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  • Section 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947
  • Section 4 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
  • Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT 1947
  • provisions of Section 21 (3) (b)
  • Reserve Bank. Section 21 (3)
  • Section 21 (3) (c).
  • Section 21 (3) (b)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Section 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947
  • Section 4 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.
  • Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT 1947
  • provisions of Section 21 (3) (b)
  • Reserve Bank. Section 21 (3)
  • Section 21 (3) (c).
  • Section 21 (3) (b)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from an order of the Executing Court dismissing objections under Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure raised by the judgment-debtor. The underlying decree, passed by the Subordinate Judge First Class, Delhi on 30 May 1966, was for recovery of Rs. 28,000. The dispute traces to a transaction effected in Hong Kong under which U.S. dollars were sold to the judgment-debtor at Rs. 5.60 per dollar, whereas the then-official exchange rate was Rs. 4.75 per dollar.

At the time the decree was passed, the trial court directed that the decree would not be executable until the plaintiff obtained the permission required under Section 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, from the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The decree-holder subsequently obtained permission from the RBI (letter dated 18 November 1966) and moved for execution. The judgment-debtor filed objections, which the Executing Court dismissed, prompting this appeal before D.K. Kapur, J.

The key surviving objections raised by the judgment-debtor were (1) that the decree was a nullity and incapable of execution because it was founded on a transaction prohibited by Section 4(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947; and (2) that the RBI's permission to execute (granted to the decree-holder) was invalid because the RBI did not hear the judgment-debtor before granting permission. Other objections (concerning the effect of the judgment in the suit and the decree-holder's claim to interest) were either inter-connected with the main points or already decided in favour of the judgment-debtor.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decree founded on a transaction prohibited by Section 4(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 can be validly passed and thereafter executed (subject to Section 21 of the Act).
  2. Whether permission granted by the Reserve Bank of India under Section 21(3) for enforcement of such a decree is invalid if the RBI did not hear the judgment-debtor (i.e., whether the RBI must afford a hearing to the debtor before granting permission).

Arguments of the Parties

Judgment-Debtor's Arguments

  • The underlying foreign-exchange transaction was prohibited by Section 4(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (because the parties contracted at a rate different from the RBI-authorised rate), making the decree a nullity and incapable of execution.
  • The RBI's letter granting permission to the decree-holder to execute the decree (dated 18 November 1966) was invalid and unenforceable because the RBI did not give the judgment-debtor an opportunity to be heard before granting permission.

Decree-Holder's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The decree was passed by the trial court, which expressly directed that execution was subject to obtaining permission under Section 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act; the decree-holder obtained the requisite permission from the RBI and applied for execution in accordance with that direction and the statutory scheme.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. Arumugham v. R. Krishnaswamy, Madras High Court, 1965, 2 M.L.J. 183 That a suit based on a prohibited foreign-exchange transaction is maintainable but execution is barred except to the extent permitted by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India. The court relied on this decision to support the view that legal proceedings are not barred by prohibition under the Act, but enforcement of any resulting decree requires permission from the appropriate authority (here, the RBI).
A. R. Ramiah v. Reserve Bank of India, 1970 I M.L.J. 1 Held that the power conferred on the RBI under Section 21(3)(b) and (c) is not coupled with a duty to give notice; failure to give notice to the judgment-debtor was not a violation of natural justice. The court adopted this principle to conclude that the RBI need not conduct a quasi-judicial hearing of the judgment-debtor before granting permission to execute a decree under Section 21(3), and that the absence of a hearing did not invalidate the RBI's permission.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the contest in two main strands corresponding to the two surviving objections.

First strand: Validity of the decree founded on a prohibited transaction

  1. The court observed that Section 4(2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 prohibits entering into a transaction providing conversion of Indian currency to foreign currency (or vice versa) at rates other than those authorised by the Reserve Bank, except with prior general or special permission of the Reserve Bank. The present transaction (sale of dollars at Rs. 5.60 vs authorised Rs. 4.75) fell within that prohibition.
  2. Two alternative bases disposed of the objection that the decree was void:
    1. Res judicata / issue already decided at trial — the very objection had been raised and addressed at the trial where the trial court held that a decree could nevertheless be passed subject to Section 21 of the Act; therefore the matter could not be reopened in execution proceedings.
    2. Textual analysis of Section 21(3) of the Act — subsection (3) makes clear that although the Act prohibits certain transactions without permission, it does not prevent legal proceedings to recover sums that would otherwise be due. However, subsections (3)(a)–(c) regulate the enforcement of judgments/orders: (a) the provisions of the Act apply to sums payable under judgment the same as other sums, (b) no steps shall be taken to enforce such judgments except insofar as the Central Government or the Reserve Bank may permit, and (c) the authorities may require production of documents and information for considering whether to grant permission.
  3. Applying Section 21(3), the court concluded that although the underlying transaction was prohibited unless authorised, legal proceedings were not barred and a decree could be obtained; enforcement of that decree required permission from the appropriate authority. Because the trial court had framed the decree as non-executable until permission was obtained, and because the decree-holder subsequently obtained the required permission from the Reserve Bank, the objection that the decree was a nullity failed.
  4. The court expressly relied on R. Arumugham v. R. Krishnaswamy to support that view.

Second strand: Validity of the RBI's permission in the absence of a hearing

  1. The appellant contended that the RBI should have heard the appellant before granting permission to execute. The court examined Section 21(3)(b)–(c): subsection (b) requires that no steps be taken to enforce a judgment except as the Central Government or RBI may permit; subsection (c) permits the authority, for the purpose of considering whether to grant permission, to require production of documents and information from the judgment-creditor and the judgment-debtor.
  2. The court reasoned that subsection (c) gives the RBI the discretion to specify which documents or information to require; it may require none, one party, or both parties. Whether the RBI calls for documents or information is a matter committed to its discretion and is not necessarily quasi-judicial in character.
  3. The court held that the statutory scheme does not impose a duty on the RBI to conduct a hearing or apply principles of natural justice that would require notice and an opportunity to be heard to the judgment-debtor before granting permission. The authority’s decision whether to ask for documents or hearing is non-justiciable in the context of execution of the decree.
  4. The court adopted and concurred with the reasoning in A. R. Ramiah v. Reserve Bank of India, which held that failure to give notice to the judgment-debtor in such matters was not a violation of natural justice and that the power under Section 21(3)(b) and (c) was not coupled with a duty to give notice.
  5. On this basis the court found the appellant's contention that the RBI's permission was invalid for lack of a hearing to be without merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Executing Court's rejection of the judgment-debtor's objections. The core ruling is:

DISMISSED — the appeal is dismissed and the objections in execution proceedings were rightly rejected.

Immediate consequences:

  • The decree for Rs. 28,000, though founded on a transaction prohibited absent prior RBI permission, was properly entered and may be enforced only to the extent permitted by the Reserve Bank of India; because the decree-holder obtained the required permission, the decree is not rendered incapable of execution on the grounds advanced.
  • The Reserve Bank's grant of permission to the decree-holder to execute the decree was valid despite the RBI not having given the judgment-debtor a hearing; the statutory scheme does not impose a hearing requirement on the RBI under Section 21(3).
  • Because of the novelty of the questions raised, the court ordered that the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.

Broader implications: The opinion confirms that (i) suits founded on transactions prohibited by Section 4(2) are not automatically barred from being tried, (ii) enforcement of any decree obtained in such suits is regulated by Section 21(3) and requires permission of the appropriate authority, and (iii) the RBI's discretion under Section 21(3)(c) to require documents or information does not import a mandatory quasi-judicial hearing obligation. The opinion rests on existing High Court authorities cited and does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond its application of the statutory text and those precedents.

    S. L. Bali v. M. S. Chopra

    D.K Kapur, J.:— This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor from an order passed on his objections under Sections 47 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Executing Court. The decree which is being sought to be executed is for the recovery of Rs. 28,000 which was passed by the Subordinate Judge First Class, Delhi on 30th May, 1966. It appears that the parties had entered into a transaction at Hong Kong by which dollars had been sold to the judgment-debtor at the rate of Rs. 5.60 per dollar in place of the then official rate of Rs. 4.75 to the dollar. At the time of the passing of the decree the Subordinate Judge directed that the decree shall not be enforceable until and unless the plaintiff obtained permission as required by Section 21 of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 from the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India. The decree-holder obtained the requisite permission from the Reserve Bank of India and applied for execution of the decree. The judgment-debtor filed objections which were dismissed. This had led to this appeal.

    The objections of the judgment-debtor as far as they are relevant for the disposal of this appeal are as follows:
    1. The decree was a nullity and incapable of execution.
    2. The permission granted to the decree-holder to execute the decree vide the letter of the Reserve Bank of India dated 18th November, 1966 was invalid and unenforceable.
    There were some other objections by the judgment-debtor concerning the effect of the judgment in the suit and the claim of the decree-holder to interest after the decree. The former question is really inter-connected with the two main objections mentioned already and the latter has been decided in favour of the judgment-debtor. As regards the objections that now survive, it was held on the first question that the Executing Court could not again deal with an objection which had been gone into and decided in the suit and, as regards the permission granted by the Reserve Bank of India it was held that the same was valid. Against this decision the judgment-debtor has appealed on the grounds that the decision on both points is wrong.
    As regards the first contested question, namely the validity of the decree sought to be executed the question really turns upon the effect of Section 4 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The said sub-section runs as follows:
    “Except with the previous general or special permission of the Reserve Bank, no person whether an authorised dealer or otherwise, shall enter into any transaction which provides for the conversion of Indian currency into foreign currency or foreign currency into Indian currency at rates of exchange other than the rates for the time being authorised by the Reserve Bank.”
    It will be seen from this provision that a transaction like the present is prohibited and the judgment-debtor therefore contends that no decree on the basis of a prohibited transaction should have been passed by the court. There are two ways of disposing of this objection. Firstly, this very objection was taken at the trial of the suit where it was contended that the official exchange rate being Rs. 4.75 and the rate adopted by the parties being at a much higher rate made the transaction illegal. The trial court, however, came to the conclusion that a decree could be passed inspite of the transaction being prohibited by Section 4 (2) of the Act and relied for this view on the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. This matter having been settled by the court which tried the suit, is no longer open to challenge in the course of execution proceedings. The second way to deal with the objection is to see from the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 itself as to whether a claim based on a prohibited transaction is barred or not. For this purpose, it is sufficient to refer to Section 21 (3) of the Act which may be reproduced in full for the purposes of this case because it is also relevant for the other substantive objection: —
    “21. Contracts in evasion of this Act
    (3) Neither the provisions of this Act nor any term (whether expressed or implied) contained in any contract that anything for which the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank is required by the said provisions shall not be done without that permission, shall prevent legal “proceedings being brought in (India) to recover any sum which, apart from the said provisions and any such term, would be due, whether as a debt, damages or otherwise, but —
    (a) the said provisions shall apply to sums required to be paid by any judgment or order of any Court as they apply in relation to other sums; and
    (b) no steps shall be taken for the purpose of enforcing any judgment or order for the payment of any sum to which the said provisions apply except as respects so much thereof as the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case may be, may permit to be paid; and
    (c) for the purpose of considering whether or not to grant such permission, the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, as the case may be, may require the person entitled to the benefit of the judgment or order and the debtor under the judgment or order, to produce such documents and to give such information as may be specified in the requirement.”
    This provision shows that inspite of a transaction being prohibited except with the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank, legal proceedings on such a transaction are not barred. I have already referred to Section 4 (2) of the Act wherein it is stated that without previous general or special permission no person can enter into a transaction for conversion of Indian currency into foreign currency at a rate different from the authorised rate. Thus general or special permission had to be obtained from the Reserve Bank for entering into the transaction which has led to the suit. It is a different matter whether such permission would have been granted or not. The transaction is, therefore one to which Section 21 (3) of the Act is fully applicable because it is a transaction which could have been entered into with the permission of the Reserve Bank. Section 21 (3) provides that even without such permission, legal proceedings may be brought but no decree obtained in such proceedings can be enforceable without the permission of the Central Government or the Reserve Bank as the case may be. In this case clearly, as the prior permission was to be obtained from the Reserve Bank, the permission for execution of the decree had also to be obtained from the Reserve Bank. This is exactly what has happened in this case. The decree was passed specifying that it would not be executable without permission. After that, the decree-holder has obtained the permission. Now he has applied for execution. He has acted according to the Section. I, therefore, find no merit in this objection. This view of mine is supported by the judgment of the Madras High Court reported as R. Arumugham V. R. Krishnaswamy, 1965, 2 M. L. J. 183, (1) In that case it was held that a suit like the present was maintainable but execution was barred except to the extent permitted by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India.
    As regards the second substantive question, the contention of the appellant is that before granting permission the Reserve Bank should have heard the appellant. I find no force in this submission also. The provisions of Section 21 (3) (b) show that the decree-holder is required to apply to the Central Government or the Reserve Bank as the case may be for permission to execute the decree. As regards the steps to be taken by the Reserve Bank in respect of such an application, reference has to be made to Section 21 (3) (c). It will be observed from this provision that it is for the Reserve Bank to call upon the person entitled to the benefit of the judgment to produce such documents or to give such information as may be specified in the requirement. It is also for the Reserve Bank in such a case to call upon the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor to produce documents and to give information as may be required. It is conceivable that the Reserve Bank may require no documents and may call upon neither party or may call upon one or other party. The question as to which documents are required by the Reserve Bank is not a matter which is justiciable and clearly requires no quasi-judicial functions to be performed by the Reserve Bank. The transaction is probably viewed by the Reserve Bank from a completely different angle to that of the parties themselves. This was a transaction between Indian citizens concerning the sale of 6,500 U.S dollars. Probably the Reserve Bank came to the conclusion that there was no point in refusing the permission. In my view, this was a matter entirely within the discretion of the Reserve Bank and did not effect the rights of either the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder. There was in my view, no provision which required the Reserve Bank to act in a quasi-judicial manner for deciding whether to give permission or not. The authorities sought to be cited on behalf of the appellant relating to the powers and duties of a quasi-judicial body have therefore no application to a case like the present and I need not refer to them. In my view the grant of permission does not require any hearing by the Reserve Bank. This view is supported by the judgment of the Madras High Court reported as A. R. Ramiah V. Reserve Bank of India, 1970 I M.L.J 1. (2). That decision was on a Writ Petition, wherein it was held that the power conferred on the Reserve Bank under Section 21 (3) (b) and (c) was not a power coupled with a duty. The failure to give notice to the judgment-debtor was held to be not violative of natural justice. I fully agree with that view and concur with the decision that —
    “. . .. In view of such an object, it is entirely foreign to contend that before the permission as contemplated by Section 21 (3) (c) of the Act is granted, a notice must be given to the judgment-debtor and the judgment-debtor must be given an opportunity of being heard . . . . Having regard to the object and provisions of the Act, there is no scope for insisting that the principles of natural justice require that before the Reserve Bank of India grants permission to a decree-holder under Section 21 (3) (c) of the Act for executing the decree it must give an opportunity to the judgment-debtor and hear him.”
    In view of this statement of the law I agree with the Executing Court that the objection of the judgment-debtor is not well founded.
    In view of my decision that the objections of the judgment-debtor have been rightly rejected by the court below I have to uphold the decision of that court dismissing the objections. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal but because of the novelty of the questions raised order that the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.
    Appeal dismissed.
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    Comments

    S. L. Bali v. M. S. Chopra
    (Sep 6, 1971)