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Case Number

Writ Appeal No. 450 of 1970

Advocates

Charanjit Talwar
Sital A.K.Dar

Judges

Mr. Justice Rajindar Sachar

Acts

sub-rule 14.25(4) C.C.S. (C) R.12.
Rule 14.25(4) and Rule 12
sub-rule 4 of Rule 14.25
Rule 12 ofCCS(C) Rules.
(c) Rule 1964

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenges an order of dismissal passed by the Superintendent of Police on 8 April 1968, which was affirmed by the D.I.G. on 20 November 1968, affirmed by the I.G. Police on 14 January 1969 and the petitioner's representation rejected by a memo of the Lt. Governor dated 7 November 1969.

The facts arise from the "Policemen Agitation" of April 1967, during which many policemen abstained from work; a number were suspended and criminal cases were instituted against several. The petitioner, who had joined as a constable and was then functioning as an Offg. Head Constable (as stated in the respondent's counter-affidavit), was charged on 27 January 1968. After an enquiry, the enquiry officer found that the petitioner was collecting funds at the time pay was being disbursed to police personnel and found the charges proved.

The Superintendent of Police issued a show cause notice, concluded that the petitioner violated Rule 14.25(4) of the P.P.R. and Rule 12 of the C.C.S. (C) Rules 1964, and also found disobedience of orders/insubordination amounting to gross misconduct. These findings led to the dismissal on 8 April 1968. The subsequent appeals, revision and representation by the petitioner were unsuccessful, resulting in the present petition seeking quashing of the impugned orders.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the petitioner's act of collecting funds from fellow police personnel at the time of pay disbursement violated P.P.R. Rule 14.25(4) and C.C.S. (C) Rule 12 of 1964.
Whether the dismissal—based on multiple grounds including the alleged rule violations and a charge of disobedience/insubordination—can be sustained when one or more of the relied-upon grounds (the rule violations) are found inapplicable or irrelevant.
Whether the impugned dismissals and subsequent affirmations should be set aside and the matter remitted to the disciplinary authority for fresh consideration in light of the court's conclusions on the applicability of the rules and the law.

Arguments of the Parties

Union of India / Respondent (Mr. Talwar)

Sub-rule (4) of Rule 14.25 prohibits any voluntary subscription; Rule 12 of C.C.S. (C) Rules prohibits asking for or accepting any contributions or raising funds for any object whatsoever.
Any collection by a Government servant — even for laudable objects and even from colleagues — without permission would ipso facto attract sub-rule 14.25(4) and C.C.S. (C) Rule 12, and therefore be prohibited.
The government does not wish to encourage monetary transactions among employees because such collections may lead to undesirable consequences and difficulty in distinguishing voluntariness from compulsion.

Petitioner / Counsel for Petitioner (Mr. Dar)

Although not set out at length, Mr. Dar urged that if authorities had known the rules were inapplicable to the petitioner's limited conduct (collections from colleagues for colleagues), the charge of disobedience or insubordination—derivative of the rule-violation charge—would likely have fallen away.
Mr. Dar also maintained that respondent No. 4 (the authority who passed the order) was not competent to take action, and that this point could be raised when authorities reconsider the matter after remand.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
State of Orissa vs. Bidybhushan Mohapotra	Principle that an order may be supported if there is a lawful substantive ground for punishment; courts should be mindful when an order might be sustainable on an alternative lawful ground.	The court noted the principle but also observed that the present matter involved multiple heads of charge and that in some earlier cases the court has examined whether the order would have been passed on remaining valid grounds. The court declined to finally determine whether the insubordination charge alone would sustain dismissal and left that to the disciplinary authorities.
State of Maharashtra v. Babu Lal	Administrative or quasi-judicial orders based on several grounds cannot be sustained if some of those grounds are non-existent or irrelevant, unless it is clear the authority would have passed the order on the remaining valid grounds.	The court applied this principle to conclude that because some grounds relied upon by the authorities (violation of the cited rules) were irrelevant in the facts of this case, the compounded order of dismissal could not be upheld without clarity that the authorities would have acted on remaining valid grounds alone.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded from the undisputed factual foundation: the petitioner collected funds from police personnel at the time their pay was disbursed, and the funds were for the benefit of suspended or dismissed colleagues. There was no allegation that funds were raised from the public or that coercion was used in the collection.

The court examined whether P.P.R. Rule 14.25(4) and C.C.S. (C) Rule 12 applied to this conduct. It accepted, prima facie, the submission that collections from the public by a government servant may attract these rules, motivated by a public interest in preventing non-voluntary collections. However, the court drew a distinction for collections made voluntarily among colleagues for a common purpose and made openly.

The court found the following relevant:

There was no suggestion of coercion in the petitioner's conduct; collections were from members of the service only.
The Government had recognized the Delhi Police Non-gazetted Karamchari Sangh and had in practice allowed non-gazetted members to be part of it; and a Government of India memorandum (O.M. No. 24/20/55 dated 10 August 1955) provided that while Rule 12 might technically bar internal collections, general permission had been granted in specified cases to allow unions to collect subscriptions among their members for welfare activities without separate permission.
On that basis, the court concluded that neither Rule 14.25(4) nor Rule 12 would cover voluntary collections made from one's colleagues in the service for a purpose common to all members; such limited internal collections fall outside the scope of the cited rules.

Having held the rules inapplicable to the limited factual category before it, the court concluded that the authorities had relied on matters outside the proper legal scope when they found against the petitioner on the basis of those rules. The court recognized that the dismissal order rested on multiple charges, including an independent charge of disobedience/insubordination (not solely on the rule-violation charge). The court stated it was not appropriate under Article 226 to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of whether the remaining charge of insubordination alone would sustain dismissal; that is a matter for the competent disciplinary authorities to consider on reconsideration.

The court applied the legal principle, drawn from precedents, that an administrative order based on several grounds cannot be sustained if some grounds are non-existent or irrelevant unless there is clear evidence the authority would have acted on remaining valid grounds. Because the authorities had in fact taken into account irrelevant matters (the rule violations) and it could not be determined with certainty what would have occurred had the authorities correctly understood the law, the court could not uphold the impugned orders.

For these reasons, the court set aside the dismissal and ancillary affirmations and remitted the matter to the original disciplinary authority (Superintendent of Police, now Deputy Commissioner of Police — respondent No. 4) for fresh consideration in light of the legal conclusions and on merits. The court noted that the petitioner could raise the point concerning the competence of respondent No. 4 when the matter is reconsidered by authorities.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the impugned order of dismissal and the subsequent orders of affirmation and rejection of representation, and remitted the matter to the Superintendent of Police (now Deputy Commissioner of Police, respondent No. 4) for reconsideration in the light of the judgment and on the merits.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The dismissal and subsequent affirmations are quashed and the disciplinary authority is directed to reconsider the matter consistently with the court's legal conclusions—specifically, that voluntary collections made among colleagues for the common benefit of suspended/dismissed members do not, on the facts found, fall within P.P.R. 14.25(4) or C.C.S. (C) Rule 12.
Broader legal consequence: The court applied and relied upon established principles (as reflected in cited precedents) about sustaining administrative orders founded on multiple grounds; the judgment does not purport to establish a new precedent beyond its application of those principles to the facts before it.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.

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Mohindar Singh v. Union Of India

(1) This is a petition against order of dismissal passed by S.P. on 8th April 1968 as affirmed by D.I.G. by his order dated 20.11.1968 and by the I.G. Police by his order dated 14 1.69 and the further order of Lt. Governor conveyed by memo dated 7.11.69 rejecting the representation of the petitioner.

(2) This case is off shoot of what is commonly known as 'Policemen Agitation' which took place in April 1967. It appears that a large number of policemen abstained from work ; many of them were suspended and against many of them criminal cases were filed. The petitioner who had joined as a constable was at that time working as an Offg. Head Constable as per the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent. On 27.1.1968 the petitioner was charged as follows :-(...)......

(3) The petitioner denied the allegations, and enquiry was held, the Enquiry officer found that petitioner was collecting funds at the time when pay was being disbursed to the police personnel. He found the charges proved against him. Show cause was issued to the petitioner by Superintendent Of Police, and he also found that the charges against the petitioner were true inasmuch as by collecting funds he violated Rule 14.25(4) and Rule 12 of the P.P.R. and D.C.S. (c) Rule 1964 respectively. He also found that the disobedience of the order of the superior Officer amounted to gross misconduct and cannot be tolerated in a discipline force on whose shoulder the responsibility of the security of the country lies. He, therefore, passed an order of dismissal on 8th April 1968. The Petitioner's further appeal and revision and representation failed, as mentioned above. This has brought the petitioner to this Court asking for quashing of the impugned orders,, (4) Now the finding that petitioner was collecting funds at the time when the pay was disbursed is not disputed. It is also not in dispute that the collection of funds was for the benefit of and to be used to assist a large number of police personnel who had been suspended or against whom cases had been instituted. It is also not in dispute that the collection was being made only from the police personnel and at the time when the pay was being disbursed. There is no suggestion that the funds were being raised from any member of the public. As a matter of fact, the charge itself is very clear that the funds were being raised from the police personnel and it is also very clear that the purpose of the funds was for keeping those police personnels who had been suspended during the police unrest. Does such an action of the petitioner violate P.P.R. 14.25(4) and C.C.S. (C) R 12 of 1964 Rules. The rules are..... ....

(5) Mr. Talwar, the counsel for Union Of India argues that sub-rule 4 of Rule 14.25 prohibits any voluntary subscription and rule 12 also prohibits asking for or accepting any contributions or the raising of any funds in pursuance of any object whatsoever, and therefore, any collection made by a Government servant like in the present case by the petitioner will ipso facto immediately attract sub-rule 14.25(4) C.C.S. (C) R.12. The arguement is that Government does not wish to encourage any monetary transaction to the employees for the reasons that this may lead to undersirable consequence. Mr Talwar would have it that any collection by the Government servant for even the most laudable object without permission from the authorities concerned would attract the applicability of the rules. Now I am prepared to accept prima facie the suggestion that any collection by the Government servent from the public for any purpose may possibly attract the applicability of these rules (though I would not like to give definite and a final opinion on this aspect as it is not necessary in the present case) It may be that a bar on Government employees to collect any funds from the public is motivated by consideration of public interest in as much it may be difficult to distinguish whether the funds collection had an element of voluntariness or otherwise and collection even made for a good purpose and thereby become counter-productive if voluntariness is absent. Restriction in a case may well be serving a public purpose. But the difficulty is when Mr. Talwar seeks to extend the operativeness of these rules to prohibition against a Government servant like the petitioner in collecting funds even from his immediate colleagues and that also for the purposes of meeting the immediate needs of the suspended employees or those against whom cases have been instituted. I do not find it possible to hold the applicability of rules to this limited situation. The purpose behind the rules being to take care that collections are not made under compulsion. The said compulsion would be completely missing when collections are made from colleagues and in the open. In the present case the allegations even if accepted only mentioned that the petitioner started rasing funds from police personnels for those who had been dismissed or suspended. There is no suggestion that there was any coercion in funds collection. It is relevant to mention that the Government itself had recognised the Delhi Police Non-gazetted karamchari Sangh and had given sanction to Non-gazetted members of Delhi police from being members of the Sangh (Annexure 'B' to the petition). Evidently in the matter of Police unrest and agitation, Karamchari Sangh was very vitally affected as being representative of the police personnel. If in that context the petitioner as a police personnel was asking for funds for other police personnel for the benefit of suspended and dismissed police personnel I fail to see how and in what manner could these rules be said to have been controveted. Even Government seems to have relied that to read rules as prohibiting collections by the organisation for the benefit of his members should not constitute a violation of the rules. In this connection reference may be made to the Government of India memo Mha, O.M. No. 24/20/55 Eatis B) dated 10th August. 1955 in which it had been made clear that though technically saying Rule 12 may seek to bar collection even from a member of the service associations but in order to assist the smooth working of unions it has been decided to grant general permission in specified cases. Thus members of a union can freely collect subscription amongst themselves for welfare activities of the union So long as appeal is confined to members no permission need be sought. Similarly where in a matter affecting the general interest of the members of the union is in dispute and it is permissible under the rules of the union to spend its funds over such a matter, its members should be free to collect funds especially for that special purpose from amongest its members. I cannot conceive of any better utilization of the funds by the Sangh and the police personnels than for the aid of those of their colleagues who had been suspended or dismissed in a matter which was common to all the police force. So in the limited category of exemption from rule 12 the petitioner would have got benefit. In my view neither of the Rules, would cover a case if voluntary collection is made from ones own colleagues in the service for a purpose common to all. In that view the reliance of the authorities in finding against the petitioner on the basis of the violation of P.P.R. 14,2. (4) and C.C.S. (C) Rule 12 cannot be upheld and has to be set aside, but unfortunately, for the pe-titioner it is not the end of the matter because he has also been charged with disobeying orders and behaving in insubordinate manner in not desisting from collecting funds. Thus dismissal is as a result of finging on all these charges. It is possible as Mr. Dar urged that if the authorities knew that the said rules were inapplicable the other charge of disobeyence or not desisting from collecting funds, which flows really from the charge of violation of the Rules in collecting funds would have fallen by its own weight and would not really have survived or it may be as Mr. Talwar sought to urge that charge of disobedience or insubordination would have survived even if there was no violation of the rules by the petitioner in collecting funds. Evidently this is not a matter which this court under Article 226 can choose to determine. This is a matter obviously for the authorities concerned to look into. I am aware that if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantive misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed. It is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant-See (State of Orissa vs. Bidybhushan Mohapotra) But in at lease two out of the five heads of charge relating to illegal gratification had been urged and it was in that connection that those observations were made. As said in the principle of decision was explained in (State of Maharashtra V Babu Lal where the court said : "An administrative or quash-judicial order based on several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained if it be found that some of the grounds are non existent or irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds'.

(6) I am finding the charge against petitioner on basis of contraventation of Ppr 14.25 as irrelevant because the said rules do not cover the case of the petitioner. It is evident therefore that the authorities have taken into account matters which fall outside the purview of the relevant circumstances which could be taken into account for the purpose of proceeding against the petitioner. It is not possible for me to divine as to what result might have been, had the authorities correctly come to the conclusion that there is no violation Ppr 14.25 and Rule 12 ofCCS(C) Rules. Obviously the authorities have to consider whether any proceedings would have been taken against the petitioner if they knew the correct position in law to the effect that the reliance on these rules is irrelevant and non-existent. In such a situation I cannot way with certainty as to what proceedings if any of the order would have been passed and it is not possible to uphold the impugned orders.

(7) The result is that the impugned order of dismissal and the further orders of affirmation in appeal and revision and the rejection of representation cannot be upheld and are set aside. The only alternative for this Court now is to send the matter back to the Superintendent of Police (now the Deputy Commissioner of Police-respondent, No. 4 for reconsideration in the light of the judgment and on law and merits I may mention that I am sending this to Respondent No. 4 because he was the first authority who had passed the order of dismissal, Mr. Dar had mentioned it in the petition and still maintains that the respondent No. 4 was not the competent authority to take action against him. But as I am allowing the petition on other point and sending the matter back. I need not dwell on it. Mr. Dar is free to raise this point when the matter is dealt with by authorities.

Mohindar Singh v. Union Of India

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Union of India / Respondent (Mr. Talwar)

Petitioner / Counsel for Petitioner (Mr. Dar)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Mohindar Singh v. Union Of India

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