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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules
  • provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) of the Court-fees Act (herein to be called the Act)
  • provisions of Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules
  • provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) or Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II
  • Rule 8 in Chapter 3-C of the Punjab High Court Rules
  • rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of the Punjab High Court Rules
  • Court-fees Act, 1870, and of the Suits Valuation Act
  • Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act,
  • stated.Sections 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act
  • Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules
  • provisions of section 9 of the Suits Valuation
  • sections 3, 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act,
  • SECTION 9 SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • section 9 of the Suit Valuation Act,
  • Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of Act.
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
  • provisions of section 7 (iv) (b)
  • SUITS VALUATION ACT 1887
  • section 7 (iv) (b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules
  • provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) of the Court-fees Act (herein to be called the Act)
  • provisions of Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules
  • provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) or Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II
  • Rule 8 in Chapter 3-C of the Punjab High Court Rules
  • rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of the Punjab High Court Rules
  • Court-fees Act, 1870, and of the Suits Valuation Act
  • Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act,
  • stated.Sections 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act
  • Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules
  • provisions of section 9 of the Suits Valuation
  • sections 3, 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act,
  • SECTION 9 SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • section 9 of the Suit Valuation Act,
  • Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of Act.
  • COURT FEES ACT 1870
  • provisions of section 7 (iv) (b)
  • SUITS VALUATION ACT 1887
  • section 7 (iv) (b)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Prithvi Raj, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners challenged by revision petition an order dated 30th April, 1974 passed by Shri S.R. Goel, Additional District Judge, Delhi. The respondent (respondent No.1) had filed a suit for partition by metes and bounds claiming a 1/7th share in certain properties alleged to be joint Hindu family (ancestral) property, including a house (No. 8567, Ara-Kishan Road, Paharganj, New Delhi), certain jewellery (claimed value Rs. 13,927) and a share of a common fund (1/7th of Rs. 6,000). The respondent alleged he was in actual or constructive possession (a portion was let to a tenant) and sought separate enjoyment of his share. The petitioners denied the allegations of ancestral/joint property, claimed the suit property was self-acquired, and denied the existence of a common fund or jewellery.

At trial the court concluded that the respondent was in symbolic/constructive possession of at least the portion of the house occupied by the tenant and fixed the value for jurisdiction at Rs. 22,910 (the value of the respondent's 1/7th share). The petitioners contended the court-fee and valuation should have been computed under section 7(iv)(b) of the Court-fees Act (ad valorem on the value of the respondent's share) and that jewellery and the common fund should have been separately valued for jurisdiction and court-fee purposes. The revision petition challenges the trial court's order on these grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the plaint allegations that the plaintiff is a co-parcener in constructive or actual possession and seeks partition by metes and bounds, the court-fee payable is a fixed fee under Article 17(vi) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act rather than ad valorem under section 7(iv)(b) of the Act.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's claims in respect of jewellery and a share of the common fund had to be separately valued and charged ad valorem for court-fee and jurisdiction.
  3. Whether the value for the purposes of jurisdiction (suits valuation) in a partition suit must be stated as the value of the whole property (as provided under Rule 8, Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887) or whether it may be stated as the value of the plaintiff's share (1/7th in this case).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position

  • The respondent pleaded that the disputed properties were joint Hindu family (ancestral) properties acquired from common family funds and accretions, and that he was a co-parcener entitled to a 1/7th share.
  • He alleged he was in actual or constructive possession of at least a portion of the property (a portion was let to a tenant) and therefore sought partition by metes and bounds and separate enjoyment of his share rather than restoration of possession.
  • On that pleading, the respondent treated the suit as one to effect a change in the mode of enjoyment (joint to separate) and, implicitly, as one requiring a fixed court-fee under Article 17(vi) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act.

Petitioners' (Defendants') Position

  • The petitioners contended that the court-fee should have been calculated under section 7(iv)(b) of the Court-fees Act — i.e., ad valorem on the market value of the respondent's share — on the basis that the respondent sought to enforce his right to a share while not in possession.
  • They also contended that the jewellery and common fund claimed by the respondent should have been separately valued and charged separate ad valorem court-fees for those portions.
  • The petitioners challenged the trial court's assessment of jurisdictional value (Rs. 22,910), asserting that the court should have valued the suit for jurisdictional purposes differently (implying the respondent's share only).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asa Ram v. Lagan Nath and others, A.I.R. 1934 Lahore 563 Where plaintiff alleges joint possession in a partition suit, court-fee is leviable under Article 17(vi) of Schedule II; section 7(iv)(b) does not apply to such suits. Cited to support that the present suit, pleaded as by a co-parcener in possession seeking partition, attracts Article 17(vi) fixed fee and not section 7(iv)(b).
Ram Narain Kaul v. Mst. Bishan Rani and others, A.I.R. 1938 Lahore 321 In partition of alleged joint family properties in joint possession, court-fee is under Article 17(vi) not ad valorem on the plaintiff's share. Reinforces the proposition that partition suits with alleged joint possession are charged fixed fee under Article 17(vi).
Mst. Durga Devi v. Parbati, A.I.R. 1933 Lahore 208 Earlier Lahore High Court authority taking similar view (partition with joint possession attracts fixed fee). Noted as supporting authority for the fixed-fee rule in partition suits.
Dewan Chand v. Dhani Ram and others, A.I.R. 1941 Lahore 123 On appeal arising from partition suit where plaintiff claimed actual or constructive possession, the fee payable on appeal is the same as in the suit (fixed fee under Article 17(vi)). Used to show consistency: characterization of the original suit governs fee on subsequent proceedings; supports fixed-fee treatment.
Tutika Lakshaminarayana and others v. Patharla Saraswati and another, A.I.R. 1969 (as cited) Held that where partition and separate allotment of alleged joint properties in joint possession is sought, the relevant Article (Article 17-A or equivalent) of Schedule II applies. Noted as an instance where partition with alleged joint possession attracted the fixed-fee provision in the relevant jurisdiction.
Raman Chandra Dey and others v. Gouralias Gharbaran Gur and others, A.I.R. 1962 Assam 137 Possession for purposes of the Act may be constructive; suit for partition where plaintiff alleges constructive possession does not attract section 7(iv)(b). Applied to confirm that constructive possession pleaded by the respondent brings the case within Article 17(vi) rather than section 7(iv)(b).
Saladi Satyam alias Satyanarayanamma v. Saladi Samanna and others, A.I.R. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 313 For court-fee one must regard the allegations in the plaint; the court should not test truth/probability while classifying the suit for fee purposes. Adopted to support the methodological rule that only plaint allegations determine classification for court-fee.
Nori Srirama Sastri v. Nori Lakshmidevamma and others, A.I.R. 1955 Andhra Pradesh 200 Suits for partition where plaintiff is in actual or constructive possession are incapable of valuation and chargeable with fixed court-fee under the relevant Article. Cited to underline that such partition suits are treated as incapable of valuation and attract fixed fee.
Nikka and others v. Fazal Dad Khan and others, A.I.R. 1930 Lahore 839 Where plaintiff alleges joint possession, Article 17(vi) of Schedule II is the proper provision to apply. Reiterated as supporting authority for fixed-fee treatment when joint possession is alleged.
Mt. Sat Bhawan v. Bedi Ram Kishan Singh and others, A.I.R. 1938 Lahore 275 Section 7(iv)(b) applies where a person is out of possession and seeks restoration to possession (a suit for possession), not to suits where a change in mode of enjoyment is sought. Cited to distinguish suits seeking restoration of possession (ad valorem) from partition suits seeking change of enjoyment (fixed fee).
Santosh s/o Gopala and another v. Rama s/o Ragho and others, A.I.R. 1949 Nagpur 305 Observed that Schedule II, Article 17 applies if the plaintiff is in joint possession of the whole estate (actual or constructive). Noted by the court but observed that the Nagpur High Court gave no reasons for limiting application to possession of the whole estate.
Mangal Dass v. Naunihal Singh and others, 1974 P.L.R. 255 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) Held that jurisdictional value of partition suits is to be determined on the value of the whole property in accordance with Rule 8 of Chapter 3‑C of Punjab High Court Rules and section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. Relied upon to hold that the trial court erred in fixing jurisdictional value at the value of the plaintiff's 1/7th share; instead the whole property's value must be stated for jurisdictional purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in two linked strands: (A) classification of the suit for court-fee purposes; and (B) determination of the value for jurisdiction (suits valuation).

A. Classification for Court-fee

  • The court reiterated the settled principle that the character of the plaint is determined by the allegations in the plaint, not by terminology or collateral facts — the court examines the plaint to determine the prima facie nature of the suit.
  • On the plaint, the respondent brought the suit as a co-parcener seeking partition by metes and bounds and separate enjoyment of his 1/7th share; the plaint alleged actual or constructive possession (a portion let to a tenant).
  • Because the relief sought was a change in the mode of enjoyment (from joint to separate) and not enforcement of a right to recover possession from someone else, the court concluded the suit is not one for enforcing title or ouster-based possession. Mere denial of title does not amount to ouster among co-parceners.
  • The court therefore held that Article 17(vi) of Schedule II (fixed court-fee for such partition suits) applies. Section 7(iv)(b) of the Court-fees Act (ad valorem on the market value of the plaintiff's share) applies to suits where the plaintiff is out of possession and seeks to be restored to possession; that situation is distinct and does not describe the present plaint.
  • The court relied on a line of authorities (see table) which consistently hold that partition suits where the plaintiff alleges actual or constructive possession attract the fixed-fee Article and are incapable of valuation for ad valorem fee purposes.
  • Accordingly, the petitioners' contention that the court-fee should have been as per section 7(iv)(b) and that jewellery and common fund claims should have been separately valued and charged ad valorem was negatived.

B. Valuation for Jurisdiction (Suits Valuation Act / High Court Rule)

  • The court addressed the value to be stated for jurisdictional purposes under the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 and rules framed by the High Court under section 9 of that Act.
  • Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act permits the High Court, with State sanction, to direct that suits of a class which do not admit of satisfactory valuation be treated as if their subject-matter were of such value as the High Court specifies.
  • The Punjab High Court, exercising that power, framed Rule 8 in Chapter 3‑C of its Rules (applicable to Delhi) which provides that for the purposes of the Suits Valuation Act and the Punjab Courts Act, the value to be stated in partition suits is the value of the whole property as determined by sections 3, 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.
  • Sections 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act ordinarily require that the value for court-fee and jurisdiction be the same unless a contrary rule is made under section 9. Rule 8 is such a contrary rule and requires that jurisdictional value be the whole property's value.
  • Therefore the trial court erred in fixing the jurisdictional value at Rs. 22,910 (the value of the respondent's 1/7th share). The correct practice under Rule 8 (framed under section 9) is to state the value of the whole property for jurisdictional purposes.
  • The court fortified its conclusion by reference to the Punjab & Haryana High Court decision in Mangal Dass v. Naunihal Singh, which held that jurisdictional value in partition suits must be determined on the value of the whole property in accordance with Rule 8 and section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court accepted the revision petition on the specific question of valuation for jurisdiction: the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction in a partition suit must be stated as the value of the whole property sought to be partitioned in accordance with Rule 8 of Chapter 3‑C of the Punjab High Court Rules framed under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. The trial court was therefore wrong in fixing the jurisdictional value at the value of the plaintiff's 1/7th share.

The court also held that, on the plaint allegations that the plaintiff was in actual or constructive possession and was seeking partition by metes and bounds, the court-fee payable on the plaint is the fixed court-fee prescribed by Article 17(vi) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act, and not an ad valorem fee under section 7(iv)(b). The petitioners' contention that jewellery and the common fund should have been separately valued and charged ad valorem was negatived.

Implications: The direct consequences are:

  • The valuation for jurisdiction must be re-stated as the value of the whole property in accordance with the applicable High Court Rule and the Suits Valuation Act; the trial court's valuation at the value of the plaintiff's share was incorrect.
  • The court-fee classification for the plaint remains as a fixed fee under Article 17(vi) because the plaint pleads possession (actual or constructive) and seeks a change in the mode of enjoyment (partition), not restoration of ousted possession under section 7(iv)(b).
  • The revision petition was otherwise limited to the valuation point; the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

The opinion relies on established authorities for these propositions; it does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying the cited rules and decisions to the facts of this case.

Order: Revision petition accepted on the question of valuation for jurisdiction. Parties to bear their own costs.

    Jagdish Pershad And Ors. Petitioners v. Joti Pershad And Ors. S

    Prithvi Raj, J.:— The petitioners feeling dis-satisfied with the order dated 30th April, 1974, passed by Shri S.R Goel, Additional District Judge, Delhi, have challenged the same by this revision petition.

    The findings of the trial Court were assailed on the ground that the case set up by the respondent was to enforce his right to share in the immovable property in suit on the plea that it was joint family property and he being not in possession of the same as averred in the written statement, the court-fees payable ought to have been computed as per provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) of the Court-fees Act (herein to be called ‘the Act’) on the market value of his share in the immovable property; that he further claims share in the jewellery in the sum of Rs. 13927 and 1/7th share of Rs. 6,000 and he admittedly being not in possession of any portion of the said assets the suit should have been separately valued for purposes of jurisdiction and court-fee and should have paid separate and ad valorem court-fees on the said amounts.
    It is settled law that to determine prima facie the nature of the suit it is the plaint which has to be examined. For the purpose of determining the appropriate provision of the Act applicable to a suit, the criterion to be kept in view is the frame of the suit. It is not of much relevance for the purpose of ascertaining the court-fees payable on a plaint as to what terminology is used in the plaint but what in fact is the substance of the plaint. The Court-fees payable on a plaint has to be determined on the allegations in the plaint as the suit would proceed on the assumption set out in the plaint.
    The respondent No. 1 (herein called ‘the respondent’) and the petitioners are brothers being the sons of deceased Jawala Prashad. Shiv Lal, their grandfather was said to have left considerable immovable property which was inherited by their father and uncle Ghasi Ram who died issueless in 1946. The property left by their grandfather was joint Hindu Family ancestral property. Their father having joined Government service the property was managed by their uncle. The respondent being the eldest of the brothers and enjoying the confidence of their father received the share of the income of the family property from their uncle. The income so received and amassed by the respondent came to about Rs. 5,000 in the beginning of 1947. According to the respondent in 1947 Jawala Prashad was in possession of Rs. 7,000, the common fund of the family while he (the respondent) had also about Rs. 5,000 as the collection from the ancestral family property, with the said family income of Rs. 12,000 the suit property house bearing No. 8567, Ara-Kishan Road, Paharganj, New Delhi, was brought by their father. The acquisition of the said house was a joint Hindu Family acquisition and the nature of the property was joint Hindu Family property. Their maternal grandmother left some agricultural property which the respondent alleges had been thrown into common hotch potch. The property left by their maternal grand-mother was a joint property and an accretion to the existing joint property income from which used to be thrown in the common fund in the hands of their father, the Karta of the Joint Hindu Family. According to the respondent the common fund in the hands of their father existing in the sum of Rs. 6,000 at the time of his death in 1972 is stated to be with Perma Nand petitioner. Besides, petitioner J.N Sharma is stated to be in possession of ancestral jewellery which is divisible between the parties. The said two petitioners in the circumstances, according to the respondent, are liable to render accounts of the family assets to the remaining co-parceners. Differences having arisen in the family the respondent does not want to keep his share joint in the said properties with the other coparceners. Accordingly he filed the present suit seeking decree for partition by metes and bounds separating his 1/7th share in the Joint Hindu Family properties. The petitioners in their written statement traverse the aforesaid claim of the respondent alleging that the family had no ancestral property that there was no joint or common fund of the family; that the respondent had separated long ago from the family of Jawala Prasad and was living separately even during his life time that the immovable suit property was the self-acquired property of Jawala Prashad; that no common fund had ever existed in the hands of Jawala Prashad and that he never left any jewellery.
    As already noted above for determining the court-fees payable on the plaint only the allegations of the plaint are to be taken into consideration. The court is not required to examine the truthfulness of the said allegation. From the allegations set out in the plaint it is evident that the respondent has filed the suit as a coparcener of the Joint Hindu Family claiming separate possession of his share by metes and bounds instead of the joint possession which he, at present, alleges, to possess in the joint family property with the other co-parceners. All that he seeks is a change in the mode of enjoyment of his share and not to seek to enforce it. If that be so, can it be said that he is enforcing his right in the property. Mere denial of right or title would not amount to ouster in the case of co-parceners.
    There is ample authority in support of the proposition that a suit for partition of alleged joint properties of which the plaintiff claims to be in actual or constructive possession is governed by the provision of Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of the Act and a fixed court-fee is payable on the plaint. The law in this respect cannot be said to be uncertain giving rise to any doubt as to whether the provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) or Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II are applicable in a suit such as the present one. Apart from the specific allegation made in the plain that the respondent was claiming separate possession by metes and bounds as a co-parcener, he in his statement stated that a portion of the house was let out to a tenant by their father. On the statement of the respondent the trial Court held that he was in symbolic possession of “at least that portion of the house” which is occupied by the tenant.
    There is a catena of authorities in support of the proposition that in a suit for partition of joint family property by metes and bounds when the plaintiff alleges to be in possession, either actual or constructive, of a portion of that property, the Court-fee payable is as prescribed by Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of the Act as in such suit what is sought is a change in the mode of enjoyment of the property and not to enforce a right to title of his share in the property. In such a case the relief is merely for change of joint enjoyment of the property into separate enjoyment and as such the suit is incapable of valuation.
    In Asa Ram v. lagan Nath and others, A.I.R 1934 Lahore 563 (1), a Full Bench of the Court after examining the case law observed at page 573 that consensus of judicial opinion is that in a suit for partition of joint property, where the plaintiff alleged joint possession, court-fee was leviable under Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of the Act and that section 7 (iv) (b) does not apply to such a suit, the ratio disendi being that the plaintiff was not enforcing any right to share in joint family property but merely sought to change the mode of his enjoyment of the joint property and that the relief in such a case was not capable of being valued in money. It was further held that section 7 (iv) (b) applies only to cases relating to joint family property where the plaintiff had been ousted from its enjoyment and sought to be restored to joint enjoyment. Further in determining the provisions of the Act applicable to a particular suit the allegations made by the plaintiff alone must be considered and that the pleas raised by the defendent did not affect the question.
    In Ram Narain Kaul v. Mst. Bishan Rani and others A.I.R 1938 Lahore 321 (2) following Asa Ram's case (supra) it was held that in a suit for partition of properties alleged to be belonging to a joint family and being in joint possession of the parties, the court-fee payable on such a plaint was under Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of the Act and not ad valorem on the share of the plaintiff in the properties in the suit.
    Similar view was taken earlier by the Lahore High Court in Mst. Durga Devi v. Parbati, A.I.R 1933 Lahore 208 (3).
    Reference here may also be made to a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in case Dewan Chand v. Dhani Ram, and others, A.I.R 1941 Lahore 123 (4). The question that arose in that case related to the amount of court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal against the preliminary decree in a suit for partition of alleged joint properties. The trial Court decreed the suit in respect of one property which was held to be jointly owned .by the parties but dismissed the suit relating to other properties holding that they were not held jointly by the parties. The plaintiff in appeal paid the fixed court-fee as per Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of Act. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the relief asked for in the appeal was not merely for change in the mode of enjoyment of the properties but to establish the appellant's title and possession of his alleged share in them and that such a relief was not incapable of being estimated in money and, therefore, Article 17 (vi) did not apply. Repelling the contention of the respondents it was held that the appeal arising from a suit for partition of the alleged joint properties of which the plaintiff claimed to be in actual or constructive possession, the fee payable thereon was the same as in the suit and that it was immaterial what the findings of the Court below were and whether the appeal was presented by the plaintiff or the defendant.
    In Tutika Lakshaminarayana and others v. Patharla Saraswati and another, A.I.R 1969 Grissa 265 (5) it was held that if the suit was for partition and separate allotment of properties alleged to be in joint possession, even though possession may be constructive, the application of Article 17-A of Schedule II of the Act as amended in Orissa was attracted.
    In Raman Chandra Dey and others v. Gouralias Gharbaran Gur and others, A.I.R 1962 Assam 137 (6), a Division Bench of the Court observed that possession contemplated under the provisions of the Act was not actual possession. When the plaintiff alleged that he had been in constructive possession of the property and asked for partition of his share, it could not be said that he had brought a suit for declaration of his title as a joint owner in respect of the property over which he had no possession attracting the provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) of the Act.
    In Saladi Satyam alias Satyanarayanamma v. Saladi Samanna and others, A.I.R 1960 Andhra Pradesh 313 (7) it was observed that it is well settled that for the purposes of ascertaining the court-fee payable one must have regard to the allegations in the plaint and it is not the function of the Court to ask itself whether those allegations were true or probable. It was further observed where the co-owner, in spite of a division in status, if there was no actual division by metes and bounds, claimed division by metes and bounds alleging joint possession, the court-fee payable was under Article 17-B of Schedule II of the Act as amended in Madras.
    In Nori Srirama Sastri v. Nori Lakshmidevamma and others, A.I.R 1955 Andhra Pradesh 200 (8), it was held that a suit for partition and separate possession of the plaintiff's share where he is in either actual or constructive possession of the family property has been held to be incapable of valuation, and therefore, chargeable with fixed court-fee under Article 17-B Schedule II of the Act as amended in Madras. It was further observed that conversely, where the plaintiff was not in joint possession of all or any of the common properties, the suit in respect of the plaintiff's share should be valued under section 7 (v) of the Act.
    In Nikka and others v. Fazal Dad Khan and others, A.I.R 1930 Lahore 839 (9), a Division Bench of the Court held that where the plaintiff definitely alleges that he was in joint possession, the proper provision of the Act applicable to the case was Article 17 (6) of Schedule II of the Act.
    In the instant case the respondent had filed the suit as a co-parcener of the Joint Hindu Family property seeking a change in the mode of enjoyment, viz., instead of joint enjoyment of the family property, to enjoy his share separately therein. On his averment he is in constructive possession of the Joint Family property, viz., house in question. He being in possession of a part of the family property there is no merit in the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the respondent should have separately valued his claim for share in the family jewellery and common family fund. On his claim the court-fee payable on the suit is the fixed court-fee as provided under Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of the Act. It is only when a person is out of possession of property to which he considers he was entitled on the strength of any right, title or interest that he claims in relation thereto and seeks to obtain possession thereof from the person who is keeping it bak from him that the suit is one for possession — bare and simple. In such a case there being no jointness of possession or title between the parties, the provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) of the Act would apply, and not that of Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of the Act, (See Mt. Sat Bhawan v. Bedi Ram Kishan Singh and others, A.I.R 1938 Lahore 275).
    Before parting with this aspect of the matter case Santosh s/o Gopala and another v. Rama s/o Ragho and others, AIR 1949 Nagpur 305 (10), may be noted, wherein it was observed that if the plaintiff is in joint possession of the whole estate, be that either actual or constructive, only then Schedule II, Article 17 of the Act would be applicable.
    Although the consensus of the judicial opinion is that if the plaintiff alleges in the plaint that he is in possession of all or any of the common properties while seeking partition of his share in the properties the suit has to be valued for the purposes of court-fee under the provisions of Article 17 (vi) of Schedule II of the Act no reasons were assigned by the Nagpur High Court in the above-cited case for taking the view that the aforesaid Article was applicable only if the plaintiff was in joint possession of the whole of the estate involved in the suit.
    In view of the discussion above the contention that the suit should have been valued for the purposes of court-fee qua the immoveable property in question as contemplated by the provisions of section 7 (iv) (b) of the Act and that separate value should have been put on the share of the respondent of jewellery and common fund, on which ad valorem court-fee ought to have been paid, has to be negatived.
    There is, however, substance in the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the trial Court was wrong in holding that the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction would be Rs. 22910 being the value of the respondents 1/7 share in the suit properties.
    Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887 (vii of 1887) envisages that when the subject-matter of suits of any class, other than suits mentioned in the Court-fees Act, 1870, section 7, paragraphs v and vi, and paragraph x, clause (d), is such that in the opinion of the High Court it does not admit of being satisfactorily valued, the High Court may with the previous sanction of the State Government direct that the suits of that class shall, for the purposes of Court-fees Act, 1870, and of the Suits Valuation Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter were of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in that behalf.
    Pursuant to its aforesaid power the Punjab High Court has framed Rule 8 in Chapter 3-C of the Punjab High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I, which are applicable to Delhi, providing for the value regarding court-fee and jurisdiction which a plaintiff is required to state in the plaint in suits for partition of property. The said rule for facility of reference is re-produced below:
    “8. Suits for partition of property —
    Court-fee — (a) as determined by the Court-fees Act, 1870.
    Value — (b) For the purposes of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, and the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 — the value of the whole of the property as determined by sections 3, 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887”.
    It would, therefore, be seen that so far as value for the purpose of jurisdiction is concerned, for the purposes of Suits Valuation Act, 1887, value of the whole of the property, sought to be partitioned, as determined by sections 3, 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act has to be stated.
    Sections 8 and 9 of the Suits Valuation Act indicate that value for court-fee and jurisdiction must be the same except in case of a contrary rules made under section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act. Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I, being a contrary rule requiring that value for the purposes of jurisdiction shall be the value of the whole of the property, the trial Court was wrong in determining the value for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs. 22910 being the value of the 1/7th share of the respondent in the joint family property. The value for the purpose of jurisdiction should have been stated as the value of the whole of the property in terms of Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I, in accordance with section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.
    I am fortified in the above view from a decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in case Mangal Dass v. Naunihal Singh and others, 1974 P.L.R 255 (11), in which it was observed that the jurisdictional value of suits for partition of property had to be determined on the value of the whole of the property in accordance with the provisions of Rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of Punjab High Court Rules and Others, Volume I and provisions of section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act.
    In this view of the matter cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that the jurisdictional value shall be the value of the share of the respondent need not be noted because of the mandatory requirement of rule 8 of Chapter 3-C of the Punjab High Court Rules and Orders, Volume I, framed by the High Court under the powers conferred by section 9 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887.
    In view of my discussion above, the revision petition is accepted on the question that the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction would be the value of the whole of the property, partition whereof is sought. In the circumstances of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs.
    Order accordingly.
    Suits Valuation Act, 1887
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    Jagdish Pershad And Ors. Petitioners v. Joti Pershad And Ors. S
    (Dec 16, 1974)