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  • S. 20 of the Arbitration Act. (the Act).7.
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  • S. 20 of the Arbitration Act. (the Act).7.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a contractor, entered into a contract with the Union of India for constructing the M.S.O Building, with a contract value of Rs. 7,82,206. The work was completed on 28th June 1976. The Government prepared the final bill of Rs. 8,06,163 on 30th March 1977 but withheld certain amounts from the contractor's bill as recoveries, including damages for delay and sums for sub-standard work. The contractor demanded arbitration under clause 25 of the contract after the Government refused to appoint an arbitrator, claiming the demand was time-barred. The contractor filed an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act seeking appointment of an arbitrator. The Government contended that the arbitration demand was barred by the 90-day time limit stipulated in the contract.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the contractor's demand for arbitration was made within the 90-day time limit prescribed by the contract clause 25, or whether it was barred by time.
  2. Whether the court or the arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide on the validity of the time-bar and waiver of claims under the contract.
  3. Whether the court should exercise discretion under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act to extend the time for making the arbitration demand due to "undue hardship".

Arguments of the Parties

Government's Arguments

  • The demand for arbitration was made after the expiry of the 90-day period stipulated in the contract, which began from the date the Government intimated the final bill was ready (21st April 1977).
  • The contractor's claims are therefore waived and barred as per the contract clause and the Government is discharged from liability.

Contractor's Arguments

  • The 90-day limitation period should be computed from the last payment made by the Government (7th June 1979), not from the initial intimation of the final bill.
  • The Government’s continuing decisions and payments after the final bill indicate that the bill was not truly final, thus extending the time for arbitration demand.
  • The Government’s conduct misled the contractor and contributed to any delay in demanding arbitration, amounting to estoppel against the Government.
  • If the demand is found to be out of time, the court should exercise its discretion under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act to extend the time due to undue hardship caused by the Government’s inconsistent conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hughes v. Metropolitan Rly. Co. (1877) 2 AC 439 Negotiations pending settlement suspend strict contractual rights. Used to illustrate that the Government’s ongoing decisions after the final bill meant the contractor’s time to demand arbitration had not yet commenced.
Vilayatram Mital v. Union of India, 1980 Rajdhani LR 312 Whether claims are barred should be decided by the arbitrator, not the court. Disagreed with; the court held that it must decide the time-bar issue as it has the power to extend time under Section 37(4).
Sterling General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Planters Airways Pvt. Ltd., 1975 (1) SCC 603 Validity of contract clause fixing time limit for arbitration demand and court’s power to extend time under Section 37(4). Supported the court’s view that such clauses are valid but courts may extend time to prevent undue hardship.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the contract clause imposing a 90-day limit for demanding arbitration after intimation of the final bill. It noted that the Government’s conduct, including multiple decisions and payments made after the initial final bill intimation, indicated that the bill was not truly final. The court held that the 90-day period should run from the last payment made by the Government (7th June 1979), not the initial notice (21st April 1977). This interpretation was based on the principle that such restrictive clauses must be strictly construed against the employer, and the Government’s inconsistent actions misled the contractor, contributing to the delay in arbitration demand.

The court rejected the Government’s contention that the demand was time-barred and emphasized that the court alone has jurisdiction to decide whether the arbitration demand was made within time, as it has the statutory power under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act to extend the time if undue hardship would otherwise result. The court distinguished its view from the precedent suggesting that the arbitrator should decide the time-bar issue.

Even if the court’s primary conclusion was incorrect, it expressed willingness to exercise discretion to extend the time limit, citing the Government’s conduct as causing undue hardship. The court underscored that waiver of rights must be clearly established and found no waiver here because the demand was timely or should be allowed under the court’s discretion.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the contractor’s demand for arbitration was made within the contractual time limit and was therefore valid. The Government’s contention that the demand was time-barred was rejected.

The Chief Engineer was ordered to appoint an arbitrator within two months in accordance with clause 25 of the contract. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

The decision clarifies that courts have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the timeliness of arbitration demands and may extend time under Section 37(4) of the Arbitration Act to prevent undue hardship. The ruling emphasizes strict construction of time-bar clauses against the employer and holds that inconsistent conduct by the Government can estop it from relying on such bars. No new precedent was set beyond the application of existing principles to the facts.

    M/S. Ram Nath Mehra And Sons, New Delhi v. Union Of India And Another

    The petitioner is a contractor. He entered into a contract with the respondent, Union of India, for the work of construction of M.S.O Building. A formal agreement was executed between the parties. The value of the contract was Rs. 7,82,206. The work was completed on 28th June, 1976. The Government prepared the final bill of Rs. 8,06,163 on 30th March, 1977. The Government effected certain recoveries from the contractor's bill.

    2. On 21st April, 1977 the Government wrote to the contractor that:

    “The final bill of the above work in your favour is ready in this office for payment.”

    3. On 11th May, 1977 the Government wrote another letter to the contractor in which it was said that the Government had a right to recover liquidated damages in accordance with the provisions of cl. 2 of the agreement as the work was not completed in time. It was said:

    “Under cl. 2 of the agreement No. EE-2 of 1973-74, you have rendered yourself liable to pay Rs. 12,040 (Rupees Twelve thousand and forty only) as compensation. The said amount of compensation is hereby levied on you.”

    It is the admitted case of the parties that the Government had withheld in the final bill a sum of Rs. 16,141 on account of their claim for damages for delay in the completion of the work. On 11th May, 1977 the Government assessed damages at Rs. 12,040 on account of delay. They refunded Rs. 4,101 to the contractor on 28th May, 1977.

    4. The Government had withheld certain other amounts also. Three amounts are admitted by the Government to have been so withheld. These were Rs. 3,000, Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 1,000. Total Rs. 9,000. Out of the amounts withheld a sum of Rs. 8,001.47 was refunded to the contractor on 17th August, 1977, 21st Oct., 1978 and 7th June, 1979. The balance of Rupees 998.53 was adjusted for sub-standard work executed by the contractor.

    5. After 7th June, 1979 the contractor thought of demanding arbitration for settlement of his claims. Because he was aggrieved by the action of the Government in withholding various amounts in the final bill and effecting recoveries from him. There was an arbitration clause in the contract. This was cl. 25. It provided for arbitration in the event of disputes arising between the parties. On 23rd June, 1979 the contractor addressed a letter to the Chief Engineer requiring him to appoint an arbitrator in terms of clause 25 of the contract. A list of disputes was annexed to this letter.

    6. On 6th July, 1979 the Chief Engineer wrote to the contractor that the letter was receiving his attention. On 1st May, 1980 he turned down the request on the ground that “your claims are barred by time. As such your request for appointment of arbitrator cannot be agreed to.” The contractor in his letter dated 22nd May, 1980 protested. He said that the claims were not barred by time and that he was entitled to demand arbitration. On 6th June, 1980 the Chief Engineer wrote to the contractor that the decision already communicated to him in letter dated 1st May, 1980 could not be changed. On 7th July, 1980 the contractor made the present application under S. 20 of the Arbitration Act. (the Act).

    7. The sole defence of the Government is that the contractor's demand for arbitration is time barred. They rely on the following term of the contract:

    “Correction Slip No. 24.

    It is also a term of the contract that if the contractor(s) do/does not make any demand for arbitration in respect of any claim(s) in writing within 90 days of receiving the intimation from the Govt. that the bill is ready for payment, the claim of the contractor(s) will be deemed to have been waived and absolutely barred and the Govt. shall be discharged and released of all liabilities under the contract in respect of those claims.”

    8. Counsel for the Government says that the period of 90 days should be computed from the date of the intimation of the final bill to the contractor. This was done on 21st April, 1977, as I have said. The period of 90 days expired on 21st July, 1977. The demand for arbitration was made, as we have seen, on 23rd June, 1979. The question for decision is whether the demand for arbitration was made out of time. In my opinion it was made within time. A clause such as the one we have here which restricts the right of a person to demand arbitration to a limited time, say 90 days as here, must be strictly construed against the employer. Such time limit clauses sometimes operate most unjustly. The contractor is absolutely barred for ever from making claims. The question is whether the arbitrator should be appointed in this case or the contractor is barred absolutely from demanding arbitration. Will the period of 90 days commence from the intimation given by the Government on 21st April, 1977 that the final bill was ready for payment, or it would commence from the last payment which the government made, namely, 7th June, 1979? In my opinion it ought to commence from the last payment which admittedly the Government made on 7th June, 1979.

    9. What is the object of this clause? The object is to give finality to the final bill if not disputed within 90 days by demanding arbitration. If a bill has been prepared for payment it means the Government has taken its decision on the claims of the contractor and it will not be for the contractor to demand arbitration if he is dissatisfied with the decision. But if no decision has been taken on certain issues and certain matters are left outstanding, it cannot he said that final bill in the strict sense of the word has been prepared. The Government even after 21st April, 1977 took several decisions. The first decision taken by them was on 11th May, 1977. They levied a penalty of Rs. 12,040 and communicated their decision to the contractor by letter of May 11, 1977 and refunded the balance Rs. 4,101 on 28th May, 1977. Then the Government took three other decisions when they refunded to the contractor a sum of Rs. 8001.47 on three different dates, namely, 17th Aug., 1977, 21st Oct., 1978 and 7th June, 1979. This shows that nothing was final in the true sense of the word. It may be called a “final” bill by the Government. But what we have to see is the substance of the matter. Everything was not finalised when the final bill was prepared. Decisions after decisions were taken even after the preparation of the final bill. The words “hereby levied” in the letter of May 11, 1977 show that the Government's claim of damages had not been finalised till then. On June 7, 1979 Rupees 998.53 were adjusted for sub-standard and work executed by the contractor. This was another vital derision. It is said on the one hand that the bill is final, on the other claims are decided de novo. I would say that the contractor was misled by the Government. He thought that the bill was not final. If there has been delay in demanding arbitration the Government have to thank themselves. Why were they taking fresh decisions on vital mailers when they had finalised the bill for payment? For delay the Government is to be blamed. They contributed to the delay no less by adopting a dilatory procedure. The case has a resemblance to Hughes v. Metropolitan Rly. Co., (1877) 2 AC 439 where there were negotiations for a settlement and it was held that pending those negotiations, the strict rights of the parties did not apply.

    10. The contractor, in my opinion, was within time when he demanded arbitration by his letter dated 23rd June, 1979. He is not barred by the clause. Suppose I am wrong. On the facts of this case I would even be prepared to exercise my discretion under S. 37(4) of the Act and extend the time. If ever there was a case of “undue hardship” as contemplated by Sub-sec. (4) it is indeed this. The Government by reason of their inconsistent conduct are estopped from pleading the bar of 90 days. It is pretty plain that their conduct has not been entirely blameless. This is the only issue which was framed in this case, namely: Whether the petition is barred by time by reason of (a) cl. 25 of the Contract and (b) Art. 137 of the Limitation Act? This issue is decided in favour of the contractor and against the Government.

    11. My attention was drawn to a decision of Dalip Kapur J. in Vilayatram Mital v. Union of India, 1980 Rajdhani LR 312. The learned Judge was of the view that it will be for the arbitrator to find whether the Government has been discharged and released from liability and whether the claim has been waived. Whether the claims were barred or not, he said, should be determined by the arbitrator and not by the Court. He said: “The Court cannot decide this question as this will be exceeding its jurisdiction.” With very great respect, I profoundly disagree with this view. In my opinion it is for the court to decide whether the demand for arbitration is barred and has been made beyond the time limit of 90 days fixed by the contract. The learned Judge also doubted the validity of the clause fixing 90 days as the time limit for making a demand for arbitration. Such a clause in the contract, I venture to think, is valid. Where the contract provides that a claim shall be barred unless it is referred to arbitration within a certain time the court is empowered under sub-sec. (4) of S. 37 of the Act to interfere if it is of opinion that in the circumstances of the case “undue hardship” would otherwise be caused to a party. The court may extend the time and make the order subject to terms as it thinks proper. This sub-sec. (4) of S. 37 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Sterling General Insurance Co. Ltd v. Planters Airways Pvt. Ltd., 1975 (1) SCC 603: (AIR 1975 SC 415).

    12. The term of the contract says that the “demand for arbitration” has to be made within 90 days from the intimation of the final bill. If the demand is not made within this time limit the claims will be “deemed to have been waived and absolutely barred”. That such a clause is valid would appear from Section 37 (4) because the jural hypothesis of that section is that such a clause though valid can cause “undue hardship” otherwise and to relieve that hardship court is given the power to extend time. So the clause has the sanction of the statute. But in each case the juristic basis of waiver must be examined. The essence of a waiver is the abandonment of a right. It is necessary therefore to analyse each case in which it is relied Upon to determine the precise basis for the plea of waiver. On the facts of this case I have come to the conclusion that there was no waiver because the “demand for arbitration” was made within time. If it is held that it was made out of time I would extend the time. This is a case pre-eminently fit for the exercise of discretion under S. 37(4). I am not prepared to hold that all claims of the contractor are barred. No prejudice will be caused to the Government if arbitrator is appointed.

    13. It has, therefore, to be noted that the court only can extend the time under S. 37(4). The statute invests the court with this power. It cannot do away with the time limit altogether. If can enlarge the time. If the court is given the power to extend the time under sub-sec. (4) of S. 37 it follows that it will be for the court, and not for the arbitrator to decide whether the “demand for arbitration” has been made within time or not. At the very threshold the objection is raised in a petition under S. 20 that the demand for arbitration is out of time because it was not made within 90 days. It will be the duty of the court to decide the objection. Because the court alone has been given the power to extend the time and not the arbitrator. If it is held that it is for the arbitrator to deride whether the contractor's claims are barred then he will have no power to extend the time even if he comes to the conclusion that undue hardship will be caused to the contractor. I am, therefore, of the view that the question of time limit has to be decided by the court and cannot be left to the arbitrator.

    14. To my mind to take the view that it will be for the arbitrator to decide whether the claims of the contractor are barred or not is begging the question. The arbitrator will decide this after he is appointed by the Chief Engineer. But the question at the outset is: Should the arbitrator at all be appointed? The other party says that the arbitrator cannot be appointed because the demand was made out of time. So the court is called upon to decide the issue whether the contractor can demand arbitration. The clause says that all his claims will be barred if the contractor does not pursue the remedy of arbitration in time. The court has to decide whether the arbitrator should be appointed or the contractor is barred absolutely for ever from going to arbitration for making his claims.

    15. For these reasons I hold that the demand for arbitration is within time. The Chief Engineer is ordered to appoint an arbitrator in terms of clause 25 of the Contract within two months from today. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

    Application allowed.
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    Comments

    M/S. Ram Nath Mehra And Sons, New Delhi v. Union Of India And Another
    (Nov 9, 1981)