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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — V.S. Deshpande, J. (Full Bench)

Factual and Procedural Background

After Shri Hardit Singh Giani was appointed liquidator of National Planners Limited in voluntary winding up, the liquidation proceedings were placed under the supervision of the Court. The Registrar of Companies applied to the District Judge under a notification issued under section 10 of the Companies Act for removal of the liquidator. The District Judge granted that application and removed the liquidator. An appeal under section 483 of the Companies Act was filed to the High Court; Hardy, J. (as he then was) set aside the District Judge's order and reappointed Shri Giani and also appointed Shri V.S. Joneja as additional liquidator, directing expeditious completion of winding up. An appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against Hardy, J.'s order was filed without a certificate from the learned Single Judge. A preliminary objection was raised that the Letters Patent appeal required such a certificate. A Division Bench (V.S. Deshpande and S. Rangarajan, JJ.) considered a precedent (Sri Ram v. Bulbhdass) holding that a certificate was required and referred the question for Full Bench consideration. The present Full Bench was convened to decide whether a certificate from the Single Judge is required in such appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent lies to a Division Bench against the decision of a Single Judge sitting in first appellate jurisdiction under section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956, without a certificate from that Single Judge.
  2. Whether section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 falls into the class of statutes that (a) implicitly or expressly bar further appeals beyond the High Court (thus cutting down the ambit of clause 10), or (b) allow appeals to the High Court without expressly barring further appeals (thus leaving clause 10 intact).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sri Ram and others v. M/s. Bulbhdass and others, ILR (1972) II Delhi 530 Held that an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent does not lie without a certificate from the Single Judge where the Single Judge decided an appeal under section 483 of the Companies Act against an order of a District Judge under section 10. The Full Bench reviewed and distinguished this Division Bench decision and stated that Sri Ram v. Bulbhdass was not correct in holding that a certificate was required in the circumstances of a Single Judge exercising first appellate jurisdiction under section 483. The Court was unable to agree with Sri Ram.
South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh and others, AIR 1965 S.C. 1442 Example of a statute (Delhi Rent Control Act) whose provision (section 43) renders orders final and therefore cuts down the ambit of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Used as an illustration of the first class of statutes where express finality bars further appeal; cited to show that where statute makes orders final, clause 10 cannot be invoked for further appeal.
Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., AIR 1962 S.C. 256 Illustration that specific legislative provisions (e.g., section 39(2) of the Arbitration Act) which expressly bar second appeals will limit the scope of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Cited as another example of a statute that cuts down the ambit of clause 10 because it expressly bars a further appeal after the High Court.
Siri Chand Sheo Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 Punjab 221 Held that an order of the High Court under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act was appealable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent despite statutory language that an appeal "shall only lie" to the High Court. Relied on as an example of the second class of statutes: where an appeal to the High Court is provided without express limitation, clause 10 may still permit a further appeal to a Division Bench.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, AIR 1970 Delhi 37 Full Bench holding that an appeal from a learned Single Judge would lie under clause 10 of the Letters Patent where the statutory provision (section 110-D Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) provided an appeal to the High Court without more. Used as precedent supporting the proposition that where a statute simply provides an appeal to the High Court (without expressly barring further appeal), clause 10 allows a further appeal to a Division Bench.
Basheshar Nath v. Kanhaya Lal, 1913 Punjab Record 134 Interpreted section 169 of the Companies Act, 1882 (which contained a three-week notice restriction) to mean only one appeal was competent and that the three-week limitation applied to the first appeal from the lower court. The Full Bench distinguished Basheshar Nath because section 169 contained special limiting words (three-week notice) absent from section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956; hence Basheshar Nath was not helpful to the present question.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the issue systematically by first categorising statutes into two classes and then determining into which class section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 falls.

  1. Two classes of statutes:
    • Class 1: Statutes that expressly bar or limit further appeals to the High Court—where the statute's language makes orders final or otherwise cuts down the ambit of clause 10 of the Letters Patent (illustrated by the Delhi Rent Control Act and the Arbitration Act cases cited to the Supreme Court in South Asia Industries and Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co.).
    • Class 2: Statutes that provide an appeal to the High Court without expressly barring further appeals—where clause 10 of the Letters Patent may still allow a further appeal to a Division Bench (illustrated by the Land Acquisition Act and Motor Vehicles Act decisions in Siri Chand Sheo Lal and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari).
  2. Analysis of section 483 of the Companies Act:

    The Court observed that section 483 states appeals would lie "in the same manner in which and subject to the same conditions" as appeals from orders of the Court in its ordinary jurisdiction. Hence, the law governing appeals against such orders is the law that governs appeals against orders of the Court in its ordinary jurisdiction. The District Judge's order was passed in his ordinary jurisdiction and was appealable to the High Court under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Single Judge's order, made in the exercise of first appellate jurisdiction, therefore became subject to clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

  3. Examination of clause 10 of the Letters Patent:

    The Court analysed the text of clause 10 and its exceptions. Clause 10 generally allows an appeal from the judgment of one Judge to a Division Bench but contains exceptions applicable where the judgment is passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a subordinate court; in such a situation a certificate from the Single Judge would be required. The Court emphasised that the certificate requirement applies where the Single Judge's decision is itself a second appellate decision (i.e., an appeal against a decision that was already appellate in nature).

  4. Distinguishing Basheshar Nath:

    The Court distinguished Basheshar Nath v. Kanhaya Lal because the older provision (section 169 of the Companies Act, 1882) contained a specific three-week notice restriction and wording that produced special consequences. Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 contains no such limiting words; thus the reasoning in Basheshar Nath was not applicable to the present statutory scheme.

  5. Conclusion of analysis:

    Because section 483 lacks the limiting provisions that would remove the ordinary operation of clause 10, and because the Single Judge in this case was exercising first appellate (not second appellate) jurisdiction, the requirement of a certificate under clause 10 does not arise. The Court therefore held that the appeal under clause 10 against a Single Judge's order made in first appellate jurisdiction under section 483 is maintainable without a certificate from the Single Judge.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is maintainable without the need of a certificate from the learned Single Judge who passed the order appealed against.

Implications:

  • The Full Bench concluded that section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 falls within the class of statutory provisions that do not, by their wording, bar a further appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent when the Single Judge is deciding in first appellate jurisdiction.
  • The Court expressly disagreed with the Division Bench decision in Sri Ram v. Bulbhdass to the extent that it held a certificate was required in such circumstances.
  • Practical consequence for the parties: the appeal filed under clause 10 (without a certificate) is to be entertained and "will be dealt with by the Division Bench according to law."
  • The opinion differentiates the present statutory scheme from the Companies Act, 1882 situation considered in Basheshar Nath and confines the need for a certificate to cases where the Single Judge's order is in second appellate jurisdiction as described in the exceptions to clause 10.

If no broader implications were expressly discussed in the opinion beyond the foregoing, the direct effect is the maintainability of the pending Letters Patent appeal and its referral for hearing by the Division Bench; the Court's analysis confines the certificate requirement to the limited circumstance of second appellate decisions described in clause 10's exceptions.

Order: Accordingly ordered.

    Registrar Of Companies v. Hardit Singh Giani

    V.S Deshpande, J.:— After the respondent Shri Hardit Singh Giani was appointed as a liquidator of National Planners Limited, a company registered under the Companies Act, in voluntary winding up proceedings, the liquidation proceedings came under the supervision of the Court. The Registrar of Companies applied to the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under a notification issued under section 10 of the Companies Act for removal of the liquidator. The District Judge granted the prayer and removed the liquidator. An appeal was filed against the decision of the District Judge under section 483 of the Companies Act to this Court. Hardy, J. (as he then was) by the order under appeal set aside the order of the District Judge and reappointed Shri Giani as the liquidator and also Shri V.S Joneja, Official liquidator, as the additional liquidator directing both of them to complete the winding up proceedings expeditiously. This appeal under clause 10 of the letters Patent has been filed against the decision of Hardy, J. (as he then was), without a certificate from the learned Judge.

    2. The appeal came up for hearing before a Division Bench consisting of V.S Deshpande and S. Rangarajan, JJ. A preliminary objection was raised that the letters patent appeal was not maintainable without a certificate from the learned Single Judge. In similar circumstances. Hardy, C.J and Prakash Narain, J. in Sri Ram and others v. M/s. Bulbhdass and others, ILR (1972) II Delhi 530 (1), had held that an appeal does not lie under clause 10 of the letters Patent without a certificate from the learned Single Judge who decided the appeal under section 483 of the Companies Act against the order of the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under a notification issued under section 10 of the Companies Act.
    3. The Division Bench was of the view that the decision in Sri Ram v. Bulbhdass needed to be reconsidered and, therefore, referred the question to a Full Bench. That is how the question has come up now before us.
    4. The appealability of orders under these circumstances may arise in two sets of cases. On the one hand, a statute may expressly bar a further appeal which would have otherwise been maintainable under clause 10 of the letters Patent. For instance, section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 allows a second appeal to the High Court but section 43 of the said Act says that “save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under this Act shall be final”. It was, therefore, held by the Supreme Court in South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B Sarup Singh and others, AIR 1965 S.C 1442 (2) that in view of the finality of the orders under the Act by section 43 of the Act, no appeal would lie under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. Similarly, section 39 (2) of the Arbitration Act allows an appeal to the High Court against orders passed under that Act but expressly bars a second appeal thereafter. This provision was held to cut down the ambit of clause 10 of the Letters Patent under which otherwise a second appeal would have been competent (Union Of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. , AIR 1962 S.C 256) (3).
    5. On the other hand are the statutes which allow an appeal to the High Court without saying anything more. For instance, an appeal lies to the High Court under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act against the decision of the civil court in a reference made to it under section 18 of the said Act. The order of the High Court passed in an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act was held to be appealable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent to a Division Bench in Siri Chand Sheo Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 Punjab 221 (4), inspite of the words “an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court” used in section 54. The thrust of the word “only” was taken to be towards the forum, namely, the High Court and was not construed to mean that any further appeal against the decision of the High Court was barred. Similarly an appeal lies to the High Court under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 against the decision of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. In the Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, AIR 1970 Delhi 37 (5), A Full Bench of this Court held that an appeal against the decision of a learned Single Judge would lie under clause 10 of the Letters Patent to a Division Bench.
    6. The question in this appeal is in which of these two classes of statutes, section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 falls. It corresponded to section 202 of the Companies Act, 1913 and section 169 of the Companies Act, 1882. In Basheshar Nath v. Kanhaya Lal, 1913 Punjab Record 134 (6), it was held by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court that under section 169 of the Companies Act, 1882, only one appeal was competent and if that appeal was made to the Divisional Court, no further appeal lay to the Chief Court. Section 169 was construed to mean that the appeal (and only one) would lie only thereunder but no further appeal would lie against an appellate judgment made under section 169 even though an appeal to the Chief Court would have otherwise been competent against the decision of a Divisional Judge under section 39 (C) read with section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act. As the High Court of Lahore had not then come into existence, the consideration of clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Lahore did not arise in that case. Therefore, the question whether the language of clause 10 of the Letters Patent is different needs to be considered afresh.
    7. In our view, the facts and circumstances of the present case and those in Sri Ram v. Bulbhdass on the one hand, are to be distinguished from those in Basheshar Nath v. Kanhaya Lal on the other hand. section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 which applies to the former merely states that the appeals would lie in the same manner in which and subject to the same conditions under which they would lie from any order or decision of the Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction. The law governing appeals would, therefore, be law which would govern the appeals against the orders of the Court in its ordinary jurisdiction. The order of the District Judge was passed in his ordinary jurisdiction. It was, therefore, appealable to the High Court under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of the learned Single Judge passed in the first appellate court jurisdiction became subject to an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent. The relevant portion of clause 10 of the Letters Patent is as follows: —
    “And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Lahore from the Judgment [. . .] of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act.”
    It will be observed that the rule in clause 10 of the Letters Patent is that an appeal lies from the judgment of one judge of the High Court to a Division Bench of the High Court. This rule is subject to exceptions. The words constituting the exception which are put in brackets and which were omitted in stating the rule above are as follows: —
    (“Not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act or in exercise of criminal jurisdiction.”).
    Certain illustrations of the exception may be stated as below: —
    “1. Where the judgment of the Single Judge is in an appeal against a decree or order by a subordinate court sitting in appeal, appeal would lie only on a certificate granted by the learned Single Judge;
    2. Where the judgment of the Single Judge is in a Revision (revisional jurisdiction);
    3. Where the judgment is not a sentence or order passed or made (a) in exercise of power of superintendence under the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, (b) in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction.”
    Then follows that part of clause 10 of the Letters Patent which requires a certificate to be given by the Single Judge before an appeal can be filed to the Division Bench. It runs as follows: —
    “. . . . . and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of February one thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.”
    It shows that it is only when a learned Single Judge of this Court bears an appeal against the decision of a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court which was itself given in exercise of appellate jurisdiction that the question of a grant of certificate by the learned Single Judge would arise inasmuch as the decision of the learned Single Judge would be a decision in second appeal.
    8. On the other hand, section 169 of the Companies Act, 1882 which was referred to in Basheshar Nath v. Kanhaya Lal had the following significant words at its end, namely: —
    “Appeals from any order or decision made or given in the matter of the winding up of a Company by the Court may be had in the same manner and subject to the same conditions in, and subject to which, appeals may be had from any order or decision of the same Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction, subject to this restriction, that no such appeal shall be heard unless notice of the same is given within three weeks after which any order complained of has been made.”
    It is because of the presence of these words that the Court observed in Basheshar Nath v. Kanhaya Lal as follows: —
    “Now “the Court” is clearly the Court of the District Judge, and the “order complained of” clearly means, in our opinion, the order of the same Court. And it would clearly be an absurdity to require that a further appeal should not be heard unless notice of the same had been given within three weeks from the order of the first Court, for, in almost every case, it would be futile to hope that the appeal to the lower Appellate Court, however promptly lodged, would be decided within three weeks from the date of the first Judge's order. We hold therefore that the 3 weeks spoken of, date from the order of the District Judge and that the restriction imposed refers only to first appeal.”
    9. There are no such limiting words in section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956. We are of the view, therefore, that the decision in Basheshar Nath v. Kanhaya Lal could not have been helpful in deciding the question before the Division Bench in Sri Ram v. Bulbhdass or the question before us in the present case. For these, reasons, we are unable to agree with the decision of the Division Bench in Sri Ram v. Bulbhdass that a certificate was needed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent for filing an appeal against the decision of a Single Judge given in the exercise of first appellate jurisdiction against the order of the District Judge. As already pointed out, such a certificate would be necessary only when an appeal is sought to be filed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the decision of a Single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of second appellate jurisdiction.
    10. In view of the above legal position, the appeal is maintainable without the need of a certificate from the learned Single Judge who passed the order appealed against and will be dealt with by the Division Bench according to law.
    Order Accordingly.
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    Registrar Of Companies v. Hardit Singh Giani
    (Mar 14, 1975)