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits valuation Act (VII of 1956) and had taken the view that the Court could enquire into the valuation put by the plaintiff for purposes of court fees. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court noticed the conflicts which were raised in that part of the country and also noticed the Statement of objects and reasons of the Bill which was later on enacted as Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and suits valuation act (vii of 1956). The objects and reasons are quoted at page 1055 of the Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court, which read as under: —

    “The provisions relating to court-fees and those relating to valuation of suits are so interlocked that it is considered expedient to have both of them enacted in a single Act. The method of valuing suits forms one Chapter in this Bill, the main purpose of which is to place the said law on a proper basis. It should not be left to the choice of a party to a litigation whether a suit should be decided by the Court of a District Munsif or a superior Court, nor, should the determination and payment of the proper court fee be left to the ingenious manipulations of the litigant. x x x x Chapter IV prescribes the method of computation of fee. Various classes of suits are dealt with independently in separate clauses and there is a residuary clause relating to suits not otherwise provided for. Fee is made payable not only by a plaintiff who seeks and obtains relief but also by a defendant who seeks and obtains affirmatives relief. In prescribing rates of fee, care is taken to see that mere alterations in the language of the pleadings do not result in any difference in the rate of fee payable. Further, the provisions are framed that the fee payable is in proportion to the value of the subject-matter in dispute. Chapter V provides for valuation of suits.

    It has been made obligatory on the courts to determine issues regarding court-fee and valuation before the hearing of the suit.”

    18. Sections 32 and 33 of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and suits valuation Act (VII of 1956) are also quoted in the Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court which lead as under: —

    “32. (1) In a suit for accounts, fee shall be computed on the amount estimated in the plaint. (2) Where the amount payable to the plaintiff as ascertained in the suit is in excess of the amount as estimated in the plaint, no decree directing payment of the amount as so ascertained shall be passed until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee that would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the amount so ascertained, is paid.

    (3) Where in any such suit it is found that any amount is payable to the defendant, no decree shall be passed in his favour until he pays the fee due on the amount.

    (4) Whether or not a decree is passed under sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), the fee payable under either of the said sub-sections shall be recoverable as if it were an arrear of land revenue.

    33. (1) In a suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts or for accounts of dissolved partnership, fee shall be computed on the value of the plaintiff's share in the partnership as estimated by the plaintiff.

    (2) If the value of the plaintiff's share as ascertained in the suit exceeds the value as estimated in the plaint, no decree, or where there has been a preliminary decree, no final decree shall be passed in favour of the plaintiff, no payment shall be made out of the assets of the partnership and no property shall be allotted towards the plaintiff's share, until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee that would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the value so ascertained, is paid.

    (3) No final decree shall be passed in favour of a defendant, no payment shall be made out of the assets of the partnership and no property shall be allotted towards his share in any suit such “the fee computed on the amount or value of his share of the assets of the partnership is paid.”

    (4) Whether or not a decree is passed, payment made or property allotted under sub-section (2) or subsection (3), the fee payable under either of the said sub-sections shall be recoverable as if it were an arrear of land revenue.”

    19. It Will be noticed that at once that under the aforesaid two sections, court fee is to be computed on the amount estimated in the plaint and not on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint as under section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act of 1870. This very distinction is brought out by the Full Bench itself at page 1056 of the Reports and the Andhra Pradesh Full Bench bad taken pains to interpret the word, “estimated” used in section 32 (1) of the Andhra Pradesh Court-fees and suits valuation Act (VII of 1956) and thus the Full Bench noticed that,

    “It appears to us that the legislature now clearly enjoins the duty on the plaintiff to endeavour to estimate or appraise the value of the relief he seeks. He has to make a bona fide effort at valuation to find out the worth of the relief he seeks. He cannot arbitrarily and deliberately under value the relief because in such cases he cannot be said to have made an estimate at all. Whatever doubts there might have been regarding the construction of section 7 (iv) of the Court Fees Act of 1870, those doubts have now been dispelled under the new Act.”

    20. It will, thus, be noticed that the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of A.KA.C T.V.CT Meenakshisundram Chettiar (supra) was based on its own provisions as prevalent in Andhra Pradesh.

    21. It will again be not out of place to mention that though the Full Bench decisions in this part of the country are there from 1913, the Legislature thought it fit to amend clause (c) of Section 7 (iv) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, namely the addition of proviso to section 7 (iv) (c) by the Provincial Legislature by Punjab Act 31 of 1953 which was extended to Delhi. So far as Section 7 (iv) (c) as amended by Punjab Act 31 of 1953 and applicable to Delhi is concerned, it reads as under: —

    (iv) In suits —

    (a) for moveable property where the subject-matter has no market-value, as, for instance, in the case of documents relating to title,

    (b) to enforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it is joint family property;

    (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed;

    (d) . . . . . . . .

    (e) . . . . . . . .

    (f) . . . . . . . .

    (Provided further that in suits coming under sub-clause (c), in cases where the relief sought is with reference to any property such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of this section.)

    22. If the interpretation of Section 7 (iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act by the High Courts in this part of the country was not according to the intention of the legislature, there was no reason for the Legislature while amending Section 7(iv)(c) to also amend Section 7 (iv)(f) of the Court-fees Act. It will be noticed that in Punjab a proviso was added to Section 7 (iv)(c) when the suits deal with property and this proviso has been extended to Delhi. We are, therefore, of the firm view that the decision of the Full Bench of this Court does not require any reconsideration in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of A.K.A.CT V.CT Meenakshisundaram Chettiar (supra).

    23. In fact, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court has been repeatedly followed by Joshi, J. in the case of Shri Manohar Lal Gupta v. State of Haryana and others (1977) 79 P.L.R.D, 181 (17), by S. Rangarajan, J. in the case of Walaiti Ram V. Sri Krishan, 1975 R.L.R, 501 (18) and by Avadh Behari, J. in the case of Dabur (S.K Burman) V. Vikas Pharmaceuticals, 1983 Patent & Trade Mark Cases (Vol 3) 169. (19)

    24. We are bound by the Full Bench decision and are not persuaded to refer the matter to a larger Bench. There is also another reason for it. As far back as 1913 this has the law in this part of the country and we for one would not like the law to get unsettled suddenly by referring the matter to the larger Bench, particularly when the Act with which the Supreme Court or the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing was materially a different provision. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.
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