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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition concerns Dr. K.R.K Talwar who was allotted government premises in New Delhi in 1953. Over time, Dr. Talwar fell into significant arrears of rent and was suspected of subletting the premises to his assistant, Shri H. Batra. Due to these issues, the tenancy/allotment was terminated in 1961. Subsequently, a show cause notice under section 4 and an eviction order under section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act were issued against Dr. Talwar. The Estate Officer found both Dr. Talwar and Shri Batra to be unauthorized occupants. Dr. Talwar appealed the eviction order under section 9(1) but his appeal was dismissed for default when he failed to appear on the hearing date. Applications for restoration and review of the appeal dismissal were also rejected. The present writ petition seeks to quash the cancellation of allotment, eviction order, dismissal of appeal for default, and dismissal of applications for restoration and review.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether under section 9(4) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, an appeal can be dismissed for the default of the appellant.
  2. Whether the appellate officer is bound to decide an appeal on merits even if the appellant fails to appear at the hearing.
  3. The scope of judicial review over orders of cancellation of allotment, eviction, dismissal of appeal for default, and refusal of restoration and review applications.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that the real reason for termination of the lease was suspicion of subletting, not merely arrears of rent.
  • It was argued that under section 9(4), the appellate officer must decide the appeal on merits and cannot dismiss it for default of the appellant.
  • Reference was made to rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act, which prescribes the procedure for appeals, suggesting dismissal without merit adjudication was improper.
  • The petitioner relied on Supreme Court decisions (notably Vajesingh Salembhai Naik v. State of Gujarat) to argue that an appeal must be decided on merits and not merely disposed of for non-appearance.
  • The petitioner sought restoration of the appeal on grounds of being engaged in High Court proceedings on the hearing date.

Respondent's/State's Arguments

  • The authorities justified termination and cancellation of allotment primarily due to long-standing arrears of rent, which is sufficient legal ground.
  • The appellate officer was entitled to dismiss the appeal for default as the appellant did not appear despite notice and opportunity, consistent with natural justice principles.
  • The appellate procedure under section 9(4) and rule 8 contemplates disposal of appeals expeditiously, which includes dismissal for default.
  • Distinction was drawn between "dispose of the appeal" and "decide on merits," with the former including dismissal for default, unlike the language in the Jagirs Abolition Act considered in cited precedents.
  • The petitioner failed to show sufficient cause for restoration of the appeal or for review of the dismissal order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh, (1963) 2 S.C.R 733 Appellate court rules require hearing only if appellant argues; no obligation to hear if appellant defaults. Used to support that appeal can be dismissed for default without hearing on merits when appellant does not argue.
Vajesingh Salembhai Naik v. State of Gujarat, (1966) Suppl. S.C.R 139 Appeal must be decided on merits and decision recorded; dismissal for default is not a decision on merits. Distinguished on basis that the present Act uses "dispose of" appeal, which includes dismissal for default, unlike the language in this case.
Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus Sadik, AIR 1921 P.C 55 Appellant must show reason to disturb judgment; duty to argue and substantiate grounds on appeal. Supported the view that appellate authority cannot guess grounds or arguments and dismissal for default is justified if appellant does not appear.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the statutory language of section 9(4) of the Public Premises Act, which requires that appeals be disposed of "as expeditiously as possible." The court contrasted this with the language in the Jagirs Abolition Act, where the statute required appeals to be "decided" on merits and decisions recorded. The distinction was pivotal: "dispose of" includes all forms of ending an appeal, including dismissal for default, whereas "decide" implies adjudication on merits.

The court emphasized the principle of natural justice that requires an opportunity to be heard but does not prevent dismissal if the appellant fails to avail that opportunity. It rejected the argument that the appellate officer must decide on merits even if the appellant is absent, noting that allowing an appellant to obstruct proceedings by simply not appearing would frustrate justice.

The court relied on Supreme Court precedent (Thakur Sukhpal Singh) to confirm that procedural rules requiring hearing apply only if the appellant argues the case. The court also noted that the petitioner had an opportunity to restore the appeal but failed to provide sufficient grounds for restoration or review.

Regarding the cancellation of allotment and eviction, the court held that the non-payment of rent was a sufficient and lawful ground for termination and eviction, and such administrative decisions are not subject to judicial scrutiny on the justifiability of reasons. The Estate Officer properly conducted proceedings and gave the petitioner an opportunity to be heard before eviction.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the writ petition, upholding:

  • The validity of the cancellation of allotment and eviction order against Dr. Talwar.
  • The appellate officer's authority to dismiss the appeal for default without deciding on merits.
  • The rejection of the petitioner's applications for restoration and review of the dismissed appeal.

The direct effect is that the eviction and related orders stand confirmed, and the appeal dismissal for default is affirmed as lawful. The court clarified the interpretation of "dispose of" in the relevant statute, distinguishing it from other statutes requiring merit adjudication, but did not establish a broader precedent beyond the statutory context. No costs were awarded.

    Dr. K.R.K Talwar Petitioner v. Union Of India & Others S

    V.S Deshpande, J.:— An interesting question arising for decision in this writ petition relates to the construction of sub-section (4) of section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act, 1958 [now corresponding to section 8 (4) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971] which is as follows: —

    “Every appeal under this section shall be disposed of by the appellate officer as expeditiously as possible.”

    The question for consideration is whether an appeal preferred against the decision of an Estate Officer can, under section 9 (4), be dismissed for the default of the appellant or whether even if the appellant fails to appear when the appeal is called for hearing, the appellate officer is bound to decide the appeal on merits.

    2. The petitioner Dr. K.R.K Talwar had been allotted on 9-6-1953 government premises at 216, Kamla Market, New Delhi. It is not clear if a lease deed signed by the petitioner and also by the authorised officer on behalf of the President of India had been executed in respect of the premises. Dr. Talwar had an assistant called Shri H. Batra who worked in the same premises. Dr. Talwar appears to have been in large amount of arrears of rent almost from the beginning of the allotment. Though he paid something, he desired that the arrears of rent should be adjusted against some verified claim which he claimed to hold as a displaced person from West Pakistan. The first order by which the petitioner felt aggrieved was passed on 12th January, 1961 (Annexure F to the writ petition) terminating the tenancy of the petitioner. The petitioner requested the authorities to withdraw the termination of his lease or cancellation of his allotment but did not succeed. The reason for the termination or cancellation of the lease or allotment probably and firstly was the undeniable fact that the petitioner was in arrears for a number of years and the arrears had mounted to a huge sum. Secondly, it was possible that the authorities suspected that the petitioner had parted with possession of the premises to Batra inasmuch as at one stage the petitioner requested the authorities to evict Batra from the premises.

    3. In due course, notice to show cause why he should not be evicted from the premises was issued to the petitioner under section 4 and the eviction order was passed under section 5 by the Estate Officer after hearing the petitioner. The order of the Estate Officer dated 5-1-1965 (Annexure M to the writ petition) gave full reasons for holding that both Dr. Talwar and Shri Batra are in unauthorised occupation of the premises. The order of eviction was later passed on 11-1-1965 and served on the petitioner on 27-1-1965.

    4. An appeal was filed by the petitioner under section 9 (1) against the order of the Estate Officer to the appellate officer who was Shri M.S Joshi, Additional District and Sessions Judge, Delhi (now M.S Joshi, J. of this High Court). The appeal was fixed for hearing on 14-7-1965 but the appellant did not turn up till after 4 P.M and the appeal was, therefore, dismissed for his default. An application was made for restoration of the appeal on the ground that he had to go to the High Court to attend his case and he could not return from the High Court till 4.45 P.M It was found as a fact that the appellant had no case in the High Court fixed for that date and even if he had some reason to believe that he had some such case there, he could have returned to the court of Shri M.S Joshi very soon long before the close of Court hours, after ascertaining that there was no case of his in the High Court on that date. Subsequently, an application for review was also dismissed by Shri M.S Joshi.

    The present writ petition is filed for quashing —
    (A) The order of cancellation of allotment,
    (B) The order of eviction,
    (C) The order dismissing the appeal for default,
    (D) The order dismissing the application for restoration, and
    (E) The order dismissing the application for review.

    5. Let us consider the validity of each of these orders and the scope of judicial review in respect of each of them.

    (A) The definition of “unauthorised occupation” in section 2 (e) of the Act is the occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. The authority for the occupation of Dr. Talwar was the original allotment or lease granted to him. When this lease was terminated or allotment was cancelled, that authority disappeared and he became a person in unauthorised occupation of the premises. The non-payment of rent by the petitioner for a long time was an overwhelmingly sufficient reason for the termination of the lease and the cancellation of the allotment. The petitioner's counsel contended that the real reason for such action was the suspicion of the authorities that the premises had been sublet by Dr. Talwar to Shri Batra. The lessor or the allottor has an absolute right to terminate the lease or cancel the allotment. It is not permissible in the course of judicial review to probe into the reasons for such action. The justifiability of such an action is not open to judicial review at all. Moreover, the non-payment of rent for a long time was a complete justification for such an action.

    6. (B) The order of eviction was passed after Dr. Talwar had the fullest opportunity of showing clause why he should not be evicted from the premises. Before the Estate Officer, Dr. Talwar pleaded that his allotment should not have been cancelled. But the Estate Officer rightly held that he was not to sit in judgment over the sufficiency of administrative reasons for cancellation of allotment. He found that a notice for more than 15 days had been given to Dr. Talwar for the termination of the tenancy. This was done when the Transfer of Property Act had not been made applicable to Delhi.

    7. (C) The duty to hear an appellant is required by the same basic rule of natural justice which requires every person to be heard before an order affecting his rights can be passed. At the appellate stage this duty is not more onerous than it is at the stage of the original hearing. The rule of audi alteram partem only requires that an opportunity to be heard should be given to the person concerned. It does not require that even if the said person does not avail himself of the opportunity, an order against him cannot be passed without hearing him. Such an interpretation of the rule would mean that the person concerned may simply refuse to say anything against the order proposed to be passed against him and may thereby stultify the proceedings against him completely with the effect that no order against him can be passed merely because he does not allow it to be passed by merely refusing to defend himself. The same principle should normally apply to an appeal by a person aggrieved by an order against which the appeal is preferred. Petitioner's counsel has, however, argued that an appeal under section 9 of the Act could not be dismissed without an order on merits by the appellate officer. His argument in support of this proposition ran as follows. Firstly, the procedure in appeal is laid down in rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act. It says that an appeal preferred under section 9 shall be in writing and set forth the grounds of objection to the order appealed against. On receipt of the appeal and after calling for and perusing the record of proceedings before the Estate Officer, however, the appellate officer shall appoint a time and place for the hearing of the appeal and shall give notice thereof to the Estate Officer against whose orders the appeal is preferred, to the appellant and to the department or authority in administrative control of the premises. Secondly, the order so passed by the appellate officer shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding in view of section 10 of the Act.

    8. As for the first reason, the whole subject as to the duty of an appellate court was considered by the Supreme Court in Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh, (1963) 2 S.C.R 733 (1). In that case, the appellant though present did not argue his appeal as he could not do so in the absence of his counsel or co-operation from his counsel. Apart from the question as to whether an adjournment should have been given or not, it was urged that the relevant rules of order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code required that the appeal should be fixed for hearing and that the appellant shall be heard in support of the appeal (Rule 16). It was also argued that the appellate court had, after hearing the appeal, to pronounce a judgment in open court (Rule 30). These provisions are, to some extent, similar to the provisions of rule 8 cited before us. The Supreme Court held that these provisions of Order XLI applied only when the appellant argued his case. They were not called into action if the appellant did not argue his case and did not show any cause as to why the order appealed against should be interfered with in appeal. The first reason given by the petitioner's counsel does not, therefore, show that the appeal could not be dismissed for default.

    9. As for the second reason, the petitioner's counsel relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in Vajesingh Salembhai Naik v. State of Gujarat, (1966) Suppl. S.C.R 139. Section 20 of the statute in that case also made the decision of the Revenue Tribunal final. But the main provision regarding the appeal was section 17 (1) which stated that the Tribunal shall, after giving notice to the appellant and the State Government, “decide the appeal and record its decision”. Relying on the said language of section 17 (1) read with section 20, the Supreme Court held as follows at page 142 of the report: —

    “... it is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to decide an appeal on merits even though there is default in the appearance of the appellants and to record its decision regarding the merits of the appeal. If an appeal is dismissed for want of prosecution it cannot be said that the Tribunal has ‘decided the appeal’ and ‘recorded its decision’ within the meaning of section 17 of the Jagirs Abolition Act. It cannot be supposed that the legislature intended by the word ‘decide’ in section 17 (1) to mean ‘dispose of the appeal or to put an end to the appeal’.”

    10. The language of section 9 (4) and rule 8 in the present case is in marked contrast to the language of section 17 of the Jagirs Abolition Act. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that the words “decide” and “record its decision” are in direct contrast to the words “dispose of the appeal”. The words “dispose of” merely mean put an end to the appeal by any of the recognised methods. We are all aware of the word “disposal” of judicial cases. In fact, every month, statements of disposals are made in respect of each court. These disposals include disposals of all kinds, namely, disposals for default, by compromise, etc., that is, not on merits as also disposals on merits. It is well established that when legislature uses a word which has a well understood meaning in the particular context in which the word is used, then it is presumed to have used the word with the same meaning. The word “disposal” in relation to judicial cases and appeals has always included all kinds of disposals. There is no reason to think that the legislature should have intended to give a meaning different from its popular meaning in section 9 of the Act. On the contrary, the legislature in the Bombay Act before the Supreme Court in Vajesingh's case did not use the word “disposal” advisedly and used the words “decide the appeal and record its decision”. The contrast between the language of the legislation before the Supreme Court in the Bombay case and the language of section 9 before us is clear.

    11. The contention that the appellate officer must have decided the appeal on merits even when the appellant was absent has dangerous implications. In Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus Sadik, AIR 1921 P.C 55, the Judicial Committee observed that in every appeal it was incumbent upon the appellants to show some reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances were considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. As such the appellant has, in our opinion, to show to the appellate authority, by oral argument and reference to the record why the order of the first authority is not sustainable. Mere mention in the grounds of appeal is not sufficient since it is open to the appellant to abandon any of the grounds and it is his duty to substantiate his grounds pressed by reference to the material placed on the record, which may not be apparent from the order of the first authority. Under the circumstances, it is impossible for the appellate court or authority to conjecture the grounds and imagine the arguments advanced and then give its reasons to repel the same. Moreover, the appellant whose appeal is dismissed for default has the legal remedy of getting the appeal restored so that it may be heard on merits. Should the appeal be decided on merits in the absence of the appellant, the question of appeal being restored for being heard and decided on merits will not arise. If the appellate court has decided the appeal on merits without the appellant, then it will considerably prejudice the appellant, if he wants the same to be heard again in his presence and surely the appeal cannot be decided twice on merits. We are, therefore, of the view that section 9 did not require the appellate officer to decide the appeal on merits and the appellate officer was fully competent to dismiss it for default and the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner before us has no merit.

    12. (D) The appeal of the petitioner had been pending for sometime and on the date it was dismissed for default, he was present before the appellate authority in the early part of the day and then had an application moved for its adjournment which was not granted. He alleges that he came to the High Court but found that he did not have a case. If it were so, it was the duty of the appellant to immediately go back to the appellate authority and attend to the appeal which was already pending. The learned appellate officer was right in his observation that the petitioner really wanted adjournment and not hearing of the appeal. We are satisfied that the order of the appellate officer dismissing the appeal for default of appearance was legal and valid and no sufficient ground had been made out for restoration of the appeal. The order dismissing the application for restoration, was, therefore, amply justified and does not call for interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

    13. (E) In view of the finding that the appellate officer had acted within his jurisdiction and according to law in dismissing the application for restoration, no case had properly been made out for review of his order and the order of the appellate officer dismissing the review application was within his jurisdiction and passed according to law and is justified in the circumstances of the case. The same does not call for any interference.

    14. As a result, we find that there is no merit in the writ petition and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Dr. K.R.K Talwar Petitioner v. Union Of India & Others S
    (Nov 24, 1976)