Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Criminal Misc (M) 59 of 1968

Judges

Mr. I.D Dua, C.J

Acts

Section 484 A Cr.P.C
Section 485-A Cr. P.C
section 526, Cr.P.C
Section 342, Cr. P.C

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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (I.D. Dua, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application made under Section 526 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) for transfer of a criminal complaint instituted under sections 483 and 485 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.). The complaint was filed by Shri R.A. Wania, Manager of Tata Oil Mills Co., Ltd., against the petitioner Ved Parkash Sawhney. According to the opinion, the complaint was originally filed on 1st August 1958 and an order for further enquiry was noted on 10th April 1984 in the record presented.

The accused's statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C. was recorded on 26th July 1966. The case had been pending for more than nine years at the time of this decision. At one stage the accused had been discharged of the offence under sections 483 and 488 I.P.C. for infringement of trade marks, but that discharge was reversed by the High Court. The matter also came before this Court on revision in February 1968 regarding the summoning of defence witnesses; the single judge (Om Parkash J.) varied the learned Magistrate's order and directed witnesses to appear in the trial Court on 12th February 1968.

Following various hearing dates in 1966–1968 (some of which are recorded with differing years in the record), the accused made a transfer application alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias by the learned Magistrate, and sought that the trial be transferred to another competent Magistrate.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the accused has a reasonable apprehension that he will not receive a fair and impartial trial before the learned Magistrate, arising from the Magistrate's conduct, adjournments and orders in the course of a long-pending prosecution.
Whether, on the facts and law applicable to an accused's entitlement to a fair trial, the criminal proceedings should be transferred from the present Magistrate's court to another competent court under Section 526, Cr.P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's (Applicant's) Arguments

The accused contended that delay in the case was caused by the prosecution and not by him; adjournments were repeatedly given because the complainant's senior counsel was not available.
Allegation that the learned Magistrate displayed partiality and resentment because an earlier order (discharging a witness) had been set aside by the High Court; the Magistrate allegedly made discourteous and ironical remarks such as "I have prepared grounds for your going to High Court again" and about seeing the accused's "shakal." (Facial/derogatory remarks are claimed.)
Complaint that the Magistrate fixed unduly short dates for the service of defence witnesses who resided in various places, effectively making proper service and attendance difficult.
Allegation that reports of service on summonses bore the same date and handwriting, suggesting that process-server reports were fabricated or dictated and therefore unreliable.
Specific concern that a summons reported as "affixed" at the house of a retired Sub-Inspector (Tirath Singh) was not believable and yet was treated as personal service, resulting in a bailable warrant and a notice under Section 485-A Cr.P.C.; this fostered apprehension of prejudice.
Complaint that the learned Magistrate issued warrants and notices despite medical certificates and applications for adjournment (for example, a medical certificate for Permanand was filed but the Magistrate did not refrain from issuing warrants or notices).
Allegations that the Magistrate acted hastily and vindictively—issuing warrants and notices without waiting for witnesses or scrutinizing summons reports properly—creating reasonable apprehension of an unfair trial.
Specific assertion that refusal reports (e.g., concerning Moti Ram) were false, and that reliance on such reports without corroboration was improper.

Learned Magistrate's (Respondent's) Comments / Defence

The Magistrate admitted recording the accused's statement under Section 342 on 26th July 1966 and explained a sequence of adjournments and attempts to summon defence witnesses, giving dates when witnesses appeared and when summonses were issued.
He explained that some adjournments occurred because the senior counsel for the complainant was absent, and that he himself had taken over charge of the court only on 7th July 1966 and had not yet gone through the file at that time.
The Magistrate described multiple occasions when defence witnesses were not present, or when the complainant's counsel was absent, and recited the administrative and duty reasons for adjournments (including being on election and law-and-order duties).
He asserted that several witnesses were residents of Delhi and that service could be affected on the same day; summonses were sent to the S.H.O., Sarat Bazar, and service was effected by the police agency.
Regarding the report of service on Tirath Singh and other witnesses, the Magistrate maintained that the reports were clear and justified issuing warrants and notices under Section 485-A Cr.P.C. He noted that proceedings under Section 485-A are sometimes initiated even against police officers who do not appear without valid reasons.
The Magistrate denied making the alleged derogatory remark about preparing grounds for the counsel to go to the High Court, saying that all counsels are given due respect by his court.
He maintained that necessary orders against witnesses were passed after due care and judicial mind, and rejected the suggestion that reports of refusal to accept summons were false, observing that objections to such reports should have been made at the time.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court concentrated on the legal standard applicable to transfer applications where an accused claims a reasonable apprehension of bias or unfairness. The opinion expressly refers to paragraph 11 of Chapter 26-A, Volume III of the High Court Rules & Orders to explain the duty of Presiding Officers to be impartial and to avoid conduct that would give rise to reasonable apprehension of unfairness.

The Court explained the two-fold enquiry it must undertake: (a) whether there is actual bias in the mind of the presiding officer and (b) whether incidents have occurred which, even if explicable without actual bias, are nevertheless such that they would reasonably create an apprehension of lack of impartiality in the mind of the accused. The emphasis is on the accused's reasonable perception (the "susceptibilities of the litigant-parties"), not solely on the presumed motive of the presiding officer.

Applying those principles to the record before it, the Court reviewed the factual matrix: long pendency (the proceeding being nearly a decade old), repeated adjournments (including those given because senior counsel for the complainant was absent), the Magistrate's recent assumption of charge (7th July 1966) but then giving adjournments on dates when the only task was to record the accused's statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C., and instances where defence witnesses attended but were not examined and later had warrants issued against them.

The Court found that certain actions and administrative conduct by the learned Magistrate — such as adjournments for absence of the complainant's counsel at times when the accused's statutory statement had to be recorded, apparent lack of careful attention to this old case, mechanical issuance of warrants without adequate explanation for failures to examine witnesses who had attended on earlier dates, and the facts surrounding service reports on summonses — cumulatively could produce a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the accused that he might not receive a fair and impartial trial.

The Court also rejected the argument that the incidents occurred long ago and were therefore irrelevant. It observed that the history of the proceedings is inextricably linked with the future course of the trial and cannot be disregarded when assessing whether a litigant now reasonably apprehends unfairness in the continuation of the trial before the same Magistrate.

On balance, the Court concluded that the accused's apprehension was not wholly imaginary or unreasonable, and that transfer was appropriate to avoid any further possibility of prejudice or the perception of prejudice.

Holding and Implications

PETITION ALLOWED; TRANSFER GRANTED

Direct effect on the parties:

The Court directed that the present case be transferred from the Court of Shri V.N. Chuttervedi, Magistrate 1st Class, to the Court of some other competent Magistrate.
The transferee Court was specifically instructed to try to dispose of the case with due despatch and promptitude.
Parties were directed to appear before the learned District Magistrate on 10th June 1960 when appropriate orders would be made for the transfer of the case to some other competent Court and for fixing the appearance date in the transferee Court.
The Court also directed that the Magistrate who will try the case should not be allocated non-judicial functions likely to interfere with the speedy trial and should be allowed to deal with the case with single-minded judicial devotion.

Broader implications:

The opinion reinforces settled principles that:

Courts must not only be impartial but must avoid conduct that gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; and
Transfer may be warranted where conduct or incidents in prior proceedings, even if explicable, are of such a character as to create a justifiable apprehension of unfairness in the mind of the accused.

The opinion did not announce a novel legal precedent; it applied established principles concerning reasonable apprehension of bias and the duty of courts to secure a fair trial. The direct effect is to transfer this particular prosecution to another competent Magistrate and to require expeditious handling of the matter in the transferee court.

Disposition

Petition allowed.

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Ved Parkash Sawhney v. R.A Wania

I.D Dua, C.J:— This is an application under section 526, Cr.P.C for transfer of a criminal complaint under sections 483 and 485, I.P.C filed by Shri R.A Wania, Manager Tata Oil Mills Co., Ltd., against the present petitioner Ved Parkash Sawhney This complaint was filed as far back as 1st August 1958 and an order for further enquiry was made on 10th April 1984.

2. The statement of the accused under Section 342, Cr. P.C was recorded on 26th July 1966.

3. The accused against whom this case has been pending for the last more than nine years was originally discharged of the offence under sections 483 and 488, I.P.C for infringement of trade marks, but this order was reversed by the High Court. The matter has also been to this Court once again as recently as February, 1968 on revision against an order of the learned Magistrate in regard to the summoning of witnesses for the defence and Om Parkash J. varied the order of the learned Magistrate and directed the witnesses to appear in the trial Court on 12th February, 1968. The transfer application proceeds to state inter alia:—

“2. That on 26th July 1963 statement of accused was recorded under section 342 Cr P.C uptil this time adjournments were being given as prosecution wanted to file documents. Even for statement of accused adjournments were given as senior counsel for the complainant was not available. Since learned Magistrate was influenced by the facts of delay and case being an old one; the above facts have been mentioned to explain that delay was caused by prosecution and not by accused.

3. That the accused appeared on 12th February 1968 but the file had not been received by the learned Magistrate hence the case was adjourned to 27th February 1938 when the learned Magistrate on account of other Government work did not come to court and case was adjourned to 28th February 1968.

On 28th February 1968 following order was passed. Counsel for the compleinant is present and accused is also present. Accused should file complete address of one witness. File be put up for defence evidence on 5tb March 1968. All the witnesses be summoned for 5th March 1968.

28th February,;

On 5th March 1968, the following order was passed:—

“Counsel for complainant present. Accused present. Perma Nand witness called. Against Permanand bailable warrant for Rs. 500/- and notice under Section 484 A Cr.P.C be issued. Summon on the house of Tirath Singh was affixed. Therefore he is served. It is clear that he refused to accept summons. So against Tirath Singh bailable warrant of same amount be issued and notice U/s. 485-A Cr.P C. be issued against him. On the summon of Moti Ram there is report that he refuses to accept summons. Bailable warrant for Rs. 500/- be issued. R C. Pandey and Bimal Pershad be summoned. Case to come up on 13th Much 1958. The summons and warrants be served specially.

5th March 1938.

7. That on 5th March, 1968, i.e on the date of nearing, Shri Kishan Chand brother of Shri Permanand submitted an application that My brother Permanand has fallen ill and is not able to attend the court, Medical Certificate is attached and it is requested that some other date be fixed. Order of the learned Magistrate on this application reads as follows:—

‘Presented by Kishen Chand at 2.45 PM. Orders were passed at 12.P.M Place on file.

Sd/- Magistrate.

5th March, 1968’.

Dr J.R Mehra s Certificate reads as follows:—

‘Certified that Shri Permanand son of Shri Goverdhan Das whose signatures are given above has been suffering from Dysentry since last night. He is under my treatment. I advise him to take rest for 3 days.

5th March, 1968.

8. That on 13th March, 1968 application for stay of proceedings was moved and the learned Magistrate stayed the proceedings. He could not issue notice and take statement of Permanand under Section 485-A Cr. P.C but he called upon him put questions and answers were recorded after stay order was passed and the defence witness was asked to appear as an accused on 30th March, 1968″.

4. Reasonable apprehension tor not getting a fair and impartial trial is stated by the accused in the following words:—

“13 *****

(a) That there is feeling in the mind of the learned Magistrate that his previous order regarding discharging one witness although he was not present in court and issuing warrants for defence witnesses although they were not served, was set aside by High Court of Delhi and he gave vent to his feelings by passing remarks on 5th of March ‘I have prepared grounds for your going to High Court again’ The accused-petitioner requested him that he be permitted to call his counsel but the learned Magistrate remarked. ‘You may call him. What your counsel will do? However I would also like to see his ‘SHAKAL’ as be has not shown ‘SHAKAL’ for a long time. I have dictated the order’.

(b) That the learned Magistrate intentionally flouted the orders of the High Court at Delhi by fixing very short date of five days (i.e 29th February, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th of March) for defence witnesses to be served when they are residents of different places.

(c) That the reports on the summons bear the same date i.e 4th of March signed by the same person. The wording on summons clearly indicate that these reports were dictated and the person, process server whose name is not legible has written wrong reports intentionally.

(d) That it is impossible for one process-server to go to different places, in one day and get service affected unless some special arrangement is made. The summons were not sent to any S.H.O who effected the service is not known.

(e) Shri Tirath Singh is retired Sub Inspector Police about whom following is the report which on the face of it is not believable.

‘That summon on the residential house is affixed. Many a times I have been there, but I could not meet him. None else received summon,’

4th March, 1968.’

This sort of service has been accepted by the learned Magistrate as personal service and warrant of arrest was ordered against a retired Sub Inspector and a notice under sec. 485-A Cr. P C. was also issued. This clearly creates apprehension in the mind of the accused that learned Magistrate's mind is prejudiced.

(f) That the learned Magistrate was requested that he may wait for some time till some witnesses may turn up but the learned Magistrate was bent upon passing such order and so the order was passed. He did not wait for any witness., there were many cases on the list still to be disposed off.

(g) That the application and Medical Certificate was submitted before lunch time to the reader, who directed the brother of Shri Permanand to put up personally before the learned Magistrate after lunch time and the same was done. The learned Magistrate instead of informing Shri Kishen Chand brother of Permanand that he should ask Permanand to appear on next hearing i.e 13th March, 1968 he in the order showed an excuse that since application was put up afterwards when case was disposed of the application be filed.

(h) That inspite of application he issued warrants and he also issued notice under Section 485-A Cr. P.C why action be not taken against Shri Permanand for his disobedience of the order of learned Court.

(i) That the attitude of the learned Magistrate and issuing notice for disobedience to Shri Tirath Singh who was never served and about whom false report has been made and summon has been affixed, clearly indicats his prejudice mind.

(j) That by the above threatening attitude of the learned Magistrate towards withesses and ironical remarks regarding accused and his counsel creates apprehension in the mind of the accused that he will not have fair trial in the court of this learned Magistrate.

(k) That even the counsel of the accused when he appeared on 13th March 1968 was told by the learned Magistrate that he had prepared grounds for him to go again to the High Court. This ironical remark is not expected from an unbiased and impartial Magistrate who in the ordinary course of business would have given of about two weeks date for summoning the witnessess, would have seen, scrutinized each and every summon whether the reports are gennine reports and whether such affixation of summons on the premises of a witness who is not seen any process-server, would justify the learned Magistrate to issue notice under Section 485-A Cr. P.C to the witnesses especially when application with certificate of sickness was placed on record on the same date when the case was fixed. Ordinarily in routine such applications are considered and orders for not issuing warrants are passed as the applicants undertakes to produce the witness falling ill on the date of hearing.

(l) Refusal to accept summon by Moti Ram is another wrong report intentionally made. Against Moti Ram also bailable warrant for Rs. 500/- was ordered to be issued. There is no witness of this report.- Refusal in presence of some has some meaning, but to rely upon such false report and immediately without waiting for witnesses passing hurriedly vindictive orders clearly creates apprehension in the mind of the accused that he will not have fair and impartial trial.”

5. I may now turn to the comments of the learned Magistrate which are as under

“2. It is admitted that the statement of the accused was recorded under section 342 Cr. P. C. on 26th July, 1966. It is also admitted that on 11th July, 1966, and 18th July, 1966 adjournments were given as the senior counsel of the complainant was not present further I had taken over the charge of the present post on 7th July, 1966 and I bad myself by that time, not gone through the case file.

3. The facts mentioned in this para are partly correct. The statement of the accused was recorded on 26th July 1966 and after that the accused bad to submit the list of the witnesses before the next date of hearing which was fixed for 27th August 1966. But the list of witnesses was filed by the accused on 27th August 1966 and the summurs were issued for the production of the defence witnesses on 15th September, 1966. On 15th September, 1966 two defence witnesses were present who were examined. Again the case was fixed tor 3rd October, 1966 for further defence witnesses. No defence witnesses appeared on 3rd October, 1966 and the fresh summons were issued for 13th October, 1966. On 13th October. 1966 a telegram was received from the accused stating that he was busy in a case in Bombay. Therefore, the adjournment was given. No defence witness was present that day. Then the case was fixed for 4th November, 1966 for the evidence of the “defence witnesses. On 4th November, 1966 no defence witness was present in the court. Then the case was fixed for 19th November, 1966. On 19th November, 1966 I was busy in law and order duty. Therefore the case was adjourned for 3rd December, 1966. On 3rd December, 1966 no witness was present. Summons were again issued for 7th January, 1967. On 7tb January, 1967 Perma Nand witness for the defence was present in the court and he was bound down for appearance on 17th January, 1967 in the court. On 17th January, 1967 witness Perma Nand again appeared but the counsel for the complainant was absent, there-tore, the case was again adjourned, and the case was fixed for 4th February, 1967. On 4th February 1967 the case was again called for defence witnesses but neither Permanand Witness who was bound down was present nor the summons issued for the defence witnesses were received back after compliance. Beacuse Perma Nand was bound down and he did not appear, therefore, bailable warrant was issued against him. On 28th February, 1967 the case was again called but as I was on election duty, therefore, it was adjourned. Then the case was fixed for 18th March, 1967 on which date I was busy in law and order duties. Therefore the case was fixed for 28th March, 1967. On 28th March, 1967 no defence witness was present. Last opportunity was given to the accused to produce his witnesses and he was asked to receive ‘Dasti’ summons for service upon his witnesses, and the case was fixed for 10th April, 1967. On 10th April, 1967 no detence witness was present nor the witnesses were produced by the accused. As on that date, it was observed that from the report of the process-server on the summons, it was clear that the address of K.C Pandey was incomplete, therefore, he could not be served, witness R.C Pandey was discharged. The accused was given another opportunity to bring his witnessess personally but he did not avail of this opportunity. Warrants against Parma Nand and Bimal Parsbad Jain were issued and Tirath Ran, was summoned for 25th April, 1967.

6. Proceedings of 12th February, 196b, 27th February 1968 and 28th February, 1968 admitted. Proceedings mentioned regarding 5th March, 1968 also admitted.

7. Admitted.

8. On 13th March, 1968 an application for transfer was moved by the learned counsel for the accused. Therefore. the accused was asked to submit a personal bond of Rs. 200 and the case was adi ourned. But the notice was given to Parma Nand under section 480A Cr. P.C because it was a separate proceedings and it had got no bearing with the main case. Parma Nand was. summoned on 30th March, 1964 for consideration of his notice.

13(a) It is totally incorrect No such remark was passed for the laened counsel for the accused. All counsels are given due respect by this court.

(b) Incorrect. There was no intention to flout the order of the Hon'ble High Court. It is admitted that on 28th February, 1966, 5th March was given as the next date of hearing. Most of the witnesses are the residents of Delhi.

(d) Most of the defence witnesses summoned were the residents of Delhi and it is not difficult to serve them on the same day. The summons were sent to S.H O. Sarat Bazar.

(e) The report regarding the service on Tirath Singh is very clear, and on the report of the process-server, warrant was issued against Tiratb Singh and a nctice under section 485A Cr. P.C, was also issued to him. Often proceedings under section 485A Cr. P.C is being initiated against the police officers who are on active duty, who do not appear on the date of hearing without any valid reasons.

(f) No witness appeared throughout the day even after the passing of the order.

(g) The application was put up before me at 2.30 p.m The case had already been taken up before lunch. Therefore, the application of Parmanand was filed.

(h) Parma Nand appeared for the first time on 13th March, 1968 and he was given notice under section 485 ‘A Cr. P.C which had already been passed. On the same day the transfer application was moved by the learned counsel for the accused.

(i) No comments except that there was sufficient service for passing necessary orders against Tirath Singh.

(j) Not admitted.

(k) Not correct. The order regarding the processes was passed against the witnesses after due care and with judicial mind. In this connection, I may also bring it to your kind notice that the case is ten years old.

(l) No comments. If the learned counsel thinks that the re-port regarding Moti Ram was false, he should have objected to it. He cannot now claim that it was a wrong report and that there was no refusal on the part of the witness to accept it. On the report of the process-server that the witness refused to accept the summon, necessary orders were passed.”

6. The contents of the transfer application and the comments of the learned Magistrate do certainly seem to suggest that the accused has perhaps had on some dates tried to seek adjournment on grounds which may not be held sufficient, but under our, law, the Courts have to see that they do not do anything which may give to the accused persons a reasonable apprehension that they would not have a fair and impartial trial in that Court. As observed in paragraph 11 of Chapter 26-A, Vol. III, High Court Rules & Orders the Presiding Officers of Courts should cerefully bear in mind that it is their duty not only to be thoroughly impartial, but to conduct themselves in such a manner as not to give rise to any reasonable apprehension in the mind of an accused person that he will not. have a fair and impartial enquiry or trial. In dealing with applications for transfer, the Court has to consider not merely the question whether there has been any real bias in the mind of the Presideng Judge against the appellant, but also the further question whether incidents may not have happened which, though they may be susceptible of explanation and may have happened without there being any real bias in the mind of the Judge, are nevertheless such as are calculated to create in the mind of the applicant a justifiable apprehen that he would not have an impartial trial. The law has regard not so much to the motive which may be supposed to bias the Judge as the susceptibilities of the litigant-parties. Feeling of confidence in the administration of justice is essential to social order and security, and to promote such a feeling must be the endeavour of every Court. In the case in band, it does seem to me that certain unfortunate events have happened which may give rise to a reasonable apprehention in the mind of the accused person that he may not have a fair and impartial trial at the hands of the learned Magistrate. In such cases, one has to consider the position from the point of view of the accused person concerned. On 11th July, 1966 and 18th July, 1966 the learned Magistrate admits to have adjourned the case merely because of the absence of the senior counsel for the complainant, though only the statment of the accused was to be recorded and though the case wase nearly 8 years old. These adjournments are not easy to appreciate. From the record, I also find that on 16th April, 1966, the case was adjourned to 9th May, 1966, for the statement of the accused and 9th May, 1966 being a holiday, on 10th May, 1966 the case was taken up, but at the fag end of the day, with the result that it had to be adjourned to 20th June, 1966. On that date, the Presiding Officer was on leave necessitating adjournment of the case to 11th July, 1966. It is in this background that one has to consider the present Magistrate's manner of dealing with the case on 11th July, 1966 and 18th July, 1966. The Magistrate, it may be remembered, had himself to question the accused generally for the purpose of enabling him to explain the circumstances appearing in evidence against him. The power given undersection 342. Cr. P.C it may be pointed out, is not to be used to elicit information from the accused to fill up gaps in the prosecution evidence. And then, this provision is for the benefit of the accused and is not intended to be used to elicit his defence. To wait for the senior counsel for the complainant to be present for this purpose and to adjourn the case because of his absence on two occasions, may well give rise to an apprehension in the mind of the accused about the Migistrate's leaning in favour of the complainant. At least an accused may consider this as indicative, to some extent, of such a leaning. The reason that as the learned Magistrate had only taken over as Presiding Officer of the Court on 7th July, 1966 and, therefore, he bad not bad sufficient time to go through the file of the case fixed before him, serves, merely to add to the unhappy impression of this Court that the learned Magistrate was not devoting the expected serious attention and care to this old case and was feeling some what unconcerned about the lot of the accused or speedy disposal of the cafe. The learned Magistrate seems apparently tc have behaved as if be was merely a disinterested auditor of the contest between the complainant and the accused. Such, 1 must point out, is not the position under the law and I consider it necessary to impress it on all the Magistrates. Jn any event, the accus-(d) could not possibly have assumed tbat the learned Magistrate was completely unaware of the facts of the case before him and be could have legitimately presumed that the learned Magistrate fully knew tbat on tbat date the accused bad merely to be examined under section 342, Cr.P.C

7. On 7th January, 1967, Parma Nard witness was present but be was not examined for reasons not disclosed in the comments of the learned Magistrate and the case was adjourned to 17th January, 1967, on which date again the witness was present, but the case was adjourned to 4th February, 1967 because of the absence of the counsel for the complainant. On 4th Februay, 1967, Parma Nand was absent and bailable warrants were issued against him, es it seems to me, without judicious consideration of all the relevant factors. On two hearings, the defence witness was present, but he was not examined for no fault of his and on the third day because of his absence, warrants were issued against him, as if mechanically. The comments of the learned Magistrate do not furnish any satisfactory explanation of this action and an accused who has been in dock for nearly nine years might well entertain an apprehension that his witness had been harassed and humiliated and that he was not likely to get a fair and impartial trial in this Court. Such an apprehension may not be considered as wholly unreasonable or imaginary or completely unjustifiable.

8. The argument that these incidents happened long ago is of little cogency because this background is inextricably linked up with the future proceeding and cannot be ignored and subsequent incidents cannot be looked at in complete isolation I may once again point out that however blameworthy or undesirable the activities of an accused person, in the Courts of law in this country, he is entitled to a fair and impartial trial and it is the duty of all the Courts to ensure such trial. Justice in all cases must not only be done but must also be clearly seem to be done.

9. In view of the foregoing discussion, I think the accused is entitled to the transfer of his case and I direct that the present case be transferred from the Court of Shri V.N Chuttervedi, Magistrate 1st Class to the Court of some other competent Magistrate, but the transferee Court must try to dispose of the case with due despatch and promptitude. Parties are directed to appear before the learned District Magistrate on 10th June, 1960 when appropriate orders would be made for the transfer of the case to some other competent Court and for the appearance of the parties in the transferee Court on a date to be fixed by the learned District Magistrate. In this case also, it is eminently desirable that the Magistrate trying this case should not be allocated non-judicial functions which are likely to interfere with the speedy trial of this case and he must be allowed to deal with it with single-minded-judicial devotion. Belated cases like the present are likely to damage the image of our criminal judicial process an aspect, the importance of which to the cause of justice, is unhappily not being properly appreciated.

10. Petition allowed.