| Kutoor Vengayil Rayarappan Nayanar v. Kutoor Vengayil Vallia Madhavi Amma and others, AIR 1950 Federal Court 140 |
Cited as authority on the role and purpose of the General Clauses Act as a "legislative dictionary" to be read into central statutes. |
The Court relied on the principle that the General Clauses Act supplies definitions and uniform expressions to be applied in central Acts, supporting use of its definitions to interpret the Industrial Disputes Act. |
| Chief Inspector of Mines and another v. Karam Chand Thapar etc., AIR 1961 Supreme Court 838 |
Cited alongside other authorities to illustrate that what the General Clauses Act says must be read into other statutes where applicable. |
Used to reinforce the point that meanings in the General Clauses Act are to be applied when interpreting central legislation such as the Industrial Disputes Act. |
| N. Subramania Iyer v. Official Receiver, Quilon & Another, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 1 |
Cited as further support for treating the General Clauses Act as an interpretive aid to statutes. |
Referenced to justify the Court's reliance on the General Clauses Act definitions when construing Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act. |
| Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal and others, AIR 1960 Punjab 76 |
Held that the Chief Commissioner of Delhi State (then) is the Central Government and when issuing references did so in that capacity; applied Sections 3(8) and 3(60) of the General Clauses Act. |
The Court noted this case (decided before the Seventh Amendment) as consistent with the proposition that the administrator acts as the appropriate authority under the General Clauses Act for purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act. |
| Malabati Tea Estate v. Bhakta Munda and others, AIR 1959 Tripura 8 |
Held that where the Chief Commissioner has been invested with the powers of the State Government for purposes of the Act by the President under Article 239(1), he is the appropriate authority under Section 2(a)(ii). |
Relied upon as supportive authority that in Union territories the administrator (or Chief Commissioner) can be the appropriate Government under the Industrial Disputes Act. |
| Goa Dock Labour Union and another v. Government of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu and others, AIR 1969 Goa 16 |
Held that under Section 3(60)(c) of the General Clauses Act and Rule 2(f) of the Industrial Disputes Rules, the administrator is the appropriate Government for industrial disputes in a Union territory. |
Used as supporting precedent that the Administrator is the appropriate Government in Union territories for the Industrial Disputes Act. |
| H.L. Rodhey v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1969 Delhi 246 |
Division Bench held (in the context of Article 309 rule-making power) that the Union territory of Delhi is not a State. |
The Court treated this decision as a Division Bench view that provoked the present reference; the opinion examined Rodhey's reasoning and distinguished context (rule-making under Article 309) from the present statutory interpretation issue. |
| Advance Ins. Co. v. Gurudasmal, AIR 1969 Delhi 330 |
Reiterated the view that the General Clauses Act as adapted under Article 372 only applied to interpretation of the Constitution in certain respects (division bench reasoning). |
Cited as one of the earlier High Court decisions on the effect of the General Clauses Act adaptations; the present Court considered its reasoning in the context of conflicting higher authority. |
| The Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shri Gurudasmal and others, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1126 |
Five-judge decision holding that the definition of "State" in Section 3(58) of the General Clauses Act (as adapted) applies to Entry 80 of the Union List and includes Union territories. |
The Court acknowledged this decision as a binding Supreme Court authority favouring inclusion of Union territories within the definition of "State" for certain constitutional entries; it formed part of the conflicting line of Supreme Court authority considered. |
| S.K. Singh v. V. V. Giri, AIR 1970 Supreme Court 2097 |
Five-judge decision (including Bhargava J.'s view) holding that the General Clauses Act as adapted under Article 372-A (post-Seventh Amendment) does not apply to interpretation of the Constitution and that the word "State" in certain constitutional contexts does not include Union territories. |
The Court regarded Bhargava J.'s reasoning (that Article 367 limits the use of General Clauses Act adaptations to those under Article 372) as supported by Article 367 and relied upon this reasoning in preferring the view that for the present statute the General Clauses Act definitions apply to central Acts. |
| Mattulal v. Radhey Lal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1596 |
Authority that where decisions of the Supreme Court are plainly in contradiction and irreconcilable, the decision of the larger Bench should be followed and a view on principle considered. |
Cited for the general principle of resolving conflicting Supreme Court decisions, though the Court noted it could not directly apply that guidance to the specific conflict it faced (both conflicting decisions were five-judge benches). |
| Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 603 |
Quoted for the proposition that the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself (citation to Frankfurter J.). |
Cited to emphasize that constitutional texts, not judicial commentary, are the ultimate guide; used in discussion about whether constitutional interpretation was necessary for the statutory question at hand. |
| Miscellaneous Supreme Court authorities cited (Reference by President under Article 143; Ram Kishore Sen v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 644; T.M. Kanniyan v. Income-tax Officer, AIR 1968 SC 637) |
Cited as part of the body of Supreme Court decisions relevant to the conflict of authority on interpretation and the application of the General Clauses Act adaptations. |
Invoked and considered by the Court while surveying the conflict in authority; the opinion notes these authorities were cited to the Bench but does not set out detailed holdings beyond their being part of the referred jurisprudential background. |
| Graves v. New York (U.S. citation, 1938, 306 U.S. 466) |
Quoted passage from Frankfurter J. as authority for the proposition that the Constitution is the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality. |
Quoted (through Bengal Immunity) to underscore the Court's remark that the Constitution itself is the ultimate guide on constitutional matters. |