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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Jagjit Singh and Hardayal Hardy, JJ.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order of acquittal dated March 31, 1967, by Shri C.R. Negi, Magistrate First Class, Delhi, in a prosecution under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The complaint, filed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi through the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor, accused Shri Chamah Dass (shop No. 21, Main Market, Moti Nagar, New Delhi) of selling Boondi sweets on March 24, 1964 that were adulterated with an unpermitted colouring matter. A Public Analyst's report indicating presence of a non-permissible yellow coaltar dye and a certificate from the Director of the Central Food Laboratory were attached to the complaint. During trial, the retained sample was also sent to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory at the seller's application.

The learned Magistrate acquitted the accused on the ground that the Food Inspector who purchased the sample, Shri Jamna Pershad, was "illegal ab initio" in his appointment because he allegedly had financial interest in the manufacture and sale of sweets. The Municipal Corporation and the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court under section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, filing the application on July 10, 1967 (accompanied by grounds and a certified copy of the Magistrate's judgment). Special leave was granted on June 25, 1967, and notice of appeal was directed to be issued. The High Court considered preliminary objections raised by counsel for the respondent concerning the timeliness and competency of the appeal, and ultimately heard and decided the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the application for special leave to appeal under section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, presented on July 10, 1967, was presented within the sixty-day period prescribed by sub-section (4) of section 417, having regard to the High Court's long vacation and the operation of section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  2. Whether Shri Jamna Pershad was disqualified from acting as a Food Inspector under the proviso to section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, by reason of having a financial interest in the manufacture or sale of articles of food, and whether such alleged disqualification vitiated the prosecution and justified acquittal.
  3. If the Food Inspector were incompetent, whether the purchase and analysis of the sample could nonetheless be treated as a purchase by a private individual under section 12 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and whether the Municipal Corporation (or a person authorised by it) could still institute prosecution under section 20.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Assistant Municipal Prosecutor)

  • The Municipal Corporation presented an application for special leave to appeal under section 417(3) of the Code, accompanied by grounds and a certified copy of the Magistrate's judgment. (The application was presented on July 10, 1967 and special leave was granted on June 25, 1967.)
  • Implicit in the prosecution's course is the position that the acquittal based solely on alleged illegality of the Food Inspector's appointment was not sustainable and that the prosecution could proceed (either on the basis of the Inspector's valid appointment or as a purchase by a private person under section 12).

Respondent (Chaman Das) / Counsel Mr. Kapur

  • Preliminary objection: The application for special leave to appeal was filed after the expiry of the sixty-day period from the date of the order of acquittal, and therefore the appeal was not within time.
  • Preliminary objection: Even if in time, the appeal could not be considered to have been filed by a competent person (i.e., contesting the competence of the complainant to appeal).
  • Substantive defence regarding the Food Inspector: Shri Jamna Pershad had not been appointed by the Central or State Government as required by section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and was disqualified from being a Food Inspector because he had a financial interest in the manufacture and sale of articles of food (he was a shareholder of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Employees' Co-operative Store which ran a restaurant and dairy).
  • If Shri Jamna Pershad acted only as a private individual (and not as a valid Food Inspector), then, argued Mr. Kapur, proceedings could be instituted only by that purchaser under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and not by the Municipal Corporation or its prosecutor.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fatteh Muhammad v. Chothu Ram, A.I.R. 1921 Lah 237 Cited in context of whether vacation is an excuse for late presentation (whether court was open for presentation during vacation). The case was cited by respondent's counsel but the Court held it not helpful on the facts because the Delhi High Court's calendar and office order did not permit filing of ordinary applications during vacation; the authority did not change the Court's conclusion that it was closed for this class of filing.
The British India Steam Navigation Co. v. H.M. Sharajally, A.I.R. 1923 Mah 435 Cited in argument concerning whether a court is to be considered closed during vacation for certain categories of work. Referenced among authorities but the Court found these authorities generally inapplicable to the present facts and therefore not helpful to the respondent's delay argument.
Tata Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Abdul Husein Hakimji, A.I.R. 1924 Bom 144 Held that whether the court is closed for a particular description of work is a question of fact in each case. The Court relied on the factual analysis (calendar and office order) rather than these authorities to decide that the High Court was closed for filing the subject application during vacation.
Kisanlal Hanummanbux Firm v. Tansukhrai Binjraj, A.I.R. 1941 Nag. 216 Observed that whether the court is open or closed depends on whether the business in question can be transacted. Cited for context; the Court applied the same factual test and concluded the Registry was closed for non-urgent applications during the vacation, so the application was timely when filed on re-opening.
Ramani Raji Moholi v. Todanpuri Manjah, A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 108 Where vacation circular allowed only urgent important civil work, ordinary plaints were not permitted during vacation — court was not open for ordinary filings. Cited to support the general principle that limited vacation openings do not make the court "open" for ordinary filings; the Court found the Delhi office order had similar restrictive effect and so treated the High Court as closed for the present application.
Anand Ram Pramhans v. Ramgulam Sahu, A.I.R. 1923 Patna 150 Authority that a memorandum of appeal presented during vacation to a proper officer may be validly presented, but an appellant may also present on first day of opening under limitation law. Cited to show the litigant can benefit from presentation on re-opening; the Court held the application presented on the first day after vacation was properly within time under section 4 of the Limitation Act.
Public Prosecutor v. Narkiidimilli Srirambhadrayya (Jagan Mohan Reddy, J.) Held that sanitary inspectors can be appointed, by virtue of their office, as Food Inspectors under section 9. The Court applied this principle to conclude that Shri Jamna Pershad, appointed as a Sanitary Inspector, became a Food Inspector for purposes of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Takhat Ram, Crl. A. No. 97 of 1967 (decided 6 Aug 1969) Discussed whether shareholder interest in a co-operative society that runs a food store constitutes a disqualifying "financial interest" under proviso to section 9; observed that the bar must be a direct interest and indirect interest of a shareholder may not be a bar. The Court cited this recent Division Bench view to support the proposition that indirect interest of a shareholder should not automatically disqualify one from appointment as Food Inspector; the question was left open in that case on its facts but supported treating a purchase by such an inspector as potentially that of a private individual.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Raft, Crl. A. 169 D of 1962 (Punjab High Court, 11 June 1965) Held that a Public Analyst who had financial interest in manufacture and sale of articles of food was not qualified to be appointed a Public Analyst. The Court distinguished this precedent, noting that a Public Analyst's report is itself the basis of prosecution (unless overridden by Central Food Laboratory report), and therefore the Analyst's disqualification is more material than the disqualification of a Food Inspector.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: (A) the timeliness of the application for special leave in view of the High Court vacation and limitation law; and (B) the validity of the Food Inspector's appointment and the legal effect of any defect in that appointment on the prosecution.

A. Timeliness of the Application for Special Leave

  • The statutory framework: sub-section (3) of section 417 (Code) permits the complainant to present an appeal if the High Court grants special leave; sub-section (4) of section 417 bars entertaining applications for special leave after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal; article 114 of the Limitation Act prescribes thirty days for an appeal after grant of special leave; and section 4 of the Limitation Act provides that where the prescribed period expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted on the day the court re-opens.
  • The Court examined the High Court calendar for 1967 and an office order which showed: the long vacation ran from May 29, 1967 to July 9, 1967; the registry would be closed on Saturdays during the vacation; and only "urgent matters" would be received by the Registry during the vacation. The calendar and office order therefore indicated the Registry was not open for ordinary filings during the vacation.
  • Because the sixty-day period for applying under section 417(3) expired during a period when the Registry was practically closed to ordinary filings, section 4 of the Limitation Act allowed presentation on the day the Court re-opened (July 10, 1967). The application filed on July 10 was therefore within time.
  • The Court expressly noted that it was unnecessary to decide whether time taken to obtain a copy of the Magistrate's order could be excluded from computation of the sixty-day period, because the vacation and section 4 resolved the timeliness issue in favour of the applicant.
  • The Court also held that once special leave was granted (on June 25, 1967) and notice directed to be issued, the appeal was admitted at that point and no further formal presentation was necessary; hence there was no material defect in presentation of the appeal.

B. Validity of the Food Inspector's Appointment and Effect on Proceedings

  • Fact-finding from the record: Shri Jamna Pershad was appointed as a Sanitary Inspector in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in 1962 and started working as a Food Inspector in March 1966. He admitted being a shareholder of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Employees' Co-operative Store, which ran a restaurant and a dairy; he received his share money back in May 1966.
  • Legal position on appointment: The Delhi Administration had issued a notification (dated 21 March 1931) appointing all Sanitary Inspectors of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to be Food Inspectors for purposes of the Act. The Court referred to Public Prosecutor v. Narkiidimilli Srirambhadrayya for the proposition that Sanitary Inspectors can be appointed as Food Inspectors by virtue of their office under section 9. Thus, Shri Jamna Pershad was, by virtue of his sanitary inspector appointment, a Food Inspector for the Act's purposes.
  • On the contention of disqualification for financial interest: The Court considered a recent Division Bench view in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Takhat Ram that the bar in the proviso to section 9 should be read as aiming at a direct financial interest; indirect interest as a shareholder in a co-operative society may not constitute a disqualifying direct interest. The Court distinguished decisions concerning Public Analysts (where disqualification is critical because the analyst's report is foundational to prosecution), observing that a Public Analyst's disqualification has different consequences.
  • Even if the appointment of the Food Inspector were defective, the Court held the action could be treated as a purchase by a private individual under section 12 of the Act because the purchaser (the Inspector) informed the vendor of his intention to have the article analysed and recorded the transaction (thumb impression on Form No. VI). Section 12 permits a purchaser (other than a Food Inspector) to have articles analysed by the Public Analyst. Further, the proviso to section 20 that enables a purchaser to institute prosecution does not exclude the power of a local authority or a person authorised by it to institute proceedings. Thus any defect in appointment did not oust the Municipal Corporation's power to prosecute.
  • Given the foregoing, the learned trial Magistrate's sole reliance on alleged illegality of appointment to acquit the respondent was insufficient; the merits should have been considered and the case not disposed of on that narrow ground alone.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF ACQUITTAL SET ASIDE.

Direct effect: The Court accepted the appeal, set aside the Magistrate's order dated March 31, 1967, which had acquitted the respondent of an offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, and directed that the case be sent to the District Magistrate, Delhi, to be passed on to a Magistrate of competent jurisdiction for fresh decision on the merits. The parties were directed to appear before the District Magistrate on September 25, 1969.

Broader implications: The opinion did not state that it was laying down any new binding precedent; it applied established principles concerning limitation during court vacation, the effect of appointment of sanitary inspectors as food inspectors, and the legal effect of any defect in appointment on the right to prosecute. The Court distinguished authorities where the role of the official (e.g., Public Analyst) made disqualification more material.

    Muncipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Chaman Dass .

    Jagjit Singh and Hardayal Hardy JJ.:— This appeal is against an order of acquittal passed by Shri C.R Negi, Magistrate First Class Delhi, on March 31, 1967, in a case under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. Shri Chamah Dass of Shop No. 21 Main Market, Moti Nagar, New Delhi, was tried on the allegations that on March 24, 1964 Shri Jamna Pershad Food Inspector, purchased from him Boondi sweets, which were adulterated due to the presence of unpermitted colouring matter.

    2. It may be stated that complaint in the case was made by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, through the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor. Report of the Public Analyst, showing adulteration due to presence of unpermitted colour, was attached to the complaint. During the trial the sample which was retained by the Food Inspector was sent on the application of the seller to the Director of Central Food Laboratory. The certificate issued by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory was to the effect that the sample of Boondi sweets was adulterated due to presence of non-permissible yellow coaltar dye. The learned Magistrate, however, acquitted the accused on the ground that the appointment of Shri Jamna Pershad, Food Inspector, was “illegal abinitio” as he had financial interest in the manufacture and sale of sweets.

    3. On July 10, 1967 the Municipal Corporation and the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor filed a petition for grant of special leave to appeal, under section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the code”), accompanied by grounds of appeal and a certified copy of the judgment of the learned trial Magistrate. Special leave to file appeal was granted on June 25. 1967, and on the same date notice of the appeal was as well directed to be issued.

    4. Mr. Kapur, counsel for Chaman Das respondent, raised certain preliminary objections. It was contended by the learned counsel that application for special leave to appeal had been presented after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal and the appeal was, therefore, not within time and that in any case the appeal cannot be considered to have been filed by a competent person

    5. Under sub section (3) of section 417 of the Code where an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present an appeal to the High Court Sub-section (4) provides that no application under sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal Further under article 114 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal from an order of acquittal under sub-section (3) of section 417 of the Code is thirty days from the date of the grant of special leave.

    6. The submission made by Mr. Kapur was that the application under sub-section (3) of section 417 of the Code tor grant of special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal should have been filed in the High Court not later then the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order and in computing the said period of sixty days it was not permissible to exclude the twenty five days period taken in obtaining a copy of the order of the Magistrate. On this basis it was urged that the sixty days period having expired on May 30, 1967 the application presented on July 10, 1967 for grant of special leave to appeal could not be entertained.

    7. It is true that sub-section (4) of section 417 of the Code does provide that no application for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of the order of acquittal. The High Court had, however, remained closed on account of the long vacation from May 29, 1967 and resumed its sittings after the vacation on July 10. 1967. This would be evident from the calender issued for the year 1967 which contained the following note:—

    “The long Vacation of the Court will commence on Monday the 29th May, 1967; and the Court will resume its sittings after the Vacation on Monday, the 10th July, 1967. The period of long Vacation has been enclosed by red lines.

    BY ORDER OF THE COURT

    Guru Datta

    Registrar.”

    8. An office order was also issued on June 1, 1967, which was in the following terms:—

    “It is hereby notified for the information of all concerned that during the period of vacation i.e, from 29th May 1967 to 7th July, 1967, the registry ot High Court of Delhi will be closed on all Saturdays, urgent matters will however be received.

    BY ORDER OF THE HON'BLE THE VACATION JUDGE.”

    9. It will be noticed that according to the calender issued for the year 1967, under orders of the couit, the long vacation was from May 29, 1967 to July 9, 1967 and the office order only made provision for receiving of “urgent matters” by the Registry during the vacation.

    10. If the High Court could be considered to have been closed from May 29, 1967 to July 9, 1967 obviously the application under section 417 (3) of the Code could be filed on the day of the court resumed its sittings after the vacation, i.e, on July 10, 1967. Section 4 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 specifically provides that were the prescribed peried for any suit., appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court re-opens. There is an explanation to the section which is to the effect that a court shall be deemed to be closed on any day if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.

    11. It was urged by Mr. Kapur that when a notification issued by a court specifically directs that its office shall be kept open for purposes of filing applications and appeals etc. the court notwithstanding the summer vacation or recess cannot by deemed to be closed for that purpose within the meaning of section 4 of the Limitation Act. He cited Fatteh Muhammad v. Chothu Ram . A. I. R. 1921 Lah 237 The British India Steam Navigation Co. v. H.M Sharajally . A.I R. 1923 Mah 435. Tata Industrial Bank Ltd. v. Abdul Husein Hakimji . A.I.R 1924 Bom 144. Kisanlal Hanummanbux Firm v. Tansukhrai Binjraj . A.I.R-1941 Nag. 216. and Ramani Raji Moholi v. Todanpuri Manjah . A.I.R 1959 A P 108.

    12. In the case of Tata Industrial Bank it was held that it is a question of fact in each case whether the court is closed for any particular description of work. In the case of Kisanlal Hanumanbux Firm as well it was observed that whether the Court is open or closed depends upon whether the business in question can be done. Where the court was in vacation but was open even for presentation of ordinary appeals the Lahore High Court, in the case of Fatteh Muhammad, considered that the vacation was no excuse for presenting the Letters Petent Appeal out of time. For the same reason a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in the case of Ramani Raji Moholi, took the view that where the language of a circular issued in connection with summer vacation showed that only urgent important civil work was permitted to be transacted, plaints in matters where urgent orders were not required to be obtained were not permitted to be entertained during the vacation and the Court was, therefore, not open for the purpose of filing plaints in ordinary suits during the summer vacation.

    13. None of the above mentioned authorities can be of any help to Mr. Kapur so far as the present case is concerned The note given on the calendar of the High Court of Delhi for the year 1967 did not provide that during the vacation applications or appeals could be filed in the Registry. The office order issued on the commencement of the vacation made it clear that the Registry will remain open, except on Saturdays, only for receiving “urgent matters”. As an application under section 417(3) of the Code cannot be considered to be an urgent matter such an application could not be filed during the vacation and for purposes of such an application the Court had to be regarded to have remained closed from May 29, 1967 to July 9, 1967. In Anand Ram Pramhans v. Ramgulam Sahu . A. I. R. 1923 Patna 150. Jwala Prasad J. even went to the extend of remarking that there was ample authority to show that a memorandum of appeal presented during the vacation to the proper officer appointed in that behalf would be valid presentation althogh it would be open to an appellant to present a memorandum of appeal on the first day of opening of the Court under the law of limitation if the time for the filing of the same expires during the vacation as this is for the benefit of the litigants.

    14. As the office order issued in connection with the vacation prohibited receiving of any application etc. except relating to urgent matters the Court will have to be regarded as closed from May 29 to July 9. 1967 for purposes of filing applications other than urgent application. The period of sixty days for the application under section 417 (3 of the Code expired during the vacation period and as it was not an urgent application it could certainly be presented on the opening day after the vacation by taking advantage of section 4 of the Limitation Act. The application was presented on the day the court resumed its sittings after the vacation and that application was, therefore, rightly entertained as being within time. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether the period requisite in obtaining copy of the order of acquittal could be excluded in computing the period of sixty days.

    15. The application of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and of the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor for special leave to appeal was accompanied by grounds of appeal and a copy of the order of acquittal. The Court while granting special leave to appeal. on July 25, 1967, also directed issue of notice of the appeal. The appeal can thus be considered to have been admitted as soon as the special leave was granted. It was not necessary to formally represent the appeal after the grant of special leave. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that there was any material defect in the presentation of the appeal.

    16. Another contention of Mr. Kapur was that Shri Jamna Pershad had not been appointed by the Central Government or the State Government as a Food Inspector, as required by section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and further that he was disqualified to be a Fond Inspector due to his having financial interest in manufacture and sale of articles of food. Our attention was invited to a portion of the statement of Shri Jamna Pershad in which he had started that he was appointed as a Sanitary Inspector in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi in 1962 and has started working as a Food Inspector in March, 1966. It was also admitted by him that he was a share-holder of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Employees' Co-operative Store. Which has been running a restaurant and a dairy, and that his share money was refunded to him in the month of May, 1966.

    17. It was not disputed before us that Shri Jamna Pershad had the technical prescribed qualifications to be a Food Inspector. The Delhi Admistration, by Notification No. F.323)/61.-M&PH dated 21st March, 1931, issued in exercise of powers conferred by section 9 of Act 37 of 1954 appointed all sanitary inspectors of Municipal Corporation of Delhi to be Food Inspectors for purposes of the said Act. In Public Prosecutor v. Narkiidimilli Srirambhadrayya,7 Jagan Mohan Reddy, J. (as his Lordship then was) held that Sanitary Inspectors can be appointed by virtue of their office under section 9 as Food Inspectors. It follows that upon being appointed as Sanitary Inspector by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi Shri Jamma Pershad became a Food Inspector for purposes of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

    18. The Food Inspector, as admitted by him, was a shareholder of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Employees' Cooperative Store, which was dealing in manufacture and sale of articles of food. His acting as a Food Inspector, it was submitted by Mr. Kapur, did contravene the provisions of the proviso to section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. That proviso is to the effect that no person who has any financial interest in the manufacture, import or sale of any article of food shall be appointed to be a Food Inspector.

    19. Recently a Division Bench of this Court, comprising of Rangarajan and Parkash Narain J J., in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Takhat Ram . Crl A. No. 97 of 1967 (Crl. Appeal No. 97 of 1967, decided on 6th August,. 1969), dealt with the question whether a person who was a shareholder of a co operative Soeiety which was running a store in which articles of food were prepared and sold could be appointed a Food Inspector. The learned Judges observed that the bar as contemplated by the proviso to section 9 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act to appointment of a person having any financial interest in the manufacture, import or sale of any article of food must be a direct interest and the indirect interest that a shareholder may have cannot be regarded as a bar to his appointment as a Food Insdector. The matter was, however, not finally decided and was left open as on the facts of the case it was considered that the incompetency of the Food Inspector to act as such was not material and the purchase made by him could be considered as by a private individual. The case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Raft . Crl A 169 D of 1962 (Crl. Appeal No. 169 D of 15 62, decided by the Punjab High Court on 11th June 1965) was distinguished. In the latter case it was held that the Public Anlyst who had examined the sample of food had financial interest in manufacture and sale of articles of food and was not qualified to be appointed a Public Analyst. The Bench of this Court took the view that the case of a Public Analyst was different as his report is itself the basis of the prosecution unless everridden by a report of the Director Central Food Laboratory, but if a person was not validly appointed as a Food Inspector the action taken by him may be regarded as that of a private individual.

    20. A purchaser of any article of food, other than a Food Inspector, can also, as provided by section 12 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, have the article analysed by the Public Analyst. He is, of course, to inform the vendor at the time of purchase of his intention to have such article so analysed. So even if the was any defect in the appointment of Shri Jmna Pershad as a Food Inspector, due to his having financial interest in manufacture and sale of articles of food, still there was nothing to prevent him from puchasing the Boondi sweets from; the respondent. Shri Jamna Pershed Had duly informed the vendor that the article purchased by him would be got analysed. A thumbs inpression of the vendor obtained on Form No. VI in which it was specifically stated that the samples of food had been taken to get the same analysed from the Public Analyst.

    21. According to Mr. Kapur if Shri Jamna Pershad had acted as a private individual and not as a Food. Inspector then under proviso to sub-section. (1) of section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the proceedings could only be instituted by him and not by the municipal Corporation of Delhi or the Assistant Municipal Prosecutor. This contention, however, seems to be untenable. The proviso to section 20 merely enables a purchaser referred to in section 12 to institute prosecution but it does not take away the power of a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by a general or special order of the local authority from insituting the prosectuton. The object of the proviso is to give additional power to a purchaser to institute proceedings so that such a purchaser may not be without a remedy were the authorities mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 20 do not take action. It may be mentioned that the learned trial Magistrate did not at all consider the merits of the case and acquitted the responden merely because the Food Inspector was considered not to have bee properly appointed due to his having financial interest in manufacture and sale of articles of food In our opinion even if the appointment of the Food Inspector was any way defective the case should have been disposed of on the basis that the article of food was purchased by a perso; other than a Food Inspector as contemplated by section 12 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The order of acquittal cannot, therefore be justified.

    22. The appeal is accordingly accepted and the order of Shri Negi, dated March 31, 1967, acquitting the respondent of the offence under section 7 read with section 16 of the Prevention of Adulteration Act, 1954, is set aside. The case shall be sent to the District Magistrate Delhi for being passed on to a Magistate of competent jurisdiction for being decided afresh on merits. The parties, through their Counsel, have been directed or appear before the District Magistrate on September 25, 1969.

    23. Appeal allowed.

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    Muncipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Chaman Dass .
    (Aug 26, 1969)