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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent challenges the judgment of a single Judge quashing the Delhi Administration's notification dated 7 November 1968, issued under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of certain lands in village Karkar Doma, Shahdara, Delhi.

Relevant chronology and facts (as stated in the opinion):

  • 13 November 1959: Delhi Administration issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act notifying intended acquisition of land measuring 34,017 acres; the notification exempted "Land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the land attached to religious institutions and Wakf property".
  • Shree Sita Ram Bhandar (a registered society) filed objections under section 5-A regarding 324 bighas in Karkar Doma, claiming the land belonged to Mandir Sita Ramji (Pilani, Rajasthan) and was outside acquisition.
  • 27 July 1962: Collector gave an endorsement after a hearing that a report be procured to determine if the property was that of Mandir Sita Ramji and exempt; no report was received and no further hearing before the Collector occurred.
  • 7 November 1968: Collector submitted recommendations to the Delhi Administration, including a note summarising the objector's claims and suggesting "Decision may kindly be taken after the inspection of site."
  • Writ Petition No. 330 of 1970 challenged the acquisition, alleging inter alia that the section 6 declaration was made without affording the objector the hearing required by section 5-A and without the Collector making mandatory recommendations.
  • 28 September 1971: Single Judge allowed the writ, holding that both a full hearing and a recommendation by the Collector (as contemplated by section 5-A) had not been complied with; the declaration under section 6 was quashed.
  • Appellants (Lt. Governor of Delhi and others) filed Letters Patent appeal; this Court directed the Delhi Administration, by order dated 6 April 1972, to give a hearing to Shree Sita Ram Bhandar and file a report and decision by 27 April 1972.
  • The Administration conducted a hearing before Deputy Secretary R.N. Puri, submitted the record and report up the hierarchy, and the Lt. Governor rejected the objections. That report was placed before this Court and formed part of the record for this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the absence of a hearing by the Collector as required under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act rendered the declaration under section 6 invalid and properly quashed by the single Judge.
  2. Whether the Collector's failure to make recommendations regarding the land in question deprived the Delhi Administration of the ability to record its satisfaction, thereby invalidating the declaration under section 6.
  3. Whether the hearing subsequently held by the Delhi Administration under this Court's order could be regarded as the hearing contemplated by section 5-A of the Act, or whether the basic infirmity persisted.
  4. Whether the hearing conducted by the Deputy Secretary complied with the Court's directions that the hearing be given by the Delhi Administration.
  5. Whether the hearing before the Deputy Secretary was a full hearing consistent with principles of natural justice, and whether the Lt. Governor's order rejecting objections was vitiated for being non-speaking.
  6. Whether the land in question was "attached to" a religious institution (a temple) and so exempt from acquisition under the exemption clause of the section 4 notification.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Delhi Administration (and supporting submissions)

  • The Collector had not abdicated his functions: his note summarized objections and referred the question (whether the land was "attached to" the religious institution) to the Administration; summary and reference indicated application of mind rather than complete abdication.
  • The hearing conducted by the Deputy Secretary pursuant to the Court's order constituted a proper hearing by the Delhi Administration because the Administration acts through responsible officers and the Deputy Secretary submitted the record and report up to the Lt. Governor.
  • The Lt. Governor did apply his mind to the record by agreeing with the Deputy Secretary's report; a non-speaking order by a higher authority is not necessarily vitiated if it is apparent that the higher authority applied its mind.
  • There was no material before either the Collector or the Administration to show the land was "attached to" the Hanuman temple in the sense required by the exemption; mere ownership or contiguity was insufficient.

Respondent / Shree Sita Ram Bhandar (first respondent)

  • The declaration under section 6 was rightly quashed because the Collector did not give the hearing mandated by section 5-A, and the Collector did not make the requisite recommendation.
  • The hearing directed and thereafter conducted by the Delhi Administration could not be equated to the hearing contemplated by section 5-A, so the fundamental defect remained.
  • The hearing before the Deputy Secretary did not comply with the Court's directions because it was to be given by the Delhi Administration (as a body) and not by a subordinate officer; deputation to the Deputy Secretary therefore did not satisfy the Court's order.
  • The hearing conducted by the Deputy Secretary was not a full hearing: witnesses the objector wanted were not summoned and cross-examination did not occur; the Lt. Governor's order rejecting objections was not a speaking order and is vitiated.
  • The land is attached to a temple dedicated to Hanuman and hence qualifies for the exemption in the Section 4 notification (clause 2(d)), precluding acquisition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hanuman Prasad Gupta and others v. Lt. Governor and others (L.P.A No. 11 of 1969), decided 6 Nov 1970 The Collector may summarise objections and refer legal issues to the appropriate government; a recommendation need not state the Collector's own opinion on legal issues to be a valid recommendation (a recommendation can be a suggestion pointing out issues for the government). The Court relied on this authority to conclude that the Collector's summary and referral of the legal question (whether "attached to" equated to "owned by") did not amount to abdication of his functions; thus the Collector's action could be a valid recommendation even if he did not record a full opinion on the legal issue.
Parshottamm Jadavji Jani v. State of Gujarat and others, A.I.R. 1971 SC 1188 Defines the kind of specific objections that must be alleged under section 5-A (examples include public purpose not genuine, land unsuitable, excessive area, selection malicious, impairment of amenities, desecration of religious buildings, etc.). The Court quoted Sikri, C.J.'s formulation to explain what objections must allege and to show the limited and specific scope of inquiries under section 5-A; used to frame the nature of the Collector's inquiry and the objector's pleaded grounds.
Patel Gandalal Somnath and others v. State of Gujarat and others, A.I.R. 1963 Gujarat 50 Explains the purpose of the Collector's inquiry under section 5-A: to inform the government's decision, serve as safeguard against ill-informed executive action, and determine limited factual questions (person interested, suitability of land, extent required, sustainment of factual objections). The Court invoked this decision to support its view that the Collector's inquiry is quasi-judicial in nature (not merely administrative) and to explain the restricted scope and object of the section 5-A inquiry.
Laing v. Bishopswearmouth, 3 Q.B.D 299 (Cockburn, C.J.) Interpretation of the word "attached" in statutory context: "attached" does not necessarily mean physically fastened; context and manner of utilisation determine attachment. The Court relied on this authority to interpret "attached to" as indicating manner of utilisation and not mere physical fastening or contiguity, supporting the conclusion that ownership alone does not make land "attached to" a temple.
Bryce v. Lindsay, 39 Sc. L.R. 141 Held that "directly attached" to a dwelling house can mean a space in contact with and belonging to the owner of the dwelling which he can prevent from being built on. Used to illustrate that attachment may be a question of use and relationship to an institution or building rather than mere proximity.
Grant v. Langston, 1900 A.C. 390 "Attached" to a dwelling house means attached for use with the dwelling house, not mere contact of parts. Supported the Court's conclusion that "attached to" denotes utilisation for the purposes of the institution (temple), reinforcing that the record lacked evidence of such utilisation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in analytic steps, built strictly on the material and authorities in the record:

  1. Statutory framework: The Court examined section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act and authoritative statements (Parshottamm Jadavji Jani) describing the specific types of objections and the limited scope of the Collector's inquiry: identify whether the objector is a person interested, whether the land is suitable for the notified public purpose, the extent required, and whether factual objections are sustainable. The Court held that because the Act mandates a hearing, the Collector's inquiry is quasi-judicial in nature though the Collector's report to government is administrative in form.
  2. On the Collector's conduct: The single Judge had held that the Collector entirely abdicated his functions by not applying his mind and failing to make recommendations. This Court disagreed. It scrutinised the Collector's endorsement of 27 July 1962 and the subsequent recommendation dated 7 November 1968, concluding that the Collector had summarised the objections, referred the core legal question (whether "attached to" equates to ownership) to the Delhi Administration, and thus had applied his mind rather than wholly abdicated his functions.
  3. Application of precedent (Hanuman Prasad Gupta): The Court applied the rule from that Bench decision that a Collector's recommendation may legitimately take the shape of a suggestion that certain issues are raised for the appropriate government to decide; the Collector is not always required to express his own opinion on legal issues. The Court found those principles attracted in this case.
  4. Compliance with the Court's direction and nature of hearing before Delhi Administration: Although the hearing held by the Delhi Administration under the Court's order was not technically the section 5-A hearing (a hearing under the Government rather than before the Collector), the Court treated the procedural sequence as removing the earlier infirmity: the Collector had referred the legal question to the Administration, and the Administration was then given an opportunity to hear the objector. The Court concluded the Administration's subsequent hearing satisfied the "spirit of the law" and remedied the prior defect, unless the satisfaction recorded by the Lt. Governor was perverse.
  5. Status of hearing before Deputy Secretary and higher authority's decision: The Court held there was no force in the objection that a Deputy Secretary could not conduct the hearing for the Administration. The Administration acts through its officers; the Deputy Secretary conducted the hearing, took evidence and affidavits, inspected the site with the objector's representatives, and submitted the record up to the Secretary and Lt. Governor, who agreed with the report. The Court found that the hearing given was adequate: witnesses of the objector were allowed or their affidavits taken on record, and no Government witnesses were produced to require cross-examination.
  6. Speaking order argument: The Court rejected the submission that the Lt. Governor's order was vitiated for not being speaking. It reasoned that in administrative proceedings it is not necessary that every officer write a detailed speaking order; what matters is whether the higher authority applied its mind. The Lt. Governor's note showed agreement with the Deputy Secretary's report, indicating application of mind.
  7. Meaning of "attached to": The Court analysed the contested statutory phrase "attached to" by reference to judicial interpretations (Laing, Bryce, Grant): "attached to" involves utilisation or functional relationship rather than mere ownership or simple contiguity. The Court noted absence of evidence that the land's income was used for the Hanuman temple or that the land was utilised for temple purposes. Consequently, ownership by the objector or contiguity to the temple did not suffice to show the land was "attached to" the religious institution and therefore exempt.
  8. Conclusion on validity of Lt. Governor's satisfaction: Absent demonstration that the Lt. Governor's satisfaction was perverse or legally untenable, the Court declined to substitute its own view. Given the record (hearing before Deputy Secretary, affidavits, site inspection, and the Lt. Governor's agreement with the report), the Court held that the Administration's decision rejecting objections was sustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The Court accepted the appeal and set aside the single Judge's order quashing the section 6 declaration; the writ petition filed by the first respondent (Shree Sita Ram Bhandar) was dismissed. The Court made no order as to costs.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the acquisition declaration under section 6 in respect of the lands in question stands validated in the view of this Court's judgment (subject to whatever statutory rights and remedies remain under the Act); the writ petition challenging that acquisition was dismissed.
  • The Court expressly proceeded to have the Delhi Administration hear the objector "without creating a precedent" when it ordered the subsequent hearing; the opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond the application of existing authorities cited in the judgment.
  • No new or broad precedent was announced by this opinion beyond application and reconciliation of established authorities on: (a) the mandatory nature and scope of the Collector's section 5-A inquiry; (b) the permissible content of a Collector's recommendation; and (c) the interpretation of "attached to" as connoting functional utilisation rather than mere ownership or physical contiguity.

    Lt. Governor Of Delhi & Others v. Mandir Sita Ramji & Another S

    Prakash Narain, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court, who had issued a writ quashing the notification dated 7th November, 1968, issued under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in respect of certain lands in village Karkar Doma, Shahdara, Delhi.

    The facts of the case are that on November 13, 1959, the Delhi Administration issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (hereinafter called the Act), notifying for likely acquisition of land measuring 34,017 acres. The said notification further set out that, inter alia, “Land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the land attached to religious institutions and Wakf property” was exempted from the purview of the said notification. Shree Sita Ram Bhandar, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, preferred certain objections under section 5-A of the Act in respect of 324 bighas of land in village Karkar Doma (Shahdra), Delhi. According to the objections of this Society, the land in respect of which it had filed objections belonged to Mandir Sita Ramji, Pilani in Rajasthan and was outside the purview of the acquisition. The Land Acquisition Collector submitted his report to the Delhi Administration in respect of notified land and thereafter, on November 7, 1968, the Delhi Administration made a declaration under section 6 of the Act, by a notification of that date, purporting to acquire various lands including the land in respect of which Shree Sita Ram Bhandar had filed objections under section 5-A of the Act. A Writ Petition No. 330 of the 1970 challenging the said acquisition on various grounds, including the contention that the Section 6 notification had been issued and the declaration under section 6 of the Act had been made without affording an opportunity to Shree Sita Ram Bhandar of being heard on its objections under section 5-A of the Act, was filed. The learned single Judge, who heard this petition, allowed the same by his judgment dated 28th September, 1971, and held that “both the requirements of a hearing, by which is meant a full and adequate hearing, as well as a recommendation by the Collector, which is mandatory, under section 5-A of the Act, not having been complied with the declaration under section 6 made in this case (without complying with both these requirements) cannot obviously be upheld.” Aggrieved by this judgment, the Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, who were respondents in the Writ Petition, preferred a Letters Patent appeal.
    One of the points that were canvassed “before us was that the notification under section 6 has been rightly quashed inasmuch as the hearing contemplated by section 5-A of the Act was not given by the Collector before making his recommendations to the Delhi Administration and even the Delhi Administration did not apply its mind to the objections of Shree Sita Ram Bhandar prior to making of the declaration under section 6 of the Act. We, therefore, without prejudice to the contentions of the parties, directed by our order dated 6th April, 1972, that the Delhi Administration should give a hearing to Shree Sita Ram Bhandar on the objections that it filed before the Collector under section 5-A of the Act and a report about it as well as the decision of the Delhi Administration should be submitted to this Court by 27th April, 1972. The report of the Delhi Administration has been filed along with the decision of the Delhi Administration which has been taken on the record and made a part of it. According to this report, a hearing was afforded to Shree Sita Ram Bhandar which was represented by Counsel before the Delhi Administration. The proceedings of the hearing were conducted before Shri R.N Puri, Deputy Secretary (Land & Buildings), Delhi Administration, who submitted the record of the hearing along with his report to the Secretary (Land & Buildings), Delhi Administration. Shri Prakbhar Kamath, Secretary (L & B), then put up all these papers, along with his comments, before the Lt. Governor who, agreeing with the report of Shri Puri, rejected the objections of Shree Sita Ram Bhandar.
    Before us, the points that have been agitated are as follows:
    (a) No hearing having been given by the Collector as requited under section 5-A of the Act, the declaration under section 6 of the Act has been rightly quashed by the learned single Judge.
    (b) Inasmuch as the Collector did not make any recommendations in respect of the land in question, that the Delhi Administration could not record its satisfaction as has been rightly held by the learned single Judge.
    (c) That the hearing now given by the Delhi Administration under the orders of the Court dated April 6, 1972, cannot be regarded as a hearing contemplated by section 5-A of the Act and the basic infirmity still remains.
    (d) That the hearing under the orders of the Court was to be given by the Delhi Administration and the hearing before the Deputy Secretary does not amount to compliance with the directions and orders of the Court.
    (e) That in any case the hearing given by the Deputy Secretary, Delhi Administration was not a full hearing and the decision taken in pursuance of that cannot be regarded as a decision given in consonance with the provisions of law of or the principles of natural justice. Further, the order of the Lt. Governor is not a speaking order and so is vitiated.
    (f) That the land in question is attached to a temple on the land dedicated to Hanumanji and so is land attached to a religious institution which results in the acquired land being exempt from the purview of the notification under section 4 of the Act.
    When the matter had been argued before the learned single Judge, the arguments were confined to non-compliance of the provisions of section 5-a of the Act and the non-application of his mind by the Collector to the objections of Shree Sita Ram Bhandar resulting in the Collector's failure to make any recommendation about the land in question. Both these objections were sustained by the learned single Judge and he held that the requirement of a hearing under section 5-A as well as the requirement of the Collector making a recommendation not having been complied with in this case, the declaration under section 6 of the Act could not be sustained.
    At this stage it will be advantageous to notice what exactly happened before the Collector after Shree Sita Ram Bhandar had filed its objections. It seems that a notice was given to Shree Sita Ram Bhandar to attend a hearing on the 27th July, 1962, with regard to the objections filed by it. On that day the objections filed were perhaps not readily traceable and so another copy of the objections was handed over to the Collector. On these objections, the following endorsement was made by the Collector: —
    “P1. report if this property is that of mandir Sita Ramji, a charitable institution and is exempt from the notification.”
    It is the common case of both the parties that no report was received by the Collector in respect of the endorsement made by him on 27th July, 1962, and there was also no further hearing before the Collector. As already observed earlier, on 7th November, 1968, the Collector made his recommendations to the Delhi Administration in respect of the land in question. It would be advantageous to quote from this report. The Collector's recommendation in respect of the land in question was as follows: —
    “One objection was received from Shri D.R Kungta, General Attorney of Shree Sita Ram Bhandar who stated that the objector had following land and houses etc. in the land in question:
    (1) Land measuring 324 Bighas.
    (2) Five Cattle sheds pacca built of vast dimensions.
    (3) Several servants quarters.
    (4) Wells five in number.
    (5) One fruit garden.
    (6) Several Godowns.
    (7) One Shri Hanuman Mandir.
    (8) One Pathshala.
    Other objections raised by him are mostly of a general nature. Decision may kindly be taken after the inspection of site.”
    The objections that had been filed under section 5-A (Annexure III to the Writ Petition), inter alia, stated that Shree Sita Ram Bhandar the objector, is managing Shri Sita Ram Mandir and other temple in Pilani (Rajasthan) and other religious and charitable institutions, e.g Dharamshala, Yagyashalas, etc., in and outside Rajasthan; that the said objectors own and possess the following land and houses, etc., on it near village Karkar Doma, Shahdara, Delhi: —
    (A) Land measuring 324 Bighas.
    (B) Five cattle sheds pucca built of vast dimensions,
    (C) Several servants quarters,
    (D) Wells 5 in number,
    (E) One Fruit Garden,
    (F) Several Godowns,
    (G) One Shri Hanuman Mandir,
    (H) One Pathshala;
    that all the above properties mentioned at items (B) to (H) are situated and built in the above mentioned land measuring 324 Bighas; that the above mentioned buildings were constructed and the land was purchased for the purpose of the said Trust and the income from the same has been used for the maintenance of a Gaushala and other religious institutions as described before; that the objectors object to the land and their properties being acquired, amongst others, for the reasons that the said Notification under section 4 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution and, therefore, a nullity and that the said land is the property of the religious institution and, therefore, is exempted from being acquired under clause 2 (d) of the said Notification under section 4 of the Act.
    There can be no dispute that the hearing contemplated by section 5-A of the Act is mandatory for the person interested has no other opportunity to object to the proposed acquisition except in proceedings under section 5-A. If land is acquired without affording the hearing contemplated by section 5-A, except where the provisions of section 17 of the Act are attracted, such acquisition has to be struck down. It is settled law that the provisions of section 5-a of the Act with regard to affording a hearing are mandatory though some distinction may be made in the provisions of section 5-a with regard to the recommendations to be made by the Collector which have been held by some courts not to be mandatory in nature. But the real purpose of sec. 5-A is that on receipt of objections, the Collector must give a hearing to the objectors and he must also make a recommendation as contemplated by section 5-A, though those recommendations are not binding on the Government and are of mere recommendatory nature. What found favour with the learned single Judge in the present case was not only that an opportunity to be heard on the objections was not afforded, but that the Collector abdicated his functions to make recommendations in respect of the land in question which he could not do. On this aspect, the learned single Judge has referred to the decision of a Bench of this Court in L.P.A No. 11 of 1969, Hanuman Prasad Gupta and others v. Lt. Governor and others, decided on 6th November, 1970 (1). Construing that decision, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that in the case of Hanuman Prasad Gupta there was no complete abdication of his functions by the Collector inasmuch as he did apply his mind to the objections before him and came to the view that the objections being purely legal, the State Government may come to a conclusion thereon and he refrained from expressing any opinion about the same. In the present case, according to the learned Judge, there was complete abdication of his mind and functions by the Collector and apart from summarising the objections, he did not apply his mind at all to the matter before him. We are in respectful disagreement with this opinion of the learned Judge. But before we set down our reasons for it, it would be pertinent to examine the scope of the hearing contemplated by section 5-A of the Act as well as the scope and nature of the recommendations that a Collector is required to make in his report under section 5-A.
    As is evident on a reading of section 5-A, any person interested in the land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), is required to submit his objections in writing. As was observed by Sikri, C.J in Parshottamm Jadavji Jani v. State of Gujrat and others, A.I.R 1971 SC 1188 (2), the said objections “must allege some specific objections, such as these:
    (i) the notified purpose is not genuinely or properly a public purpose;
    (ii) the land notified is not suitable for the purpose for which it is notified;
    (iii) the land is not so well suited as other land;
    (iv) the area proposed is excessive;
    (v) objector's land has been selected maliciously or vexatiously;
    (vi) the acquisition will destroy or impair the amenity of historical or artistic monuments and places of public resort; will take away important public rights of way or other conveniences or will desecrate religious buildings, graveyard and the like.”
    After admitting an objection and after having given the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader, the Collector is to decide whether it is desirable to hear oral or documentary evidence and in this hearing he shall afford to the other party an opportunity of rebutting the evidence led and of cross-examining the witnesses. Thereafter, the Collector makes his recommendations. The scope of the inquiry to be conducted by the Collector, however, is restricted. All that he has to find out in this inquiry is whether the objector is a person interested, the land in question is suitable for the public purpose for which it is being acquired, the extent of land which will meet the requirements of the specific public purpose, and whether the objections as filed on questions of fact are sustainable. The Collector may also opine as to whether the proposed acquisition should be proceeded with in respect of the public purpose for which the land has been notified for intended acquisition. The inquiry by the Collector is thus to serve a two-fold purpose: it is intended to instruct the mind of the Government so that the Government would be in a position to decide whether any land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, and it is also meant to act as a safeguard against any ill-informed action on the part of Government. It is left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government concerned to decide whether any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company. A safeguard has, however, been provided that the Government does not act on any incorrect information and thereby deprive a person of his property. The inquiry is intended to serve the purpose of affording an opportunity to the person interested to show that the land is not needed for a public purpose or for a company and that the proposal for acquisition initiated by the Government by issue of a notification under section 4 should not culminate into any definite proceeding for acquisition of the land but should be dropped; see Patel Gandalal Somnath and others v. State of Gujarat and others., A.I.R 1963 Gujarat 50 (3). We cannot agree with the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the inquiry contemplated by Section 5-A is merely an administrative inquiry. The action of the Government in acquiring land may be an administrative action but inasmuch as the action has civil consequences in the nature of depriving a person of his property, though compensation is contemplated to be paid, the inquiry conducted by the Collector under Section 5-A must be regarded as a quasi-judicial inquiry though his report may be an administrative report on which the satisfaction of the Government is to be recorded. Inasmuch as the statute itself requires that a hearing must be given, we need not dilate on the applicability of the principles of natural justice in administrative actions having civil consequences. It is in this state of law that it has to be seen whether there has or has not been compliance with the provisions of section 5-a of the Act in the present case.
    What found favour with the learned single Judge was that the Collector after asking for a report on the objections filed by Shree Sita Ram Bhandar did not afford any further hearing to the objector and proceeded to make a recommendation without even receiving a report on the query made by him on 27th July, 1962. The crucial point is whether the recommendations of the Collector in the case of Shree Sita Ram Bhandar, which we have noticed above, spell out an abdication of his functions by the Collector and whether no further opportunity being granted to the objectors amount to a denial of the right of hearing. In our view, on a reading of the objections as filed by Shree Sita Ram Bhandar, the only question that remained for a decision of the Government was whether the land and buildings, other than those which the Collector recommended should be left out of acquisition, stood exempted from the purview of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act in view of the exemption clause in the said Notification. Whether the words “attached to” could be equated to the words “owned by” was the only question left for determination of the concerned Government and this is what was referred by the Collector for the decision of the Delhi Administration. The rule laid down by the Bench of this court in the case of Shri Hanuman Prasad Gupta (1) was clearly attracted. The Collector had summarised the objections, which indicates application and not abdication of mind by him, leaving the decision on the question of law to the Government. It was not necessary in the circumstances of the case that the Collector's recommendations on the objections should have taken the form of either agreeing or disagreeing with the same. The recommendation contemplated by section 5A of the Act may (to quote from the Bench decision in Shri Hanuman Prasad Gupta's case) (1) “as well take the shape of a suggestion to the appropriate government that the objections raise certain issues but even if the Collector's own opinion on the legal issues is not there, it will nonetheless be a recommendation, nothing more and nothing less.
    The learned Counsel for the respondents has urged that the tenor of the note of the Collector made on 27th July, 1962 shows that what had to be found out was —
    (a) Whether property in question was the property of Shri Mandir Sita Ramji;
    (b) Whether it was a charitable institution; and
    (c) whether in this view of the matter, it was exempt from the Notification.
    All these could not be regarded as a mere question of law.
    The constitution of Shree Sita Ram Bhandar was on the record and it was not in dispute that a temple may be a religious institution, therefore, on these facts all that had to be decided was whether in terms of the exemption contained in the Notification under Section 4 of the Act, land measuring 324 bighas, etc. were exempt from the purview of acquisition. On this aspect it is a decision of the Government which was to be final and a pure question of law arose as has been observed by us earlier.
    It is no body's case that after the Collector had submitted his report the objector has any right of appearing before the appropriate Government prior to the appropriate Government recording its satisfaction leading to the issue of a Notification and a declaration under Section 6 of the Act. Inasmuch as the question of law may be considered as somewhat ticklish, we felt that in the fitness of things, without creating a precedent, the respondents/objectors may be heard by the Delhi Administration, the appropriate Government in this case, and so directed that a hearing may be given by the Delhi Administration to the objector, shree Sita Ram Bhadar, and a report about the hearing and recording the satisfaction of the Government on those objections be submitted to us. As already noticed earlier, this was received in Court and we find that the objections stood rejected. Unless it can be shown that the satisfaction so recorded by the Lt. Governor of Delhi is perverse or ex-facie contrary to the settled law, this Court will not sit in appeal to reverse the satisfaction so recorded. This leads us to the consideration of the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents which we have summarised in points (c) to (f) earlier.
    For the purposes of this case, although there is no express finding of the Delhi Administration, we may presume that the Hanuman temple on a portion of the land in question is an old temple and is a religious institution. The question would then arise whether the land in question is “attached to” this religious institution. Mrs. Shyamla Pappu, the learned counsel for the Lt. Governor and Delhi Administration, contested the proposition that the Hanuman temple which has been exempted from acquisition is a religious institution, but argued in the alternative that assuming that the said temple is a religious institution no material was placed by the objector to show that the land in question was attached to this temple. We will examine this contention in due course.
    It is true that the hearing afforded by the Delhi Administration in persuance of this Court's order dated April 6, 1972, cannot be regarded as a hearing contemplated by Section 5A of the Act. But then, as we have already observed, the Collector had entertained the objections by Shree Sita Ram Bhandar and on the assumption that it was a religious charitable institution, referred the question of law regarding exemption of the properties claimed to be owned by Shree Sita Ram Bhandar or Mandir Sita Ramji for the decision of the Delhi Administration. In that view of the matter, in our view, the infirmty pleaded that there was no hearing as contemplated by Section 5A ceases to have any force. It has not been shown to us what the objector could have shown to the Collector on further hearing. If all that had to be shown was that the property was owned by Shree Sita Ram Bhandar/Mandir Sita Ramji or that the property was owned by a religious institution, then the only thing to bed determined was whether ownership was synonymous to the land being attached to the institution. As far as that is concerned, it had to be decided by the Delhi Administration and an opportunity to do so was afforded to the first respondent under the Court's orders dated April 6, 1972. Inasmuch as the spirit of the law is that a party should have a hearing, the requirement stands satisfied. In that view of the matter, we need not dilate on the various precedents cited on behalf of the respondents in which the Supreme Court has laid stress on the principles of natural justice being followed even in the case of administrative orders involving civil consequences..
    It was urged by the learned counsel for the first respondent that the hearing given under this Court's order dated April 6, 1972 by the Dy. Secretary does not amount to compliance with the directions and orders of the court inasmuch as the hearing was to be given by the Delhi Administration and not the Deputy Secretary. There is no force in this contention. The Delhi Administration has to act through its officers and a responsible officers of the status of the Deputy Secretary was deputed to give the hearing after the initial objection of the first respondent to the hearing being given by the Collector was upheld. The Deputy Secretary then submitted the entire record of the proceedings before him to the Secretary who in turn placed it before the Lt. Governor. In that view of the matter, it must be held that the court's order dated April 6, 1972, was fully complied with.
    A grievance was made by the counsel for the first respondent that the hearing as given was not a full hearing and the satisfaction recorded by the Lt. Governor cannot be regarded as one complying with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act inasmuch as the order is not a speaking order. There is no force in this contention. A perusal of the proceedings filed in this court shows that the objector was represented by counsel before the Deputy Secretary, Shri R.N Puri, and was allowed to file documents as well as affidavits. The contention that the objector was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses is untenable inasmuch as it was for the obejector to substantiate its pleas and no witnesses appeared on behalf of the Government. It was urged that certain witnesses whom the objector wanted to produce were not summoned and were not allowed to be produced. On 21st April, 1972, a list of 12 witnesses was filed by the objector without disclosing the relevancy of those witnesses. Subsequently, the counsel for the objector gave up one witness and regarding the clerk of the Land Acquisition Collector whom he wanted to summon, since the file was already before Shri Puri, the counsel agreed to give him up also. Regarding the third and the fourth witnesses, counsel agreed to place copies of the affidavits of the two witnesses on the record and the fifth witness was also given up. The counsel wanted Shri K.N Srivastava, Revenue Assistant, to be summoned, but since Shri Srivastava's affidavit was on record that was disallowed. Two more witnesses were also given up and of Two other witnesses the counsel agreed to file affidavits. In the end the counsel only wanted two witnesses to be summoned. Shri Puri felt that he had no powers to summon these witnesses and so directed that their deposition on behalf of the objector may be brought on record by their affidavits being filed. This was done.
    Thus the contention that some witnesses were not summoned is without foundation, and inasmuch as these were witnesses of the objector whose affidavits were taken on record, the question of cross-examining them did not arise. The site was inspected by Shri Puri in the company of the counsel for the objector as well as its Manager and another employee. In this view of the matter, it does not lie in the mouth of the first respondent to urge that the hearing as given was not complete. As already noticed earlier, a full record of the proceedings before Shri Puri was placed ultimately before the Lt. Governor who has in terms stated that he agreed with the report and, therefore, rejected the objections. In administrative proceedings, it is not necessary that every officer should write a detailed order. So long as it is clear that the higher authority has applied its mind, the order of the higher authority need not be a speaking order. It is apparent on a reading of the note of the Lt. Governor that he had applied his mind inasmuch as he agreed with the report of Shri Puri. We thus find that there is no force at all in the contentions raised by the respondents.
    We now come to the last contention that the words “attached to” are synonymous with “owned by”. The contention is that it is not necessary for the land to be physically attached to an institution in the sense of its being contiguous to the institution because land even at some distance may be attached to an institution, if it is owned by the institution. We cannot agree with this contention. It may be that physical contiguity is not relevant but then “attached to” connotes something different from mere ownership. The first respondent had not stated in its objections that the notified properties were “attached to” any temple. All that was said was that the said properties were owned by the objector. Therefore, any enquiry that the land in question was attached to Hanuman temple on the land would have been really outside the scope of the objections as raised. However, even if it could be said that the objections should be read to mean that the land was attached to the Hanuman Mandir, no evidence was adduced either before us or before the Delhi Administration to show that the land was really attached to the Hanuman temple. As it apparent from a reading of the report of Shri Puri, the accounts of the first respondent were not produced to show that the income from the land in question was utilised for maintenance or upkeep of the Hanuman temple. If it had been so shown, perhaps it could be argued that the land in question was attached to the Hanuman temple. It was nobody's case that the land in question was owned by the Hanuman temple nor was it shown that the income of the land was utilised by the first respondent for the said temple or that there even was any income from the land in question. The ordinary dictionary meaning of these words spell out different concepts and we cannot persuade ourselves to agree with the contention that the words “attached to” and “owned by” would have the same meaning or concept. There can be no ambiguity in the meaning of the words “owned by” and for the purpose of this case, it has been assumed that the land in question was in the ownership of Shree Sita Ram Bhandar/Mandir Sita Ramji. It only remains to be considered what in law is the meaning of the words “attached to” and whether there is any material on the record to show that the land in question was attached to Shree Sita Ram Bhandar/Mandir Sita Ram/the Hanuman temple on the land in question.
    The word “attached” has been judicially interpreted in the context of many statutes. When this word is considered in relation to articles or things considered in fixing the rating value of a premises, it means, to quote from the speech of Cockburn, C.J in Laing v. Bishopswearmouth, 3 Q.B.D 299, (4) “now does the word ‘attached’ there mean attached by some physical fastening such as screws or bolts ? If it does, a thing weighing tons, which cannot be and never was intended to be lifted, would not be taken into account if not fastened to some part of the building; whereas if it were fastened it would. That, as it seems to my mind, would be a monstrous consequence. I do not think the word ‘attached’ does there mean ‘physically fastened’, so as to determine whether the thing is to be taken into account or not.” Similarly, whether open space was “directly attached” to a dwelling house came up for consideration in Bryce v. Lindsay, 39 Sc. L.R 141, (5) and was held to mean a space in contact with the dwelling-house which space belongs to the owner of such house of which he can prevent from being built on. In Grant v. Langston, 1900 A.C 390, (6) “attached” to a dwelling house was held not to mean mere contact of some part of the two structures, but as being attached for use with the dwelling house. Thus it is the manner of the utilisation of land which will determine whether it was “attached to” or not in the present case. Inasmuch as nothing has been shown that the land was utilised for the purpose of the temple or the institution or that its income was so utilised, it must be held that the mere contiguity of the land to the temple of Shri Hanuman or its ownership by Shree Sita Ram Bhandar/Mandir Sita Ramji at Pilani would not make the land in question “attached to” any one of these. In this view of the matter, we do not find anything patently illegal in the satisfaction recorded by the Lt. Governor that the land in question does not qualify for being exempted from acquisition.
    The result is that this appeal is accepted and the writ petition filed by the first respondent is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
    Appeal allowed.
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    Lt. Governor Of Delhi & Others v. Mandir Sita Ramji & Another S
    (May 9, 1972)