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  • (h) of Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (hereinafter the Act).
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  • (h) of Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (hereinafter the Act).
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The tenant, Brij Mohan, died on 7 April 1972. He was survived by his widow, Sheel Utpal, and four sons, who succeeded to the tenancy rights. On 4 April 1974 the landlord, Hari Chand, filed an eviction petition under clauses (e) and (h) of sub‑section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The tenancy was alleged to commence on the first day of each calendar month and to have been terminated by a notice dated 13 March 1974.

It was alleged by the landlord that after the commencement of the Act Brij Mohan had been allotted a DDA residential flat in Janakpuri, of which the respondents obtained vacant possession in 1972. The landlord asserted a bona fide requirement for the first floor accommodation for himself and family, stating he lived in a Barsati with seven family members and had no other residential accommodation suitable for the family.

The tenants contended that the Janakpuri flat was allotted only in the name of Mrs. Sheel Utpal after the death of Brij Mohan, and that the flat had been let out from 1972 and was not available for their occupation. The tenants also raised objections to the validity of the termination notice. The landlord had been residing on the second floor and had previously let out parts of the premises, and he had let out a ground-floor flat before and after institution of the eviction petition.

The Rent Controller held that the tenancy had been terminated by valid notice, found that the Janakpuri flat being allotted only to one of the co-tenants did not furnish a ground of eviction against the remaining co-tenants, and held that the landlord had not shown bona fide requirement or lack of other reasonably suitable accommodation; the petition was dismissed.

On appeal the Rent Control Tribunal agreed that the clause (h) ground was not available for the reasons given by the Rent Controller, but allowed eviction on the separate ground of bona fide personal requirement. The Tribunal accepted that the landlord legitimately needed the first floor because it was most convenient to his existing occupation and family arrangements, and it found no mala fide in the landlord’s having let out parts of the house earlier to obtain higher rent. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and an eviction decree was passed on 20 December 1977.

The present opinion is from the subsequent appeal in which the High Court reviewed both factual findings and the legal interpretation of clause (h) and the validity of notices. The court ultimately dismissed the appeal and directed the tenants to vacate within two months, with costs “easy.”

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the landlord's claimed bona fide requirement for the first floor was negated by subsequent events (such as the ground floor falling vacant and being sub‑let), and whether the lower appellate court erred in finding bona fide requirement despite those events.
  2. Whether the circumstance described in clause (h) of Section 14(1) — that the tenant "has built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence" — must exist as a present right to the vacant residence on the date of the eviction application in order to furnish a cause of action to the landlord (i.e., the correct temporal scope and meaning of clause (h)).
  3. Whether the notices terminating the tenancy were valid and effective to terminate the tenancy and trigger the statutory period for possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The lower appellate court failed properly to appreciate subsequent events — notably that the ground floor portion had fallen vacant and had been sub‑let — which, if considered, would have negated any bona fide requirement for the first floor.
  • The landlord did not state in the petition that the first floor was more suitable for him; that assertion was an after‑thought raised later in the proceedings.
  • Even during the pendency of the proceedings (June–July 1978) the landlord advertised for tenants for portions of the ground floor that had fallen vacant, indicating lack of true requirement.
  • The landlord filed an incorrect plan, omitted portions of the premises from the plan, and failed to disclose his proper status, all of which were material to the determination of his need.
  • The validity of the termination notices raised questions of law that ought to have been addressed.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent argued that eviction should also have been allowed on the basis of clause (h): that the tenants (originally Brij Mohan) had acquired a residential accommodation (DDA flat) and thereby lost protection under the Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gian Singh v. Tarlok Singh, 1975 Rajdhani LR 340(B) Held that one of the three situations in clause (h) "must exist on the date of the application in order to furnish a cause of action to the landlord"; construed "has acquired vacant possession of a residence" or "has been allotted a residence" to mean the tenant must have a present right to move into the premises at the date of application. The court considered this authority as presenting a stricter temporal interpretation of clause (h) but did not adopt that strict view as the general rule; the court distinguished and rejected the Gian Singh construction as too narrow in light of the statutory language and purpose in the present facts.
Batoo Mal v. Rameshwar Nath, 1970 Ren CR 532 (C) Observed that the scheme of provisos to S.14(1) sets out different causes of action for eviction and that whether a cause of action must continue until filing or until order depends on the individual nature of each cause of action. The court cited this Division Bench authority to show that causes of action under different clauses may have different temporal requirements; the court used this reasoning to support an interpretation of clause (h) that does not invariably require present possession of the alternate residence on the date of application.
Premlal v. Jadav Chand, 1977 WLN 332 (A) (Rajasthan High Court) Division Bench opinion that it is the termination of tenancy and not the grounds of eviction which constitute the cause of action for eviction. The court noted its own agreement with that view in principle (as a digression) but proceeded to decide the present case on the established view in the court that the various grounds in S.14(1) can also constitute distinct causes of action.
Ramdayal v. Maji Devdiji, AIR 1956 Raj 12(D) Authority for the proposition that, in exceptional cases, courts may take into account events subsequent to filing where relief originally claimed has become inappropriate and consideration of subsequent events may subserve substantial justice. The court relied on this case to acknowledge that subsequent events can sometimes be considered, but held that clause (h) generally gives rise to a cause of action when the relevant act has been completed and that later events do not necessarily defeat that cause of action unless exceptional circumstances exist.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two linked strands: (A) the review of factual findings about bona fide requirement and (B) the legal interpretation of clause (h) of Section 14(1).

A. Review of factual findings

  • The court observed that the Rent Controller's and the Tribunal's findings on bona fide requirement and availability of other reasonably suitable accommodation were findings of fact. As findings of fact, the court stated it could not ordinarily interfere with them.
  • The court explicitly recognised that the lower courts had considered (or could have considered) the fact that a ground-floor portion had fallen vacant before the petition and had been sub‑let during the pendency of proceedings, but concluded that the Tribunal reasonably concluded the landlord was not obliged to shift to the ground floor because the first floor was more convenient for family reasons.
  • The court further held that even if the landlord did not specify in the petition that the first floor was the more suitable accommodation, or filed an incorrect plan or did not disclose status, such deficiencies did not convert the factual finding in the landlord’s favour into an issue of law: the factual finding was one that could legitimately be reached on the record.

B. Interpretation of clause (h) (Section 14(1))

  • The court found that Brij Mohan had been allotted a D.D.A. flat, the possession of which was taken on 26 October 1972 by his widow and subsequently let out. The court considered this a "clear case of acquisition of vacant possession of residential accommodation after the commencement of the Act."
  • The court critically examined the decision in Gian Singh which required the situation under clause (h) to exist on the date of the application. The court contrasted this with the Division Bench view in Batoo Mal that whether a cause of action must continue depends on the nature of the cause.
  • The court analysed the grammar of clause (h), observing that the verb "has" functions as an auxiliary with a past participle and denotes a completed state (i.e., construction, acquisition, or allotment completed). From this grammatical and textual analysis, the court concluded that the cause of action arises when any one of those acts has been completed.
  • The court read Section 14(1) as allowing a landlord to rely on acquisition of a residence by a tenant whether such acquisition occurred before or after the commencement of the Act, and held it is not necessary that the acquisition must continue to exist at the time the tenancy is terminated or at the time the application is made. The clause contemplates a cause of action arising upon the completed act, and the subsequent occupation or letting out of the new residence by the tenant does not necessarily defeat the landlord’s right to seek eviction.
  • The court acknowledged the exceptional rule (derived from Ramdayal) that subsequent events may be taken into account in special circumstances to adapt relief to altered conditions, but emphasised that the ordinary effect of clause (h) is to ground a cause of action at the time of the completed act (building, acquisition, or allotment).
  • On the specific fact that the allotment stood mutated in the name of one heir only, the court held that this did not preclude the remaining heirs from being treated as having received the allotment for the purpose of clause (h), because the allotment had taken place in the lifetime of Brij Mohan and the heirs could not claim a better position than the deceased.

C. Validity of notices

The court held there was no invalidity in the notices: they terminated the tenancy by the last day of the month and, where service on 16 March 1974 was refused, that refusal amounted to service and provided the tenants with the clear fifteen days' statutory period.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The eviction decree is upheld. The tenants are directed to vacate the premises within two months. Costs are ordered to be "easy."

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The eviction decree in favour of the landlord is sustained and the tenants must vacate within two months; costs are modest ("easy").
  • Legal consequence explained in the opinion: The court held that clause (h) of Section 14(1) gives rise to a cause of action when a tenant has completed the act of building, acquiring vacant possession of, or being allotted a residence; it is not uniformly required that the tenant have a present right to occupy the alternate residence at the date of the eviction application. Subsequent dealings with that alternate residence (such as letting it out) do not automatically destroy the cause of action arising from the completed act, except possibly in exceptional circumstances warranting consideration of events after filing.
  • The court reaffirmed that factual findings by the lower tribunals on bona fide requirement and availability of reasonably suitable accommodation are not lightly disturbed on appeal where they are open on the record.

Appeal dismissed.

    Sm. Sheel Utpal And Others v. Hari Chand .

    Tenant Brij Mohan died on April 7, 1972, leaving behind the respondents, namely, his widow Sheel Utpal, and four sons, who succeeded to the tenancy rights. An eviction petition was filed on April 4, 1974, against them by their landlord Hari Chand under cls. (e) and (h) of Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (hereinafter the Act). It was alleged that the tenancy commenced on the Ist day of each calendar month and was terminated by a notice dated March 13, 1974. Brij Mohan was allotted after commencement of the Act a residential flat in Janakpuri by the Delhi Development Authority of which the respondents got a vacant possession in 1972. The petitioner also required the disputed premises for his own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of the members of his family dependent upon him. The petitioner was living on the Barsati with seven members who have by now grown up. He, therefore, was in need of the first floor accommodation and did not own any other residential accommodation. The tenants contend that the Janakpuri flat had been allotted only to one of the respondents, namely Mrs. Sheel Utpal, after the death of her husband, the original allottee. That too was let out long back without any objection from the landlord in 1972 itself and was no more available to them for occupation. The landlord was living on the second floor when he let out the premises in dispute to Brij Mohan. He has since then added two halls besides kitchen, latrine, bathroom etc. The petitioner has been letting out one of his flats on the ground floor both before and after the institution of the eviction petition. An objection was also taken with regard to the validity of the notice.

    2. The learned Rent Controller held that the tenancy had been terminated by service of a valid notice. He further held that the acquisition of the flat in Janakpuri was only by one of the contenants and therefore, it could not provide a sufficient ground for eviction against the remaining co-tenants. He also held that the premises were not required bona fide for the use and occupation by the landlord for himself and members of his family even though he found that his children have now grown up. As a matter of fact, the landlord filed the petition after he had let out the ground floor portion which had fallen vacant before the institution of the present petition. He was, therefore, of the view that it was not correct to say that the landlord had no other reasonably suitable accommodation and dismissed the petition.

    3. Upon appeal, the learned Rent Control Tribunal upheld the finding that the ground under cl.(h) was not available upon the same reasoning as that of the learned Rent Controller. The learned Tribunal, however, allowed the landlord to succeed on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The learned Tribunal stated that soon after the construction of the house in 1967, the landlord shifted to the top second floor while he let the ground floor and the first floor to different tenants because at that time his children were young and he could manage with a Barsati, but now he felt the need for more accommodation for his growing family. He no doubt let out the portion of the ground floor before the filing of the first eviction petition in order to have rental income on higher rent which he had a right to do. Even during the appeal, a portion of the ground floor had fallen vacant and the landlord let out the same at a higher rate. But, the flat on the ground floor did not suit the need of the landlord as he could not split up his family, some living on the ground floor and the others on the second floor. The first floor was, therefore, more convenient to him as it was the closest to the portion already in his possession. The desire on the part of the landlord to have more rental income in the circumstances of the case was not considered mala fide. The opinion of the learned Tribunal was also influenced by the provision in S. 19 of the Act that if the landlord did not occupy the premises in dispute for his own residence and let them out to earn more rent, the tenants would have recovered possession. The appeal was allowed and the eviction decreed on Dec. 20, 1977. Hence, this second appeal.

    4. As a matter of fact the findings regarding bona fide requirement and non-availability of suitable accommodation are findings of fact and this court cannot interfere with those findings. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, urged that a substantial question of law has arisen in as much as the lower appellate court failed to properly appreciate the subsequent events that had taken place in the case, namely, that the ground floor fell vacant and was sub-let. If these facts were properly appreciated, the finding of bona fide requirement could have never been given. The petitioner had not come forward with a case in his petition that the first floor was more suitable to him. It was an after-thought. Even now, in June, 1978 and July 1978, he has advertised for a tenant in respect of some portion which has fallen vacant in the ground floor. The landlord filed a wrong plan of the premises omitting some portion therefrom. He also did not disclose his status which was essential for determination of his need. Besides, the validity of the notices raises a question of law. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent maintained that he should have been allowed to succeed also on the ground of acquisition of residential accommodation by the tenants.

    5. I have considered over the rival contentions. The findings regarding bona fide requirement and availability of other reasonably suitable accommodation to the landlord are findings of fact and it is not correct to say that the learned lower court has not taken into consideration the fact that ground floor portion fell vacant both before the filing of the petition and even when the petition was pending. But in spite of this fact, the learned lower appellate court took the view that the landlord was not bound to shift to the ground floor when the first floor was more convenient to him and he was entitled to ask for eviction. Even if he did not state in the petition that the first floor was more suitable, did not disclose his status or did not file a correct plan, and the court gave a finding in his favour, it still remained a finding of fact and involved no question of law. It cannot be said that the finding was such as could not be arrived at by any court upon the record before it.

    6. On the other hand, it appears to me that the landlord should have succeeded on the second ground as well. That ground is “(h) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence;”. Brij Mohan was the tenant of the premises in dispute and a D.D.A residential flat was allotted to him. When he died on April 7, 1972, all his survivors should have succeeded to the allotment, but it appears that for the sake of convenience the allotment was made in the name of his widow. The house was taken into possession on Oct. 26, 1972, by her and was let out thereafter. It was therefore a clear case of acquisition of vacant possession of residential accommodation after the commencement of the Act. The lessor had also filed an eviction petition some time after Sept., 1973 but it was withdrawn on March 12, 1974. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, invited my attention to a case of this court reported in Gian Singh… v. Tarlok Singh…, 1975 Rajdhani LR 340(B) in which Avadh Behari, J., held that one of the three situations given in Cl.(h) above “must exist on the date of the application in order to furnish a cause of action to the landlord” and “if the tenant has no present right to the vacant residence on the date of the application then his ejectment cannot be ordered under this clause.” He construed the words “has acquired vacant possession of a residence” or “has been allotted a residence” to mean that the tenant has a present right to move into the premises, for a vacant residence whether built, allotted or acquired, is at his disposal. But in a Division Bench ruling of this court reported in Batoo Mal v. Rameshwar Nath, 1970 Ren CR 532 (C) his Lordship Deshpande, J., (now the Chief Justice) said that “the scheme of the various provisos to S. 14(1), is to set out the different causes of action which arise in favour of the landlord for filing an eviction petition against the tenant.” and “whether a cause of action must continue till the filing of the petition for eviction or till the order of eviction is passed”, “depends entirely on the individual nature of each cause of action.”

    7. Permitting myself a small digression, I may add that in Premlal v. Jadav Chand, 1977 WLN 332 (A) a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court to which I was a party, took the view that it is the termination of tenancy and not the grounds of eviction which constitute the cause of action for eviction. To that view I still subscribe because if that position were accepted, many of the problems would perhaps not have arisen. But for the present purpose, I shall proceed on the view accepted in our court that the various grounds in S. 14(1) proviso also constitute various causes of action.

    8. I have turned in my mind over and again the rival views presented by the learned Judges with such an admirable erudition. It appears to me that if a cause of action has arisen and the party fails to obtain relief outside the court, it may bring an action at any time subject to the law of limitation. But an action must be tried in all its stages on the cause action as existed on the date of its commencement and the relief claimed must be confined to matters existing at that date. But in exceptional cases it is open to a court to take into consideration events which may have taken place subsequent to the filing of the action and grant relief on their basis where the relief as claimed originally may have become inappropriate by reason of altered circumstances and where this may appear to be necessary to shorten unnecessary litigation between the parties or tend to subserve the substantial interest of justice, vide Ramdayal v. Maji Devdiji, AIR 1956 Raj 12(D). The cause of action for eviction therefore must exist on the date of the application and also on the date of direction. But it is equally true that in order to determine whether the cause of action does so exist or not, one has to examine its nature. To begin with, I may say that the verb “has” in Cl.(h) has not been placed there as a principal verb but only as an auxiliary followed by a past participle of a principal verb which determines the completed position or completed state of action denoted by the principal verb here,(i) build, (ii) acquire, or (iii) allot. The cause of action will, therefore, arise simultaneously once any one of the said three acts has taken place. This view is in consonance with other parts of the clause. Section 14(1) of the Act, while imposing a complete ban on eviction of tenants, has vested the Rent Controller with a discretion to direct eviction on grounds enumerated in the proviso. When the Act says that acquisition (be it by construction, allotment or otherwise) of a residence, whether such an acquisition has taken place at any time before or after the commencement of the Act, will be a ground for eviction, it clearly means to say that it is not necessary that such acquisition must continue to exist when the tenancy is being terminated or an application for eviction is made. The action can be founded even in an event which was completed before the Act came into force. The significance of the words “before or after the commencement of this Act” in Cl.(h) has got to be taken into account. It has further to be noted that Cl.(h) does not in all cases insist that the tenant should have a vacant residence at his disposal when an application is made. In cases where he has built a residence or has been allotted a residence, a cause of eviction will arise as soon as these events occur. Whether the residence thereafter remains occupied or unoccupied for a long or short interval is no part of consideration for the Controller to act. This is quite an equitable proposition. If at any time during the tenancy, the tenant constructs a residence or gets vacant possession of a residence or receives an allotment of a residence, such a tenant cannot claim the statutory protection to continue to occupy the premises. The cause of action does not change because the residence which was at one time available to the tenant is no more available. The cause of action can be defeated only if the tenant is in a position to prove that he never built any residence, or acquired vacant premises or was allotted any residence, or that the landlord was estopped from exercising his right. I see no other way of termination of the cause of action except by way of eviction voluntarily. The cause of action is not the availability of vacant premises but a completed act or state. How can a completed act or state cease to be incomplete ? The fact therefore that on the date of the application, the tenant, for one reason or the other, had ceased to have or keep the residence vacant, will not disentitle the Controller to direct his eviction, save perhaps in those exceptional circumstances over which he had no control. The purpose is not to shift the tenant to the new residence but to evict him from the tenanted premises. He may either have his premises cleared or may hire other premises; it is all for him to decide for himself. The law appears to extend protection to genuine tenants and not to tenants who themselves are landlords earning high rents out of their acquisitions and denying the same to their lessors. Here, it is not a question of balancing convenience or hardship but a question whether the protection has ceased to be available or not. Unless the law permits otherwise, protection once lost cannot be revived by the tenant. To hold otherwise would mean that a tenant can defeat the law by showing that at the commencement of the Act, he had no such residence or so soon as he gets the scent that eviction proceedings are imminent, by surrendering possession of or letting out the residence. That appears not permissible. It is possible that in some cases the landlord, if he unduly delays his action, may be defeated not because there exists no ground or cause of action but because he lacks bona fides or is barred by estoppel. As a matter of fact, in this case the landlord began to stir within a year of the possession obtained by the tenant. The respondent, therefore, had a right to obtain a direction for eviction. It is again wrong, at least in the facts of this case, to think that because the allotted premises stood mutated only in the name of one of the several inheritors, the remaining heirs cannot be said to have received the allotment. As a matter of fact, the allotment took place in the lifetime of Brij Mohan and if he had then become liable to ejectment, his heirs do not inherit a better right than what the deceased had. I would, therefore, uphold the impugned judgement on the second ground as well.

    9. There is no invalidity in the notices. They terminated the tenancy by the last day of the month and service was refused on March 16, 1974, which amounted to service and gave a clear fifteen days' statutory period to the tenants.

    10. Accordingly, I find no force in the contentions of the appellants and dismiss this appeal. The tenants shall, however, be allowed two months' time to vacate the premises. Costs shall be easy.

    Appeal dismissed.
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    Comments

    Sm. Sheel Utpal And Others v. Hari Chand .
    (Apr 25, 1979)