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Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal was instituted by the Union of India (appellant No. 1) and the Chief Commissioner of Delhi (appellant No. 2) against the judgment dated 19 November 1968 of the Additional District Judge, Delhi, which had dismissed their appeal from a judgment and decree of the Sub‑Judge, 1st Class, Delhi, decreeing the respondent's suit.

The respondent is a Co‑operative Housing Society whose objects include acquiring land for housing schemes. It purchased the land in dispute (about 44 bighas in village Mohammadpur Munikka, Delhi) and spent money in developing it. The Chief Commissioner issued notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act on 8 March 1957, with further notifications on 10 September 1957 and 25 October 1957, resulting in government acquisition of the entire land. Compensation awarded by the Collector was paid in October 1958 and received by the respondent “without prejudice to its objections.”

The respondent filed suit on 2 December 1960 seeking a declaration that the acquisition notifications were illegal, invalid, void, ultra vires and without jurisdiction, and sought a permanent injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with the respondent's possession of the land.

The Sub‑Judge decreed the suit on 31 March 1965, holding among other things that the land was not waste or arable, the Government had not applied its mind properly, the civil court's jurisdiction was not ousted, and acceptance of compensation did not operate as an estoppel. The Additional District Judge, on appeal, affirmed these findings and dismissed the appellants' appeal. The second appeal challenges that affirmance.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the land in question was "waste or arable land" such that the State could validly invoke Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act to dispense with the procedure under Section 5A.
  2. Whether the suit for declaration was maintainable in view of the question of actual possession — i.e., whether possession was that of the Government or of the respondent‑society.
  3. Whether the initial Section 4 notification (and related acquisition notifications) had survived and could support the appellants' case (i.e., whether the Section 4 notification remained a "reservoir" for further acquisitions).
  4. Whether acceptance of compensation by the respondent operated as an estoppel barring the suit.
  5. Whether the suit was barred by limitation, and if so, which limitation provision applied.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The lower courts were wrong in finding that the land was not waste land — the land was claimed to be waste/arable and therefore amenable to summary acquisition under Section 17.
  • The suit for declaration was not maintainable because possession was that of the Government and not of the respondent‑society.
  • The Section 4 notification had survived and could support the acquisition; however, this contention was not pressed before the Court because of the effect of the Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Act, 1967.

Respondent's Arguments / Evidence

  • The respondent‑society had developed the land prior to acquisition: plots were demarcated and roads had been laid; the land was substantially urban, being adjacent to Moti Bagh and Vinay Nagar colonies.
  • The respondent had spent money in developing the land (stated amount of about Rs. 40,000) and produced oral evidence, including that of residents and the society's head clerk (P.W.6), to support the development and possession claims.
  • The respondent accepted compensation "without prejudice to its objections" and contended that acceptance did not operate as an estoppel, particularly since the initial notifications were alleged to be ultra vires.
  • The respondent asserted actual possession (or at least that the Government had not proved actual physical possession) and relied on the absence of government proof of having taken possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302 The standard for interference by a High Court in a second appeal: interference is permissible where the finding of fact is without any evidence, or where the evidence accepted is such that no reasonable person could have accepted it. The Court relied on this authority to explain and apply the well‑settled limitation on interference in second appeals, concluding that the lower courts' findings were supported by evidence and therefore not open to interference in second appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded primarily by assessing the factual findings of the trial and first appellate courts and then determining whether those findings could be assailed in a second appeal.

Key points in the Court's reasoning:

  • Findings of fact — such as that the land was developed (not waste or arable) and that the respondent was in possession — are findings of fact by the lower courts and therefore generally not open to challenge in a second appeal.
  • The lower appellate court's finding that the land was substantially an urban area was supported by unrebutted oral evidence from various residents and by the Collector's award, which itself noted that roads had been laid and plots demarcated. The Court observed there was "absolutely no rebuttal whatsoever" to this evidence.
  • Regarding the respondent's claimed expenditure (about Rs. 40,000) on development, the Court noted that the society’s head‑clerk stated on oath that account books had been brought into court when he gave evidence. No request was made by the appellants to have the account books kept in court or to inspect them, and no cross‑examination was directed to discredit that evidence. Therefore, the Court declined to draw an adverse inference against the respondent for non‑production under those circumstances, while also observing that strictly speaking the respondent had not proved the Rs. 40,000 expenditure to the full evidentiary standard.
  • The appellants had failed to establish that they had obtained physical possession of the land; government records showing formal possession were not produced. Given the open nature of the land and absence of proof of dispossession, the courts treated the respondent as in possession.
  • On the point of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Court accepted that the statutory summary powers under Section 17 are available only in respect of waste or arable land. Because the land was held to be developed (urban), the State could not validly invoke Section 17; consequently, the acquisition notifications issued under that provision were ultra vires for lack of jurisdiction.
  • With respect to limitation, the Court identified Article 120 of the Limitation Act (six years) as the relevant provision and held the suit was not barred.
  • The acceptance of compensation did not operate as an estoppel against the respondent's challenge to the acquisition, particularly where the initial notifications were ultra vires. The decree was, however, made subject to a condition that the respondent would be entitled to the benefit of the decree only if it paid to the Government the amount it had received together with interest.
  • The Court applied the principle (cited from authority) that a High Court will interfere in a second appeal only where the first appellate finding is unsupported by any evidence or is such that no reasonable person could have accepted the evidence. Finding ample evidence to support the conclusions below, the Court resisted interference.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences and practical effects:

  • The judgment and decree of the Sub‑Judge (trial court) as affirmed by the Additional District Judge are maintained: the acquisition notifications in issue (insofar as based on Section 17 for waste/arable land) were held ultra vires and the respondent's suit for declaration was decreed.
  • The respondent‑society remains entitled to the benefit of the decree only on condition that it repays to the Government the compensation amount it had received together with interest; otherwise the decree's operative benefit does not accrue to the respondent.
  • The appellants failed to prove actual physical possession or to justify the invocation of Section 17; the Section 4 notifications were held to have "exhausted themselves" and could not be treated as a reservoir for further acquisitions (as found below).
  • Costs were awarded against the appellants, including counsel fee of Rs. 200/‑.

The opinion does not indicate that the Court intended to lay down a new legal principle or to depart from existing precedent; it applied settled principles on appellate review of findings of fact and statutory interpretation of the Land Acquisition Act provisions as they applied to the facts.

    Union Of India And Another v. M/S. Burmah Shell Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. .

    1. This second appeal by the Union of India appellant No. 1 and the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, appellant No. 2, is directed against the judgment dated November, 19, 1968. of the Additional District Judge. Delhi, by which he dismissed their appeal against the judgment and decree of the Sub-Judge. 1st Class, Delhi, decreeing the respondent's suit against them.

    2. The respondent-society is a Co-operative Housing Society with one of its objects being to acquire land for housing schemes. It purchased the land in suit and spent some money in developing the same. On March 8, 1957. the Chief Commissioner. Delhi. Appellant No. 2. issued three notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17. respectively, of the Land Acquisition Act herein called ‘The Act’ in respect of a portion of the respondent's land. Other notifications under the same sections of the Act were again issued on September 10, 1957 in respect of some other portion of the said land; and notifications under the said three sections of the Act were further issued in respect of the remaining land of the respondent on October 25. 1957. Thus, the Government acquired the entire land of the respondent measuring about 44 bighas, situated in the revenue estate of village Mohammad pur Munikka, Delhi. Compensation thereof under the awards of the Collector was paid in October, 1958, which was received by the respondent, without prejudice to its objections. The respondent then filed a suit on December 2. 1960 for declaration that these notifications were illegal, invalid, void, ultra vires and without jurisdiction, with the consequential relief of restraining permanently the appellants their officers and servants from interfering with the respondent's possession of the said land.

    3. The suit was decreed by the learned sub-Judge on March 31, 1965. He held that the land of the respondent did not warrant resort to summary proceedings under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act as the same could not be treated as waste or arable land, that the Government had not applied its mind properly in issuing these notifications and that the suit was not barred. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit was not ousted. It was also held that the acceptance of compensation by the respondent did not operate as an estoppel. The learned Additional District Judge, in appeal confirmed the findings of the trial Court and found that the respondent's land had been developed before the acquisition and was an urban area as the Moti Bagh and Vinay Nagar colonies had come up just adjacent to it at a distance of a few furlongs. The land, therefore, could not be treated as waste land, which was a pre-requisite of the jurisdiction of the appellants for invoking the powers under Section 17 of the Act. The resort to Section 17 of the Act for dispensing with the compliance of the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act requiring service of notices of the acquisition and inviting objections was, therefore, not permissible.

    4. It was only in the case of waste or arable land, that State Government acquired jurisdiction to invoke the powers under Section 17 of the Act. The Government by wrongly deciding the question as to the character of the land, could not give itself jurisdiction to give a direction to the Collector to take possession of the land under Section 17(1) of the Act. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore held that the aforesaid acquisition notifications were ultra vires being not in respect of waste or arable land. The proper provision applicable to the case was held to be Article 120 of the Limitation Act which provided six years, limitation. The suit, accordingly, was not barred by limitation. It was also held that the receipt of compensation by the respondent-society did not operate as estoppel, especially as the initial notifications were ultra vires. It was made clear in the decree itself that the respondent-society would be entitled to take benefit of the decree, only if it paid to the Government the amount received by it together with interest and not otherwise.

    5. It was further held that the appellants had failed to show as to who was in actual possession. Government records had not been produced to prove that the appellants formally took possession of the land. The land being open area, it had to be treated in possession of the owner. As the acquisition notifications had been held to be ultra vires the respondent-society was treated as the owner and therefore, in possession of the land; their dispossession at any stage not having been proved. The suit for declaration was therefore, held to be competent. The notifications issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act were also held to have exhausted themselves and could not be treated as reservoir for further acquisitions. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court was affirmed.

    6. In the second appeal, Mr. S.S Chadha the learned counsel for the appellants, raised three contentions: (i) that the finding that the land was not waste was not correct; (ii) the suit declaration should have been held not maintainable as possession was that of the Government and not of the respondent-society; and (iii) that Section 4 notification had survived. The last contention was of no help to the appellants, in view of the Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Act. 1967. More than two years having already expired after the commencement of the said Act no declaration under Section 6 of the Act, could be made. The learned counsel, therefore, did not Press his third contention.

    7. The finding that the land was not waste or arable land, but was developed land; and that the respondent was in possession thereof are findings of fact. They cannot be challenged in second appeal.

    8. The lower appellate court has held that the land in dispute was substantially an urban area as Moti Bagh and Vinay Nagar colonies are just adjacent to the same at a distance of a few furlongs. It has further been found that the land was developed into plots and roads existed there. These are findings of fact and are supported by ample oral unrebutted evidence of the various residents in the neighbourhood. Even the Land Acquisition Collector in his award has stated, as reproduced in the judgment under appeal, that roads have been laid and plots have been demarcated. There is absolutely no rebuttal whatsoever to this. It was further brought on record by the respondent that it had spent about Rs. 40,000/- on development of land. Mr. Chadha contended that the respondent-society has failed to produce the cheques by which payments are said to have been made and had not produced its account books, which were admitted to have been maintained. He therefore, urged that on account of the failure of the respondent to produce the best evidence, in the shape of account books, presumption should have been made against it

    9. It is true that It was admitted that accounts were kept. P.W 6. A.N Bhardwaj head-clerk of the respondent-society had stated in his statement on oath that he had brought the account books in Court, when he appeared in the witness box to show that the said amount on the development of the land had been spent. No questions were asked from him in cross-examination on behalf of the appellants to discredit this statement nor was any attempt made to look into the said account books, which were then lying in Court. Adverse inference could only be drawn if the appellants had asked the Court to order the respondent to keep the account books in Court and the respondent had then failed to do so. Neither any prayer to that effect was made on behalf of the appellants, nor was any question asked from the witness when he had actually brought the account books in Court. Non-production of the account books under the said circumstances would not be fatal to the respondent's case. In any case, it may be said that the respondent had failed to prove the spending of Rs. 40,000/- on the development of the land.

    10. It could not be said that the lower appellate court had no evidence before it to hold that the land had been demarcated into plots and that roads existed at the site. The question for decision, was whether it was an urban area or whether it was waste land. It is nobody's case that it was arable land. It was found that the land was adjacent to the developed colonies like Moti Bagh and Vinay Nagar colonies and was therefore, substantially an urban area. This finding cannot be assailed.

    11. Same is the position with regard to the finding about the actual possession of the land. It is admittedly an open piece of land and nobody has been in actual physical possession thereof. The learned lower appellate Court found that the appellants had failed to adduce any evidence to show that physical possession was ever obtained. In view of this the finding that the respondent-society was in possession of the land is unimpeachable. The legal position about the scope of the jurisdiction of this court to interfere in second appeal is now well settled. The High Court would interfere in second appeal, if, inter alia, the finding, recorded by the first appellate court is without any evidence. Or if the evidence which is accepted by the lower appellate court was such that no reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounted to saying that there was no evidence. The High Court may then interfere, as a finding of fact, without any evidence, can be successfully challenged in second appeal.

    12. For then it may be said that the decree proceeding on such a finding discloses a substantial defect or error in procedure. But the High Court would not interfere if there is an error or defect in the appreciation or assessment of evidence by the lower appellate court. Even if the appreciation is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded is grossly defective, as a consequence thereof, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure permitting interference by this Court. This court would not interfere even if it thinks that the finding accepted by the lower appellate court could not have been reasonably accepted, (See V. Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, AIR 1963 SC 302).

    13. There is thus no scope for any Interference by this Court in this second appeal, which lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 200/-.

    14. Appeal dismissed.

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    Union Of India And Another v. M/S. Burmah Shell Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. .
    (Jul 21, 1972)