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Comprehensive Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal was filed by Pirthi Singh and others against judgments and decrees of the lower courts concerning a suit for a permanent injunction. The appeal challenges the Senior Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur's judgment and decree (the opinion records a date of 28th November 1963 in one place and a judgment dated 18th November 1963 in another place) which had confirmed the Subordinate Judge, First Class, Una's judgment and decree dated 19th August 1963 in Civil Suit No. 326 of 1962.

The original suit sought a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from raising any construction on a parcel of land described in the opinion as 2 Kanals and 2 Marlas situate in village Basbli, Tehsil Una. The opinion lists the suit land as comprising three fields: (as recorded in the text) "Nos. 5461/261, 5878/250 and 5898/260" in one paragraph, and later refers to the fields as "5461/251, 5878/250 and 5898/250." The parties and the nature of their claims (as set out by the courts) are described below.

Procedurally: the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The plaintiffs appealed to the Senior Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur (the appellate court dismissed the appeal). The plaintiffs then preferred this second appeal before the court delivering the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether co-owners of joint land who are in exclusive possession of separate portions under an arrangement or by consent of all co-owners may, without more, change the user of their portion (specifically by raising a construction) in a manner inconsistent with the similar rights of other co-owners.
  2. Whether, when a co-owner threatens to change the user of a jointly owned agricultural parcel by raising constructions, the other co-owners are entitled to a permanent injunction restraining such change of user, or whether the appropriate remedy is only a suit for partition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The suit land was jointly owned and possessed by the appellants and respondents Nos. 1 and 2.
  • The respondents (1 and 2) exchanged portions of the disputed land with respondents Nos. 3 to 6, and therefore had no right to raise any construction on the suit land.
  • The appellants sought a permanent injunction to restrain respondents from raising construction; they argued that even if respondents were in exclusive possession of parts of the joint land under an arrangement, those co-owners could not change the user of their portions in a way that would impair the rights of other co-owners.
  • On appeal, counsel for the appellants (Shri S. Malhotra) relied on the proposition that exclusive possession of a co-owner without contrary evidence should be deemed with the consent of other co-owners, but that such consent does not permit a change of user inconsistent with other co-owners' rights.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondents contended that fields Nos. 5878/250 and 5898/250 were not joint fields but had been gifted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 by their father, and therefore they (and their transferees) could use those fields as they liked, including raising constructions.
  • As to field No. 5461 (variously numbered in the text), respondents admitted it was a joint field but asserted that by agreement among the parties portions of that field had been put into exclusive possession of particular co-owners (appellant No. 1 and respondents Nos. 1 and 2). Respondents argued that persons in exclusive possession of portions under such an arrangement had a right to build on the portions in their possession.
  • Respondents contended that, if the appellants objected, the proper remedy was a suit for partition rather than a suit for an injunction to restrain construction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sant Ram Nagnina Ram v. Daya Ram Nagina Ram, A.I.R. 1961 Punj. 528 The proposition that exclusive possession of a co-owner, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, must be deemed to be with the consent of the other co-owners; and related propositions about a co-owner's right to use joint property in a manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners and that arrangements of exclusive possession cannot be disturbed except by partition. The court relied on this authority to support the view that exclusive possession is prima facie deemed by consent, but that such consent is limited — it does not permit changing the user of the land in a way inconsistent with the rights of other co-owners. That principle weighed against the respondents' claim to raise construction.
Radhey Lal v. Mahraj Kunj Behari Lal, A.I. 1939 Oudh. 275 The passage quoted: where a co-sharer is allowed exclusive possession, that consent must be confined to the nature of exclusive possession already enjoyed; if the nature of exclusive possession is changed, other co-sharers have a right to object. The court quoted and applied this reasoning to hold that changing the nature of use (from agriculture to construction) would be beyond the consent implicit in exclusive possession and thus objectionable by other co-owners.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps (as recorded in the opinion):

  1. Confirmed that the field in issue (field No. 5461/— numeration in the text varies) was joint land and that appellant No. 1 and respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had been in exclusive possession of 4 Marlas each under an arrangement between the parties. Both lower courts had proceeded on this footing.
  2. Recognized the legal propositions, drawn from prior authorities (as summarized in the opinion), that: (a) every co-owner has a right to use joint property in a husband-like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners; and (b) where a co-owner holds separate parcels under an arrangement consented to by other co-owners, that arrangement cannot be disturbed except by filing a suit for partition.
  3. Reasoned by corollary that a co-owner in exclusive possession under an arrangement can only use that portion in a manner not inconsistent with the rights of other co-owners — consent to exclusive possession does not extend to any and all changes of user.
  4. Examined the factual record (the Jamabandi, Exhibit P.1) and noted that the land had been in personal cultivation by the co-owners; hence the land was being used or intended for cultivation and was agricultural in character. There was no evidence that the land had ever been used for building or that any construction existed before the dispute.
  5. Distinguished cases where a construction had already been raised and co-owners had remained silent; the court noted that where a building already exists and other co-owners acquiesce, demolition might not be ordered in appropriate circumstances. That situation was absent here: respondents only threatened to raise a construction and the appellants promptly objected and filed suit.
  6. Rejected the lower courts' assumption that exclusive possession necessarily allowed the co-owners in possession to use the land "as they liked" including raising constructions. The court held this assumption to be erroneous because a change of user to the detriment of other co-owners is inconsistent with their rights and cannot be effected merely because the possessor enjoyed exclusive possession by arrangement.
  7. Considered and rejected the Senior Subordinate Judge's reliance on an averment in the plaint that the land was "valuable as fit for being used as abadi" as amounting to an admission that the land should be used for building; the court read this averment as only indicating value, not an admission of intended or prior building use.
  8. Concluded that, on the facts and law as presented, the appellants were entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from raising any construction on the portion of the joint field in dispute (field No. 5461/251 as described in the opinion), because raising a construction would change the user from agricultural to non-agricultural and be inconsistent with the rights of the other co-owners.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED IN PART; the second appeal is allowed in respect of field No. 5461/251, the judgments and decrees of the lower courts are set aside in that respect, and the suit is decreed as prayed for (a permanent injunction restraining respondents from raising any construction on field No. 5461/251). The suit is dismissed as regards the other two fields (Nos. 5898/250 min and 5878/250).

Direct implications for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The respondents are restrained by a permanent injunction from raising any construction on field No. 5461/251 (the portion of the joint land in question).
  • The judgments and decrees of the two lower courts are set aside insofar as they refused the injunction for field No. 5461/251; the lower courts' dismissals remain in force with respect to the other two fields.
  • The parties were directed to bear their own costs throughout.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established principles about exclusive possession of joint land and its limits — namely, that exclusive possession by consent does not authorize a change of user inconsistent with other co-owners' rights. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond applying these established principles to the facts; it does not explicitly state the setting of a new precedent.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal allowed."

    Prithi Singh v. Bachitar Singh .

    T.V.R Tatachari, J.:— This second appeal has been filed by Pirthi Singh and others against the judgment and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur, date 28th November 1963, in Civil Appeal No. 197 of 1963 on his file, whereby the learned Senior Supordinate Judge confimed the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, First Calss, Una, dated, 19th August, 1963, passed in Civil Suit No. 326 of 1962.

    2. The aforesaid suit was filed by the appellants herein for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents herein from raising any construction in the suit land of the extent of 2 Kanals and 2 Marlas situate in village Basbli, Tehsil Una.

    3. The case of the appellants-plaintiffs was that said land, was jointly owned and possessed by them and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, that the said respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had exchanged portion's of the said land with respondents Nos. 3 to 6, that the respondents had no right to rai e any construction on the suit land and that ther fore, they should be restrained from raising any construction. The suit land comprised there fields, Nos. 5461/261. 5878/250 and 5898/260 The case of the respondents defendants was that the said fields Nos. 587.s/250 and 5898/250 were not joint fields, that the said fields were gifted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 by their father, that the field No. 5461/251 however, was jointly owned by the appellant No. 1 and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, that by agreement among the parties portions of the field No. 5461/251 have been in exclusive possession of appellant No. 1, Pirthi Singh, and respondents 1 and 2, that respondents 1 and 2 had exchanged their portion in the said field with respondents Nos. 3 to 6, that they had'a right to build on the portions in their possession, and that the appellants-plaintiffs, if at all, could only file a suit for partition and could not sue for an injunction.

    4. The trial Court, by judgment, dated 19th August, 1963 held that the portions of field No. 5878/50) were gifted separately to each of the appellants and respondehts Nos. 1 and 2, and respondent No. 1 being a donee from his father could use the portion in his possession in any manner he liked As regards' field No. 5898/250 and field No ‘5461/251, the trial Court took the view that the said fields were joint fields and the parties were co-owners of the same, that the raising of structures by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 or their transferees does not in any way adversely affect the rights of the appellants, the co-owners that the possession of the respondents was subject to partition and until the partition is effected the oher co-owners could not disturb the possession, and that the appellants-pi intiffs could not merely sue for an injuction restraining respondents Nos. 1 and 2 from raising any construction on the portions of the fields' in their possession. In the result, the trial Court dismissed the suit.

    5. Against that judgment and decree, the appellants herein preferred an appeal, Civil Appeal No. 197 of 1933, to the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge, in his judgment, dated 18th November, 1963. stated that the appellants-plaintiffs had given up their claim in the suit with regard to khasra No. 5898/250 min as, according to respondents Nos. 1 and 2, it was not exchanged and the said respondents had no interation to raise any consttruction upon it As regards' field No. 5898/250, the learned Senior Suborinate Judge held that as the said field was gifted to respondents Nos. 1 and 2 by their father, they and their transferees could raise a construction thereon. As regards the field No. 5461/251, the learned Senior Subordinate Judg found that the said field was a joint field, that under an arrangement between the parties, appellant No. 1, Pirthi Singh, and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, have been in exclusive possession of 4 Marlas each, that the 8 Marlas which were in the exclusive possession of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were exchanged by them with respondents Nos. 3 to 6, that since respondents Nos. 1 and 2 or their transferees have been in exclusive possession of specific portions of the joint land under an arrangement between the parties, it was open to them to raise a construction thereon, and that it was not open to the appellants to seek for an injuction restraining the respondents from raising a construction without filing a suit for partition. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge also pointed out to an averment in the plaint that the land in question was valuable as it was fit for being used as abadi. In the result, the learned Senior Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal It is against that judgment and decree that the present second appeal has been preferred by the appellants-plaintiffs.

    6. Shri S. Malhotra. the learned counsel for the appellants, stated before me that the appellants do not press their claim for injunction as regards Melds Nos. 5898/250 min and 5878/250, and that they press their claim in this second appeal only as regards the field No. 5461/251. As regards this field, Shri Malhotra contended that as the said field is a joint land and the parties are co-owners of the same, even though the respondents are in exclusive possession of portions of the same under an arrangement between or by consent of all the co-owners. it is not open to the respondents to raise any construction thereon as they, as co-owners cannot change the user of the land so as to impair similar rights of the other co-owners like the appellants. Admittedly, the field in question is joint land and by an an arrangement between the parties, appellant No. 1. Pirthi Singh and respondents Nos. 1 and 2, have deen in exclusive possession of 4 Marlas of land each. As pointed out by Tek Chand J. in Sant Ram Nagnina Ram v. Daya Ram Nagina Ram . A I. R. 1961 Punj 528., exclusive possession of a co-owner, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, has to be deemed to be with the consent of the other co owners. In fact, both the lower Courts have proceeded on the footing that the appellant No. 1 and responderts Nos. 1 and 2 have been in exclusive possession by virtue of an arrangement between the parties. The question then is as to whether the co owners who are in exclusive possession of portions of the joint land under an arrangment or by consent of all the other co owners can raise a construction on the portion of the land in their exclusive possession, and whether the other co owners before any construction is raised, can file a suit for injunction instead of filing a suit for partition of the joint land. It is now well settled that “every co-owner has a right to use the joint property in a husband like manner not inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners”. It is also well-settled that “where a co- owner is in possession of separate parcels under an arrangement consented to by the other co-owners it is not open to any one to disturb the arrangement without the consent of others except by filing a suit for partition “The said two propositions emerge from the various decisions of the different High Courts as pointed out by Tek Chand J at page 539 in the aforesaid decision. It follows as a corollary from the said two propositions that when a co-owner is in possession of a separate portion of the joint land under an arrangement consented to by the other two co-owners he can use the said portion of land only in a manner not inconsistent with similar rights of the other co-owners. In the present case respondents 1 and 2 have been in possession of 4 Marks of land each. As already pointed out above the said possession was under an arrangement between the parties. There is no definite evidence on the record to show what exactly was the arrangement. Shri K.C Sud, the learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, contended that the said arrangements might as well have been that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 could use the portion of land in thier possession as they liked. I do not think so Admittedly, there was an arrangement between the parties. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the reasonable or proper inference that can be drawn is that the arrangement or the consent of the other co-owners was to the nature of exclusive possession which respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have been enjoying till they entertained the idea of raising a construction thereon. A Similar view was taken by Radha Krishana J. in Radhey Lal v. Mahraj Kunj Behari Lal . A. I. 1939 Oudh. 275.. The learned Judge expressed his view as follows:—

    “The right of a co-sharer to continue in exclusive possession of those portions of joint land of which he was allowed to acquire exclusive possession arises on the assumption that it was consented to by his other co-sharers Such a consent, in my opinion, in case of plots in exclusive possession of one co-sharer in a village must be confined to the nature of exclusive possession already enjoyed. If the nature of the exclusive possession which has been submitted to or consented to by other co-sharers is changed then the other co-sharers have a right to object to the change.”

    7. In the present case, it appears from the Jamabandi Exhibit P. I, that the land in question has been in the personal cultivation of the co-owners. The said entry in the Jamabandi shows at least that the land was being used or intended for purposes of cultivation It is not the case of the respondents that the said land was at any time used for building purpose or that a building or any other construction was raised on the said land before the present dispute arose between the parties. In other words, the land has been an agricultural land, and the respondents now desire to raise a construction thereon and thus change the use from cultivation to one of raising a construction. Such a change of the user will obviously be inconsistent with similar rights of the other co-owners. If a construction had already been raised by a co-owner in the land which has been in his exclusive possession and the other co-owners merely kept silent without raising any objection, the Court might take that circumstance into consideration and in appropriate cases decline to direct the demolition of the said construction. But, in the present case, the respondents merely threatened to raise a construction, and the appellants-plaintiffs promptly raised an objection thereto and filed immediately the suit out of which the second appeal has been arisen. When the respondents have no right to change the user to the detriment of the appellants-plaintiffs, and when the appellants have promptly raised an objection to the said change of user, they are entitled to an injunction restraining the respondents from changing the said user by raising a construction on the land in dispute. Both the Courts below assumed that as the respondents were in exclusive possession under an arrangement they were entitled to use the land in such a manner as they liked and, therefore, could raise a construction thereon. The said assumption was clearly wrong, and respondents; as co-owners had no right to use the land in their possession, even though under an arrangement, to a user which would be inconsistent with similar rights of other co-owners. The lower appellate Court referred to and relied upon the averment in the plaint that the land in question was a valuable land as it was fit for the purposes of abadi. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge treated that averment as an admission on the part of the plaintiff, that the best use to which the land in question can be put was to construct a structure thereon. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge was obviously in error in construing the averment in that manner. The averment only meant that the piece of land was a valuable one as it was fit for purposes of abadi. The averment does not amount to an admission that the land was intended to be used or was best used for purposes of construction of structures thereon. As already pointed out above, the land was an agricultural land and was never used for construction purposes

    8. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the appellants-plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from raising any construction on the field No. 5461/251. The second appeal is, accordingly, allowed, the judgments and decrees of the lower Courts are set aside, and the suit is decreed as prayed for in respect of field No. 5461/251. The suit is dismissed as regards the other two fields, Nos. 5898/250 min and 5878/250. In the circumstances, I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.

    9. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Prithi Singh v. Bachitar Singh .
    (Dec 5, 1968)