| Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 SC 381 |
Article 359 intended to postpone enforcement of rights until expiry of Presidential order (i.e., suspension of enforcement of rights during emergency). |
Used to support the proposition that enforcement can be postponed during emergency but that after suspension ends affected persons may seek judicial determination of invalidity. |
| A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 SC 120 |
While some enforcement is suspended during emergency, the rule of law is not obliterated; breaches remain unlawful though remedy for certain constitutional claims may be temporarily barred. |
Quoted and relied upon to explain that the Presidential Order did not validate unlawful executive action and that after the Presidential order ceases, enforcement can be sought; court reproduced key passage to explain limits of suspension. |
| Madan Mohan Pathak v. UOI, A.I.R. 1978 SC 803 |
Approving the views on the effect of Article 359 and suspension/cessation consequences (quoting A.D.M. Jabalpur). |
Noted as a Supreme Court authority approving the proposition that suspension under Articles 358/359(1A) ceases when proclamation ceases and enforcement is available thereafter. |
| Krishan Murari Aggarwal v. U.O.I., A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1877 |
Principles concerning requirement that grounds be properly framed and contemporaneously signed under preventive detention law. |
Relied on by petitioner; Court considered the authorities but found on facts that grounds here were formulated contemporaneously and that the cited cases did not require further discussion given production of the original file. |
| Shalini Soni v. U.O.I., 1980 (4) S.C.C. 544 |
Addresses consequences of ignoring representations by detainees and requirements of procedural fairness in detention cases. |
Invoked by petitioner regarding non-consideration of Section 11 representation; Court held the rule in those cases did not apply because Section 12-A(4) removes disclosure/representation requirement and periodic reconsideration procedures under Section 12-A(3) existed and were not shown to have been ignored. |
| Jayantilal Bhagwan Das Shaw v. State of Maharashtra, 1981 Mh. L.J. 487 |
Supporting the proposition on contemporaneous formulation/signing of grounds for detention. |
Cited by petitioner; Court found on facts that the grounds had been formulated and approved contemporaneously, so the authority of this precedent did not require the detention to be set aside. |
| Harish Vohra v. U.O.I., I.L.R. 1976 (1) Delhi 192 |
Interpretation of Section 12-A(4) (that a detaining authority may act on information/material without disclosing facts or giving opportunity if disclosure would be against public interest). |
Followed by the Court to hold that Section 12-A(4) permits non-disclosure and that the declaration under Section 12-A relieved the detaining authority of the duty to disclose grounds for effective representation during the emergency. |
| Sabir Ahmed v. U.O.I., 1980 (3) S.C.C. 295 |
Failure to consider detainee's representation may render detention invalid when representations are ignored for a considerable period. |
Relied upon by petitioner; Court rejected its applicability because Section 12-A(4) applies and there was no demonstration that required reconsiderations under Section 12-A(3) were not undertaken. |
| Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1975 SC 550 |
Defines scope of judicial review of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in preventive detention cases (limited review; grounds such as non-application of mind, mala fides, irrelevant considerations, lack of probative material, etc.). |
Applied to articulate court's role: the High Court may test whether requisite subjective satisfaction was reached on relevant material, but cannot substitute its view for the detaining authority; used as the primary guide for assessing reviewability. |
| Emperor v. Shibanath Banerji, AIR 1943 SC 75 |
Authority failing to apply its mind is a ground for invalidity of satisfaction. |
Referred to within the Khudiram Das exposition as an example of where no satisfaction exists because the authority did not apply its mind; used to frame criteria for judicial review. |
| Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1952 SCR 135 (AIR 1952 SC 16) |
Exercise of power under dictation of another body invalidates subjective satisfaction. |
Referred to among illustrative authorities showing grounds for invalidating detaining authority's satisfaction (i.e., dictation or lack of independent application of mind). |
| Simms Motor Units Ltd. v. Minister of Labour and National Service, (1946) 2 All. ER 201 |
Same principle: action under dictation of another body invalidates satisfaction. |
Referred to as another illustration of improper exercise of power that would vitiate satisfaction. |
| S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 |
Authority must have regard to matters expressly or impliedly required by statute when exercising the power. |
Referenced to support limits on detaining authority's discretion and matters it must consider. |
| Machinder v. King, AIR 1950 FC 129 |
Grounds for satisfaction must be of rationally probative value and relevant to the subject matter. |
Cited within the Khudiram Das discussion; Court used the standard to assess whether material before the detaining authority was rationally connected to the subject-matter. |
| State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya, AIR 1981 SC 2005 |
High Court under Article 226 can examine whether a detention order was based on any material but cannot go into adequacy of that material (that is the appellate authority's function). |
Applied to reiterate that the High Court's review is limited to whether the order was based on some material and not whether the material was adequate to satisfy the detaining authority. |