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  • S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government
  • General Clauses Act and the provisions of the Constitution.8.
  • S. 3(60) of the Central Clauses Act, the Central Government
  • Central Government in S. 3(8) of the General Clauses Act.
  • 317 (12). Since S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • SECTION 10 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • S. 3(8) and (60) of the General Clauses Act.
  • Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956,
  • S. 2(a)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act.20.
  • S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 3(39) of the General Clauses Act
  • S. 3(8) of the General Clauses Act.
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
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citation codes
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  • S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government
  • General Clauses Act and the provisions of the Constitution.8.
  • S. 3(60) of the Central Clauses Act, the Central Government
  • Central Government in S. 3(8) of the General Clauses Act.
  • 317 (12). Since S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • SECTION 10 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT
  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • S. 3(8) and (60) of the General Clauses Act.
  • Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956,
  • S. 2(a)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act.20.
  • S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
  • 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 3(39) of the General Clauses Act
  • S. 3(8) of the General Clauses Act.
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of orders made under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, referring industrial disputes for adjudication to labour courts or industrial tribunals. The orders were made by the Secretary (Labour) of the Delhi Administration, purportedly exercising powers delegated by the Central Government. The central question was whether the Central Government was the “appropriate Government” authorized to delegate such power under the Industrial Disputes Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Central Government is the “appropriate Government” under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for the Union Territory of Delhi in relation to industrial disputes falling under Section 2(a)(ii) of the Act.
  2. Whether the delegation of powers by the Central Government to the Secretary (Labour), Delhi Administration, under Section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, is valid.
  3. Whether the notification dated 14-4-1975, issued by the Central Government and published in the Gazette of India, complies with constitutional requirements, including Article 77(1) and the proper Gazette of publication.
  4. The legal effect and correctness of a prior full bench judgment holding that the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi was the “State Government” for purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act and the validity of delegation under Article 239 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Patiala Iron Works v. Union of India, ILR (1975) 1 Delhi 613 Interpretation of “State Government” in the Industrial Disputes Act as including the Lt. Governor of Delhi. The court distinguished this case by clarifying that the Lt. Governor’s power under Article 239 is different from delegation under Section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, AIR 1952 SC 317 Clarification that the term “State Government” means the Governor, but the Governor is distinct from the State Government itself. Used to caution against assuming perfect equivalence between terms “State Government” and “Central Government” or related terms in the General Clauses Act.
Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and others, AIR 1954 SC 587 Distinction between President’s functions under Article 239 and his role as head of Central Government. Supported the conclusion that the President acting under Article 239 is not the “Central Government” or “State Government” under the Industrial Disputes Act.
D. Gobalousamy v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1975 Madras 345 Similar principle to Satya Dev Bushahri regarding President’s distinct role under Article 239. Reinforced the view that the President under Article 239 occupies a different position than the Central Government for purposes of delegation.
Joti Prasad Upadhya v. Kalka Prasad Bhatnagar, AIR 1962 Allahabad 128 Governor’s functions are distinct from the State Government though the term “State Government” is used in statutes. Supported the limitation on interpreting definitions as strict algebraic equivalences.
M/s Avon Services Production agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and others, AIR 1979 SC 170 Power to refer disputes under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is an administrative function distinct from judicial functions. Rejected the argument that the power to refer disputes is an automatic incident of the power to administer a Union territory under Article 239.
J.K Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd. v. Emperor, AIR 1947 FC 38 Article 77(1) is directory, not mandatory, regarding executive actions being expressed in the name of the President. Supported the view that the notification issued in the name of the Central Government was valid despite not naming the President.
Ram Chander Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1968 Punjab 178 Similar principle on directory nature of certain constitutional formalities. Reinforced the non-fatal nature of the notification naming the Central Government instead of the President.
Management of the Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gurudasmal, AIR 1969 Delhi 330 Similar principle on executive action and naming conventions. Supported the validity of the notification despite the naming issue.
Zalam Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Delhi 285 Held that it is immaterial whether the name “President” or “Central Government” is used in notifications, provided conformity with the enabling section. Applied to uphold the validity of the notification naming the Central Government.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the central statutory provision governing delegation of powers: Section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which allows the “appropriate Government” to delegate powers. The critical issue was the identity of the “appropriate Government” for industrial disputes in the Union Territory of Delhi under Section 2(a)(ii) of the Act.

The court relied on Section 3(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which defines “State Government” in relation to a Union territory as the “Central Government.” Thus, although Section 2(a)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act refers to the “State Government” as the appropriate Government for certain disputes, in a Union territory like Delhi, the “State Government” must be read as the “Central Government.”

Accordingly, the Central Government is the appropriate Government for the purpose of delegation under Section 39 in Delhi. The delegation notification dated 14-4-1975, issued by the Central Government to the Secretary (Labour), Delhi Administration, was therefore valid.

The court distinguished a prior full bench decision which held the Lt. Governor of Delhi to be the “State Government” for the Industrial Disputes Act. It explained that the full bench’s reasoning was based on the Lt. Governor’s powers under Article 239 of the Constitution, which is a different legal basis from delegation under Section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The President acting under Article 239 is not equivalent to the Central Government or State Government for the purpose of delegation under the Industrial Disputes Act.

The court emphasized the nuanced interpretation of definitions in the General Clauses Act, noting that while “State Government” equals “Central Government” in a Union territory, the converse is not always true, and definitions must be read carefully in context.

The court rejected the contention that the President’s power to “administer” a Union territory under Article 239 automatically includes the power to delegate under the Industrial Disputes Act, holding that the power to refer disputes is a special statutory power and not an inherent incident of administration.

Regarding procedural objections, the court held that the notification’s issuance in the name of the Central Government rather than the President, and its publication in the Gazette of India rather than the Delhi Gazette, did not affect its validity. The court cited settled law that such formalities are directory, and the Gazette of India is the proper publication medium for notifications issued by the Central Government.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed.

The court held that the Central Government is the “appropriate Government” under the Industrial Disputes Act for the Union Territory of Delhi and validly delegated powers to the Secretary (Labour) via the notification dated 14-4-1975. The prior full bench decision on the Lt. Governor’s role under Article 239 does not invalidate this delegation. Procedural objections regarding the naming of the authority and publication in the Gazette of India were found to be without merit.

The direct effect is that the delegation of powers under Section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act to the Secretary (Labour), Delhi Administration, stands valid. No new precedent beyond the interpretation and application of existing statutory and constitutional provisions was established. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

    Leela Separators (P) Ltd. v. Secretary (Labour), Delhi Admn. & Others

    T.P.S Chawla, J.:— The question raised in this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution has also been raised in many others which we have heard alongside. This judgement will apply to all of them.

    2. In each case an order has been made under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 referring a dispute or disputes for adjudication to the labour court or industrial tribunal. The order has been made by the Secretary (Labour), Delhi Administration. He purports to have exercised the power delegated to him by the Central Government. The question is whether the Central Government was the ‘appropriate Government’ to delegate that power.
    3. The relevant notification is dated 14-4-1975, and is published in the Gazette of India dated 26-4-1975. It reads as follows:
    ‘In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), the Central Government hereby directs that the powers of the State Government in regard to the Union territory of Delhi exercisable by it under S. 3, 10 and 10-A, sub-s. (5) of S. 12 and Ss. 17, 33-B and 36-A of the said Act be exercisable also by the Secretary (Labour) of the Delhi Administration.
    S.S Sahasrawahan, Under Secy.,
    It will be observed that in this notification the ‘Central Government’ has delegated to the Labour Secretary the specified powers of the State Government in regard to the Union Territory of Delhi. The argument is that the ‘Central Government’ is not the State Government, and, therefore, had no power to make this delegation.
    4. To my mind the answer is too simple to bear any elaborate discussion. The power to delegate is given by S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, It says:
    ‘The appropriate Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act or rules made thereunder shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction, be exercisable also,—
    (a) Where the appropriate Government is the Central Government, by such officer or authority sub-ordinate to the Central Government or by the State Government, or by such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government, as may be specified in the notification; and
    (b) Where the appropriate Government is a State Government, by such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government as may be specified in the notifications.’
    So the question is, which is the ‘appropriate Government’?
    S. 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines ‘appropriate Government. It has two clauses. In relation to industrial disputes of the kind mentioned in Cl. (i), the ‘appropriate Government’ is the ‘Central Government’. We are not concerned with that clauses, because the disputes here were admittedly not of that kind. Then, Cl. (ii) says: ‘in relation to any other industrial dispute, the State Government’. It is agreed on all hands that it is this clause of the definition which applies. Hence, in regard to the present cases, the ‘appropriate Government’ is the ‘State Government’.
    5. But, when this ex facie conclusion from the section is applied, it give rise to the question: Who or What is the ‘State Government’ in a Union territory such as Delhi? S. 3(60) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides the answer. Leaving out all the immaterial parts, the section reads:
    ‘In this Act, and in all central acts and regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—
    (60) “State Government”,—
    (c) as respects anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, shall mean, in a State, the Governor and in a Union territory, the Central Government.’
    This makes it plain that in relation to a Union territory, one must read ‘Central Government’ for ‘State Government’ in S. 2(a)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act. So the ultimate conclusion is that, in Delhi, the ‘Central Government’ is the ‘appropriate Government’ even in respect of disputes falling within S. 2(a)(ii).
    6. Now, reading S. 39 in this light, it is apparent that the ‘Central Government’ could, as the ‘appropriate Government’, delegate the ‘powers of the State Government in regard to the Union territory of Delhi’. The phrase ‘powers of the State Government’ has reference to the division of power made by S. 2(a) between the Central Government and the State Government. In a Union territory, that division has no significance because the powers merge as there is only one Government, the Central Government. It is different in a State, properly so called, which has a separate State Government. But, in a Union territory there is none. As its very name indicates, it is the exclusive domain of the Union. Therefore, in a Union territory, ‘powers of the State Government’ really means ‘powers of the Central Government’, and the notification delegating powers to the Secretary (Labour) is not vitiated by any incongruity. As I see it, that is the end of the case, and the notification must be held to be valid.
    7. However, it was contended that in The Management of Patiala Iron Works v. Union of India, ILR (1975) 1 Delhi 613(1), a full bench of this court had already held that the Lt. Governor of Delhi was the ‘State Government’ for purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act, and so the ‘Central Government’ could not be the ‘State Government’. This negative conclusion sought to be inferred from that judgment is neither logical nor warrnted nor valid. It is based on a total misapprehension of some definitions in the General Clauses Act and the provisions of the Constitution.
    8. In the case before the full bench, the industrial disputes had been referred to the labour court by an order made by the Lt. Governor of Delhi. He exercised the power conferred upon him by the President ‘in pursuance of Cl. (1) of Art. 239 of the Constitution’. The notification was dated 24-3-1961, and the operative part said:
    ‘…… the President hereby directs that the powers and functions of the State Government under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947). Except insofar as they relate to any industrial dispute concerning the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation and except those under S. 38 of the said Act, shall subject to the control of the President, and until further orders be respectively exercised and discharged by the Lieutenant Governor or the Chief Commissioner, as the case may be, of each of the Union territories of Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, within his jurisdiction.'
    It was argued that the ‘Lt. Governor is not the ‘State Government’ and, therefore, not the “appropriate Government” under S. 2(a)(ii). The full bench held that he was.
    9. The reasoning of the full bench rests on a conjoint application of the definitions in S. 3(8) and (60) of the General Clauses Act. I have already quoted S. 3(60) which defines ‘State Government’, and need not repeat it S. 3(8) defines ‘Central Government’, and omitting the irrelevant portions, it reads as follows:
    ‘In this Act, and in all central acts and regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—
    (8) “Central Government” shall,—
    (b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,—
    (iii) in relation to the administration of a Union territory the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Art. 239 of the Constitution’.
    In Delhi, the ‘Administrator’ is designated as the ‘Lt. Governor’. Therefore, according to this definition, he is the ‘Central Government’ provided he is ‘acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Art. 239 of the Constitution’. Since, according to S. 3(60) of the Central Clauses Act, the ‘Central Government’ is the ‘State Government’ in a Union territory, it follows that the ‘Lt. Governor’ is also the ‘State Government’. This is what the full bench held, and obviously it was right.
    10. For a further analysis of the matter, it is worth writing down the two definitions, which I have quoted from the General Clauses Act, in the form of equations. This will help in achieving clarity. Of course, it must be remembered that the assumption is a Union territory.
    From S. 3(60) we get the equation:
    State Government = Central Government.
    From S. 3(8) we get the equation:
    Central Government = the President = the Administrator. Since two things equal to the same thing must be equal to each other, these two equations can be combined to give the following comprehensive equation.
    Since two things equal to the same thing must be equal to each other, these two equations can be combined to give the following comprehensive equation.
    State Government = the Central Government = the President = the Administrator.
    This shows that ‘State Government’ in a Union territory has three other names: ‘Central Government’, ‘President’ and ‘Administrator’. Nevertheless, it is one and the same executive power. Merely the name varies, and is chosen to suit the particular context. The full bench held that the ‘Administrator’ was the ‘State Government’. It does not follow from that that the ‘Central Government’ is not. On the contrary, the very first equation shows that it is. The subsequent comprehensive equation establishes that both propositions are simultaneously correct. There is, therefore, nothing in the full bench judgment which goes against the conclusion I have reached.
    11. A word of caution is now necessary. Though, I have expressed the definitions in the form of equations, they are no true in the perfect algebraic sense. Thus, whilst it is true, on the basis of S. 3(60), that
    State Government = the Central Government, it is not true that
    Central Government = State Government,
    Because there is no converse definition in the General Clauses Act. The same applies to S. 3(8). That means that the equations are valid only if read from left to right, and not the other way. The reverse equation:
    The Administrator = the President =
    Central Government = State Government
    Is not valid, for the simple reason that there are no definitions in the General Clauses Act to support it. This was recognised by the Supreme Court in State Of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik AIR 1952 SC 317 (2), when it said:
    ‘Now though the term “State Government” appearing in an enactment means the Governor of the State, there is no ‘provision of law which equates the term Governor with the State Government of which he happens to be the head. On the contrary, the Constitution invests him with certain functions and powers which are separate from those of his Government.’
    This limitation of the equations is most important, and must constantly be kept in mind to check the natural tendency to use the equations both ways.
    12. Now, going back to the judgment of the full bench, I would observe, with respect, that, unwittingly, it sanctions by implication a collateral fallacy. That seems to have happened because a point available was apparently not argued. In order to explain this, it is necessary to emphasise that the Lt. Governor, in that case, was exercising a power conferred upon him by the President under Art. 239 of the Constitution. He was not exercising a power delegated to him under S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The application of the General Clauses Act to each of those two provisions does not yield the same result.
    13. As I have tried to show, the words ‘appropriate Government’ in s. 39 can be successively replaced by the words ‘State Government’, ‘Central Government’, and ‘President’, by virtue of the definitions in the General Clauses Act (I am deliberately leaving out ‘Administrator’ for a reason which will presently emerge.) Consequently, the power to delegate under S. 39 can be exercised in any of those names. In particular, the ‘President’, acting under Article 53 of the Constitution as the repository of ‘the executive power of the Union’, can delegate the powers of the State Government under the Industrial Disputes Act.
    14. But, no similar process is possible with regard to Art. 239(1) of the Constitution. That Article reads as follows:—
    ‘Save as otherwise provided by Parliament by law, every Union territory shall be administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an administrator to be appointed by him with such designation as he may specify.’
    Here, the word is ‘President’. There is no definition in the General Clauses Act enabling any other word or phrase to be substituted for that word. So, no further step is possible. To read ‘Central Government’ for ‘President’ in this Article would be to reverse the definition in S. 3(8) of the General Clauses Act. Thus, the ‘President’ acting under Art. 239 is not the ‘Central Government’, and hence not the ‘State Government’, and, therefore, not the ‘appropriate Government’ under the Industrial Disputes Act. More specifically, the ‘President’, whilst administering a Union territory under Art. 239, cannot become the ‘appropriate Government’ in S. 39 because the definitions in the General Clauses Act are of no avail.
    15. This result is not surprising because in a number of cases it has been held that when the president performs his functions under Art. 239, ‘he occupies a position different from that of the head of the Central Government’: see Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and others, AIR 1954 SC 587 (3); D. Gobalousamy v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1975 Madras 345 (5) It is only when he exercises the executive power of the Union that he can be equated with the Central Government. That is a corollary from Art. 53 of the Constitution, and is, borne out by Joti Prasad Upadhya v. Kalka Prasad Bhatnagar, AIR 1962 Allahabad 128, (6) which states the like proposition with regard to the Governor of a State Presumably, it is because the President, whilst acting under Art. 239 of the Constitution, could not exercise the power to delegate under S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act that the notification dated 24-3-1961 does not refer to that section. It cites only ‘Cl. (1) of Art. 239 of the Constitution’.
    16. So, one is face to face with another question: can the President, acting under Article 239, confer upon the ‘appropriate Government’ (whether it be ‘State government’ or the ‘Central Government’) under the Industrial Disputes Act ? Since, as I have tried to demonstrate, the President, in that capacity, cannot become the ‘appropriate Government’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, he has no power under that Act, and, therefore, can confer no such power on the ‘Administrator’. Non dat qui non habet. He gives not who hath not.
    17. It was suggested in argument that the power to ‘administer’ a Union territory, vested in the President by Article 239, of itself made him the ‘State Government’ for purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act. The only reason advanced in support of this proposition was that in M/s Avon Services Production agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and others, AIR 1979 S.C 170 (7) it had been held that the power to refer disputes under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act was an ‘administrative function’ and, hence, must form part of the power to ‘administer’ a Union territory. But there, as the judgment itself states, that phrase was being used ‘in contradistinction to a judicial function’. It had nothing to do with the ambit of governance. the power to perform the ‘administrative function’ of referring industrial disputes to a labour court or industrial tribunal is not a necessary ingredient or incident of the power to ‘administer’ a Union territory. It is special power conferred by a special statute. In keeping with the scheme of that statute, it happens to be conferred upon the ‘appropriate Government’. But, it could have been conferred on anyone, and even on the parties to the dispute as does the usual form of arbitration agreement. So, it cannot be regarded as an automatic component of the power to ‘administer’. I would, therefore, conclude that the powers of the ‘State Government’ under the Industrial Disputes Act do not inhere in the President by mere virtue of the fact that he ‘administers’ a Union territory under Article 239 of the Constitution.
    18. It follows that the President could not, whilst purporting to act under Art. 239, convey the powers of the ‘State Government’ under the Industrial Disputes Act to the ‘Lt. Governor’. Therefore, on this ground the notification dated 24-3-1961 was bad.
    19. Furthermore, in exercising the powers sought to be given to him by that notification, the Lt. Governor was not ‘acting within the scope of the authority’ that could be given to him under Art. 239 of the Constitution. In doing so, he did not come within the definition of ‘Central Government’ in S. 3(8) of the General Clauses Act. This is why I earlier omitted ‘Administrator’ while applying that definition to S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
    20. I can now briefly sum up the position. For the reasons I have stated, the President could delegate the powers of the ‘State Government’ under the Industrial Disputes Act if he acted under S. 9 of that Act. But, he could not do so under Art. 239 of the Constitution. Of course, even whilst acting under S. 39 of the Act, the President could have delegated the powers to the Lt. Governor. But, then it would be a delegation to the Lt. Governor not as the ‘Administrator’ of a Union territory, but as an ‘officer subordinate’ to the ‘Central Government’ or the ‘State Government’. Insofar as the full bench judgment impliedly upheld the notification dated 24-3-1961 as being valid under Art. 239, I would respectfully dissent.
    21. It is interesting to note that the full bench judgment was delivered on 27-1-1975. Notwithstanding that the decision was in favour of the Government, they expeditiously issued, within less than three months, the notification dated 14-4-1975 delegating power to the Secretary (Labour) under S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Perhaps, it would not be incorrect to infer that despite their success before the full bench, the advisers of the Government were not themselves convinced of the validity of the notification under Art. 239 pursuant to which references had been made by the Lt. Governor.
    22. I have dwelt on these aspects in order to meet the arguments that were addressed to us. If the notification under attack in the present cases had been one under Art. 239, I would have asked for the matter to be reconsidered by a larger bench. But since the notification is under S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the full bench judgment is only of peripheral application. As I have said, to the extent that it holds that the definitions in S. 3(8) and (60) of the General Clauses Act include the ‘Lt. Governor’ within the concept of ‘State Government’, provided that he is ‘acting within the scope of the authority given to him under Art. 239 of the Constitution’, I agree with it. Indeed, that is the clear purport of those definitions. The other questions, with which I have had to deal, do not seem to have been canvassed before the full bench. At any rate, the judgment does not go into them.
    23. That disposes of the main point argued, but there were also two subsidiary ones. It was contended that the notification dated 14-4-1975 was void as it did not comply with Art. 77(1) of the Constitution. That Article says that ‘All executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President’. The notification, it will be recalled, is issued in the name of the ‘Central Government’. Even assuming that there is some substance in this objection, it can have no effect on the validity of the notification. It is now settled law that provisions like Art. 77 are directory and not mandatory: See J.K Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. (Rampur) Ltd. v. Emperor, AIR 1947 FC 38(8); Ram Chander Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1968 Punjab 178(9), and Management of the Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gurudasmal, Supdt. of Police, AIR 1969 Delhi 330 (10). A full bench of this court held in Zalam Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Delhi 285 (11), that, having regard to S. 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, it was immaterial whether the name ‘President’ or ‘Central Government’ was used, and, further, that the notification should ‘conform’ to the ‘terms’ of the section under which it is issued. In support of this view the court relied on State Of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, AIR 1952 SC 317 (12). Since S. 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act refers to the ‘Appropriate Government’, which I have found to be the ‘Central Government’, it is more consistent with that section to use the name ‘Central Government’ rather than ‘President’. But, in any case, the validity of the notification is not affected.
    24. The other contention was that the notification should have been published in the Delhi Gazette and not the Gazette of India. This point is again devoid of substance. S. 3(39) of the General Clauses Act says:
    “ ‘Official Gazette’ or ‘Gazette’ shall mean the Gazette of India or the Official Gazette of a State.”
    Although, this definition does not indicate which notifications are to be published in which Gazette, common sense easily supplies the answer. Notifications issued by the Government of India should be published in the Gazette of India, and those issued by a State Government in the State Gazette. Each of these Gazettes is intended to record and give publicity to the acts of the Government whose name it bears. The notification, here, was issued by the Central Government. Therefore, it was rightly published in the Gazette of India. It is of no consequence that the contents of the notification pertained to the Union territory of Delhi. The author of the notification was the Central Government, and that is the deciding factor.
    25. As, in my opinion, none of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners is sound, I would dismiss this petition, but, having regard to all the circumstances, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
    S.N Kumar, J.— I agree
    Industrial Disputes Act,
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    Comments

    Leela Separators (P) Ltd. v. Secretary (Labour), Delhi Admn. & Others
    (Mar 5, 1981)