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  • section 117(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • section 117(3) and section 107 of the Code
  • sub-section (3) of section 117 of the Code
  • sub-section (1) of section 117 of the Code
  • Sub section 3 of Section 117 Cr. P.C
  • sections 107 and 117(3) of the Code
  • sections 112 and 117(3) of the Code
  • Section 117(3) of the Code
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 117(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • section 117(3) and section 107 of the Code
  • sub-section (3) of section 117 of the Code
  • sub-section (1) of section 117 of the Code
  • Sub section 3 of Section 117 Cr. P.C
  • sections 107 and 117(3) of the Code
  • sections 112 and 117(3) of the Code
  • Section 117(3) of the Code
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — Jagjit Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

A petition was presented on behalf of Tara Chand of Kucha Dakhini Rai, Darya Ganj, Delhi, seeking quashing of an order made by Shri Omesh Sehgal, Sub-divisional Magistrate, under Section 117(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code). By that order the petitioner was directed to execute a personal bond of Rs. 5,000 with two sureties of like amount for keeping the peace until the conclusion of an inquiry in connection with a report under section 107 of the Code.

The petition alleged that the Magistrate had not applied his mind to the legal requirements of Section 117(3), that the order was passed mechanically on a printed form belonging to another Magistrate (Shri R.K. Anand) with necessary particulars left blank, and that the demanded sureties were onerous with an intention to keep the petitioner in detention. The petitioner further described the proceedings as an abuse of process in the context of a purportedly industrial dispute.

Record obtained showed the following events: on January 14, 1968 a report was made alleging that the petitioner threw a stone at a jeep (breaking a front glass) and made a threat. The petitioner was arrested under section 151 and produced before Shri Omesh Sehgal on January 15, 1968. Orders under sections 112 and 117(3) were made that day. One formal order under Section 117(3) used a cyclostyled form of Shri R.K. Anand and contained blank particulars. Another contemporaneous order recorded that the petitioner was to be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond and one surety of Rs. 5,000; however, the formal Section 117(3) order required two sureties of Rs. 5,000 each. Three persons offered sureties; all were rejected by the Magistrate and the petitioner remained in detention from arrest.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order made by the Magistrate under Section 117(3) Cr.P.C. was lawful where reasons for directing execution of a bond were not recorded and the formal order was mechanically prepared on another Magistrate's printed form with particulars left blank.
  2. Whether, given the discrepancies between the Magistrate's contemporaneous direction to release the petitioner on a personal bond and one surety and the formal order requiring two sureties, the Magistrate had applied his mind or acted arbitrarily.
  3. Whether rejection of the surety bonds offered by three persons was justified on the record or whether such rejection demonstrated an arbitrary exercise of the Magistrate's powers.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The learned Magistrate did not apply his mind to the legal requirements of Section 117(3) and passed the order mechanically on a printed form belonging to another Magistrate, leaving the portions for necessary particulars blank.
  • The amounts of sureties demanded (Rs. 5,000 each) were extremely onerous and were imposed to keep the petitioner in detention.
  • The proceedings under Section 117(3) amounted to an abuse of the process of the court in what was otherwise a purely industrial dispute.
  • The substance of the information required by Section 112 was not set forth in the order; the only statement was "On 14-1-68 you threatened" with no details as to who was threatened, where, or under what circumstances.
  • The rejection of surety bonds lacked justification: the record contained no basis for concluding offered sureties were incapable of controlling the petitioner or were financially inadequate.

Respondent's (State's) Arguments

  • Counsel for the State (Shri V.D. Misra) submitted that omission to record reasons for directing a person to execute a bond under Section 117(3) does not necessarily render the order illegal.
  • The State relied on prior decisions (cited in the opinion) to argue that where the sequence of proceedings and the police report read together show good grounds, the High Court may not interfere despite imperfect formal compliance with recording reasons.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amir Singh v. The State Observed that omission to record reasons in writing for action under sub-section (3) of Section 117 is wrong but the High Court may not interfere if the preceding orders and police report together clearly show good grounds (substantial compliance). The court considered this principle but found that in the present case there was no substantial compliance: the record and orders did not together disclose good grounds or reasons; hence Amir Singh did not justify the impugned order.
Hatim Khan and others Referenced in argument but, according to the opinion, did not deal with orders under Section 117(3) where reasons may not have been recorded. The court noted that Hatim Khan's case was not directly applicable to omissions under Section 117(3) and distinguished it on that basis.
Thirunavukkarasu and other petitioners v. The State The remark (by Ramaswami J.) that an order under Section 117(3) is not a routine order, but designed to meet an emergency; the Magistrate must consider emergency and necessity of immediate measures as a separate question. An order under Section 117(3) is not invalid merely because based on same information as order under Section 112 provided the emergency is separately considered. The court relied on this principle to assess whether the Magistrate had treated the emergency question as a separate consideration. It concluded that in the present case the Magistrate did not apply his mind to emergency and immediate necessity, so Thirunavukkarasu did not save the order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the record and the formal orders issued on 15 January 1968. Key analytical steps were:

  1. Examination of Record and Allegations: The police report alleged that on 14-1-68 the petitioner had thrown a stone at a jeep (breaking the front glass) and made a threat. The petitioner was arrested under section 151 and produced before the Magistrate on 15-1-68.
  2. Identifying Statutory Requirements: The court reviewed the statutory scheme—Section 107 permits inquiry where a person is likely to commit breach of the peace; Section 112 requires the Magistrate, when directing a person to show cause, to make a written order setting forth the substance of the information received, amount of bond, term and particulars of sureties; Section 117(3) permits a Magistrate, pending inquiry, to direct a person to execute a bond for keeping the peace if immediate measures are necessary, "for reasons to be recorded in writing".
  3. Assessing Compliance with Section 112: The court found the order under Section 112 deficient because it did not set forth the substance of the information. The only recital was "On 14-1-68 you threatened" without identifying who was threatened, where the act took place, or the circumstances—thus depriving the person of a meaningful opportunity to meet the case.
  4. Assessing Compliance with Section 117(3): The formal Section 117(3) order was irregular—issued on a cyclostyled form of another Magistrate (Shri R.K. Anand), with title and particulars blank and the date of the police report omitted. Critically, the order contained no reasons in writing showing application of mind to the necessity of immediate measures or the nature of the alleged wrongful acts from which breach of the peace was apprehended.
  5. Reconciling Contradictory Orders: A contemporaneous order directed release on furnishing a personal bond and one surety of Rs. 5,000, but the formal Section 117(3) order required two sureties of Rs. 5,000 each. The court treated this inconsistency as evidence that the Magistrate did not properly apply his mind and proceeded mechanically.
  6. Evaluation of Rejection of Sureties: The court examined the basis for rejection of the three offered sureties. The Magistrate stated two were unable to keep control and the third lacked adequate financial position, but the record did not show any reasoned basis for these conclusions. The court observed that one surety claimed ownership of a shop valued at Rs. 15,000 and another a house valued at Rs. 20,000; there was no recorded justification for rejecting them, indicating arbitrary conduct.
  7. Consideration of State's Authorities: The State contended that omission to record reasons did not necessarily invalidate the order and relied on cases (Amir Singh, Hatim Khan, Thirunavukkarasu). The court distinguished Hatim Khan and read Amir Singh and Thirunavukkarasu narrowly: Amir Singh permits non-interference only where the written orders and police report together show good grounds (substantial compliance); Thirunavukkarasu requires separate consideration of emergency by the Magistrate. The court found neither standard satisfied here.
  8. Conclusion on Legality and Application of Mind: Because (a) the substance of the information was not set forth as required by Section 112, (b) the Section 117(3) order had no recorded reasons and was prepared mechanically on another Magistrate's form with blanks, (c) there was inconsistency between oral and formal orders, and (d) the rejection of sureties lacked justification, the court concluded the Magistrate acted arbitrarily and without application of mind. The Section 117(3) order was therefore illegal.
  9. Remedial Steps and Directions: The court set aside the impugned Section 117(3) order, directed immediate release of the petitioner from detention, ordered the record returned for further proceedings, and instructed that the petitioner appear before the District Magistrate on February 12, 1968 so the case may be made over to a Magistrate other than Shri Omesh Sehgal. The court also observed that the inquiry under Section 117(1) will continue and that any future order under Section 117(3) must be made strictly in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the order made by Shri Omesh Sehgal under sub-section (3) of Section 117 of the Code was illegal, having been made carelessly and without application of mind, and consequently the order is set aside and the petitioner is to be forthwith released from detention.

Implications and Consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner was ordered to be released immediately from custody. The record is to be returned immediately so that further lawful proceedings may follow, and the petitioner was directed to appear before the District Magistrate (Delhi) on February 12, 1968 for the case to be reallocated to another Magistrate.
  • Continuation of inquiry: The inquiry under sub-section (1) of Section 117 will continue. If, pending completion of that inquiry, the Magistrate properly records reasons in writing and considers the question of emergency, an order under sub-section (3) of Section 117 may still be made—but only strictly in accordance with law.
  • Statement of principle: The court emphasized that powers conferred on Magistrates under Part IV of the Code to prevent offences are judicial in character and must be exercised judiciously and in conformity with the statutory requirements; Magistrates cannot treat liberty lightly or play with personal liberty under the pretext of preventive action.
  • Precedential impact: The opinion applied existing principles from earlier authorities to the facts; it did not purport to establish a new broader legal rule beyond reiterating the need for recorded reasons, application of mind, and lawful exercise of preventive powers.

Order accordingly.

    Tara Chand Petitioner v. The State And Another S

    Jagjit Singh, J.:— On behalf of Tara Chand of Kucha Dakhini Rai, Darya Ganj, Delhi, a petition was submitted for quashing an order passed by Shri Omesh Sehgal, Sub-divisional Magistrate, Delhi, under Section 117(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). By that order the petitioner was directed to execute a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000 with two sureties in the like amount, for keeping peace until the conclusion of inquiry in connection with a report against him under section 107 of the code.

    It was stated in the petition that the learned Magistrate did not apply his mind to the legal requirements of Section 117(3) of the Code and passed the order mechanically on a printed form of the court of another Magistrate (Shri R.K Anand, Sub-divisional Magistrate, New Delhi) and that the portions meant for recording necessary particulars in that form had been left blank. It was further mentioned that the amounts of sureties demanded from the petitioner were “extremely onerous” and that this had been done with a view to keep him in detention. According to the petitioner the entire proceedings in the case, under secion 117(3) of the Code were an abuse of the process of the court in what was otherwise a purely industrial dispute.

    As serious allegations were made that the order under Section 117(3) of the Code had been passed on a printed form of the court of another Magistrate and the necessary particulars had not been filled up in that form, the record of the case was obtained.

    The record shows that Tara Chand petitioner was arrested by the police under provisions of section 151 in connection with a report made against him under section 107 of the code. That report was made by Dharam Pal, driver of a jeep and two others, alleging that on January 14, 1968, he had thrown a stone at jeep No. DLT-1545, in front of the Claridge's Hotel, as result of which the front glass of the vehicle was broken. The petitioner was as well alleged to have held out a threal to Tara Chand that he would not leave him alive.

    The petitioner was produced before Shri Omesh Sehgal, Sub-divisional Magistrate, on January 15, 1968. Orders under sections 112 and 117(3) of the Code were made by the Magistrate on the same day. By his order under section 112 the petitioner was required to show cause why he should not be required to execute a bond for Rs. 5,000, with two sureties in the like amount, for keeping the peace for a period of one year. The order under Section 117(3) of the Code was as under :—

    “In the Court of Shri R.K Anand, Sub-divisional Magistrate, New Delhi.

    State Versus ————————————

    Under Section 117(3) Cr.P.C

    ORDER

    From the Police report dated————— of P.S Tugh Rd. it appears that while the public tranquillity in Delhi is disturbed, you Tara Chand son of Johari Lal at——— which is a wrongful act so provocative that it may occasion breach of the peace or public tranquillity;

    2. I am, therefore, of the view that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of the breach of the peace or disturbance of public tranquillity of the commissions of any offence or for public safety. Accordingly, I under Sub section 3 of Section 117 Cr. P.C direct you the said Tara Chand to execute a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000 with two sureties in the like amount, for keeping peace until the conclusion of enquiry failing which you shall be detained in custody until such bond is executed or, in default of execution, until such enquiry is concluded.

    ANNOUNCED.

    Sd/- Tara Chand.

    Dated:—

    Sd/- (Omesh Sehgal).

    Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

    New Delhi. 15-1-68”

    Another order was passed by the Magistrate. According to that order also dated the 15th January, 1968, the orders under section 117(3) and section 107 of the Code were read out and explained to the petitioner and he was directed to be released on bail on furnishing a personal bond and one surety of Rs. 5,000. That order reads as follows :—

    “15-1-68 : Respt. present in police custody. PSI present. He is allowed to be released on bail on furnishing p.b and one surety of Rs. 5000. Notice u/s 107 Cr. PC read over and explained.

    Notice u/s. 117 Cr. P.C read over and explained. P.E on 23-1-69.

    Sd/- Omesh Sehgal.

    15-1-68………”.

    Three persons, named Dr. Dharam Veer, Shri Vishan and Shri D.D Singh, offered themselves as sureties but the surety bonds furnished by them were not accepted. Regarding Dr. Dharam Veer and Shri Vishan it was remarked by the learned Magistrate that they were not in a position to keep control over the petitioner and their identity had not been established. The third surety was rejected because he was not considered to be of good financial position. Thus the surety bonds not having been accepted the petitioner has been in detention from the date of his arrest.

    Under section 107 of the code whenever a District Magistrate, Sub-divisional Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class is informed that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity, the Magistrate if in his opinion there is sufficient ground for proceeding may, in manner provided in the Code, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties for keeping the peace for such period not exceeding one year as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix. When the Magistrate acting under section 107 deems it necessary to require such person to show cause under that section he had to make an order in writing, under section 112 of the code, setting forth the substance of the information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, the term for which it is to be in force and the number, character and class of sureties (if any) required to be produced. When the person in respect of whom order under section 112 of the code is made is present in court that order has to be read over to him or if he so desires the substance thereof is to be explained. Section 117(3) of the Code gives power to a Magistrate, pending completion of the inquiry into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for prevention of breach of the peace or disturbance of public tranquillity or the commission of any offence or for the public safety, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to direct the persons concerned to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour until the conclusion of the inquiry. Until such bond is executed or in default of its execution the person in respect of whom an order under section 112 of the code was made may be detained in custody till the inquiry is concluded.

    In the order to be made under section 112 of the code the substance of the information received has to be set forth. The object evidently is to enable the person concerned to meet the case against him. Compliance with these requirements of law as well ensures application of mind by the Magistrate to the circumstances of the case before preventive action under section 107 of the code is initiated. In the order issued by the learned Magistrate, however, the only particulars given were as under :

    “On 14-1-68 you threatened”.

    It was not mentioned who was threatened, where that threatening took place and under what circumstances. Thus for all practical purposes the substance of the information received by the Magistrate was not set forth in the order.

    The order passed under Section 117(3) of the Code was still more irregular. The learned Magistrate did not bother to see that he was using a cyclostyled form of another Magistrate and that even the title of the case was not written therein. The date of the police report was not mentioned and the portion where particulars of the alleged wrongful acts of the petitioner were to be given was left completely blank.

    The order passed by the learned Magistrate after the so called “notices” under sections 107 and 117(3) of the Code had been read out and explained to the petitioner directed that the petitioner be released on furnishing a personal bond of Rs. 5,000 with one surety of Rs. 5,000. In the formal order under Section 117(3) of the Code, however, no such change was made with the result that the petitioner was required to furnish two sureties in an amount of Rs. 5,000 each instead of one surety of Rs. 5,000.

    There is nothing on the record to show on what basis the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that Dr. Dharam Veer and Shri Vishan, who had offered themselves as sureties for the petitioner, were not in a position to keep control over him. One of them had stated on affidavit that he was owner of shop No. 14, Purani Market, Malviya Nagar, of the value of Rs. 15,000. The other surety claimed to be owner of house No. 1317/18, in Darya Ganj area, of the value of Rs. 20,000 on which a house tax of Rs. 30 per annum was being paid by him. It appears that the learned Magistrate acted arbitrarily in rejecting the surety bonds without any justification.

    Shri V.D Misra, who appeared for State, urged that omission to record reasons for directing a person in respect of whom an order under Section 117(3) of the Code has been made to execute a bond without or with sureties for keeping the peace until conclusion of the inquiry does not necessarily make the order illegal. Amir Singh v. The State (1) Hatim Khan and others (2) and Thirunavukkarasu and other petitioners v. The State (3) were cited.

    Hatim Khan's case did not deal with an order under Section 117(3) of the Code where reasons may not have been recorded. In Amir Singh's case it was observed that it was wrong to omit to record in writing for taking action under sub-section (3) of section 117 of the Code but even so the High Court will not interfere with the order if the several proceeding orders leading to the impugned order read together with the police report clearly showed that there were good grounds for the Magistrate taking action under sub-section(3) of section 117 of the Code and thus there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the section. Ramaswami J. in the case of Thirunavkkarasu remarked that an order under Section 117(3) of the Code was not a mere routine order but was an order designed to meet an emergency and that the Magistrate must direct his consideration particularly to the question of emergency and the necessity of immediate measures as a separate case. An order under sub-section (3) of section 117 of the Code passed after considering the question of emergency as a separate question, was, however, not regarded to be bad merely because the Magistrate had based it on the same information which was the basis of his order under section 112 of the code.

    It cannot be said that in the present case there was substantial compliance with the requirements of recording reasons in writing for taking action under sub-section (3) of section 117 of the Code. There is not the slightest indication that the learned Magistrate at all applied his mind to the question of emergency. He acted in a most mechanical manner, which is evident from the fact that even in the order under section 112 of the code, the substance of the information received was not set forth. The order passed under section 117(3) did not contain a word to show what wrongful acts were alleged to have been committed by the petitioner from which the breach of the peace was apprehended. The second paragraph of the order was intended to be based on the details of the alleged wrongful acts of the petitioner for forming an opinion that immediate measures were necessary for prevention of the breach of the peace. As already stated no particulars, whatsoever, were given in the earlier part of the order and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Magistrate applied his mind to the facts of the case or had formed an opinion that there was any emergency which necessitated immediate measures to be taken for prevention of the breach of the peace.

    The fact that even after ordering that the petitioner should be released on his furnishing a personal bond and one surety of Rs. 5,000 no change was made in the formal order under sub-section (3) of section 117 of the Code, which required furnishing of two sureties, in an amount of Rs. 5,000 each, leaves no doubt that the learned Magistrate dealt with the case not only in complete disregard of the requirements of law but in an arbitrary and mechanical manner. That inference further finds support from the way in which the surety bonds offered by the petitioner were rejected. It seems that the learned Magistrate was proceeding with the pre-conceived idea of keeping the petitioner in detention, irrespective of the facts and merits of the case.

    The order of the learned Magistrate under sub-section (3) of section 117 of the Code cannot in any way be justified, and, it appears to me, was made carelessly and without application of mind to the facts of the case. It has, therefore, to be regarded as illegal and is set aside. The petitioner should be forthwith released from detention.

    The powers conferred on Magistrates in respect of prevention of offences, under part IV of the Code, are of judicial character and it is necessary to exercise them in a judicious manner and in conformity with the requirements of law. They cannot play with the liberty of people on the pretext of taking preventive action.

    Of course the inquiry under sub-section (1) of section 117 of the Code will continue. If pending the conclusion of the inquiry it is considered that any immediate measures are necessary for prevention of the breach of the peace then an order may be made under sub-section (3) of section 117 of the Code but strictly in accordance with law and not in the arbitrary and illegal manner in which such an order was passed earlier.

    The record of the case should be returned immediately so that further proceedings are taken. The petitioner, through his counsel, is being directed to appear before the District Magistrate, Delhi, on February 12, 1968, so that the case may be made over by him to a Magistrate other than Shri Omesh Sehgal.

    A.N.K Order accordingly.
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    Comments

    Tara Chand Petitioner v. The State And Another S
    (Feb 6, 1968)