Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 4 (3) (vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (herein called the Act).
  • provisions of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1957,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 4 (3) (vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (herein called the Act).
  • provisions of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1957,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee, Shri Ram Pershad, was allotted 30 preference shares valued at Rs. 30,000 by United Hotels, New Delhi, for promoting the company. The Income-tax Officer included the value of these shares as income for the assessment year 1952-53, treating it as remuneration for services rendered and thus taxable. The assessee contended that the shares represented a casual, non-recurring benefit exempt under section 4(3)(vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The Income-tax Officer rejected this claim, assessing the shares' value as income. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the assessee's contention and held the shares were not taxable income. The Department challenged this before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's decision. The Department then filed a reference application under section 66(1) of the Act to the High Court, which was rejected by the Tribunal. Subsequently, the Department petitioned the Punjab High Court under section 56(2) to direct the Tribunal to refer a question of law to the Court. The Tribunal complied and referred the question whether the shares allotted to the assessee were a gift and thus not taxable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was correct in holding that the 30 preference shares allotted to the assessee were in the nature of a gift and therefore not taxable income.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The shares were allotted as remuneration for services rendered by the assessee in promoting and managing the company.
  • The allotment compensated for the assessee’s personal expenditure, extraordinary devotion, and effective management related to the company.
  • The shares were not a gift but income liable to tax under the Act.

Assessee's Arguments

  • The shares were a testimonial gift for personal qualities, casual and non-recurring, and therefore exempt under section 4(3)(vii) of the Act.
  • Promotion of the company was neither the assessee’s business nor vocation, and thus the value of shares could not be considered profits or gains of business, profession, or vocation.
  • The activity of promoting the company could not be classified as an occupation or vocation as it lacked a profit motive and was a solitary act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C. Rajagopalachariar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, 50 I.T.R 196 Definition of vocation: activity for which one has special fitness need not be profit-motivated to be vocation. Supported the view that promotion of company could be a vocation even without profit motive.
Commissioner of Expenditure Tax, Gujarat I v. Ambalal Sarabhai (deceased), 73 I.T.R 78 Absence of profit motive does not exclude activity from being vocation or occupation. Used to reject assessee’s claim that promotion was not vocation due to lack of profit motive.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. V.P Rao, 18 I.T.R 825 Income from arbitration was held to be income from occupation despite being casual and non-recurring. Indicated that even non-recurring receipts can be taxable if connected to vocation.
P. Krishna Menon v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Mysore, Travancore-Cochin, and Coorag, Bangalore, 35 I.T.R 48 Teaching Vedanta philosophy was held to be a vocation and payments received were income from vocation. Supported broad interpretation of vocation including non-traditional activities.
Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, 26 I.T.R 765 Even a single isolated transaction can be business income if it bears indication of trade. Used to reject assessee’s argument that promotion was not business since not regular activity.
David Mitchell v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, 30 I.T.R 701 Shares allotted as remuneration for professional services are taxable income. Supported the proposition that shares given for services rendered are income.
Mahesh Anantrai Pattani and another v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North, 41 I.T.R 481 Gift given for personal qualities is not taxable income. Distinguished from present case as shares were not given for personal qualities.
B. Malik v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P, 67 I.T.R 616 Fees received by sitting Judge acting as Umpire without prior arrangement and non-recurring were exempt as casual receipts. Distinguished on facts; present case involved prior agreement and remuneration.
P.H Divecha (deceased) and another v. Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City, 48 I.T.R 222 Ex gratia payments made as testimonial gifts without connection to services are not taxable income. Held not applicable as present case involved prior agreement for remuneration.
Dilip Kumar Roy v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Poona, 94 I.T.R 1 Amounts received as personal gifts for personal qualities and not for services are not taxable income. Distinguished as present case involved agreed remuneration for services.
Nalini Kant Ambalal Mody v. S.A.L Narayan Raw, Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I, 61 I.T.R 428 Receipts after elevation from profession were profits and gains of profession but not taxable if received in year profession not carried. Held irrelevant to present case facts and issue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the shares allotment in light of the agreement executed before the company's incorporation. The agreement explicitly provided for the allotment of 30 fully paid preference shares to the assessee in consideration of services rendered in promoting and forming the company, including personal expenditure and extraordinary devotion. The Court emphasized that the shares were not an unsolicited gift or testimonial for personal qualities but a bargained-for remuneration agreed upon before the company’s formation. The Court rejected the assessee’s argument that promotion was not a vocation, clarifying that vocation includes activities for which one has special fitness and does not require a profit motive. The Court referred to precedents establishing that even single, isolated transactions can constitute business income if connected to trade or vocation. It distinguished cases cited by the assessee where receipts were personal gifts or casual payments unrelated to services rendered. The Court concluded that the allotment was remuneration for services rendered and thus taxable income under the Act. The use of terms like “reward” did not change the nature of the payment, which was contractual and linked to the assessee’s promotional services.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the reference in the negative, holding that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not correct in treating the allotment of the thirty preference shares as a gift exempt from tax. The value of the shares is taxable income as remuneration for services rendered.

Implications: The decision clarifies that shares allotted pursuant to a prior agreement as compensation for services rendered in promoting a company constitute taxable income, even if the activity is not the assessee’s regular business or profession. The ruling reinforces the broad interpretation of "income" under the Income-tax Act and the principle that remuneration need not be recurring to be taxable. No new precedent is established beyond the direct effect of reversing the Tribunal's finding and confirming taxability in this case. The parties are left to bear their respective costs.

    Cit v. Ram Pershad

    Prithvi Raj, J.:— The assessee, Shri Ram Pershad, was allotted 30 preference shares of the value of Rs. 30,000 for promoting company, United Hotels, New Delhi, (herein called ‘the company’). The Income-tax Officer sought to include the value of the said shares as income of the assessee during the course of assessment for the year 1952-53, accounting year ending on 31st March, 1952. The view taken by the Income-tax Officer for including the amount of Rs. 30,000 being the value of 30 shares was that the value of the shares was assessee's remuneration for services rendered and as such was taxable. The assessee's stand was that the value of the shares was a benefit of casual and non-recurring nature, exempt from income-tax under section 4 (3) (vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (herein called ‘the Act’). The Income-tax Officer by his order dated 13th May, 1956, rejected the contention of the assessee and included the amount of the shares as income of the assessee and assessed the value of the shares to tax. Being aggrieved by the said finding of the Income-tax Officer the assessee challenged the same in an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, New Delhi. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order, Annexure B, accepted the contention of the assessee and held that the allotment of the preference shares to him was not assessable either as income under the head ‘Salaries’ or income under the head ‘Other Sources’, and accordingly allowed the appeal. The Department challenged the correctness of the view taken by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by filing an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal but remained unsuccessful. The Tribunal by its order dated 20th September, 1961, Annexure ‘C held that the decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not found upon a mis-conception of law as was urged by the department and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

    2. The Department filed a reference application under section 66 (1) of the Act requesting that a statement of the case be drawn and the question of law suggested in para 4 of the application be referred to the High Court. The Tribunal rejected the application. The Department accordingly filed a petition in the then Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court under section 56 (2) of the Act registered as income-tax Case No. 4-D of 1963, praying that a direction be issued to the Tribunal to draw up a statement of the case and refer the question of law to this Court stated to arise in the case. On a direction issued by this Court the Tribunal by this Income-tax Reference drew up an agreed statement of the case and has referred the following question of law to this Court for opinion:
    “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the 30 Preference shares of the United Hotels, New Delhi, allotted to the assessee were in the nature of a gift and its value was therefore not taxable?”
    In drawing up the statement of the case the Tribunal noted that the assessee is the managing director of the Company, a private limited company, incorporated on 7th November, 1950. The Tribunal has further stated that the Board of Directors of the Company on 15th November, 1950, approved a draft agreement in connection with the appointment of the assessee as managing director of the company. The agreement was executed between the assessee and the Company on 20th November, 1950. Clause (h) of the agreement envisaged that “in consideration of the services rendered in connection with the formation, promotion of the Company and in particular for the effective arrangements made for the conduct of the business of the company incurring heavy personal expenditure and extraordinary devotion brought to bear on the project the Directors shall, soonafter fifty per cent of the capital of the company is allotted, allot thirty fully paid-up preference shares of the face value of Rs. 1,000 each to the (said) Managing Director without any consideration in money.”
    3. In declining to include the sum of Rs. 30,000, being the value of the shares allotted to the assessee, as his income, the Tribunal observed that the whole question was, as to whether the shares in question had been allotted to the assessee by way of remuneration for his services or by way of present or testimonial. On examining the terms of the agreement, the Tribunal found that under sub-clause (h) of clause 1 the shares in question were to be allotted to the assessee in consideration of the services rendered in connection with the formation, promotion of the company and in particular for the effective arrangement made for the conduct of the business of the company incurring heavy personal expenditure and extra-ordinary devotion brought to bear on the project. The Tribunal further observed that the assessee became entitled to the shares by the same agreement whereby he was appointed as managing director and that the decision to give the shares had been decided upon prior to the assumption of the charge of the office of the managing director by the assessee. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that the allotment of thirty shares in question, of the face value of Rs. 1,000 each, to the assessee had all the attributes of being a personal gift to him and that it did not cease to be a gift merely because the same had been allotted to the assessee in recognition of the services as a promoter of the company. The Tribunal further held that “the agreement to give reward to the assessee was already there even before the incorporation of the company and it was fulfilled in recognition of his services in promoting the company”.
    4. The question for consideration accordingly is whether the allotment of shares to the assessee is by way of an award or bounty wholly removed from the sphere of remuneration as was sought to be contended by the learned counsel for the assessee or whether the allotment of shares has the attributes of remuneration lacking the feature of a personal gift as urged by the Revenue.
    5. Section 3 of the Act is the charging section envisaging that where any central Act enacts that income tax shall be charged for any year or at any rate or rates, tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for that year in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the Act in respect of the total income of the previous year of the persons enumerated in the said section. The word “income” has been defined in section 2 (6-C) of the Act. A perusal of the definition of the word “income” leaves no manner of doubt that a receipt in order to be an income need not necessarily be of a recurring nature. In a given circumstance, a single receipt may be income. Heads of income chargeable to income-tax are enumerated in section 6 of the Act and, among others, include profits and gains of business, profession or vocation and income from other sources.
    6. The company, as noted earlier, was incorporated on 7th November, 1950. On 15th November, 1950, a draft of the agreement eventually executed between the assessee and the company, was approved by the board of directors of the company. On 16th November, 1950, the board of directors passed a resolution to execute the agreement with the assessee on behalf of the company. The agreement was executed between the parties, i.e, the assessee and the company on 20th November, 1950. The assessee was allotted 30 shares in question of the value of Rs. 30,000 on 23rd November, 1951, as enumerated in clause (h) of para 1, of the agreement dated 20th November, 1951, “in consideration of the services rendered” by him “in connection with the formation, promotion of the company and in particular for the effective management made for the conduct of the business of the company incurring personal expenditure and extra-ordinary devotion brought to bear on the project”. The assessee, it may bear mention here, was the promoter of the company and by the above-said agreement was appointed as the managing director of the company.
    7. The case of the revenue is that the allotment of the shares was made by way of remuneration to compensate for (1) the services rendered by the assessee in connection with the formation and promotion of the company, (2) for the effective management made by the assessee for the conduct of the business of the company, (3) for extraordinary devotion brought to bear by the assessee on the project and (4) for having incurred heavy personal expenditure. That being so, it was urged, the allotment of shares was not a gift but was income liable to assessment. On the other hand the contention of the assessee is that the allotment of shares was a testimonial for his personal qualities and as such the money value of the shares could not be included as income of the assessee for the assessment year 1952-53. It was further contended on behalf of the assessee that promotion of company was not the business of the assessee, nor could it be said to be his profession or vocation. The money value of the allotment of shares, goes the argument, in the premises could not be said to be profits and gains of business, profession or vocation. Besides, the learned counsel submitted, promotion of the company as a solitary act could not be brought under the head “any adventure or concern in the nature of trade, commerce or manufacture”.
    8. It was also urged that promoting the company could not be said to be the occupation of the assessee, as the term “occupation” necessarily connotes the principal business of one's life; vocation, calling or trade which a man follows to procure a living or obtaining wealth, which occupies or engages one's time or attention.
    9. The contention appears to be spacious but is without merit. Vocation is a sphere of activity for which one has special fitness. It is not necessary that such activity should be one indulged in for earning a livelihood before it can be called vocation. A motive for making a profit is not an essential requisite of a vocation. (See C. Rajagopalachariar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, 50 I.T.R 196) (1).
    10. In Commissioner of Expenditure Tax, Gujarat I v. Ambalal Sarabhai (deceased) 73 I.T.R 78 (2), the question under consideration was whether a certain amount expended by the assessee's wife for the purpose of attending meetings of four institutions of social welfare was exempt from expenditure tax under the provisions of the Expenditure Tax Act, 1957, in that attending of meetings was not the vocation or occupation of the assessee's wife, besides there was no motive or intent to earn income from attending such meetings. Negativing the contention the Gujarat High Court observed that the absence of profit making motive or intent did not take an activity out of the category of vocation or occupation and that the activity of the assessee's wife could not be denied the character of vocation or occupation merely because she was carrying on that activity without any motive or intent to earning income.
    In commissioner of Income Tax, Madras v. V.P Rao 18 I.T.R 825 (3), the respondent who was a retired Judge of Madras High Court was appointed arbitrator in a case. He was paid Rs. 3,000 as his fee for the work done as an Arbitrator. The respondent showed this amount of his return but claimed that it was not subject to tax on the ground that arbitration was not the assessee's occupation or vocation and that the receipt was of a casual and non-recurring nature. The contention was rejected, the amount in question was held to be assessee's income from his occupation as the arbitration proceedings occupied and engaged his time and attention for those months he took the work of arbitration.
    11. In P. Krishna Menon v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Mysore. Travancore-Cochin, and Coorag, Bangalore, 35 I.T.R 48 (4), the appellant assessee was studying Vedanta philosophy and imparted knowledge acquired by him as a result of his studies to others as cared to come and imbibe it. Accordingly a question arose whether payments made to the assessee were income received from his vocation of imparting Vedanta philosophy. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that teaching of Vedanta was assessee's vocation and the payments received by him were held to be his income derived from his vocation.
    12. The occupation and engagement of the assessee's time in the instant case and the attention that he devoted to the formation and promotion of the company during the period he was occupied with the said work undoubtedly would be occupation or vocation of the assessee.
    13. The word “income” used in the Act is of wide connotation and its extent and sweep is not controlled or limited by the words “profits and gains”. It is true that the word “business” normally connotes some real, substantial and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose but even a single and isolated transaction can be held to fall within the definition of business provided the transaction bears clear indication of trade. (See Narain Swadeshi Weaving Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, 26 I.T.R 765) (5). The contention urged on behalf of the assessee that promotion of companies was not the assessee's business is of no consequence if allotment of shares in question posit assessee's remuneration for promoting the company. Modes in which promoters of the company obtain their remuneration vary considerable. One of such ways is the allotment of shares to the promoters. An apparent gift, if it possesses an element of reward for services or work done, assumes the character of an income.
    14. In David Mitchell v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, 30 I.T.R 701 (6), the shares allotted to the appellant, who had rendered valuable assistance to the promoters of the Company in the course of rendering professional service, were considered as extra amount paid to the appellant as his profits. The value of the shares was held as income in the hands of the appellant.
    15. Case Mahesh Anantrai Pattani and another v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay North, 41 I.T.R 481 (7), proceeded on its own facts. In that case the amount of Rupees five lacs was given to the assessee as gift for the personal qualities of the assessee. It was on that count that the Supreme Court held that the said amount was not liable to tax.
    16. Case B. Malik v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P, 67 I.T.R 616 (8) is also of no assistance to the assessee. In that case at the time Shri B. Malik who was a sitting Judge of the High Court was requested to act as an Umpire and at the time when he accepted to act as such there was neither mention of any payment nor was there any question at that time of any payment of fee for acting as an Umpire. On this ground the fee received by the assessee as an arbitrator was held to be exempt under section 4 (3) (vii) as the assessee had not stipulated for it and also that there was no possibility of its recurrence. Since the assessee at the time he acted as an Umpire was a sitting Judge of the High Court and had undertaken the assignment at the request of the Home Minister of the Government of India, it was held that the amount received by the assessee was not a receipt from his profession, vocation or occupation. The receipt in the circumstances was held to be of a casual nature and a non-recurring one.
    17. In the instant case before us, the finding of the Tribunal (page 3 of the paper book) is that “under sub-clause (h) of clause 1, the shares in question were to be allotted to the assessee in consideration of the services rendered in connection with the formation, promotion of the company and in particular for the effective arrangements made for the conduct of the business of the company” and for “incurring heavy personal expenditure and extra-ordinary devotion brought to bear on the project.”. It is, therefore, evident that the shares in question were not allotted to the assessee for his personal qualities as testimonial but on the contrary were allotted in consideration of the services rendered in connection with the formation and promotion of the company and to reimburse the assessee for having incurred heavy personal expenditure during the course of the formation and promotion of the company. According to the agreed statement of the case prepared by the Tribunal (page 4 of the paper book) “The agreement to give the reward to the assessee was already there even before the incorporation of the company and it was fulfilled in recognition of his services in promoting the company”. It is, therefore, evident that it was not an unsolicited gift but the assessee even before the incorporation of the company had stipulated for and in fact had been promised remuneration for services rendered in promoting and forming the company and the promised remuneration was allowed to him in recognition of his services “in promoting the company” and not for his personal qualities as a testimonial. The allotment of the shares in the premises was not in the nature of the unforeseen windfall; on the contrary the assessee had bargained for it as noted by the Tribunal in the statement of the case. The dominant object of the assessee in promoting and forming the company was an enterprise of a commercial character. The assessee did not pursue the activity primarily to entertain himself. In promoting the company there was not only the expectancy of the payment for the contribution made by the assessee but he had bargained for it as there was already an agreement to give reward to the assessee even before the incorporation of the company.
    18. The use of the word “reward” would not alter the nature of the payment which in the instant case without doubt was by way of remuneration for services rendered by the assessee, for which payment on the findings of the Tribunal even before the incorporation of the Company the assessee had bargained for, which agreement “was fulfilled in recognition of his services in promoting the Company”. The question under consideration is not why the payment was made but for what the assessee has received it? In other words, what was the quality of payment from the point of view of the recipient? The assessee had bargained for the allotment of the shares to him for being compensated for the services rendered by him and as found by the Tribunal “the agreement to give reward” was already there “even before the incorporation of the company”, the money value of the shares in the circumstances of the case cannot be deprived of its character as taxable income by merely calling it “reward”, negativing the liability to pay income-tax on it.
    19. There is intrinsic evidence on the record to show that the shares were not allotted for the personal qualities of the assessee but by way of remuneration to compensate for the services rendered in promoting and forming the company, the prior arrangement, as found by the Tribunal was put in the form of written agreement. Sub-clause (h) of clause 1 of the agreement is clear and unambiguous. The intention of the parties is to be derived from it. The parties thought it was desirable to introduce the element of consideration in order to make the promise legally enforceable. This is vouchsaved in sub-clause (h). The acquisition of the shares under the terms of the agreement was linked up with the services rendered by the assessee, the effect of the agreement cannot be cast aside merely because the result is found to be inconvenient to the assessee. The circumstances of the case do not tend against the conclusion that the shares allotted were in the nature of remuneration; the circumstances on the contrary unequivocally stamp the transaction as such. It is tritesaying that remuneration need not generally be effected by systematic and recurring payments. Considering the antecedent conduct of the parties, there being a prior agreement subsequently reduced into writing, the allotment of shares being in consideration of past services, the money value of the shares would represent the income of the assessee. Merely by describing the allotment of shares as “reward” the motive for conferring the benefit cannot be confounded.
    20. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the assessee on P.H Divecha (deceased) and another v. Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City 48 I.T.R 222 (9); Dilip Kumar Roy v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Poona, Poona, 94 I.T.R 1 (10); and Nalini Kant Ambalal Mody v. S.A.L Narayan Raw, Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City I, 61 I.T.R 428 (11). The said cases are of no assistance to the assessee.
    21. In case P.H Divecha, Precious Electric Company entered into an agreement with M/s. Phillips Electrical Company (India) Ltd. for the sale of electric bulbs. The arrangement under the agreement continued for 16 years and thereafter it was ended. However, some arrangement was entered into between parties under which M/s. Phillips Electrical Company, as a gesture of goodwill undertook to pay to each of the three partners of Precious Electric Company, Rs. 40,000 annually for three years to ensure a smooth winding up of their business. The Income-tax Officer sought to tax this amount. The contention of the assessee was that the amount was ex gratia payment made by way of testimonial.
    22. The Supreme Court taking note of the respective contentions of the party, on examining the agreement executed between Precious Electric Company and Phillips Electrical Company, observed that the agreement did not state that on its termination in the way provided, compensation was payable to M/s. Phillips Electrical Company. Accordingly it was held that the payment on the terms of the agreement could not be connected with loss of estimated profits. That being so, their Lordships held, the payment received could not be related to profits or income from other sources. Further, the payment was held to be not related to any service in the past or in the future as services rendered by the assessee in the past were amply remunerated and that record did not show that any service in future was expected from the assessee. In the premises it was held that the payment was made out of regard for the qualities of the three partners of the firm in token of appreciation out of gratitude. Accordingly the payment was held not to bear the character of income, profits and gains.
    23. In Dalip Kumar Roy's case the facts were like this. The assessee utilized his talents for doing service to the Divine Cause. His two main activities were singing Bhajans and writing books. He was paid some amounts from time to time by some individuals which the revenue sought to tax. The plea of the assessee was that the amounts so received were not receipts arising out of a profession or vocation but were given as personal gifts to him out of personal esteem and veneration for him and as such were not income and were not liable to tax. It was also contended that the activities carried on by the assessee did not constitute a vocation within the meaning of section 10 of the Act. The Bombay High Court upheld the contention of the assessee holding that amount paid as personal gift for the personal qualities of the assessee and as a token of personal esteem and veneration were not subject to tax as income arising out of business, profession or vocation. It may bear mention here that the major gifts flowed to the assessee from two American Gentlemen. According to them as stated in their affidavits a desire arose in their mind to build a temple house for their Guru (assessee) on account of the Guru's spiritual reputation, his valuable contribution to literature, music, religion and various fields of cultural activities. It was on the basis of these affidavits that the Court upheld the contention of the assessee holding that the amounts paid were for personal qualities and not by way of payment for the services and further that none of the two Americans had received any instructions from the assessee or ever heard him before making the payment. In the premises, it was held that the amounts paid by these Americans could not be regarded as receipts by the assessee in exercise of his vocation.
    24. The above-noted cases were decided on their own facts and have no bearing on the case under consideration by us.
    25. In Nalini Kant Ambalal's case, the assessee who was practising as an Advocate was elevated to the Bench. After his elevation he received certain monies on account of his outstanding fees. The assessee's accounts were kept on the cash basis. A question accordingly arose in that case whether the assessee was liable to pay income-tax on the receipts of money which he received after elevation. Dealing with the contentions their Lordships of the Supreme Court by majority observed that the receipts of the amount in question were the fruits of the assessee's professional activities. They were the profits and gains of profession. They would fall under the head “Profits and gains of business, profession or vocation”. It was, however, held that they were not chargeable to tax under that head because under the corresponding computing section, i.e, section 10 an income received by an assessee, who kept his accounts on the cash basis, in an accounting year in which the profession had not been carried on at all was not chargeable to tax and that income in that case was so received. It was further observed that the receipts would not be income falling under the head ‘residuary head of income’, charged to tax as such. Summing up the position their Lordships on the facts of that case observed that they found no support for the view that an income which was admittedly under a specific head could be brought to tax under the residuary head if it could not be so brought under the computing section corresponding to that head. The ratio of this case has no bearing on the instant case.
    26. We also find no merit in the contention of the assessee that the money value of the shares was exempt from tax in terms of section 4 (3) (vii) being receipt of casual and non-recurring nature.
    27. In view of our discussion above we answer the reference in the negative. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on the facts and in the circumstances of the case was not right in holding that the thirty preference shares of the company were allotted to the assessee in the nature of a gift. In the circumstances of the case the parties are, however, left to bear their respective costs.
    Reference answered in the negative.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Cit v. Ram Pershad
    (Jan 17, 1978)