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Judgment Summary — D.R. Khanna, J. (Revision under Delhi Rent Control Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Civil Revision challenged an order dated 3-3-1981 of the III Additional Rent Controller (Mr. Kuldip Singh) dismissing a petition by Smt. Kamla Tandon under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act for ejectment of the tenant, Brij Kishore Kapoor, from the ground floor of house No. 4227, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, Delhi. The demised premises comprised two rooms, one store, kitchen, latrine with compound and a miani; the first floor of the same building (two rooms, store, kitchen and bath) was already in the petitioner's possession.

The respondent was an old tenant paying Rs. 125 per month. The petitioner had purchased the property in 1969. At the time of proceedings the petitioner resided at house No. 4764, Darya Ganj, which she said belonged to her father-in-law and contained a large family of about 20 members; she asserted she had been asked by her father-in-law to shift to her own house (the dispued property). The Rent Controller found that the disputed premises were let for residential purposes, that the petitioner and her family occupied No. 4764 with sufficient accommodation, and that the petitioner’s father-in-law and family were in possession of a Dharampura house (where they were enrolled as voters and drew rations). On that basis the Rent Controller dismissed the ejectment petition; this revision challenges that finding of sufficient accommodation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner (Smt. Kamla Tandon) already had reasonably suitable residential accommodation in her possession such that she could not successfully seek ejectment of the tenant under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
  2. Whether the assessment of evidence by the Additional Rent Controller in concluding that the petitioner had sufficient accommodation (and therefore dismissing the petition) involved any gross illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error warranting interference in revision.
  3. Whether the Court should remit the case to permit the petitioner to supply additional evidence (e.g., to examine her father-in-law or produce a plan of the Dharampura property) or require some other remedial course.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The petitioner said she had been asked by her father-in-law to vacate house No. 4764 and shift to her own house (the premises in dispute) and therefore required possession to live separately with her immediate family.
  • She asserted that the Dharampura house (where her father-in-law and his family were said to reside) was small (about 70 sq. yds.) and could not reasonably accommodate the large family; no plan of that property had been filed and the father-in-law had not been examined.
  • The petitioner contended that the accommodation at No. 4764 was insufficient for her family's needs and that the Rent Controller's observation regarding voter enrolment from the Dharampura house was incorrect (supported, she said, by electoral rolls which she attempted to rely upon but which were not admitted by the Rent Controller).

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The respondent argued that the petitioner failed to examine her father-in-law to prove he asked her to vacate or that he was the exclusive owner of No. 4764, and that no plan of the Dharampura house was produced.
  • The respondent relied on evidence (the petitioner's brother-in-law's testimony) that the father-in-law and family members were enrolled as voters from the Dharampura house and drew rations there, indicating their residence at Dharampura.
  • It was pointed out that the petitioner's husband had stated he was separated from his father and brothers, and respondents questioned how separate families could be operating independently at Darya Ganj when the property there had only one kitchen — these facts, the respondent submitted, belied the petitioner's claims.
  • The respondent contended that the Additional Rent Controller's assessment of evidence was fair and reasonable and should not be interfered with in revision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sal Pal v. Nand Kishore (XXIII (1983) D.L.T (S.N) 6) Considered in relation to family occupation and eviction; court noted the facts of Sal Pal involved a widower father and eviction on a fanciful ground where an earlier letting had been effected. The Court distinguished Sal Pal from the present case on its facts, explaining Sal Pal was not analogous because of material factual differences (widower father and prior letting) and therefore did not control the result here.
Kasturi Lal Nandraj v. Bakshi Ram (XIX (1981) D.L.T 329) Principle concerning when a revisional court may interfere — i.e., interference is warranted only where there is gross illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error. The Court relied on this authority to hold that the Additional Rent Controller had not committed any gross illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error and therefore revisionary interference was not justified.
Kewalchand Kastoorchand v. Samirmal Jaini (AIR 1953 Nagpur 146) Observation cited that a voter's list has "practically no evidentiary value" (in that case arising from a printing error in house number). The Court noted the principle but found the circumstances different: in this case the petitioner's brother-in-law admitted voter enrolment from Dharampura, so the Kewalchand observations did not control or undermine the trial court's reliance on voter/ration evidence.
J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Lt. Col. M.M. Lal (XX (1981) D.L.T 176) Principle that where a landlord occupies premises only as a licensee or by courtesy and has no right of his own to stay there, he is not thereby debarred from seeking eviction of a tenant from what is effectively his own house. The Court expressed agreement with this principle in abstract but held it was not decisive here because the petitioner's husband had long lived at Darya Ganj and could not, without the father being examined, be treated as merely a courtesy occupant.
Gurbachan Singh v. Rajpal (XIX (1981) D.L.T 271 (S.C.)) Similar proposition (as in J.K. Industries) about landlord's position when occupying as licensee/courtesy occupant and the right to seek eviction. The Court agreed with the legal principle but found the factual matrix of the present case did not warrant applying it to deny the Rent Controller's finding; the father's absence from the witness stand meant the requisite factual foundation was lacking.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a fact-focused analysis and legal evaluation limited to the record. It began by acknowledging the general legal proposition that members of a joint family who have independent means or houses may establish separate households and thereby justifiably seek occupation of their own houses. The Court observed that social and economic changes make separate establishments common and acceptable where demands are not "manifestly extravagant or fanciful."

However, the Court emphasized that the present case turned on the evidence placed before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller had found that:

  • The petitioner's father-in-law and other members were residing at the Dharampura house (supported by voter enrolment and ration-card evidence), and
  • The petitioner and her family were occupying No. 4764, Darya Ganj, which had accommodation found by the Rent Controller to be sufficient (the plan Ex. A.2 showed limited accommodation and only one kitchen).

The Court noted several evidentiary gaps in the petitioner's case: the father-in-law was not examined to confirm ownership of No. 4764 or that he had asked the petitioner to vacate; no plan of the Dharampura house had been filed; the petitioner could have produced more direct material to counter the Rent Controller's inferences (e.g., plan, father-in-law's evidence, or clearer electoral/ration evidence). The Court observed that the brother-in-law's testimony supported the Rent Controller's finding about Dharampura.

Having reviewed the totality of circumstances, the Court concluded that the Additional Rent Controller's assessment was not so unreasonable as to constitute gross illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error (invoking Kasturi Lal Nandraj). The Court therefore declined to interfere with the Rent Controller's factual conclusions in revisional jurisdiction.

The Court also considered remedies: remanding to allow the petitioner to present additional evidence was declined because "power of remand cannot be exercised to enable a party to fill up the lacuna in evidence" which could have been produced at trial. An alternative — permitting withdrawal and refiling of the petition — was available and acceptable to the respondent, but the petitioner chose not to withdraw. Given these circumstances, the Court found no course other than to dismiss the revision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision is dismissed. (The judgment records: "Revision dismissed" and "No order as to costs.")

Implications and direct effects:

  • The Rent Controller's order dated 3-3-1981 dismissing the ejectment petition is upheld; the petitioner was not granted the relief of ejectment in this revisional proceeding.
  • The Court declined to remand the matter to permit supplementation of evidence that the petitioner could have produced at trial; the petitioner retained the option (which she did not take) to withdraw and re-present a fresh petition, but she declined that course during the revision hearing.
  • The Court applied established standards for interference in revision (no gross illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error) and relied on the record to find the Rent Controller's assessment reasonable; the decision does not purport to lay down a new legal principle or expand precedent beyond its factual application.

No costs were ordered.

    Kamla Tandon v. Brij Kishore Kapoor .

    D.R Khanna, J.:— This Civil Revision is directed against an order dated 3-3-1981, of Mr. Kuldip Singh, III Additional Rent Controller, whereby he dismissed the petition moved by Smt. Kamla Tandon under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act for ejectment of Brij Kishore Kapoor, tenant, from the ground floor of the demised premises in house No. 4227, Ansari Road, Darya Ganj, Delhi. The same it comprised of two rooms, one store, kitchen, latrine with compound and a miani. The first floor thereof consisting of two rooms, store, kitchen and bath is already in possession of the petitioner.

    2. The respondent is an old tenant there at the rent of Rs. 125/- per month. The petitioner purchased the property from the previous owner in 1969. At present she is staying in house No. 4764, Darya Ganj, Delhi, which is said to belong to her father-in-law who has a big family consisting of as many as 20 members. She has, however, been according to her, asked by her father-in-law to shift to her own house. Her own family is comprised of her husband, five daughters, two of whom are married, and one son. The husband is a Chartered Accountant of 27 year's standing, and the petitioner is also an income tax payee from the business known as “Rangnath Publication” said to be carried on from the first floor of the property in dispute. The respondent's case before the Rent Controller was that the petitioner was not living with other members of her father-in-law's family, but was exclusively occupying the house No. 4764, Darya Ganj. The same, it was pleaded, has enough accommodation for the petitioner's requirements. As regards the father-in law, and his other members of the family, they are stated to be residing in a house in Dharampura. It was denied that any publication business was being run from the first floor of the property in dispute. Rather it has been stated that the same is lying vacant with even the electric connection having been disconnected. It was got vacated in 1971.

    3. The learned Rent Controller after considering the evidence that had been led before him, came to the conclusion that the premises in dispute were actually let out to the respondent for residential purpose, and not for residence cum-business as asserted by him. It was at the same time found that the petitioner's father-in-law and his family members were staying in the house at Dharampura, and that the petitioner and her family were entirely occupying the property No. 4764, Darya Ganj. The accommodation in her possession there, was found sufficient. As such the petition for ejectment was dismissed.

    4. The controversy raised in this revision concerns the finding that the petitioner has sufficient accommodation already in her possession for residence. In this regard, reference has been made to three properties. One has been at Dharampura, which has since long been in possession of the petitioner's father-in-law. He and the members of his family are enrolled as voters from that property. They are also drawing their rations from there. No plan of this property has been filed, nor the father-in-law exmined. It was, however, sought to be brought out by the petitioner that the same is a small property covering an area of about 70 sq. yds., and that it was obtained on lease by the grand father of the petitioner's husband, and that his uncles are also as such interested and entitled to its benefit. The property No. 4764, Darya Ganj where the petitioner is at present residing, has been shown in plan Ex.A.2 filed on record. The same shows that it has two rooms on the ground floor along with a gallary, latrine and some open space. The first floor has one big room of 7 ft. × 16 ft, a small temporary room, a store, bath and kitchen. The second floor has three rooms and a small store. There is thus only one kitchen in the room. The petitioner contends that she is in occupation of only one room in this property which is quite insufficient for the requirements of the family and that now her father-in-law has required her to vacate the same and shift to her own house. The rest of this property is stated to be occupied by her father-in-law along with a large number of family members. The father-in-law has thus his wife, four other sons apart from the petitioner's busband, three of whom are married and have their families. One of them is a chartered accountant and having his office on a ground floor room of the property. There are three daughters as well who are married and quite often come to the parents' house and some accommodation is required for them too.

    5. In the grounds of revision it is pointed out that the observation of the Additional Rent Controller that all the family members of the petitioner's father-in-law have their votes enrolled from the house at Dharampura is not correct and this is borne out from the copies of electoral rolls as well. They were said to be not admitted by the Additional Rent Controller. The landed area of Dharampura house is stated to be 70 sq. yds only and the same can hardly accommodate the large family of father-in-law.

    6. From the side of the respondent, on the other hand, it has been pleaded that the petitioner had failed to examine her father-in-law in support of the contention that he has required her to vacate his house, nor it shown that he is the exclusive owner thereof. No plan of the Dharampura house has besides been filed. Rather the testimony of the petitioner's brother-in-law who had been examined as her witness showed that the family members of the father-in-law are enrolled as voters from Dharampura house and hold their ration cards with the address of that house. This itself shows that they are residing there. Morever, it is pointed out that the petitioner's husband stated that he is separated from his father and brothers. If that is so it is not clear now the separated brothers and parents are independently operating their kitchens from Darya Ganj property when it has only one kitchen there. All these assertions it is pleaded are belied by the circumstances brought on record. The assessment of evidence by the learned Additional Rent Controller it is pleaded has been fair and reasonable, and this Court in revisional jurisdiction should not interfere in the same in any manner.

    7. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that where a person is living along with his family in the house of his father who has other children and their families as well, he can seek to set up his independent establishment in a house of his own, or that belonging to his spouse or dependent child. With the passage of time when family is grown and financial status of individual members improve, there is nothing unusual in sons desiring their separate independent establishments and acquiring their own identities. This is all the more so where each son has independent source of income, or different avocation in life. Large joint Hindu families perhaps in their jointness bring in community spirit and a sort of mini socialism within the family bonds where all pool their resources and then enjoy them jointly to the benefit of all. However, with concepts of fast changing and the smaller families seeking autonomy and individuality of their own, the old systems and traditions cannot continue to be enforced and required to be abided. Not unoften frictions and strifes over-take the mutuality and adjustment necessary’ for the success of larger joint Hindu families. XXIII (1983) D.L.T (S.N) 6, Sal Pal v. Nand Kishore, on which reliance has been placed by the respondent, is distinguishable inasmuch as there a widower father who was living with his son's family wanted the eviction of a tenant of another portion of the same property on some fanciful ground and when it had been found that some time earlier letting out of another portion had been effected.

    8. Now in the present case, if the house No. 4764, Darya Ganj, where the petitioner is residing, belongs to her father-in-law, and if he has asked her to vacate the same and shift to her own house, not much exception can be taken to her seeking eviction of the respondent from her house. The petitioner's husband is not the only son of her father-in-law. There are several other sons who are married and have families of their own. A father may not like to be indulgent to one son over others and allow him to occupy a much larger portion of his house than he should otherwise be entitled to considering the extent of the family. He may like the house to be proportionately distributed for purposes of occupation by different members of the larger family. In such an eventuality, one of the sons owning a house himself or through his spouse seeking to shift to that house, cannot be taken exception to. After all one earns and buys or builds a house not to rot in a minimal space insufficient by any reasonable standards, or be a burden on others or continue resigning himself to the grace or courtesy of others even though they may be near relations. He has a right to make himself comfortable and acquire his own independence, dignity and status provided the demands are otherwise not manifestly extravagant or fanciful.

    9. At the same time, where a son has been allowed by his father to occupy his house without demur, and the same is sufficient for his requirements, and there is nothing to show that the father has required him to vacate or make room for other children, it cannot be said that the former son seeking eviction of a tenant from his own house, has no reasonably suitable residential accommodation with him. Unfortunately the present case, at least from what has been brought on record, tends to fall in this category. The father has not been examined to depose that he is the owner of property No. 4764, Darya Ganj, and he wants the petitioner and her family to shift from there or at least make room for his other sons. His of course is a large family, and if all the members are taken into consideration that property itself may fall short of their requirements. The petitioner would in that case have justifiable ground to seek shifting to her own house. However, the manner in which the case has been conducted in the trial court, and the evidence that has been placed on record, show that the assessment of the circumstances by the learned Additional Rent Controller is not altogether unreasonable as to justify interference in this revision. He has come to the view from the evidence that the petitioner's father-in-law and the other members of the family are residing in Dharampura house where they were not only enrolled as voters, but also draw their rations. Perhaps there may be some truth that the Dharampura house is a small one built over a plot of land measuring 70 sq. yds. The petitioner could have filed a plan of that property, or at least the father-in-law could have deposed that his own brothers were also in occupation of part thereof. None of this has been done. The learned Additional Rent Controller has also taken note of the existence of only one kitchen in house No. 4764, Darya Ganj, and in case the father-in-law and his sons are all separate, and having their independent establishments, it is not shown how they are just managing on with one kitchen. Suffice it to say that in the assessment of the entirity of the circumstances, the learned Additional Rent Controller has not committed any gross illegality or material irregularity or jurisdictional error as held in the case Kasturi Lal Nandraj v. Bakshi Ram, XIX (1981) D.L.T 329.

    10. During the course of the hearing of this revision it was felt that perhaps the petitioner has a sound case to seek eviction of the respondent if proper material had been placed on record. Two courses were then open. One was to remand the case back and permit the petitioner to examine her father-in-law, and also produce a plan of the property at Dharampura, and further tender copies of the electoral rolls and ration cards. However, it is now well settled that power of remand cannot be exercised to enable a party to fill up the lacuna in evidence and place material which it could have well produced during the course of trial. This course, therefore, could not resorted to. The other was that the petitioner could be allowed to withdraw the petition with permission to move a fresh one. The respondent was agreeable to this. For reasons best known to the petitioner, she declined to proceed with this course. In the circumstances, I have no other course but to reject this revision. Before concluding, reference may be made to certain decisions relied upon by the petitioner. One of them has been AIR 1953 Nagpur 146, Kewalchand Kastoorchand v. Samirmal Jaini, in which it was observed that voter's list has practically no evidentiary value. These observations happened to be made where there appeared some printing error of the number of the house where the voter was residing. That has not been the position in the present case as the petitioner's brother-in-law admitted that they are enrolled as voters from the Dharampura house. XX (1981) D.L.T 176 J.K Industries Ltd. v. Lt. Col. MM. Lal, and XIX (1981) Delhi Law Times 271 (S.C), Gurbachan Singh v. Rajpal, next relied upon by the petitioner are to the effect that where a landlord is occupying a premises as a mere licensee or the courtesy of the owner thereof, and has no right of his own to stay there, he cannot be debarred from seeking eviction of the tenant from his own house. I am in respectful agreement with these decisions, and have already made observations on similar line above. However, in the present case, the petitioner's husband who has all through lived in the Daryaganj house, reared up his children, married his two daughters, cannot now suddenly turn round and say that his stay has been just as a matter of courtesy of his father. He has been a Chartered Accountant having good income and still reconciled to his stay there finding that to be suitable for his requirements. The complexion, however, would have been different had the father been examined and stated that he wanted the petitioner and her husband to vacate or at least make room for the families of his other sons.

    11. As a result, I am constrained to reject this petition. No order as to costs.

    12. Revision dismissed

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    Kamla Tandon v. Brij Kishore Kapoor .
    (Mar 23, 1983)