| Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India (AIR 1979 S.C. 1628) |
Tests to determine when a corporation is an instrumentality/agency of the State (e.g., shareholding by State, financial assistance, pervasive control, public importance of functions). |
Used to apply the instrumentality tests to the Corporation (all shares held by the President, State funding, deep control, public functions) and conclude it is an instrumentality within Article 12. |
| Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (AIR 1981 SC 487) |
Enquiry into "why" a juristic person was created; instrumentality concept applies irrespective of the juridical form; Article 12 coverage for agencies performing governmental functions. |
Reinforced the conclusion that the Corporation is an authority under Article 12 because of its objects, state control and public purpose. |
| Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (AIR 1975 S.C. 1331) |
Regulations of certain corporations were treated as having the force of law; employees of such bodies have statutory status and protection under Articles 14 and 16. |
Cited to support that employees of State instrumentalities/public corporations obtain status entitling them to constitutional protections in employment matters. |
| U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan (AIR 1980 S.C. 840) |
Corporations set up or owned by Government should observe equality clauses; employees in such bodies should enjoy protection akin to public employment; public employment extends constitutional safeguards. |
Quoted (especially Chinnappa Reddy, J.) to show that employees of government agencies/corporations should receive protection under Articles 14 and 16 and that public employment must be free from arbitrary action. |
| Som Parkash Lekhi v. Union of India (AIR 1981 S.C. 292) |
Affirmation of the view that public employment of such instrumentalities attracts administrative-law protections. |
Noted as a three-Judge Bench affirmation of the observations in Vijay Narain Vajpayee, supporting the proposition that constitutional protections apply in public-sector employment. |
| Raghunandan Prasad v. Institute for Physically Handicapped (C.W.P. 118/80, April 4, 1984) |
Public employment is governed by administrative law; in public employment, dismissal without natural justice can be quashed; three irreducible minimums of natural justice noted. |
Adopted to hold that employment with the Corporation is public employment and that principles of natural justice apply; used to reject purely contractual characterization. |
| Ved Prakash Malhotra v. State Bank of India (I.L.R. 1974 Delhi 660) |
Earlier Full Bench view referenced by counsel that the question turns on whether a right is contractual or statutory/constitutional. |
Not followed: the court observed that subsequent Supreme Court decisions have undermined the authority of Ved Prakash Malhotra and related earlier decisions in this Court. |
| H. M. Joshi v. Reserve Bank of India (I.L.R. 1980 (1) Delhi 291) |
Earlier Full Bench decision aligned with Ved Prakash Malhotra on contractual/statutory distinction. |
Not followed for the same reason: earlier local precedents were said to be shaken by later Supreme Court authorities. |
| Indian Institute Of Technology… v. Mangat Singh (ILR 1973 (11) Delhi 6) |
Earlier decision treating employment rights in certain institutions as contractual or otherwise. |
Mentioned as one of the earlier authorities not followed in light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions. |
| Mohd. Khan Durrany v. The Principal (Shri Tulsi Ram) Shivaji College (I.L.R. 1970 (11) Delhi 914) |
Earlier Full Bench decision on contractual/statutory distinction in employment disputes. |
Mentioned among earlier authorities whose authority was challenged by later Supreme Court rulings. |
| A. M. Aggarwal v. Union of India (1981 (2) S.L.R. 407) |
Division Bench decision treating some public-sector employment as contractual (Steel Authority of India case). |
Criticised by this Court as following earlier Full Bench (Y. P. Gupta) and subsequently weakened by the Supreme Court in P. K. Ramachandra Iyer; not followed as good law here. |
| Dr. Y. P. Gupta v. Union of India (1975 (2) S.L.R. 560) |
Earlier Full Bench decision relied upon by subsequent cases to treat certain employment as contractual. |
Noted that this Court’s Full Bench decision was set aside by the Supreme Court in P. K. Ramachandra Iyer, thus eroding its authority. |
| P. K. Ramachandra Iyer v. Union of India (AIR 1984 S.C. 541) |
Supreme Court decision setting aside the earlier Y. P. Gupta decision and clarifying that prior Full Bench authority was incorrect. |
Relied upon to demonstrate that the earlier Full Bench approach treating certain public employment as merely contractual is not good law. |
| M/s. Kasturi Lal v. State of J. & K. (AIR 1980 S.C. 1992) |
Test of "reasonableness" under Article 14; reasonableness pervades constitutional scheme (Maneka Gandhi and related cases referenced). |
Applied to insist that Rule 26 must satisfy reasonableness and non-arbitrariness; used to support conclusion that Rule 26 is unconstitutional. |
| Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 2 SCR 621; AIR 1978 SC 597) |
Principle that due process under Article 21 requires procedure established by law to be reasonable, fair and just; interaction with Article 14's non-arbitrariness. |
Cited (via Kasturi Lal) to underline that reasonableness is a constitutional requirement and that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness. |
| R. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1974 SC 555) |
Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness; reasonableness and rationality are essential components of equality. |
Invoked to emphasise that arbitrary state action in employment is forbidden by Article 14. |
| State of A.P. v. Nalla Rajja Reddy (AIR 1967 S.C. 1458) |
Official arbitrariness is particularly subversive of equality doctrine and Article 14; statutory discrimination is clearer to locate than arbitrary executive conduct. |
Quoted to stress that arbitrariness in administrative action (including employment dismissal) violates Article 14. |
| Manager, Govt. Press v. D. B. Balliappa (1979 (1) S.L.R. 351) |
Noted transformation of master-servant doctrine in public employment; constitutional protections (Articles 14, 15, 16, 311) apply more fully in public employment. |
Used to support the view that public employment is not merely contractual and that public employees are entitled to safeguards of administrative law. |
| John v. Rees ((1970) 1 Ch. 345) |
Quotation/authority for the phrase that natural justice is a "distillate of our process of law." |
Referred to in support of the characterization of natural justice in the Court’s reasoning (quotation used by the court). |