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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Petitioner:— Mr. V.S Sawhney, Advocate
  • — Mr. Narinder Singh, Advocate
Judges
  • Mr. Justice Prakash Narain
Acts
  • Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code
  • Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereupon,
  • (1971 Allahabad Law Journal 1121) (5) Section 151 CPC
  • Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 CPC
  • Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. Section 146 CPC
  • 1961 Punjab 57) (4).13. Section 151 CPC
  • Art. 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
  • hereinafter Order 1 Rule 10 CPC
  • provision of Article 227
  • Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.4.
  • Order 9 Rule 13 CPC
  • Order 9 Rule 13
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Petitioner:— Mr. V.S Sawhney, Advocate
  • — Mr. Narinder Singh, Advocate
Judges
  • Mr. Justice Prakash Narain
Acts
  • Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code
  • Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereupon,
  • (1971 Allahabad Law Journal 1121) (5) Section 151 CPC
  • Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 CPC
  • Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. Section 146 CPC
  • 1961 Punjab 57) (4).13. Section 151 CPC
  • Art. 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
  • hereinafter Order 1 Rule 10 CPC
  • provision of Article 227
  • Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.4.
  • Order 9 Rule 13 CPC
  • Order 9 Rule 13
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution challenges an order dated 24th May, 1975, by which the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, dismissed the petitioner's application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The petitioner claims to be a tenant of premises No. 6324, Padam Singh Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, originally owned by Harbans Kaur. On 9 February 1971 the petitioner filed an application in the Rent Controller's court for fixation of standard rent; that application was decided ex parte on 12 October 1971, fixing standard rent at Rs. 62.50 per month. On 15 October 1971 Harbans Kaur sold the property to the present respondents.

In September 1973 the respondents moved an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the ex parte order of 12 October 1971 be set aside. The petitioner filed reply and objections on 11 October 1973, inter alia questioning the respondents' locus standi to move under Order 9 Rule 13. At the end of October 1973 the respondents moved an application under Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and section 151 CPC to be impleaded as parties; the petitioner opposed on 15 November 1973.

By an order dated 23 November 1973 the Additional Rent Controller granted impleading of the respondents. The petitioner challenged that order in this Court under Article 227; a judgment of Prithvi Raj, J. accepted that petition, quashed the order of 23 November (referenced in the opinion) on the ground that Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 146 CPC were not attracted, and remanded the matter for disposal of the respondents' pending application under Order 9 Rule 13.

On 7 February 1975 the petitioner filed an application under section 151 CPC seeking that the respondents' Order 9 Rule 13 application be dismissed without recording evidence, raising preliminary objections to its maintainability. The Additional Rent Controller dismissed that section 151 application (the impugned order), expressing views that it would be unjust to bar a landlord's remedy and that the respondents were assignees of the previous landlord's rights. It is against that dismissal that the petitioner approached this Court under Article 227.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the approach of the Additional Rent Controller in dismissing the petitioner's section 151 CPC application and holding that the respondents had locus standi to move under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC is legally tenable.
  2. Whether the respondents, who became owners after the ex parte decree, had locus standi to apply under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside that decree.
  3. Whether the question of the respondents' locus standi should have been decided as a preliminary issue before permitting trial on the merits of the Order 9 Rule 13 application.
  4. Whether the respondents could invoke section 151 CPC (the court's inherent powers) to seek vacation of the ex parte order when specific provisions (Order 9 Rule 13 and Section 146 CPC) exist.
  5. Whether Article 227 is available where two views are possible (raised by respondents' counsel and addressed by the Court).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The respondents' application under Order 9 Rule 13 was incompetent, misconceived and untenable.
  • The respondents lacked locus standi to move under Order 9 Rule 13 because they became owners only after the ex parte order and their attempt to be substituted or impleaded had already failed before this Court.
  • The petitioner relied on preliminary objections under section 151 CPC to prevent a full trial on merits until locus standi was decided.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended they had succeeded to the rights of Harbans Kaur and therefore should be regarded as defendants entitled to apply under Order 9 Rule 13 to set aside the ex parte decree.
  • The Additional Rent Controller relied on decisions from the Patna and Andhra Pradesh High Courts to support the proposition that parties in the respondents' position could seek to set aside the decree (or otherwise obtain relief), and he treated the respondents as assignees of rights of the previous owner.
  • The respondents argued that even if Order 9 Rule 13 did not directly assist them, they could invoke section 151 CPC (inherent powers) to achieve the same result.
  • Counsel for the respondents relied on three decisions (Shaligram Bindalal; Smt. Bhagwanti; Subhash Chander) to support the contention that section 151 or analogous provisions could be used for substitution or relief in circumstances where substitution under Order 22 was not possible or where the Rent Controller's inherent powers were invoked.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Susil Chandra Guha and another v. Gouri Sundari Devi and others (A.I.R. 1926 Calcutta 1015) Holds that a puisne mortgagee not a party to a suit cannot apply to set aside an ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 or under Section 146 CPC. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that an outsider (like the respondents, who were not parties when the ex parte decree was passed) cannot move an application under Order 9 Rule 13.
Pulhin Suga Kuer and another v. Deorani Kuer and others (A.I.R. 1952 Patna 72) Decision under Section 146 CPC where the application was moved by the defendant (not a transferee); Section 146 deals with claims 'under a party'. The Court held reliance on this case by the Additional Rent Controller was misplaced because the Patna decision involved a defendant and Section 146, not Order 9 Rule 13.
Balaji Govinda Narain v. Hira Lal & another (A.I.R. 1957 (3) Andhra Pradesh 364) Bench decision which, according to the opinion, substituted the word "through" for "under" in Section 146 CPC, producing a fallacy in the headnote/reading of law. The Court criticized this decision as containing an obvious mistake; it found the Additional Rent Controller's reliance on it to be unsound because the correct statutory language is "under" and not "through".
Murari Lal v. Smt. Gurdei and others (1971 Allahabad Law Journal 1121) Holds that Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked to substitute legal representatives after judgment has been signed and decree passed; Section 151 does not create rights where specific provisions exist. The Court applied this principle to conclude that section 151 CPC does not confer on the respondents a right to be treated as defendants or to obtain substitution where specific provisions (Order 9 Rule 13 / Section 146) govern the matter.
Shaligram Bindalal v. Pundalik Baliram and others (A.I.R. 1955 Nagpur 238) Used Section 146 CPC to hold that the word "defendant" in column 1 of Art. 164 of the Limitation Act would include a person claiming under the original defendant. The Court noted that Section 146 was relied upon in that case, but found that Section 146 is not available to the respondents here in view of the earlier decision (Prithvi Raj, J.) in this matter; thus the reliance was unhelpful to the respondents.
Smt. Bhagwanti v. Kidar Nath (Note in 1974 Rajdhani Law Reporter as note No. 110) States that where a person cannot be substituted under Order 22 CPC, substitution can be ordered under Section 151 CPC. The Court held this decision was not relevant to the present case (the circumstances did not fit the principle as applied here).
Subhash Chander v. Rehmatullah (1972 Rajdhani Law Reporter 154) Held that a Rent Controller had inherent power to set aside an ex parte order at any time without being bound by the law of limitation; concerned whether the Rent Controller was functus officio. The Court observed this decision did not decide the locus standi issue and therefore did not help the respondents on the question whether an outsider could invoke Order 9 Rule 13 or section 151 CPC for substitution.
Judgment of Prithvi Raj, J. (earlier in this Court; referenced in the opinion) Quashed the Additional Rent Controller's order of 23rd November (referenced) holding Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 146 CPC not attracted and remanding for disposal of the respondents' pending Order 9 Rule 13 application. The Court treated that earlier judgment as binding inter partes and held that the Additional Rent Controller's later view (that respondents could be treated as entitled to move to set aside the decree) was contrary to that binding decision.
A.I.R. 1961 Punjab 57 Example cited by the Court: an Appellate Court lacks inherent power to permit substitution of legal representatives where an appeal has been filed in the name of a dead person. Used as an illustration of the settled law that section 151 CPC cannot be invoked where a specific provision governs; the Court relied on this principle to reject respondents' reliance on section 151 CPC to obtain substitution/relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Interpretation of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC: The Court quoted the Rule and concluded that only a defendant in the original action can apply under Order 9 Rule 13 to set aside an ex parte decree. A person who is not a party, even if interested, is not entitled to apply under that Rule. Even a formal party who was expressly exempted by the operative portion of the decree cannot apply under the Rule.
  2. Application of the rule to the facts: The respondents became owners only after the ex parte order was passed. Their earlier attempt to be impleaded/substituted (under Order 1 Rule 10 / Order 22 Rule 10) had been quashed by this Court (Prithvi Raj, J.). Consequently, they could not claim to be legal representatives or substituted defendants in the proceedings and were outsiders to the proceedings when the decree was passed. On that basis, the Court held they lacked locus standi to move under Order 9 Rule 13.
  3. Reliance on precedent and criticism of the Additional Rent Controller's reasoning: The Court accepted the Calcutta High Court decision in Susil Chandra Guha as supporting the proposition that an outsider cannot move under Order 9 Rule 13. It found the Additional Rent Controller's reliance on Patna and Andhra decisions (Pulhin Suga Kuer and Balaji Govinda Narain) to be unsound because those authorities either involved different parties/provisions (Section 146 rather than Order 9 Rule 13) or contained an erroneous substitution of words that produced a fallacious headnote. Therefore, the Additional Rent Controller's interpretation — that the respondents as assignees could apply to set aside the decree — was plainly erroneous.
  4. On section 151 CPC (inherent powers): The Court examined section 151 CPC and emphasised that it preserves the inherent power of the Court but does not confer any substantive right or jurisdiction where a specific statutory provision exists. The Court cited authority (including an A.I.R. 1961 Punjab decision and Murari Lal) to underscore the settled rule that section 151 cannot be invoked to override or substitute for specific statutory provisions (for example, to permit substitution of legal representatives after decree or to provide a remedy where Order 9 Rule 13 applies).
  5. Consideration of authorities relied upon by respondents: The Court reviewed the three authorities relied upon by respondents' counsel (Shaligram Bindalal, Smt. Bhagwanti, Subhash Chander) and explained why each did not assist the respondents on the locus standi question: Shaligram Bindalal involved Section 146, not available here; Smt. Bhagwanti addressed a different substitution context; and Subhash Chander concerned the Rent Controller's power vis-a-vis limitation and functus officio, not the locus standi issue.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: The Court concluded that the Additional Rent Controller erred in law in holding that the respondents had locus standi to move under Order 9 Rule 13 and therefore erred in dismissing the petitioner's section 151 application on that basis. The proper course was to decide locus standi as a preliminary point rather than forcing the parties to proceed to evidence on the merits.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court accepted the petition under Article 227, quashed the impugned order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 24th May, 1975 (which had dismissed the petitioner's section 151 CPC application), and directed that the respondents' application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC be listed for hearing forthwith and disposed of in accordance with the law laid down in the opinion.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The Additional Rent Controller's approach that the respondents had locus standi to move under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was held legally untenable and set aside.
  • The respondents' pending Order 9 Rule 13 application must be heard and disposed of in accordance with the Court's legal conclusions (noting that as outsiders at the time of the ex parte decree they lack locus standi to invoke Order 9 Rule 13, subject to the court below applying the law).
  • The petitioner was awarded her costs; counsel's fee was fixed at Rs. 250.

Broader implications: The opinion confined itself to the proper application of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and the inapplicability of section 151 CPC to confer locus where specific statutory provisions exist. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel or sweeping precedent beyond these conclusions; it applied and distinguished existing authorities to the facts of this case.

Show full summary ...

    Mrs. Santosh Chopra Petitioner v. S/Shri Teja Singh Sardul Singh S

    Prakash Narain, J.:— This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed against an order dated 24th May, 1975, by which an Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, dismissed the petitioner's application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure moved in that court. To appreciate the scope of the controversy in this Court it will be advantageous to first briefly notice the facts and circumstances leading to the impugned order.

    2. The petitioner claims to be a tenant in the premises bearing No. 6324, Padam Singh Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. This property was owned by one Harbans Kaur. On February 9, 1971, the petitioner filed an application in the court of Rent Controller, Delhi, for fixation of standard rent of the premises in her occupation, claiming herself to be a tenant of Harbans Kaur. This application was decided ex-parte on October 12, 1971, and standard rent was fixed at Rs. 62.50 per month. On October 15, 1971, Harbans Kaur sold the said property to the present respondents. In September, 1973, an application was moved by the present respondents in the court of Additional Rent Controller under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the ex-parte order dated October 12, 1971, fixing the standard rent, be set aside. The present petitioner filed her reply and objections to that application on October 11, 1973, and, interalia, questioned the locus standi of the respondents to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereupon, the respondents in the end of October 1973, moved another application under Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for being impleaded as a party to the original proceedings for fixation of standard rent. This application was also opposed by the present petitioner in her reply filed on November 15, 1973. By an order dated 23rd November, 1973, the Additional Rent Controller granted the application of the respondents hereinafter Order 1 Rule 10 CPC etc. and ordered that the respondents be impleaded as a party to the original case of fixation of standard rent. Aggrieved by that order the petitioner herein moved this Court by a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. By a judgment of Prithvi Raj, J. this Court accepted that petition, quashed the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated November 23, 1975, holding that Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case, and remanded the case back for disposal of the respondents' application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was still pending. On February 7, 1975, the petitioner filed an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the respondents' application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC be dismissed without proceeding to record evidence. This application under Section 151 CPC raised certain preliminary objections to the maintainability of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC contending that the respondents' application was incompetent, mis-conceived and untenable. The learned Additional Rent Controller dismissed this application of the petitioner and even expressed an opinion in paragraph 12 of the impugned order that without going into evidence it would be unjust to bar any remedy for a landlord like the respondents, if it is held that they cannot get the ex-parte order fixing standard rent set aside. An opinion has also been expressed that the respondents are the assignee of the rights of the previous landlords (wrongly mentioned as petitioner in the impugned order). It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has come to this Court for interference with the order of the Additional Rent Controller under the provision of Article 227 of the Constitution.
    3. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the approach of the Additional Rent Controller is legally tenable. The respondents in their application under Order 9 Rule 13 have raised disputed questions of fact as to service of notice on Harbans Kaur etc. But foremost it has to be seen whether such application as moved by the respondents under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC is one which the respondents had locus standi to move. The question is whether the Additional Rent Controller should have decided this matter as a preliminary issue or gone on to decide the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC on merits and then at that stage decide about the locus standi of the respondents to move the application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.
    4. In my opinion, the approach of the Additional Rent Controller cannot be sustained in law. As is apparent from his observations in paragraph 12 of the impugned order, his approach is that “It would be patently unjust to bar any remedy for such a landlord, if he cannot even get the decree set aside if the law so permits and, therefore, in my opinion since the petitioner is the assignee of the rights of the previous landlord, therefore, he can apply for getting the decree set aside as such.” This finding is patently erroneous and against settled law. Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under: —
    “R. 13. In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to the Court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside, and if he satisfies the Court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into Court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit:
    Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also.”
    5. On the very reading of the Rule it is clear that it is only the defendant in an action who can move an application under this provision of law. A person who is not a party, though he may be interested in the suit, is not entitled to apply under this Rule. Indeed, even if a person who is formally a party but against whom nothing is said in the operative portion of the decree or who has been expressly exempted from a decree cannot apply under this Rule to set aside an ex parte decree.
    6. It has been urged that the respondents had succeeded to the rights of Harbans Kaur and so they must be regarded as defendants within the meaning of Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. Factually the position is that the respondents became the owner of the property subsequent to the passing of the ex parte order sought to be set aside. The respondents' application under Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 CPC etc. stands dismissed by an order of this Court. They cannot, therefore, even plead that they are the legal representatives of or entitled to be substituted in place of the original defendant or added as a party to the original proceedings. If that be the position then the respondents are outsiders to the proceedings in which ex parte order was made and may not have locus standi to have the order set aside. The proposition of law which I have enunciated hereinabove finds support from a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Susil Chandra Guha and another v. Gouri Sundari Devi and others (A.I.R 1926 Calcutta 1015) (1). In that case it was held that the puisne mortgagee not a party to a suit cannot be allowed to apply for setting aside the ex parte decree either under Order 9 Rule 13 or under Section 146 CPC. If this is the correct law, it may have to be held that an outsider like the respondents cannot move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. The Additional Rent Controller in his impugned order could not take up the position that he has in paragraph 12 of the impugned order which has been quoted above. The decision of the Calcutta High Court referred to earlier was brought to the notice of the Additional Rent Controller but he has disagreed with that interpretation. He has rather relied on two other decisions, one of the Patna High Court and the other of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In my view the reading of these two decisions by the Additional Rent Controller is not tenable.
    7. In the case of Pulhin Suga Kuer and another v. Deorani Kuer and others (A.I.R 1952 Patna 72) (2) relied on by the Additional Rent Controller, the application in question was moved by the defendant and not the transferee. It was a case under section 146 CPC and not under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. Section 146 CPC speaks of claiming “under a party” and not “through a party”. I do not understand how any reliance on this decision could be placed by the Additional Rent Controller.
    8. In the case of Balaji Govinda Narain v. Hira Lal & another [A.I.R 1957 (3) Andhra Pradesh 364] there is an obvious mistake in the judgment. The fallacy in the Bench decision is that the word “through” has been substituted for the word “under” occurring in Section 146 CPC. The head note is somewhat misleading and one has to read paragraphs 12 to 16 to find the fallacy. With respect it must be said that had their Lordships of the Andhra, Pradesh High Court not substituted the word “through” for the word “under” such a proposition of law as laid down would not have been laid down.
    9. The respondents' attempt to get substituted or added as a party has already failed. In this view of the matter it was incumbent upon the trial court to first decided the locus standi of the respondents to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC instead of putting the parties to the cost and trouble of trial on merits. In any case, the Additional Rent Controller has not dismissed the application under section 151 CPC moved by the petitioner on the ground that according to him it would be more convenient to try the whole matter after evidence. He has dismissed the application moved by the petitioner on the ground that the respondents had locus standi to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. Such an approach cannot be sustained in law.
    10. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that Article 227 of the Constitution is not attracted where there are two views possible. First of all I do not agree that there are two views possible in a case like this. Secondly, the approach of the Additional Rent Controller is wholly untenable in law. Indeed, the finding of the Additional Rent Controller to the effect that the respondents can move an application to set aside the ex parte order made against Harbans Kaur amounts to a decision against the rule laid down by my brother Prithvi Raj, J. referred to earlier which was inter parties and is binding on them.
    11. It was next urged that even if the present landlords cannot move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, they can move the Additional Rent Controller under Section 151 CPC to set aside the ex parte order against Harbans Kaur. Apart from the fact that Harbans Kaur, if she had herself moved the application, would have faced a problem of limitation and having no interest in the property at the time when she moved the application, the respondents cannot take advantage of section 151 CPC. This section reads as under: —
    “151. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.”
    12. The above section saves the inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. This section by itself gives no right to a party nor does it confer any jurisdiction. It is settled law that where there is a specific provision of law, the provisions of section 151 cpc cannot be invoked. For example, where an appeal has been filed in the name of a dead person, the Appellate Court has no inherent power to permit his legal representatives to be substituted in his place as appellants (See A.I.R 1961 Punjab 57) (4).
    13. Section 151 CPC may be availed of by a Court read with some other provision of law or where there is no provision of law to cover a contingency. As has been held in Murari Lal v. Smt. Gurdei and others (1971 Allahabad Law Journal 1121) (5) Section 151 CPC cannot be invoked by a court for substituting legal representatives after the judgment has been signed and the decree passed.
    14. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied on three decisions to contend that Section 151 CPC would be attracted. The first case he relies on is the decision in Shaligram Bindalal v. Pundalik Baliram and others (A.I.R 1955 Nagpur 238) (6). This is a case where aid was taken of Section 146 CPC etc. to hold that the word ‘defendant’ in column 1 of Art. 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908, would include a person claiming under the original defendant. But Section 146 CPC is not available to the respondents in view of the decision of the High Court inter parties referred to earlier.
    15. The counsel for the respondents next relied on the decision in Smt. Bhagwanti v. Kidar Nath etc. reported in the Note portion of 1974 Rajdhani Law Reporter as note No. 110 (7). This decision only lays down that where a person cannot be substituted under Order 22 CPC then substitution can be ordered under Section 151 CPC also. This decision is, therefore, not relevant for the purposes of the present case.
    16. Lastly, the learned counsel relied on a decision in Subhash Chander v. Rehmatullah (1972 Rajdhani Law Reporter 154) (8). This is a case where a Bench of this Court held that the Rent Controller had inherent power to set aside an ex parte order at any time without being bound by the law of limitation. This decision has not laid down any rule as to the locus standi of the person at whose instance ex parte order is to be set aside. The point in issue in the case was whether a Rent Controller had become functus officio after having made an order, and so he had no power to correct it. This decision also does not help the respondents.
    17. It is not the question of power of the Additional Rent Controller that arises for decision in the present case. The point at issue is whether the approach of the Additional Rent Controller is tenable or not in his holding that the respondents, placed as they are, had locus standi to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC. In my opinion, the order of the Additional Rent Controller cannot be sustained in dismissing the application of the petitioner moved under section 151 CPC for the reasons given. The Additional Rent Controller has held that the respondents have locus standi to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC on untenable grounds. This decision cannot be sustained. I accordingly quash the impugned order. Inasmuch as I have already observed that the respondents had no locus standi to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC, which was the point debated before the Additional Rent Controller, that application of the respondents has to be disposed of in accordance with the law laid down herein. I, therefore, direct that the said application of the respondents under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC be listed for hearing forthwith and disposed of in accordance with the law laid down. The present petition is accepted as indicated above. The petitioner would be entitled to her costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 250.
    Petition accepted.
    provision of Article 227
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    Comments

    Mrs. Santosh Chopra Petitioner v. S/Shri Teja Singh Sardul Singh S
    (Aug 13, 1976)