Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Prakash Narain, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent/plaintiff manufactures and sells playing cards and on 8 February 1966 registered a trade mark (No. 233581, Class 16) consisting of a tractor device and the word "tractor" for playing cards. The appellant/defendant also trades in playing cards and, according to the respondent, adopted the trade mark "Ferguson" and used a tractor device on the back of its playing cards; the respondent became aware of this in early 1971. The respondent sued for permanent injunction, passing off, rendition of accounts and damages. Alongside the suit, the respondent filed an interlocutory application (I.A. 963 of 1971) under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC seeking an interim injunction restraining the appellant from dealing in playing cards bearing the mark "Ferguson" and the tractor device or any similar mark.

The appellant resisted the suit and the interlocutory application, pleaded prior use of "Ferguson" since February 1966 and that its application for registration of "Ferguson" in Class 16 had been accepted and advertised in the Trade Marks Journal (No. 531 dated 16 July 1971), to which the respondent filed opposition. The learned Single Judge granted a temporary injunction restraining the appellant, its agents and representatives from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale or otherwise dealing in playing cards printed with the device of a tractor or any mark resembling therewith. The appellant appealed against that interlocutory order. This opinion disposes of that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a prima facie case existed to justify the grant of an interim injunction restraining the appellant from using a tractor device on playing cards that allegedly resembled the respondent's registered mark.
  2. Whether the acceptance and advertisement of the appellant's application for registration (and the possibility of concurrent registration under Section 12(3) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958) required the suit to be stayed or prevented the grant of interim relief.
  3. Whether the registration of the respondent's mark extended to the playing cards (and not merely the carton) such that use of a similar device on the cards themselves constituted infringement under the Act (having regard to Section 2(2), Section 28 and Section 29).
  4. Whether there was evidence of honest concurrent user that would defeat the respondent's claim for interim relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • No prima facie case had been made out by the respondent to warrant an interim injunction.
  • The appellant's application for registration of the mark "Ferguson" had been accepted by the Trade Mark Registry and advertised; the statute contemplates concurrent registration/user (Section 12(3) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958), and therefore the action should have been stayed rather than granting interim or permanent relief to the respondent.
  • The device of the tractor appeared on the playing cards' back as an ornamental device, but the cartons bore only the word "Ferguson"; because playing cards are sold in sealed cartons, an unwary purchaser would not be led to believe the cards were those of the respondent.
  • The registration (or acceptance for registration) related only to the carton (it was argued that only the device on the carton was registered), so use of a device on the playing cards themselves could not be stopped.
  • The appellant sought alternatively that, if relief were to be granted, the respondent should be put on terms (because the appellant's registration application had been pending since January 1970 and published July 1971).
  • Relied on several authorities (English and Indian) to support stay or refusal of interim relief: Edwards v. Elkan (1888) 5 R.P.C. 70; Mitchell v. Henry (1880) 15 Ch D 181; Bravingtons Ltd. v. Barrington Tennant, 1957 RPC 183; Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v. Specters Ltd., 1957 RPC 498; D. Adinarayana Setty v. Brooke Bond Tea of India Ltd., AIR 1960 Mys 142; and decisions reported at 1932 RPC 597 and 1969 RPC 286.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent relied on its registered trade mark (No. 233581, Class 16) for the tractor device and the word "tractor" registered in 1966, asserting infringement and passing off by the appellant's use of a similar tractor device on playing cards.
  • The respondent sought interim relief under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC to restrain the appellant from manufacturing, selling or otherwise dealing in playing cards bearing the "Ferguson" mark and tractor device or any confusingly similar mark.
  • The respondent contended that the tractor device used by the appellant was calculated to cause confusion and amounted to infringement and/or passing off; the respondent asserted that the registered trade mark covered the goods (playing cards) and not merely a carton.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Edwards v. Elkan, (1888) 5 R.P.C. 70 Authority where interim injunction was stood over pending decision by Registry because defendant had prior user and had applied for registration; used to argue that plaintiff's motion for injunction should be deferred until Registry decision. The court held Edwards v. Elkan inapplicable: there was nothing on record here to show long or prior user by the appellant of the infringing tractor device; further, the appellant's registration application related to the word "Ferguson" on the carton while the interlocutory injunction concerned the tractor device on the playing cards.
Mitchell v. Henry, (1880) 15 Ch D 181 Case in which injunction was refused because there was no similarity in the goods and thus no infringement (despite resemblance in a selvage thread after dyeing). The court found this decision inapposite: unlike Mitchell, in the present case the tractor device on the appellant's playing cards is similar to the respondent's registered device, so Mitchell did not assist the appellant.
Bravingtons Ltd. v. Barrington Tennant, 1957 RPC 183 Concerned similarity of trade names and refusal of injunction where doubt existed as to deception and undue delay on plaintiff's part. The court held this authority did not help the appellant: there was no undue delay by the respondent in this case and the tractor device displayed by the parties was similar, making Bravingtons distinguishable.
Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v. Specters Ltd., 1957 RPC 498 Case where injunction was refused primarily for undue delay and lack of similarity (alleged copyright/label copying but ultimately distinguished). The court considered the decision inapplicable for the same reasons as Bravingtons: here there was no undue delay and there was a similarity in the tractor device.
D. Adinarayana Setty v. Brooke Bond Tea of India Ltd., AIR 1960 Mys 142 Cited by appellant in support of stay or terms relating to concurrent registration/user (as an Indian authority). The court stated that the decision cited was not attracted to the facts of the present case and therefore did not support the appellant's plea for stay or terms.
Decisions reported at 1932 RPC 597 and 1969 RPC 286 English decisions cited by the appellant (specific case names not set out in the opinion) in support of stay or imposing terms. The court treated these decisions as not attracted to the present case and therefore not supportive of the appellant's contentions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reviewed the factual record and the interlocutory relief granted by the Single Judge and addressed the appellant's principal contentions in turn. The reasoning proceeded as follows:

  1. Prima facie similarity: The court agreed with the Single Judge that the tractor device used by the appellant on its playing cards was "patently similar" to the respondent's registered tractor device. The similarity on visual inspection justified a prima facie finding favoring the respondent for interim relief.
  2. On the question of purchaser perception, the court rejected the appellant's narrow focus on the carton: it noted the common knowledge that playing cards are purchased after seeing the contents as well as the carton, so absence of the device on the carton did not negate the possibility of confusion arising from the device on the cards themselves.
  3. Regarding the appellant's reliance on concurrent registration (Section 12(3), Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958): the court observed that, while the statute permits concurrent registration in appropriate cases, such registration is not effective until granted. Meanwhile the respondent's registration (already granted in 1966) is prima facie evidence of validity and confers statutory rights under Section 28. Because the appellant did not challenge the validity of the respondent's registration, it could not rely at this interlocutory stage on Section 12(3) to defeat the respondent's claim.
  4. On the question of stay: the court considered Edwards v. Elkan and similar authorities but found them distinguishable on facts (no evidence here of prior or long use by the appellant of the tractor device) and stressed that the appellant's application related to a different aspect (the word "Ferguson" on the carton) while the injunction concerned printing of the tractor device on the cards.
  5. Other authority relied on by the appellant (Mitchell v. Henry; Bravingtons; Tavener Rutledge) were examined and rejected as inapplicable either because those decisions turned on lack of similarity or on undue delay by plaintiffs—factors not present here.
  6. Scope of registration: The court interpreted the registration as covering the trade-mark in relation to the goods (playing cards) and held that the registered trade-mark would be available to the respondent both for the playing cards and for the carton, referencing sub-section (2) of Section 2, Section 28 and Section 29 of the Act.
  7. Honest concurrent user: The court found no prima facie evidence on the record to show honest concurrent user by the appellant.
  8. Terms and stay alternatives: The court noted that the appellant sought imposition of terms as an alternative to stay, but observed there was no prayer for such terms either in the appeal or in the appellant's reply in the original suit; on that basis the court declined to impose terms.

The court therefore concluded that the Single Judge had not erred in granting the interlocutory injunction and that the appellant's challenges—statutory and precedential—did not overturn the prima facie case established by the respondent's registration and the factual similarity of the tractor device.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed.

Direct effect: The order of the learned Single Judge granting a temporary/interim injunction restraining the appellant, its agents and representatives from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale or otherwise dealing in playing cards printed with the device of a tractor or any mark resembling therewith is affirmed for the duration of the suit; the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Broader implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying existing statutory provisions and authorities to the facts; the court emphasized that acceptance or advertisement of an application for registration does not confer rights while prima facie statutory rights of an existing registered proprietor (here, the respondent) remain enforceable, and that there was no prima facie evidence of honest concurrent user by the appellant.

Note: All statements in this summary are drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and no additional facts or inferences have been introduced.

    Metro Playing Card Co. v. Wazir Chand Kapoor .

    Prakash Narain, J.:— This appeal is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court sitting on the original side whereby an interim injunction was issued against the appellant on a motion by the respondent.

    2. The respondent/plaintiff manufactures and sells playing cards. On 8th February, 1966, the respondent/plaintiff registered under No. 233581 in Class 16 a trade mark consisting of the device of a tractor and the word “tractor” for his playing cards. The appellant defendant also trades in playing cards and it is alleged by the respondent that early in 1971 he came to know that the appellant had adopted the trade mark “Ferguson” in relation to its playing cards ana was marketing the same under that name also using the device of a tractor on the back of the playing cards. The respondent, therefore, brought an action against the appellant seeking permanent injunction restraining the appellant from infringing the reistered trade mark of the respondent and passing off its goods as those of the respondent. A prayer was also made for rendition of accounts, damages etc. Along with the suit the respondent filed an application (I.A 963 of 1971) under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC claiming that during the pendency of the suit an interim injunction may be issued restraining the appellant-defendant, its agents and representatives from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale or otherwise dealing in playing cards bearing the trade mark “Ferguson” and tractor and/or any mark resembling thereto, calculated to cause confusion and amounting to infringement and/or passing off as and for the genuine trade mark of the respondent/plaintiff.

    3. The appellant resisted both the suit and the interlocutory application. It pleaded that its application for registration of the “Ferguson” trade mark has been accepted for registration in the Trade Mark Registry at Bombay in Class 16 and has been advertised in the Trade Mark Journal No. 531 dated 16th July, 1971 to which the plaintiff-respondent has filed his opposition on September 11, 1971; that it has been in the trade of manufacturing, and selling cards using the mark “Ferguson” since February, 1966; that the trade mark “Ferguson” does not in any way infringe the registered trade mark of the respondent-plaintiff; that playing cards are sold in sealed cartons and although the playing cards manufactured by the appellant have the device of tractor on the back of the playing cards merely as an ornamental device with the word “Ferguson” printed thereon in a comer yet the carton does not have the device of the tractor and has only the trade mark “Ferguson” on it and so, there is neither any infringement nor would an unwary purchaser be led to purchase the appellants playing cards in the belief that the same were manufactured and marketed by the respondent. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties was of the view that the device of tractor on the playing cards of the appellant did amount to any infringement of the registered trade mark of the respondent and so, issued a temporary injunction for the duration of the suit restraining the appellant, its agents and representatives from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale or otherwise dealing in playing cards printed with the device of a tractor or any mark resembling therewith.

    4. Mr. Anoop Singh, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has urged that no prima facie case had been made by the respondent to justify the issue of an interim injunction. We are not impressed by this contention at all. The device of the tractor on the playing cards manufactured by the appellant is patently similar to the device of the tractor of which the respondent has obtained registration. It may be that there is no device of the tractor on the carton of the appellants playing cards but then it is common knowledge that playing cards are purchased not only by looking at the carton but also after seeing the contents of the carton. We would not like to express any opinion at this stage as to whether the word “Ferguson” itself is an infringement of the trade mark of the respondent who contents that “Ferguson” is a well-known tractor and in common parlance is almost synonymous to the word tractor. Therefore, on a visual inspection it must be held that, prima facie, the respondent's complaint was justified.

    5. It was next urged by Mr. Anoop Singh that since the statute contemplated concurrent registration or user and the appellant's application for registration of the trade mark “Ferguson” had been accepted in the Registry the action brought by the respondent should have been stayed instead of granting any interim or permanent relief to the respondent. Reference in this behalf may be made to sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (hereinafter called the Act). The provision of law is that in case of honest concurrent use or of other special circumstances which in the opinion of the Registrar make it proper so to do, the Registrar may permit the registration by more than one proprietor of trade marks which are identical or nearly resemble each other (whether any such trade mark is already registered or not) in respect of the same, or description of goods, subject to such conditions and limitations, if any, as the Registrar may think fit to impose. It is urged that inasmuch as the application of the appellant has been accepted for registration no relief should have been granted.

    6. No doubt registration may be granted for concurrent user as provided by the law but till registration is granted there can be no doubt that the respondents trade mark is infringed by the appellant and the statutory right which the respondent has under Section 28 of the Act is violated. Inasmuch as registration of the trade mark is prima facie evidence of its validity and the appellant has not challenged the validity of the registration of the respondents trade mark it is not open to the appellant at this stage, to plead Section 12(3) of the Act.

    7. Mr. Anoop Singh laid great stress that instead of granting any relief to the respondent the action of the respondent should have been stayed, In support of his contention he invited our attention to a decision rendered in the High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) in England by Stirling, J., in Edwards v. Elkan, (1888) 5 R.P.C 70. In that case there was an infringement of a trade mark “Our Boys” for watches. The defendant in that action had alleged and it was not contradicted by the plaintiff that the defendant had been using the words “Our Boys” in connection with watches two years prior to the date when the plaintiff obtained registration of his trade mark. There was no motion to rectify the registration of trade mark in that case also. The defendant had applied for registration. In these circumstances it was held that the plaintiffs motion for interim injunction should stand over till the defendant's application for registration was decided by the Registry. This decision is no authority in the present case for here there is nothing on record to show long or prior laser by the appellant of the infinging trade mark of the device of a tractor. Apart from this the application of the appellant is for registration of the trade mark of the word “Ferguson” on its carton whereas the interim injunction granted by the learned Single Judge is in respect of printing the device of the tractor.

    8. Mr. Anoop Singh also referred to the decision in Mitchell v. Henry, (1880) 15 Ch D 181. In this case the plaintiff's registered trade mark was for worsted goods escribed as “a white selvage on each side of the piece having a red and white mottled thread interwoven the full length of the selvage between the edge of the piece and edge of the selvage,” and deposited a specimen at the Patent Office Museum. The specimen so deposited was undyed, and the selvage was white, the warp being white cotton and the woof white mohair, and nearly in the middle of the selvage was a compound warp thread composed of a thread of white cotton and a thread of Turkey red cotton twisted together. The defendant sold black mohair goods with a dark grey selvage of nearly the same shade as that of the plaintiffs, with a twisted thread running along its inner edge, which thread was originally white, red and yellow, but in the course of dyeing the white became dark grey, and the yellow a dark olive, which could hardly be distinguished. The plaintiffs sought to restrain the sale of! these goods as an infringement, and moved for an injunction. There was evidence that the selvage, though not actually white, was what was known in the trade as a white selvage. The injunction was refused on the ground that there was no similarity in the goods of the plaintiffs and those or the defendant. This decision also does not help the appellant for obviously in the present case the device of the tractor on the playing cards is similar.

    9. Reference was also made by Mr. Anoop Singh to the decisions of the Chancery Division in Bravingtons Ltd. v. Barrington Tennant, 1957 RPC 183 and Tavener Rutledge Ltd. v. Specters Ltd., 1957 RPC 498. The first or these cases related to similarity of trade names inasmuch as the defendant instead of using its full name Barrington Tennant started trading only under the name Barrington which was stated to be similar to Bravington Ltd. used by the plaintiff. The motion for injunction was refused on the ground that it was doubtful if the similarity of the shops would deceive potential customers that there had been undue delay by the plaintiffs in taking action and that in view of these facts no interim relief should be granted. On facts the Court came to the conclusion that it was not satisfied that there would be any deception as alleged. In the latter case, namely, 1957 RPC 498, the complaint of the plaintiff was that the defendant was selling sweets in canisters that were almost exact copies of those used by the plaintiff and infringement of copy-right was alleged. Later on the action was brought for infringement of trade-marks copyright and passing-off. Injunction was refused primarily on the ground of undue delay and that there was no similarity in the labels of the canisters. These two decisions, therefore, also do not help the appellant. There is neither undue delay in the present case and there certainly is a similarity in the printed device of the tractor on the playing cards of both the appellant and the respondent.

    10. Mr. Anoop Singh urged that only the device on the carton of the respondent is registered and not the device on the playing cards and so use of the device of a tractor on the playing cards of the appellant could not be stopped. This contention has to be merely stated to be rejected. What is registered in the case of the respondent is the trade-mark in relation to the goods and it cannot be disputed that the goods that are being manufactured by the parties are playing cards packed in cartons. A reference to sub-section (2) of Section 2, Section 28 and Section 29 of the Act makes it clear that the registered trade-mark of the respondent would be available to him both lor the playing cards as well as the carton.

    11. Mr. Anoop Singh lastly urged that the appellant's application for registration has been pending since January, 1970 and was even published in July, 1971 and so, even if the suit was not stayed the respondent should have been put on terms in case the suit is ultimately dismissed on the plea of the appellant regarding concurrent user.

    12. Mr. Anoop Singh, of course, strongly, urged, as already noticed, that the suit should have been stayed but in the alternative prayed for imposition of terms. He sought support for his contention from a Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in D. Adinarayana Setty v. Brooke Bond Tea of India Ltd., AIR 1960 Mys 142 and the English decisions reported in 1932 RPC 597 and 1969 RPC 286. We have already dealt with the plea regarding the Stay of the suit and are of the opinion that the decisions cited are not attracted in the present case. No terms can be imposed on the respondent for there is no such prayer either in the appeal before us or even in the reply filed by the appellant in the original side.

    13. We are entirely in agreement with the learned Single Judge that the mere acceptance of an application for registration of a trade-mark or its advertisement confers no right on the appellant and, prima facie, there is an infringement of the trade-mark. There is also, prima facie, no evidence on the record to show honest concurrent user.

    14. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.

    15. Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Metro Playing Card Co. v. Wazir Chand Kapoor .
    (Apr 5, 1972)