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  • Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the operation of Sections 96 to 112, including Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provision analogous of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision in Section 105 of the Cods of Civil Procedure
  • Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, including Section 105,
  • Section 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short, the Act),
  • provisions of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provision of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • Section 105 of the Code of Civil
  • Section 14 (1) (e)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the operation of Sections 96 to 112, including Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provision analogous of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision in Section 105 of the Cods of Civil Procedure
  • Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, including Section 105,
  • Section 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short, the Act),
  • provisions of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provision of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • Section 105 of the Code of Civil
  • Section 14 (1) (e)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — H.L. Anand, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The Controller, in eviction proceedings for non-payment of rent despite service of a notice of demand, made an order under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act despite the tenant's plea disputing the validity of the notice and the quantum of liability. The tenant defaulted in complying with the Controller's order because the deposit was made after the prescribed period; the tenant's plea for condonation of delay was rejected. The Controller directed eviction without deciding the validity of the notice of demand or the disputed liability.

On appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, the tenant attempted to challenge the Section 15(1) order but was not permitted to do so on the ground that no appeal had been filed earlier against that order and it had become "final." The Tribunal nonetheless sustained the tenant's other contention that eviction under Section 14(1)(a) could not be ordered unless the landlord established non-payment or non-tender of arrears within the requisite period where the tenant had raised a dispute about the notice; the Tribunal held that eviction could not be ordered without recording evidence. The Tribunal set aside the eviction order and remanded the case to the Controller, reserving liberty for the landlords to invoke Section 15(7) of the Act in further proceedings.

Both parties appealed the Tribunal's order. S.A.O. No. 280 of 1972 is the tenant's Second Appeal and S.A.O. No. 354 of 1972 is the landlords' appeal. The only question posed for decision before the Court was whether an order made by the Controller under Section 15(1) of the Act is immune from legal challenge in case no appeal against it was filed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order made by the Controller under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act becomes immune from challenge (i.e., enjoys total finality) if no appeal is filed against that order.
  2. Whether the principle embodied in Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure — permitting error in an interlocutory order affecting the decision of the case to be raised in an appeal from the final order — applies to proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, notwithstanding Section 43 of the Act and other procedural provisions relied upon by the landlords.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant's Arguments

  • The order under Section 15(1) of the Act is interlocutory in nature and need not be challenged by a separate appeal; it can be assailed in an appeal against the final order of eviction.
  • By virtue of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the principle embodied in it, the tenant could challenge any interlocutory order affecting the decision of the case in the appeal from the final order.
  • Section 43 of the Act, which provides finality to orders, does not operate so as to exclude the operation of the principle in Section 105 CPC or to deprive the tenant of the right to assail the Section 15(1) order in the appeal against the final order.
  • There was nothing in Section 43 or elsewhere in the Act that made Section 105 CPC or its underlying principle inapplicable to proceedings under the Act.

Landlords' Arguments

  • Given the scheme of the Rent Control Act, the principle of Section 105 CPC could not be invoked in proceedings under the Act; an order against which no appeal was filed acquires total immunity and cannot be attacked even in an appeal against the final order of eviction.
  • The finality of unappealed orders under Section 43 of the Act, and the incorporation by reference of practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes via Section 37(2), precluded application of Section 105 CPC.
  • Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure excludes Sections 96 to 112 (including Section 105) for courts constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act; the landlords relied on this and on decisions such as Shri Durga Swaroop v. Murari Lal and several learned Single Judge decisions of this Court to support the view that unappealed orders are immune.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh & Ors. Explains that the word "final" in Section 43 of the Act means conclusive within the Act and prevents further appeal outside the Act; finality has relevance to proceedings outside the Act (original suit, application, execution), not to proceedings envisaged by the Act itself. The Court relied on this interpretation to conclude that Section 43's finality protects against collateral challenges outside the Act but does not bar challenges in proceedings within the Act (such as an appeal from the final order).
Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. Bengal Government (Privy Council) Recognised the long-standing principle that a litigant is not bound to appeal every interlocutory order and that appellate courts may correct interlocutory orders in an appeal from the final decision. The Court invoked this Privy Council principle as historical justification for permitting challenge to interlocutory orders in appeals from final decisions under the Rent Control Act.
Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum Reaffirmed the Privy Council principle permitting appellate review of interlocutory orders in appeals from the final decision. Used by the Court as supporting authority for allowing challenges to interlocutory orders in a final appeal.
Sheonath v. Ramnath Further reaffirmation of the Privy Council principle regarding interlocutory orders and appellate review. Relied upon as part of the line of authority upholding the rule that interlocutory orders can be considered on appeal from a final order.
Satyadhyan Ghosal & Ors. v. Smt. Deorajin Debi & another Supreme Court approval of the Privy Council principle and explanation of the salutary effect of allowing interlocutory orders affecting the decision to be challenged in an appeal from the final order; references legislative recognition in Section 105 CPC. The Court cited this case as authoritative support for the proposition that the principle embodied in Section 105 CPC is salutary and should apply in appropriate statutory contexts, including under the Rent Control Act.
Parbhati v. Budho Devi Referenced as a case in which Anand J. had doubted the correctness of prior decisions holding that unappealed orders under the Act are immune. The Court noted that one of the judges had earlier expressed doubt about the contrary view and used that context as part of the reason to refer the legal question to a larger Bench (and to re-examine the issue).
Shri Durga Swaroop v. Murari Lal (Punjab High Court) Held that principles in Section 105 CPC would not be applicable to proceedings under the Act (view relied upon by many Single Judges and by landlords). The Court criticised this decision as having overlooked the correct analysis of Section 43 of the Act and treated it as a misconstruction; the Court declined to follow its reasoning.
Shrimati Urmila Rani v. Shrimati Savitri Devi One of several Single Judge decisions of this Court that followed the view that unappealed orders under the Act were immune. Noted by the Court as part of the line of decisions that followed Shri Durga Swaroop; the Court found these decisions to be unsatisfactory as representing the wrong legal position.
L. T. Thadani v. Yogeshwar Dayal Another Single Judge decision cited as following the view that unappealed orders under the Act could not be challenged later. Recorded by the Court as part of the decisions which, in the Court's view, did not represent the true legal position.
Shrimati Sanyukta Uppal v. Shri Vidya Parkash Another Single Judge decision aligned with the view that unappealed orders under the Act are immune from later challenge. Noted by the Court among prior decisions that were followed without close examination; the Court declined to adhere to that view.
Hukam Chand v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi (S.A.O No. 131 of 1969) Single Judge decision relied upon to support the landlords' contention that unappealed orders are immune. Identified by the Court as part of the precedent line which the Court considered to be based on a misconstruction of Section 43 and hence not followed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory appeal scheme in the Rent Control Act: Section 38 confers a right of appeal from every order of the Controller; Section 39 provides a limited right of second appeal. Section 43 provides that, "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding."

The Court analysed Section 43 in light of the decision in South Asia Industries which interpreted "final" as precluding further appeals outside the Act and protecting orders from collateral attack in proceedings outside the Act (original suits, applications, execution proceedings), but not as barring proceedings envisaged by the Act itself.

The Court then reviewed the older Privy Council authorities (including Maharajah Moheshur Singh) and subsequent approvals by the Supreme Court (including Satyadhyan Ghosal) establishing the long-standing principle that interlocutory orders need not be appealed separately and may be challenged in an appeal from the final order when those interlocutory orders affected the decision. The Court observed that Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure legislatively recognises this principle.

The landlords' reliance on the exclusion of Sections 96–112 CPC (including Section 105) for Small Cause Courts under Section 7 of the CPC and the practice-and-procedure incorporation by Section 37(2) of the Rent Control Act was examined. The Court acknowledged that those provisions exclude the appeal/second appeal regime for Small Causes Courts, but emphasised that proceedings under the Rent Control Act do provide for appeals (Section 38 and Section 39), and thus there was no reason to exclude the salutary principle of Section 105 CPC from proceedings under the Act.

The Court concluded that prior decisions (notably Shri Durga Swaroop and several Single Judge decisions following it) which held that an unappealed order under Section 15(1) acquired total immunity were based on a misconstruction of Section 43. The proper construction is that finality in Section 43 prevents collateral attack outside the Act but does not prevent a party from challenging an interlocutory order that affected the decision in an appeal provided for under the Act. Because the Controller had made the Section 15(1) order notwithstanding the tenant's pleadings disputing the notice and liability, the order should be open to challenge and, in the circumstances, must be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: S.A.O. 280/72 (the tenant's appeal) is allowed and S.A.O. 354/72 (the landlords' appeal) is dismissed. The Court set aside the Controller's order made under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and remanded the matter to the Controller to decide whether the tenant is liable to be evicted. The tenant was awarded costs in S.A.O. 280/72; no costs were ordered in the other appeal.

Implications: The Court held that an order under Section 15(1) of the Act is not rendered immune from challenge merely because no separate appeal was filed against it; interlocutory orders that affect the decision of the case may be assailed in an appeal against the final order under the Act. Section 43's finality protects against collateral attacks in proceedings outside the Act but does not exclude challenges within the Act's appeal mechanism. The Court characterised prior decisions to the contrary as having misconstrued Section 43 and therefore declined to follow them in this matter. The direct consequence in these proceedings was setting aside the Controller's Section 15(1) order and remand for further consideration.

Ordered accordingly.

    Shri Kehar Singh v. M/S. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran S

    H.L Anand, J.:— This judgment would dispose of S.A.O No. 280 and S.A.O 354 of 1972, both of which assail a common order of the Rent Control Tribunal setting aside the order of eviction made by the Controller and remanding the case back to the Controller for decision in accordance with law. The only question posed for decision is as to whether an order made by the Controller under Section 15 (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (for short, the Act), gets total immunity from legal challenge in case no appeal against it is filed.

    2. This is how the question has arisen. In the course of proceedings for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent in spite of service of notice of demand, the Controller made an order under section 15 (1) of the Act in spite of a plea of the tenant denying the validity of the notice and disputing the quantum of liability. The tenant admittedly made default in compliance of the order in that the deposit was made after the expiry of the period within which the deposit was to be made in terms of the order. The plea of the tenant for condonation of delay was turned down and by the same order, the Controller directed the eviction of the tenant without going into the question as to the validity of the notice of demand and the alleged failure to comply with the terms of the notice. In the appeal against the order of eviction before the Rent Control Tribunal, the tenant sought to challenge the validity of the order made under section 15 (1) of the Act, but was not allowed to assail it on the ground that the tenant had failed to file an appeal against the order, and that the order having thus become “final” could not be made a ground of attack in the appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. The Rent Control Tribunal, however, sustained the other plea of the tenant that an order of eviction could not be passed under section 14 (1) (a) of the Act unless the landlords established that the tenant had neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of rent within the requisite period of service of the notice of demand in view of the dispute raised by the tenant with regard to the notice etc. and it was, therefore, held that the order of eviction could not be made without recording evidence. Liberty was, however, reserved for the landlords to invoke Section 15 (7) of the Act in the proceedings before the Controller. The order of eviction was accordingly set aside and the case was remanded to the Controller for decision according to law. The landlords and the tenant are both aggrieved by the order of the Rent Control Tribunal. S.A.O 280/72 is the tenant's Second Appeal while S.A.O 354/72 is that of the landlords.
    3. When the appeals came up for final hearing before a learned Single Judge of this Court, the contention of the tenant with regard to his right to assail the order under section 15 (1) of the Act was reiterated in S.A.O 280 of 1972, it was noticed that although the rival contention was reinforced by a decision of the Punjab High Court and following that a number of decisions of this Court, the correctness of the view taken in the decisions had been doubted by one of us, Anand J., in the case of Parbhati v. Budho Devi etc. and that it would, therefore, be proper that the matter was referred to a larger Bench. This is how both the appeals were placed before us for decision.
    4. On behalf of the tenant, it was urged that an order under section 15 (1) of the Act was in the nature of an interlocutory order; that the tenant was not bound to challenge the order in an appeal against it; and that by virtue of the provisions of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, in any event, the principle embodied in it, the tenant was entitled to assail the validity of such an order in an appeal against the final order of eviction, and that the Rent Control Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding to the contrary even though on the basis of a number of decisions of the Punjab High Court and of this Court. It was urged that the finality of orders made under the Act by virtue of the provisions of section 43 of it was subject to any proceedings under the Act such as an appeal against the final order and with a view to defend such orders from any collateral challenge, and that the finality could not be extended so as to deprive the tenant of the right to assail the order under section 15 (1) of the Act in the appeal against the order of eviction. It was urged that there was nothing in the provision of Section 43 of the Act which made the provision of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the principle underlying it inapplicable to proceedings under the Act, and that the Punjab High Court, as indeed a number of learned Single Judges of this Court, had taken the wrong view of the law in holding that by virtue of the provision of Section 43 of the Act, such an order, if not assailed in an appeal against it, became final to the extern that it could not be challenged even in an appeal against the final order.
    5. On behalf of the landlords, it was urged that on the peculiar scheme of the Act, the principle incorporated in Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedures could not be invoked, and that the consequential finality attaching to an order against which an appeal had not been filed gave total immunity to such an order from attack even in appeal under the Act against the final order of eviction. The exclusion of the principle incorporated in Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure was sought to be justified not only with reference to the provisions of section 43 of the Act, but also of Section 37 of the Act, which made the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes applicable to proceedings under the Act. It was urged that by Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, including Section 105, were made inapplicable to courts constituted under the Provisional Small Causes Courts Act. The contention was sought to be reinforced with reference to decision of the Punjab High Court in Shri Durga Swaroop v. Murari Lal, and a number of decisions of learned Single Judges of this Court in the cases of Shrimati Urmila Rani v. Shrimati Savitri Devi., L T Thadani v. Yogeshwar Dayal., Shrimati Sanyukta Uppal v. Shri Vidya Parkash, and in the case of Hukam Chand v. Smt. Kaushalya Devi and another S.A.O No. 131 of 1969, decided on August 25, 1972.
    6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, it appears to us that the contention urged on behalf of the landlords that the order of the Controller under section 15 (1) of the Act could not be assailed in the appeal against the final order of eviction because it had not been appealed against, and the decisions referred to above which have taken that view are based on a misconstruction of the provision of Section 43 of the Act.
    7. Section 38 of the Act confers a right of appeal from every order of the Controller made under the Act. Section 39 confers a limited right of second appeal. Section 43 provides for finality of orders and protects the orders made under the Act from any collateral challenge. This is how the section runs:—
    “43. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.”
    It has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B Sarup Singh & Ors. that the expression ‘final’ in Section 43 connotes that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lay against it, and that the expression ‘final’ in the first part of Section 43 puts an end to a further appeal outside the Act. It was further observed that the Act was a self-contained one and the opening words of the Section emphasised the fact that the finality of the orders could not be questioned by resorting to something outside the Act and that the second part of the Section makes the final order immune from any collateral attack “in any original suit, application or execution proceedings”. The finality provided in the Section has, therefore, relevance to proceedings outside the Act, but not those which are envisaged by the Act itself. It is a well settled principle that a litigant is not bound to challenge every interlocutory order that may be made in the course of proceedings, and where an interlocutory order which had not been appealed from either because no appeal lay or even though an appeal lay, an appeal was not taken, could be challenged in an appeal from a final decree or order and the only exception was an order of remand which stood on a different footing. More than a century ago, Privy Council recognised this principle in the case of Maharajah Moheshur Singh v. Bengal Government, when it was held that it was open to the appellate Court which had not earlier considered the matter to investigate in an appeal from the final decision grievances of a party in respect of an interlocutory order. This is how the Privy Council dealt with the objection:—
    “We are of opinion that this objection cannot be sustained. We are not aware of any law or regulation prevailing in India which renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which he may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the appellate court. No authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything would be more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which would impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing; whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities. We believe there have been very many cases before this Tribunal in which their Lordships have deemed it to be their duty to correct erroneous interlocutory orders, though not brought under their consideration until the whole cause had been decided, and brought hither by appeal for adjudication.”
    The principle was reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Forbes v. Ameeroonissa Begum, and later in the case of Sheonath v. Ramnath. These decisions were approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi & another. This is how the matter was dealt with by the Supreme Court:—
    “(13) There can be little doubt the salutary effect of the rule as laid down in the above cases on the administration of justice. The very fact that in future litigation it will not be open to either of the parties to challenge the correctness of the decision on a matter finally decided in a past litigation makes it important that in the earlier litigation the decision must be final in the strict sense of the term. When a court has decided the matter it is certainly final as regards that court. Should it always be treated as final in later stages of the proceedings in a higher court which had not considered it at all merely on the ground that no appeal lay or no appeal was preferred. As was pointed out by the Privy Council in Moheshur Singh's case, 7 Moo Ind App. 283, the effect of the rule that at every stage of the litigation a decision not appealed from must be held to be finally decided even in respect of the superior courts, will put on every litigant against whom an interlocutory order is decided, the burden of running to the higher courts for redress of the grievances, even though it may very well be that though the interlocutory order is against him, the final order will be in his favour and so it may not be necessary for him to go to the appeal court at all. Apart from the inevitable delay in the progress of the litigation that such a rule would cause, the interests of the other party to the litigation would also generally suffer by such repeated recourse to the higher courts in respect of every interlocutory order alleged to have been wrongly made. It is in recognition of the importance of preventing this mischief that the Legislature included in the Code of Civil Procedure from the very beginning a provision that in an appeal from a decree it will be open to a party to challenge the correctness of any interlocutory order which had not been appealed from but which has affected the decision of the case.”
    8. It is interesting to notice that the principle propounded by the Privy Council is older than its legislative recognition in the Code of 1859, which contained a provision analogous of Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision in Section 105 of the Cods of Civil Procedure that where a decree was appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order affecting the decision of the case may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal did not, therefore, introduce a new principle, but was a legislative recognition of this salutary principle enunciated by the Privy Council. There is no reason why this principle should not apply to proceedings under the Act and there is nothing in the provision of Section 43 of the Act or any other provision of it which may justify such an exclusion. True, by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Act, the Controller shall, while holding an inquiry in any proceeding before him, follow “as far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes”, and there is no doubt that by virtue of Section 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the operation of Sections 96 to 112, including Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, have been excluded from the proceedings under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. This is, however, because these provisions relate to appeal and second appeal and there is no provision of an appeal or a second appeal against the decision of a Judge, Small Cause Court, but that is not so in the case of proceedings under the Act. There would, therefore, be no reason to exclude the operation of this salutary principle incorporated in Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure from proceedings under the Act.
    9. Unfortunately, the learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court over looked this aspect of the matter in the case of Shri Durga Swaroop (supra). The decision is based on the assumption that the principles incorporated in Section 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not be applicable because of a provision to the contrary in Section 43 of the Act. The provisions of the Section were, however, not analysed and I say so with respect. The later decisions of this Court by and large followed the decision of the Punjab High Court and the decisions of this Court that followed without a closer examination of the matter. None of these decisions, to our mind, represent the true legal position, with respect.
    10. It was not disputed before us that if the order of the Controller under section 15 (1) of the Act was open to challenge in the appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, it must be set aside Because it was made notwithstanding the plea set up by the tenant as to the validity of the notice of demand and the liability to pay the rent by virtue of a long line of decisions of this Court.
    11. In S.A.O 354 of 1972 it was not disputed that even if an order under section 15 (1) of the Act was beyond challenge, the Controller was still bound to consider if the requirement of Section 14 (1) (e) had been satisfied.
    12. In the result, S.A.O 280/72 succeeds and the other appeal fails. The order of the Controller under section 15 (1) is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Controller for decision of the question if the tenant is liable to be evicted. The tenant would have his costs in S.A.O 280/72. There would be no costs in the other appeal.
    Ordered accordingly.
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    Comments

    Shri Kehar Singh v. M/S. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran S
    (Jan 3, 1978)