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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Inder Dev Dua, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Om Parkash Singal (the landlord; appellant in this Court) filed an application before the Rent Controller under section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (the Act) on 15-12-1964 seeking ejectment of the tenant on the ground of the landlord’s personal bona fide requirement for occupation by himself and members of his family. The premises were residential; the rent payable by the tenant was Rs. 130 per month. The tenant had occupied the premises since 15-10-1961.

The Rent Controller, after trial, allowed the landlord’s application by an order dated 4-11-1965, concluding that the landlord’s requirement was genuine and that the accommodation already in his possession was not reasonably suitable. The Controller relied upon several authorities in support of the order.

The tenant appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal which reversed the Controller. The Tribunal noted matters including: a portion on the first floor had been let out repeatedly (the last letting about a year before the ejectment application); the disputed portion had been let in 1961 (three years before the application); there had been civil litigation between the parties (relating to a common staircase) and negotiations to let a barsati; absence of medical evidence to support the landlord’s claim about his daughter’s health; one daughter had been married since the disputed portion was leased; and the tenant had offered to exchange portions of the house which offer the landlord declined. On these facts the Tribunal doubted the landlord’s bona fides and dismissed the ejectment application with costs.

The landlord then brought a second appeal under section 39 of the Act to this Court, challenging the Tribunal’s legal approach to clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) and arguing that the Tribunal imposed an erroneous legal standard when assessing bona fides and reasonable suitability of alternative accommodation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the proper scope of a second appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in matters where the Rent Control Tribunal has reached conclusions on the landlord’s bona fide requirement?
  2. How is clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act — permitting recovery of premises where the landlord genuinely requires them as residence — to be construed, in particular the meaning and proof of “bona fide” requirement and the standard for assessing whether the landlord has other "reasonable suitable residential accommodation"?
  3. Whether the Tribunal erred as a matter of law by substituting its own view of what constituted necessary accommodation (including insisting on medical evidence and stressing past lettings) and thereby improperly negating the landlord's bona fide claim?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Landlord)

  • The Tribunal erred in law in its construction of clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) by imposing an unduly strict or intrusive standard of proof for bona fide requirement.
  • The Tribunal's observations that the premises had been let three years earlier and that a man of ordinary prudence could foresee his family’s needs were legally misplaced; past lettings do not automatically indicate mala fides or absence of genuine requirement at the time of the application.
  • The Tribunal was wrong to insist on a medical certificate to prove the landlord's daughter's indifferent health; the landlord's wish to have his daughter come home, if genuine, should not be defeated by demanding meticulous proof on such personal family matters.
  • The landlord relied on multiple precedents (C.L. Davar v. Shri Amar Nath Kapur; Ram Saran v. Shri Harbhajan Singh; Smt. Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Das; and certain unreported decisions) in support of his contention that he should ordinarily be left to assess his own accommodation needs judged by a reasonable man standard and that the Rent Control authorities should not substitute their own views lightly.

Respondent's Arguments (Tenant)

  • The Tribunal's conclusion that the landlord’s claim was not bona fide was essentially a finding of fact; such findings are not open to reappraisal on second appeal under section 39 of the Act.
  • The respondent relied on authorities (including Parkash Chander Gupta v. Tara Chand Malik and others) to support the proposition that the Tribunal’s factual conclusion should stand.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Smt. Vidya Vati v. Shri Hanuman Parshad This precedent was cited by the Rent Controller in supporting the eviction order; the opinion does not reproduce its ratio. Noted as one of the authorities relied upon by the Rent Controller in granting the ejectment.
Mahabir Parshad v. Mohinder Kumar, 1959 P.L.R. 625 Cited by the Rent Controller; the text does not set out the principle from this authority. Recorded as relied upon in support of the Rent Controller's order.
Ram Piara v. Baboo Ram (unreported; G.D. Khosla C.J., Punjab High Court) Relied upon by the Rent Controller; the opinion does not state the detailed principle from this unreported judgment. Appears in the list of authorities on which the Rent Controller placed reliance.
Jiwan Dass v. Smt. Devi Bai Cited by the Rent Controller; the opinion does not quote its principle. Recorded as one of the authorities invoked to support the Controller's finding of bona fides.
C.L. Davar v. Shri Amar Nath Kapur Cited by the appellant in support of the legal position regarding bona fide requirement and the proper approach to clause (e). Noted as an authority relied on by the appellant to show the Tribunal's approach was incorrect as a matter of law.
Ram Saran v. Shri Harbhajan Singh Cited by the appellant to support his legal arguments about bona fide requirement under clause (e). Recorded as cited by the appellant; no further exposition of its ratio in the opinion.
Smt. Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Das Cited by the appellant for principles on landlord's bona fide requirement. Included among the appellant's cited authorities; the opinion does not state the precise rule from the case.
Vishnu Dass Garg v. Mange Ram (S.A.O. No. 26-D of 1962; decided 22-5-1964) Unreported decision cited by the appellant in support of his arguments. Noted by the Court as one of the appellant's citations.
Mst. Shahzadi v. Kaka Ram (C. Rev. No. 363-D of 1961; decided 27-5-1968) Unreported decision cited by the appellant. Recorded as cited in support of the appellant's position.
Parkash Chander Gupta v. Tara Chand Malik Relied on by the respondent to support the contention that the Tribunal’s finding was factual and not open on second appeal. Cited by the Court as part of the respondent's reliance on precedents to contend that factual conclusions of the Tribunal are final on second appeal.
Manohar Singh v. M/s Kanshi Ram & Sons Relied on by the respondent as authority for the finality of factual findings on appeal. Noted by the Court as among the authorities relied upon by the respondent.
Shri V.N. Sarin v. Major Ajit Kumar Poplai Relied on by the respondent to support the submission that the Tribunal's conclusion was factual and not reviewable on second appeal. Mentioned as part of the respondent's cited authorities; the opinion does not elaborate the ratio.
Roop Lal Mehra v. Smt. Kamla Soni Discussed at length: establishes that (a) bona fide means genuinely and without intent to deceive; (b) assessment must take the landlord's point of view and be both subjective and objective; (c) suitability of alternate accommodation must be judged from the standpoint of a reasonable landlord and in a broad commonsense way, considering social status, customs, etc. The Court relied on and quoted this decision extensively to explain the correct legal test under clause (e), to critique the Tribunal’s approach, and to support the conclusion that the Tribunal erred in law.
Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal Relied upon by the respondent among authorities cited for finality of factual conclusions on appeal. Noted as one of the respondent's citations; the opinion does not extract additional principle from it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by focusing on the correct construction of clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) and on the permissible scope of review on second appeal under section 39 of the Act.

The Court reproduced clause (e) and emphasized two central inquiries that must be directed by the authorities: (a) whether the landlord's requirement of possession is bona fide; and (b) whether the premises already in the landlord's possession afford a reasonably suitable alternative accommodation.

The Court relied importantly on the reasoning in Roop Lal Mehra v. Smt. Kamla Soni which the opinion quotes at length. That authority teaches:

  • The bona fide requirement must be judged both subjectively and objectively: subjectively from the standpoint of the landlord’s genuine desire, and objectively by asking whether a reasonable person in the landlord’s position would genuinely require the accommodation.
  • Suitability of alternate accommodation is not to be judged solely by bare physical sufficiency but must be considered in context — social status, customs, traditions, family circumstances and the requirement of practical commonsense as a “man of the world.”
  • The statutory scheme does not render landlords the sole arbiters of their requirements; courts and controllers have limited power to scrutinize bona fides but should not weigh claims on a “fine scale.”

Applying these principles to the case, the Court found the Tribunal's approach legally unsound in several respects identified in the opinion:

  • The Tribunal appeared to treat the fact that the disputed premises had been let three years earlier (1961) as indicative that the landlord then found his remaining accommodation sufficient and therefore was estopped from later claiming bona fide need. The Court held that such past lettings do not automatically negate a bona fide need at the later date of application.
  • The Tribunal’s insistence on documentary proof such as a medical certificate for the landlord's claim regarding his daughter's health was an overly stringent evidentiary requirement. The Court stated that the landlord's assessment about bringing his daughter to live with him, if genuinely held, should not be displaced lightly by Rent Control authorities demanding meticulous proof for family decisions.
  • Overall, the Tribunal’s approach amounted to substituting its own view of reasonable necessity for that of the landlord and required the landlord to prove “absolute necessity” rather than to satisfy a broad commonsense, reasonable-man standard judged from the landlord’s standpoint.

The Court also observed procedural and scope points:

  • No distinct point was pressed before the Tribunal or before the Court with regard to the landlord having other reasonably suitable residential accommodation as a separate legal issue; that aspect was intermingled with the bona fide question and was not separately urged by the respondent on appeal to this Court.
  • The statutory safeguard in section 19 was highlighted: where a landlord obtains possession under clause (e) but does not occupy within two months or relets within three years without Controller's permission, the evicted tenant may apply for restoration of possession or compensation. The Court said this provision indicates the statute’s mechanism to deter and remedy collateral or ulterior motives in eviction claims.

On the combined application of law and facts, the Court concluded that the Tribunal had committed a legal error of approach — weighing the landlord's claim in too fine a manner and imposing undue evidentiary expectations — and that this error raised a substantial question of law permitting intervention on second appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The order of the Rent Control Tribunal is reversed and the order of the Rent Controller granting the landlord's application for ejectment is restored. The appellant (landlord) is granted the relief of ejectment.

Immediate practical consequences and directions:

  • The appellant is entitled to eject the respondent after the expiry of three months from the date of the judgment, although execution proceedings may be initiated before the expiry of that period.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Broader implications:

The opinion explains and reinforces the legal standard under clause (e) — namely that bona fide requirement is to be assessed from the landlord's viewpoint with an overlay of objective reasonableness judged in a broad commonsense way, and that Rent Control authorities have a limited power of scrutiny but must not substitute their views for those of the landlord unless there is clear indication of abuse or ulterior motive. The opinion does not set out any further novel or expansive precedent beyond applying existing principles (as discussed in Roop Lal Mehra) to the facts; its practical effect is to restore the Controller's order in this specific case.


Note: This summary has been prepared strictly from the material contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the opinion has been added or inferred.

    Om Parkash Singal Petitioner v. Roshan Lal Khanna

    Inder Dev Dua, C.J:— The second appeal from order under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958 (hereafter called the Act) raises the usual question of the scope of the present appeal and also the question of the construction of clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Act.

    An application for ejectment of the tenant was filed before the Rent Controller by Om Parkash Singal (appellant in this Court). The premises in dispute are admittedly residential and the rent payable by the tenant is also indisputably Rs. 130 p.m No question in regard to them has been raised before me. The tenant occupied the premises in question on 15-10-1961 and on 15-12-1964, the proceedings, out of which this appeal arises, were initiated under section 14 of the Act, the ground for eviction being personal bona fide requirement of the landlord-owner for occupation as residence for himself and members of his family dependent on him.

    This prayer was opposed on the ground that the landlord was already in possession of sufficient and suitable accommodation and the present proceedings merely meant to harass the tenant. An earlier proceeding for eviction on the ground of subletting, according to the tenant, was also pending before the Controller.

    After trial, the Rent Controller, in a very well-reasoned order, granted the landlord-owner's application on 4-11-1965. In the order, reliance was placed in support of the order in favour of the landlord-owner on Smt. Vidya Vati v. Shri Hanuman Parshad (1) Mahabir Parshad v. Mohinder Kumar 1959 P.L.R 625, an unreported judgment of G.D Khosla C.J of the Punjab High Court in Ram Piara v. Baboo Ram, C.R 35-D of 1959 and Jiwan Dass v. Smt. Devi Bai, (3). On the evidence, the Rent Controller concluded that the accommodation already in possession of the landlord was not reasonably suitable for his requirements and that he was in need of more accommodation in this very building for living comfortably. He had a large family and he was held to be justified in claiming more accommodation for his family. The landlord's claim was considered to be genuine and bona fide.

    The tenant took the matter on appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal. On appeal, the learned Tribunal took into consideration the extent of accommodation in the possession of the landlord and took note of the fact that some portion on the first floor in occupation of some tenants had fallen vacant and been let out again about half a dozen times during the last two or three years. The last letting was about a year prior to the filing of the present ejectment application. The fact that the portion now in dispute was let out in 1961 only three years before the institution of the present application for ejectment, was also taken into account. The attention of the learned Tribunal was also drawn to some civil litigation between the parties with regard to the use of the common staircase in which the landlord's plea for permanent injunction was disallowed by the trial Court and the appeal though preferred, was later withdrawn. It appears that reference was also made to some evidence in regard to some negotiations for letting out a barsati on the second floor of the house in question and the learned Tribunal felt that under the circumstances of the case, it could not be said that the tenant's allegation about the negotiations for the lease of the barsati was without any basis. After considering the number of members of the landlord's family and noting the absence of medical evidence in support of the landlord's plea that his daughter studying at Pilani was keeping indifferent health and was for this reason to be brought to Delhi and also keeping in view that one of the landlord's daughter had since the lease of the portion in question been married off, the learned Tribunal felt doubt about the landlord's bona fides in filing the present ejectment application.

    It seems that before the learned Tribunal, the tenant made an offer to exchange his portion of the house in question with the back portion along with the kitchen, but this offer was declined by the landlord. This denial was also considered by the learned Tribunal to be a circumstance which went against the genuineness of the landlord's requirement. It was in addition observed with reference to this offer that the portion claimed by the tenant was not so unfit or unsuitable that the landlord could not utilise it for relieving the pressure on his accommodation if there was any. On this view of the matter, the appeal was allowed and setting aside the order of the learned Rent Controller, the application for eviction was dismissed with costs throughout.

    On second appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the order of the learned Rent Control Tribunal is tainted with a serious legal infirmity and deserves to be reversed. According to him, the following observations in the order of the learned Tribunal prominently bring out the legal error in his approach in construing section 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act.

    “The premises in dispute were leased out to the appellant only three years ago. A man of ordinary prudence having such a big family could easily anticipate the needs and requirements of his family during the coming three or four years. The fact that he leased out the premises in dispute may seem to suggest that the landlord found his accommodation already in his occupation as sufficient and suitable for his family in 1961-62. The Rent Controller or the Tribunal would have no business to enforce on the landlord or his family more liberal or comfortable standards of living than the landlord has been crying to provide for himself and his family.”

    This view, so argues the learned counsel for the appellant, runs counter to the legal position enunciated in some of the decisions relied upon by the learned Rent Controller and it is emphasised that the learned Tribunal did not even care to refer to the ratio of those decisions. It is next emphasised that merely because some portion of the house was let out by the landlord which presumably was not convenient or comfortable enough for his requirements, could not by itself be construed to suggest either mala fide or want of bona fide on the part of the landlord in seeking the present portion of his own property for his residence. Again, to insist that the landlord should file a medical certificate establishing the indifferent health of his daughter, if he wanted her to come back to Delhi from Pilani where she was studying, and if he desired for this reason to have more accommodation at his disposal in his own house, has been described by the learned counsel to be a legally erroneous approach to the question of the landlord-owner's bona fide requirement for his residence and for residence of the members of his family. After all, if the father thinks that his daughter had better come and stay in Delhi because her stay in Pilani is not as healthy as it is desired by the parents to be, the tenant cannot insist on strict meticulous proof of the indifferent health of the daughter as a condition precedent to the acceptance of the plea of indifferent health, if the father wants to have her daughter come and live with him, then unless it is a mere pretext and is not genuine it deserves to be accepted and ordinarily, it would not be open to the Rent Control Authorities to substitute their opinion for that of the father on a question like this. The landlord-owner is certainly entitled to make himself and his children comfortable in his own house and unless there is clearly discernible some collateral purpose or ulterior object in getting the premises vacated, the tenant cannot successfully resist the landlord's claim for possession of the premises on the plea that, in his opinion, or in the opinion of the Rent Control Authorities, the landlord-owner should not be desirous of having his children live with him. This is how the learned counsel has developed his challenge to the order of the learned Tribunal. He has, in support of the appeal, cited C.L Davar v. Shri Amar Nath Kapur, (4) Ram Saran v. Shri Harbhajan Singh, (5) Smt. Subhadran Devi v. Sunder Das, (6) and two unreported decisions in Vishnu Dass Garg v. Mange Ram, S.A.O No. 26-D of 1962 decided on 22-5-1964 and Mst. Shahzadi v. Kaka Ram, C. Rev. No. 363-D of 1961 decided on 27-5-1968.

    The main plank on which the respondent's learned counsel has sought to support the learned Tribunal's order is that the impugned conclusion is one of fact and, therefore, not open to challenge on second appeal under section 39 of the Act. Reliance for this submission has been placed on Parkash Chander Gupta v. Tara Chand Malik, (7), Manohar Singh v. M/s Kanshi Ram & Sons, (8) Shri V.N Sarin v. Major Ajit Kumar Poplai, (9) Roop Lal Mehra v. Smt. Kamla Soni, (10) and Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal, (11).

    Section 14(1) proviso (e) of the Act may now be reproduced :—

    “14. Protection of Tenant against eviction. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:

    Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:—

    (1) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonable suitable residential accommodation.”

    In Roop Lal Mehra's case, cited on behalf of the respondent, the Court observed as follows:—

    “The attention of the courts will have, therefore, to be directed to find out: (a) whether or not the requirement of possession is bona fide, and (b) whether or not the premises already in possession of the landlord afford a reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. It would also not be correct to suggest that the question of accommodation, actually in possession of the landlord, being ‘reasonably suitable’ is to be judged only in the context of physical sufficiency of the accommodation. In terms of physical sufficiency three rooms in possession of a landlord with family of three, may be sufficient, yet court may hold that accommodation is sufficient having regard to various circumstances, such as, the social status of the family or traditions and customs observed by it. In that view the decision of the landlord would be both subjective and objective. Subjective in the sense that the matter has not to be decided from the standpoint of the Rent Controller or the tenant but from that of the landlord. In deciding this from the point of view of the landlord, various considerations, mentioned above, would be relevant. So long as the landlord is able to establish that he in good faith and genuinely wishes to occupy the premises in possession of the tenant and that good faith or genuineness is of a reasonable man, it would not be open to the Controller to weigh the claim of the landlord in a fine scale. Similarly, the suitability of the other accommodation will also have to be decided from the standpoint of a reasonable landlord.

    “True, that the necessity for such legislation has arisen with a view to protecting the tenants from unscrupulous landlords, who may adopt devices to extract exorbitant rent, but at the same time the statute is not intended to deprive a landlord of his bona fide desire, so long as that desire is confined within reasonable limits, judged from a practical and not fanciful point of view, to be more comfortable by occupying his own house. It is objective in the sense that the authorities under the Act have not been rendered powerless to pronounce dissatisfaction with the bona fides of the landlord's claim, provided they judge it from the point of view of the landlord. The law does not require a landlord to sacrifice his own comforts and requirements merely on the ground that the premises are with a tenant. Whether or not the alternate accommodation available to the landlord is suitable or not, must, therefore, be decided after taking into account all relevant circumstances, but in deciding that the authorities must step into the position of the landlord and decide in what I venture to call a broad commonsense way as a man of the world. In so deciding, the social customs, conventions and habits, usages and practices of the society also cannot be completely ruled out as irrelevant. The problem will in all cases have to be approached from a practical point of view and from the point of view of a reasonable man and not from that of a whimsical landlord, who may be wanting a premises for satisfaction of his mere whims. Whatever may be the scope of the expression : ‘required bona fide by the landlord’ it appears to be fairly clear that read as a whole, clause(e) of proviso to sub-section(1) of section 14 does not make the landlords sole arbiters of subjectively deciding the question of their requirements. It is possible that the later part of the clause has been added to avoid an argument that once a landlord is able to show that he in fact desires possession and genuinely intends to occupy it, his claim becomes unanswerable. I think, the clause does confer a power of scrutiny, though of limited nature on the authorities charged After taking into account a finding of fact, which was not questioned in the High Court, the second appeal presented by the tenant was allowed in the reported case. The ratio of, and, the trend of discussion in, this decision do not seem to help the respondent. The word “bona fide” as used in proviso(e) has been considered judicially in a number of decisions and this interpretation is no longer in controversy. It means, genuinely or in good faith, and it conveys an idea of absence of intent to deceive. If the owner-landlord is not considered to be seeking eviction on false pretext of acquiring additional accommodation with some collateral purpose or oblique motive and his requirement cannot be considered to be inspired by a pure fanciful whim, the plea of bona fide requirement put forth by the landlord-owner, deserves ordinarily to be upheld. As a broad workable rule, the landlord, must be left to assess his requirements in the background of his position, circumstances, status in life and social and other responsibilities and other relevant factors. The order of the learned Tribunal below seems to suggest that unless the landlord can satisfy the Controller or the Tribunal the absolute necessity for additional accommodation, the requirement cannot be considered to be bona fide. This line of approach is, in my view, erroneous and the error involves a substantial question of law.

    While considering the question of ejectment on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord-owner, it is eminently desirable to strike a proper and just balance between the rights of the owner on the one hand and those of the tenant as protected by the law on the other. The owner is entitled to make himself comfortable and is, normally speaking, the best judge of his own requirements. Unless he can be considered to be abusing or misusing this right to acquire possession of his property in eviction proceedings, which means that he is seeking to get possession under the veil of bona fide requirement, but for some other purpose, his claim demands acceptance. Of course, in some rare cases, when his claim prima facie appears to be wholly unreasonable, when considered in the background of his status, position and other family circumstances, the Controller or the Tribunal may be persuaded judicially to negative his bona fides. Such, however, is by no means the case before me.

    Before the Tribunal, no distinct and separate point was raised about the landlord having other reasonably suitable residential accommodation and apparently, this aspect was mixed up with the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord. Even before me, the respondent has not cared to urge anything on this aspect as distinct from the plea that the landlord's requirement is not bona fide. I need, therefore, say nothing on this point. Once the conclusion of the Tribunal as to the bona fide requirement of the landlord is reversed and that of the Controller restored, the ejectment order must, on the facts of this case, follow.

    At this stage, it would not be out of place to refer to section 19 of the Act which provides for recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry. sub-section(2) of this section provides that where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause(e) of the proviso to sub-section(1) of section 14 and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such possession or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession, relet to any person other than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller under section 14(1) or the possession of such premises in transfer to another person for reasons which do not appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller is empowered, on application made to him in this behalf by the evicted tenant within the prescribed time, to direct the landlord to put the tenant back in possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit. This indicates the scheme of the statute and provides for cases where the landlord secures possession for some collateral purpose under the veil of his bona fide requirement.

    In view of the foregoing discussion, I am constrained to allow the appeal and reversing the order of the Rent Control Tribunal, grant the appellant's prayer for ejectment. There would be no order as to costs. The appellant would be entitled to eject the respondent after the expiry of three months, though execution proceedings can be initiated before that period.

    A.N.K Appeal allowed.
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    Comments

    Om Parkash Singal Petitioner v. Roshan Lal Khanna
    (Dec 11, 1968)