Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, punishable under Section 5(2)
  • section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Section 101 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5 (1) (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 161, Penal Code.
  • Section 5(1)(d) of the (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
  • Section 4(1), Prevention of Corruption Act
  • Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.3.
  • Section 161, Indian Penal Code,
  • SECTION 101 EVIDENCE ACT
  • SECTION 161 PENAL CODE
  • section 342 Cr. P.C
  • Section 4 (1)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, punishable under Section 5(2)
  • section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Section 101 of the Evidence Act
  • Section 5 (1) (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 161, Penal Code.
  • Section 5(1)(d) of the (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,
  • Section 4(1), Prevention of Corruption Act
  • Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.3.
  • Section 161, Indian Penal Code,
  • SECTION 101 EVIDENCE ACT
  • SECTION 161 PENAL CODE
  • section 342 Cr. P.C
  • Section 4 (1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Satish Chand Sharma, was charged by the Special Judge, Delhi, under Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for an offence punishable under Section 5(2) of that Act), and under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. The respondent was finally acquitted by the trial judge by an order dated 23rd May, 1976. The State appealed against that acquittal.

The prosecution case, based on a complaint by Shri Jaswant Singh (Proprietor, M/s Khalsa Tyre Soles), alleged that the respondent, employed as Engineering Supervisor (Automobiles) at Modern Bakeries (a Government of India enterprise), obstructed timely payment of bills so as to extort Rs. 250 as a bribe in relation to two bills (No. 1187 for Rs. 285 and No. 1188), together totaling Rs. 1,045. The complainant alleged that an appointment to pay Rs. 250 was fixed for 20.12.1974; a trap was conducted with two panch witnesses and an investigating officer; the respondent was observed to accept money, which was purportedly seized and the respondent's left hand and left coat pocket were washed, producing a colour reaction with sodium carbonate solution.

The prosecution primarily relied upon the testimony of the complainant (PW2), two panch witnesses (PW3 and PW4), and the investigating officer (PW7). The trial judge acquitted the respondent; the State appealed, and this opinion is the appellate court's consideration of that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellate court should interfere with the trial court's acquittal where the view taken by the trial court is not shown to be devoid of reason or perverse (as framed by reliance on Caetano Piedade Fernanda v. Union Territory of Goa, Daman & Diu).
  2. Whether the prosecution had proved, as a foundational fact, that a demand and acceptance of bribe occurred such that the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act could be invoked.
  3. Whether the prosecution evidence (including the trap, the testimony of the complainant and panch witnesses, the recovery and handling of currency, and the other surrounding circumstances) was sufficiently reliable and inspiring to sustain a conviction.

Arguments of the Parties

Argument highlighted by Mr. D.R. Sethi

  • Invocation of the appellate restraint principle: Mr. D.R. Sethi drew the court's attention to the rule regarding the jurisdiction of the appellate court in acquittal appeals, relying on Caetano Piedade Fernanda v. Union Territory of Goa, Daman & Diu (AIR 1977 S.C. 135). The rule states that an appellate court should not disturb an acquittal unless the trial court's view is devoid of reason or perverse, and if the trial court's view is a reasonably possible view the appellate court should not substitute its own view merely because it prefers another.

Argument highlighted by Mr. G.S. Sharma

  • Reliance on statutory presumption under Section 4(1), Prevention of Corruption Act: Mr. G.S. Sharma argued that once the prosecution recovered the money from the accused's possession, the presumption under Section 4(1) would apply and the onus would shift to the accused to explain the possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Caetano Piedade Fernanda and another v. Union Territory of Goa, Daman & Diu, Panaji, Goa, AIR 1977 S.C. 135 The principle that an appellate court should not interfere with an acquittal unless the trial court's view is devoid of reason or perverse; if the trial court's view is a reasonably possible view, it should be left undisturbed. The court applied this restraint: it held that the trial judge's view was not unreasonable or perverse and was, on the facts, a possible and acceptable view; therefore, the appellate court declined to disturb the acquittal on that ground.
Trilok Chand Jain v. State of Delhi, 1977 Criminal Law Journal 254 Explains the nature of the burden on an accused to rebut the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act; the accused need only render the presumption improbable by a preponderance of probability rather than discharging a prosecution-standard burden. The court relied on this authority to explain that the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) cannot be invoked unless the prosecution first proves demand and acceptance; that an accused may rebut the presumption on the balance of probabilities; and that the presumption cannot cure a fundamentally unbelievable prosecution story.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in sequential factual and legal steps:

  1. Standard of appellate review: The court began by restating the principle from Caetano that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal unless the trial court's view is unreasonable or perverse. The court concluded that the trial judge had reached a view of the evidence that could not be characterized as unreasonable or perverse.
  2. Assessment of the prosecution's witnesses and overall reliability: The court emphasized that the prosecution's case rested primarily on PW2 (complainant Jaswant Singh), PW3 and PW4 (panch witnesses), and PW7 (investigating officer). The court found the prosecution story and witnesses "not inspiring" and identified material inconsistencies and weaknesses.
  3. Procedural evidence about bill verification and payment: The court examined unrebutted defence evidence (DW1 and DW4) setting out the enterprise's detailed procedure for bill verification and payment. That testimony established that the Maintenance Division (and the respondent) had no role in disbursement of cheques and that verification was performed by the Maintenance Engineer (or in his absence), and that subsequent approvals and cashier disbursement followed a chain that did not involve the respondent. The court used this to conclude the respondent was not in a position to create the alleged obstacle in payment.
  4. Inconsistencies in the complainant's account and documentary/other evidence: The court highlighted several contradictions and infirmities:
    • The complainant's allegation that the cashier told him the cheque had been taken by the respondent was contradicted by the cashier (DW4), who testified the cheque remained with him.
    • The cheque was not recovered from the respondent at the time of the trap; it was recovered from Modern Bakeries' office 14 days later, and the investigating officer had not explained how he initially "knew" it was at Modern Bakeries.
    • Timing inconsistencies: the complainant admitted telephoning the respondent on the morning of 20.12.1974 while at the Anti-Corruption Office, which indicated the meeting was arranged in conjunction with the official trap; this suggested an arranged trap rather than an independent, spontaneous complaint.
    • Panch testimony inconsistency: PW4 (panch) stated the only conversation he heard related to tyres and did not corroborate the demand for a bribe, while PW3 did support the demand; the court found PW4 credible and doubted PW3's evidence on demand.
    • Commercial motive inconsistency: the complainant admitted a margin of profit of 15–20%, which the court noted undermined a plausible explanation for parting with Rs. 250.
  5. On the statutory presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act: The court rejected the contention that recovery of the money alone attracts the presumption that it was a bribe and shifts the entire onus to the accused. The court held, relying on Trilok Chand Jain, that the presumption can operate only after the prosecution has proved the foundational facts (demand and acceptance). If the prosecution story is inherently unbelievable, the presumption cannot be invoked.
  6. Critique of the recovery procedure and chain of custody: The court found the manner of recovery (the investigating officer asking the respondent to reach into his pocket and withdraw the notes) suspicious and clumsy. The court observed that the investigating officer ought to have secured the respondent's person immediately, searched and recovered the currency, and then taken hand wash samples to avoid the appearance of manipulation; the procedure adopted undermined the credibility of the recovery evidence.
  7. Burden of proof: The court reiterated that the burden of proof remains squarely on the prosecution, and Section 101 of the Evidence Act applies. Even if an accused's explanation is not wholly plausible, the cumulative effect of prosecution material may render the presumed fact improbable and thus discharge the accused's burden under Section 4(1) to the extent required.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: Taking the procedure evidence, witness contradictions, doubtful recovery, and overall lack of an inspiring prosecution case together, the court considered that the trial judge's acquittal was a reasonably possible and defensible view of the evidence and that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accused was in a position to demand or accept a bribe.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • The trial court's acquittal of the respondent is upheld and the State's appeal fails.
  • The direct consequence is that the respondent remains acquitted of the charges; the opinion does not purport to set any new legal precedent beyond applying established authorities (Caetano and Trilok Chand Jain) to the facts of this case.
  • The court underscored that statutory presumptions (Section 4(1), Prevention of Corruption Act) cannot be invoked unless the prosecution first proves foundational facts (demand and acceptance), and stressed the importance of proper procedures in recovery and traps to preserve evidentiary credibility.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond that text has been added or inferred.

    Delhi Admn. v. Satish Chand Sharma .

    Malik Sharief ud-din, J.:— The respondent, Satish Chand Sharma, was charged under Section 5(1)(d) of the (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, for an offence punishable under section 5(2) and he was also charged under Section 161, Indian Penal Code, by the Special Judge Delhi, and was finally acquitted of the charges by his order dated 23th May, 1976. Aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent, State has come in appeal.

    2. To begin With, the charge against the respondent is as under:

    “That on 20-12-1974 at Delhi while employed and posted as Engineering Supervisor (Automobiles) Modern Bakeries, Delhi Unit, a Government of India Enterprise, New Delhi, a public servant in the discharge of his official duties as such public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise by abusing his position as such public servant had accepted or obtained Rs. 250/- from Shri Jaswant Singh, Proprietor M/s. Khalsa Tyre Soles, Rohtak Road, Delhi and thereby committed an offence under Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, punishable under Section 5(2) of the aforesaid Act.

    Secondly, on the same day and time while employed and posted as Engineering Supervisor (Automobiles) Modern Bakeries, Delhi Unit, a Government of India Enterprise, New Delhi, a public servant in the discharge of his official duties as such public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise by abusing his position as such public servant accepted or obtained Rs. 250/-, as illegal gratification other than his legal remuneration as a motive or reward for showing him favour in getting his payment released from the Modern Bakeries for having their job of retreading the tyre soles of the vehicles vide his bill Nos. 1187 and 1188 for a sum of Rs. 1045/- and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.”

    3. Stating in a little detail, prosecution's case is based on the complaint of one Shri Jaswant Singh, Proprietor M/s. Khalsa Tyre Soles, Rohtak Road, Delhi. The respondent on the relevant date, i.e 20th December, 1974, was employed as Engineering Supervisor (Automobiles Modern Bakeries, Delhi Unit), a Government of India Enterprises, New Delhi, (hereinafter for short known as ‘enterprise’). The complainant on the relevant date was engaged in resoling the vehicular tyres of the aforesaid enterprise for four years. The work was being allotted to him on the basis of lowest quotations. On submission of the bills he used to receive payment through cheques. The case of the prosecution is that the respondent used to create obstacles in the payment of his bills with a view to pressurise him to grease his palm. This according to the complainant was being done by the respondent by not verifying the bills as without the verification of the bills by the respondent the bills were not being passed for payment.

    4. About a month prior to the date of the incident, the complainant had completed the work worth Rs. 1045/- and two bills Nos. 1187 dated 1.12.1974 for Rs. 285/- marked Ex. PW2.A/1 and bill No. 1188 dated 7th December, 1974, marked Ex. PW2.B/1 were pending for payment with the aforesaid enterprise on the date of incident. On 17th December, 1974 when the complainant inquired on telephone, he learnt from the Cashier that his cheque was ready. Allegedly, on 19th December, 1974, the complainant, is stated to have visited the enterprise at 3 p.m to collect the cheque. There, he is alleged to have met the respondent, who told him that he would not get the cheque unless the respondent was paid Rs. 250/- as bribe. A bargain was allegedly struck and it was agreed that the respondent would visit the shop of the complainant at 3 p.m on 20.12.1974, and on payment of Rs. 250/- to him, the cheque would be delivered to the complainant. The complainant had also alleged that the cheque which he generally used to collect from the Cashier, had also been taken away by the respondent from the Cashier and according to him, the respondent had also told him to inquire from him on telephone in case he did not come at 3 p.m On 20th December, 1974, the complainant at about 12 a.m goes to the Anti Corruption Organisation where his statement marked Ex. PW2.B, is recorded and thereafter-a trap is arranged. Two panch witnesses namely PW3 Sardar Harbans Singh and PW 4 Shri Gurbax Singh are summoned from the office of the Joint Director, Agriculture, Delhi Administration. In their presence the statement of the complainant is read over to them and after the complainant admits its correctness, the complainant hands over Rs. 250/-, two hundred rupee and five notes of ten rupee denomination. Serial numbers of these notes are noted and thereafter they are dusted with phinopethelin powder (for short P. Powder). Demonstration is also given in respect of the effect of P. Powder in the presence of panch witnesses. They are also given necessary directions, that they have to remain quite close to the complainant and hear and see what transpires between the complainant and the respondent. The panch witnesses are also informed that in case the bribe is accented they will give an agreed signal to the raiding party.

    5. The prosecution version further is that thereafter the raiding party headed by, Shri Krishan Gopal, PW 7, proseeded to the spot at about 3.20 p.m The respondent is stated to have come in an Ambassador Car bearing registration No. DHB 6240. He parked the car opposite the shop of complainant. The complainant accompanied by panch witnesses, is said to have gone near the respondent. The respondent is alleged to have come out of the car, had some talk for two to three minutes with the complainant. The respondent is then stated to have sat on the driving seat of the car and there it was noticed that he accepted the bribe money with his left hand and put it in the left pocket of his coat. On receiving the signal given by PW 3, Harbans Singh, there was a raid. The respondent was told by the Investigating Officer that he has accepted bribe, whereupon he took out the bribe money with his left hand from his pocket. The currency notes were compared and seized. Thereafter left hand and the left pocket of the coat of the respondent was washed in sodium carbonate solution which turned into pink. A raid report Ex. PW7.X was prepared and the case was registered.

    6. The whole case of the prosecution, in fact, rests on the evidence of PW2, Jaswant Singh, complainant, PW 3, Harbans Singh and PW 4, Gurbax Singh, two panch witnesses as also on the testimony of PW 7, Krishan Gopal, investigating officer. Much depends upon the fact as to whether their testimony is believed or not. To our mind, their testimony can be only relied upon if the circumstances of the case also support their version. It will also depend upon the fact if the prosecution's story is reliable and inspiring. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has given adequate reasons for the acquittal Of the respondent. We, however, prefer to deal with the case in our own way, of course, keeping in mind the contention of Mr. D.R Sethi, whereby he invited our attention to the rule regarding the jurisdiction of this court, in dealing with the acquittal appeals. Mr. Sethi placed reliance on Caetano Piedade Fernanda and another v. Union Territory of Goa, Daman & Diu, Panaji, Goa, AIR 1977 S.C 135. The ratio of the law laid down by the highest court of the land in dealing with the appeals against acquittal is as under:

    “That even though the appellate court has the same power; as the trial court of appreciating evidence and coming to its own conclusion on questions of fact, it should not interfere with an acquittal, unless it finds that the view taken by the trial Court is devoid of reason or is perverse. If the view taken by the trial court is reasonably possible view, the appellate court should not disturb the acquittal merely because it thinks that another view is better or more preferable.”

    7. With this rule in mind we may now grapple with the facts and evidence of this case. We have earlier pointed out that the entire case rests on the testimony of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 7. In our view, after considering the entire material, we are of the opinion that the learned trial judge has taken a view of evidence which can by no stretch of imagination be dubbed as unreasonable or perverse. To our mind, otherwise also, on the facts of this case, that appears to be the only possible view. But, if for some reason these observations on our part are not considered enough to dispose of this appeal, we would like to add that in our view neither the prosecution story nor the prosecution witnesses are inspiring.

    8. There is hardly any need for us to detail the prosecution evidence which has been elaborately dealt with and reproduced by the Special Judge in his lengthy judgment. In short, in respect of the board facts of the case PW 2, 3, 4 and 7 have all supported the prosecution. PW 4, however, has stated that the only talk that transpired between the complainant and the respondent within his hearing was in respect of tyres. He does not support the prosecution on the point of demand of bribe. The prosecution, however, is supported on the point of demand by PW 2 and PW 3.

    9. Assuming that bribe was accepted though that is not our finding, there is great deal to be said against the prosecution. This we are only saying to meet the arguments of Mr. G.S Sharma that once the money was recovered from the pocket of the respondent, presumption would be that he accepted it as bribe, and the onus of proving that it was otherwise, would squarely shift on him under Section 4 (1), Prevention of Corruption Act, The contention, to our mind, appears to be misconceived. To attract this presumption, the prosecution must first prove that the bribe was not only demanded but it was accepted as well. If the prosecution case is not believable, then the question of presumption would not arise. The question of presumption would only arise, if the prosecution discharges its burden of proving the case. This has been so held in Trilok Chand Jain v. State of Delhi, 1977 Criminal Law Journal 254 wherein the law laid down on this point is as under:

    “The degree and the character of the burden of proof which Sec. 4(1) casts on an accused person to rebut the presumption raised thereunder, cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof which under Section 101, Evidence Act rests on the prosecution. While the mere plausibility of an explanation given by the accused in his examination under section 342 Cr. P.C may not be enough, the burden on him to negate the presumption may stand discharged if the effect of the material brought on the record, in its totality, renders the existence of the fact, presumed, improbable. In other words, the accused may rebut the presumption by showing a mere preponderance of probability in his favour, it is not necessary for him to establish his case beyond a reasonable doubt.

    The sole purpose of the presumption under Section 4 (1) is to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving a fact which is an essential ingredient of the offences under Section 5 (1) (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 161, Penal Code. The presumption therefore can be used in furtherance of the prosecution case and not in derogation of it. If the story set up by the prosecution inherently militates against or is inconsistent with the fact presumed, the presumption will be rendered sterile from its very inception, if out of judicial courtesy it cannot be rejected out of hand as still-born.”

    10. Thus, the, reliance on presumption under Section 4(1), Prevention of Corruption Act is misplaced. Before placing reliance oh the presumption, it is the duty of the prosecution to first prove the basic facts on which the prosecution rests. Unless that is done this legal presumption cannot be invoked.

    11. We are in full agreement with the findings of the learned Special Judge and we do so for very cogent and plausible reason. This brings us to the examination of defence evidence regarding the prosecure followed in verification and payment of bills in the enterprise. The evidence of the relevant defence witnesses, all officials of the enterprise, is very important. In the absence of looking into that procedure, it is difficult to deal with this case. We are making mention of this procedure to find out if the respondent was in a position to create obstacle in the payment of cheques and this we do for the reason, because the positive case of the prosecution is that the respondent was creating obstacle in the payment of bills. The case of the prosecution is not that despite the fact that the respondent was not in a position to favour, he did create an impression with the complainant that without his intervention, the bills would not be paid to him. We have a positive case before us as to how the respondent allegedly abuse his official status and if it is not borne out by the circumstances of this case, we hardly need to say that the case is false.

    12. Let us as, such revert back tothe procedure in the enterprise. Direct and reliable evidence which is not controverted, in this regard is provided by DW 1 Mr. Subramaniam and DW 4 Bhagwan Sahai Bansal. The procedure, for, payment of. bills as stated by them is the following:

    On the submission of bills a certificate verifying that the work has been done according to specified standard is issued by the Maintenance Engineer and it is only in his absence, that such veri-fication was being done by the respondent After verification, the bill goes to Chief Manager for approval and after he ac-cords his approval it is sent by the Maintenance Engineer to ‘Accounts Clerk for further scrutiny by the Accounts Branch who, after further scrutiny prepares the voucher and makes an entry in the payment register. The papers are then submitted to the Accounts. Manager who after further scrutiny of the bills initials the voucher and the entry made in the payment register and then it is, again sent to the Chief Manager for sanctioning the payment. Thereafter the General Manager accords sanction and the bill and voucher is sent back to the Accounts Manager. From there the papers go to the concerned clerk and then to the cashier. The cheque is prepared by the cashier and the cheque along with the voucher is then again sent to the Accounts Manager for scrutiny and initials. The Accounts Manager then initials the counter-foil of the cheque and forwards the same to the Chief Manager for his signature on the cheque. From there the papers go back to the Accounts Manager, who on receipt thereof passes on the cheque along with other pipers to cashier. The cashier then disburses the cheque to the concerned party, after obtaining his signatures on the voucher. DW 1, Accounts Manager, has clearly evidenced that after the bill and the certificate is sent to the Accounts Branch, Maintenance Division has no role to play. PW 5, Shri S.S Gupta, has also clearly stated that the duty of the respondent was to supervise the Automobiles Section as also the Maintenance of vehicles including their repairs. DW 4, Shri Bansal, has categorically stated that the respondent had nothing to do with the disbursement of cheques. All these facts are proved by the aforesaid set of witnesses, whose testimony on this point cannot be brushed aside. In the present case we find that both the bills of the complainant had been verified by the Maintenance Branch in which the respondent was working long before 17th December, 1974, the date on which the cheque Was ready.

    13. Wherein a case the specific allegation against the accused person in that he demanded illegal gratification to do a favour in his official capa-city, it is absolutely necessary for the prosecution to show that the accused was in a position to do such favour. In a case such as this, it was in fact, for the prosecution to bring these procedures to the notice of the court. We have made a reference to the procedure that was in vogue, in the, enterprise in this regard with a view to indicate that it was none of the duties of the accused, either to prepare or to disburse the cheques. This was very much within the knowledge of the complainant who had dealings with the enterprise. In fact the respondent in this case was not even a verifying authority of the bills, a job which was essentially the function of the Maintenance Engineer. Even the complainant has admitted that on all previous occasions, he used to collect cheques from the cashier and that even on 17th he was told by the cashier on telephone that the cheque was ready. Ought we to., know under such circumstances as to where was the occasion for the COM plainant to approach the respondent, particularly, when the cheque was ready with the cashier and he had to disburse it after getting receipt for the same?

    14. With this background in view, let us now examine the merits of this case. The complainant PW 2, in his complaint Ex. PW2.C has clearly stated that the accused used to create obstacle in the payment of the bills and his bills were not passed for payment in the absence of verification by the accused. This is factually incorrect as the bills had long before been verified and the accused was neither a verifying authority nor was he the person who was disbursing the cheques to the parties. In this very complaint, it is alleged that on 19-12-1974, when he asked the accused for the cheque, he was told that he could only get it if Rs. 250/- are paid to him. He also states that he was informed by the cashier that the cheque had been taken away from him by the accused. This also is factually incorrect. The cheque was not found at all in the possession of the accused and was recovered 14 days after the trap from the office of the enterprise. Again the complainant alleged that the accused had told him that he would visit his shop on 20th December at 3.30 p.m and deliver him the cheque soon after collecting the bribe money. All this is also factually incorrect. If the complainant used to collect the cheque from the cashier, where was the necessity for him to go to the accused for the same? If the cheque was to be disbursed by the cashier, who had also to procure a receipt, how could the cheque be handed over to the accused. It is on record right from the month of PW 7, Investigation Officer, that no attempt was made by him to search the car or the person of the accused for recovery of cheque. The explanation given is that he already knew that the cheque in question was in Modern Bakeries. The Investigating Officer, however, has not taken the court into confidence as to how he came to know this fact. Admittedly, he had not contacted any official from the enterprise, till then. That makes us believe that he must have come to know about it from the complainant, and that he knew that the allegations against the respondent were being falsely made. The most astonishing feature is that to discover this crucial piece of evidence, no attempt is made by PW 7. He only does so on 4th January and the cheque is procured from Modern Bakeries. Perhaps he was made wiser by the legal branch that this was a crucial piece of evidence and that is how he went so late to recover the same. DW 4, the cashier, has denied that he ever gave the cheque to the accused. The testimony of the complainant that the cashier told him that the cheque had been taken away by the accused is not admissible in view of the direct testimony of the cashier, DW 4, that the cheque was all the time lying with him and he never informed the complainant about the same having been taken by the accused. According to him the accused did not contact him after 17th of December at all.

    15. The next crucial aspect of the case is that the complainant has admitted in his statement that the time for payment of bribe was fixed by him on telephone on 20.12.1974 This clearly belies the complainant's testimony that the time was in fact, fixed on 19th December, 1974. He admits that he contacted the accused in this regard at 11.30 a.m on 20-12-1974 and inquired as to when the accused would come to collect tyre from him and the accused had told him that he would come at 3.30 p.m, an appointment which the accused kept. This is significant in the sense that the complainant seems to have telephoned the accused at a time when he was in Anti Corruption Office. Why, if we may so ask, has this been done and why, the accused was asked to come at that time to collect the tyre? The only reasonable inference would be that the prosecution story is false and it was false to the knowledge of PW 2 and PW 7. In all probability, it was PW 7 who asked the complainant to call the accused at that hour on the pretext of collecting the tyre, lest the raid is unsuccessful. That also goes to show that the complainant had not come into contact with the accused on 19th December, 1974, when the demand for bribe was allegedly made for the first time. From these facts, it clearly appears that it was really an arranged trap. Secondly, the complainant had not even in his statement under section 161, Penal Code, stated that he had been told by the cashier, that the accused had taken the cheque and the voucher. The most Important feature of the case is that neither the cheque nor the voucher was found in the possession of the accused. All that goes on before us, clearly establishes that there was no occasion for the complainant to contact the accused at least for collecting his cheque. That also goes to show that there was no occasion for the accused to demand bribe or for the complainant to agree to pay it. This is particularly so, in view of the fact, that within the knowledge of the complainant, both the cheque and the voucher were with the cashier and the cashier would not in normal course abdicate his duties by handing over these to the accused. Moreover, according to the statement of the complainant, the accused had come to collect tyre and that too at his asking. All these facts taken together, show that there was no demand for bribe. Surprisingly, the complainant admits that the margin of profit in doing this work was 15 to 20 per cent. If that be so, there was no reason for him to part with the bribe of Rs. 250/- when his earnings were less than that.

    16. Next we come to the acceptance part of the bribe. The witnesses testifying to this fact, are PW 2 and PW 3. PW 3 says that within his hearing the bribe was demanded. PW 4 who is also a panch witness has clearly deposed that the only talk that transpired between the complainant and the accused was in respect of tyres. We are under the circumstances, unable to believe PW 3, another panch witness, on the point of demand. PW 4, Gur-bax Singh is equally respectable and disinterested witness. According to him he was two steps aliead of PW 3. He was naturally in a better position to listen to what transpired between the two. What is curious is that we are told that the bribe was demanded and accepted within the view and presence of PW 3 and 4. This does not appear to be true. It is impossible to believe that the accused would create evidence against himself. In normal course this never happens.

    17. Another important feature is about the recovery of the tainted currency notes, from the left pocket of the coat of the accused. We are astonished at the clumsy manner in which the recovery has been effected. It has created a great deal of suspicion in our mind. The prosecution case is that the accused has accepted the bribe money with his left hand and put it in the left pocket of his coat. The currency notes are dusted with P. Powder with the singular purpose of showing the existence of a circumstance which would independently show that bribe was accepted. When this is the object, it was all the more necessary for the Investigating Officer to secure the arms of the culprit immediately and after searching his person, recover the currency and then take his hand wash. Instead of securing the arms of the accused he has asked the accused to put his left hand in his left pocket and draw the money from it. This is a fact which is not denied by the prosecution. Is it that the Investigating Officer was aware that the money has been sneaked into the pocket of the accused and unless he himself draws it from his pocket, there would be no evidence of P. Powder on his hands. That to our mind also makes the whole case suspicious and the benefit eventually must go to the accused.

    18. In the presence of all these facts which are staring us in the face, it is not necessary for us to go into the stand taken by the accused. The burden of proving the case squarely rests on the prosecution and this burden cannot be diluted simply because the charge is under section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Section 101 of the Evidence Act is equally applicable to such cases. Even if the explanation tendered by the accused is not plausible, the burden on him to negate the prosecution case will always stand discharged, if the effect of the material brought on the record, in its totality, renderes the existence of fact presumed, improbable. It is not essential for him to establish his case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is so held in 1977 Criminal Law Journal 254 (supra).

    19. Lastly, we may state even at the cost of repetition that, the positive case of the prosecution is that the accused demanded bribe as he was in a position to do favour by issuing cheque against the bills submitted by the complainant. This is a question of fact, and we have on careful consideration of the evidence found that this fact, prosecution has utterly failed to establish. Under these circumstances this appeal fails. It is accordingly dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Delhi Admn. v. Satish Chand Sharma .
    (Feb 6, 1986)