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Opinion Summary — S.N. Andley, J. (Appeal against Tatachari, J.'s order dated 26.8.1968)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent arrived at Palam Airport, New Delhi on 14 August 1967 by Air France. He declared a packet containing four smaller packets of diamonds (approximate value $34,000), made the declaration required by Section 77 of the Customs Act, 1962, and at his request the Customs Officer issued a detention receipt under Section 80 stating that the packet (sealed with the passenger's and customs seals) had been received and that re-export was allowed/pending re-export. The respondent left for Bombay and returned to New Delhi on 24 August 1967 seeking return of the diamonds before departing again; the diamonds were not released. On the evening of 25 August the respondent's statement was recorded. On 26 August 1967 a Panchanama recorded that the diamonds detained for re-export on 14 August were liable to confiscation under the Customs Act and were seized under Section 110. A demand for return on 30 August was not complied with, and the respondent filed Civil Writ No. 1300 of 1967 in this Court. The Single Judge (Tatachari, J.) allowed the writ on 26 August 1968, quashing the seizure and directing return of the packet; the appellants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the diamonds constituted "baggage" within the meaning of Sections 77 and 80 of the Customs Act, 1962 (read with the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958), so as to attract the protection of a detention receipt issued under Section 80.
  2. Whether goods entrusted to the proper officer for detention under Section 80 can be treated as "imported" or as an "attempt to import" within clause (d) of Section 111 and thus liable to confiscation and seizure under Section 110(1).
  3. Whether the discretion of the proper officer to accept detention under Section 80 can be revoked after it has been exercised.
  4. Whether the High Court should refrain from exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 because the Customs Act provides statutory remedies of appeal and revision.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The diamonds were not "baggage" within the meaning of Sections 77 and 80 read with the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958, and so the detention receipt issued under Section 80 did not protect the respondent against seizure under Sections 110(1) and 111(d).
  • On landing at Palam Airport the diamonds were imported into India (the appellants argued "import" occurred on landing), which made them liable to confiscation under Section 111(d) and seizure under Section 110(1).
  • It was argued that acceptance of detention under Section 80 is a matter of discretion for the proper officer and that such discretion could be revoked subsequently.
  • The appellants further argued that because the Customs Act contains provisions for appeal and revision, the High Court should not interfere under Article 226 and should leave the matter to the statutory appellate/revisional remedies.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent made a declaration under Section 77 and requested detention under Section 80; a detention receipt was issued recording the packet as received for pending re-export. By doing so the respondent indicated an intention not to import the diamonds into India and to have them returned on departure.
  • Because the article was entrusted to the proper officer under Section 80 and remained within the customs control (not carried beyond the customs barrier), the diamonds were not "imported" within the meaning of the Customs Act and could not be seized under Sections 110(1) and 111(d).
  • The respondent sought return of the packet and pursued a writ when customs did not comply with the demand for return.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Maharashtra v. George (Supreme Court) — (case under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947) Construction of the term "cargo" (used as contradistinguished from personal luggage) in a notification; effect of a proviso in a notification requiring manifest declaration for through-transit cargo. The court considered the decision but found it distinguishable: the decisive feature there was a specific proviso in a Reserve Bank notification which required manifest declaration; absent any similar provision in the Customs Act or Tourist Baggage Rules, the court would not accept the appellants' contention that "baggage" in Section 80 is restricted to personal/bona fide baggage.
The Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The Municipal Committee, Wardha (The Express Mills, Nagpur) — AIR 1958 S.C. 341 Meaning of "import" — import is not merely bringing into but includes incorporation and mixing up of goods with the mass of property in the local area; goods not unloaded from a carrier are not necessarily "imported" for certain statutory purposes. The court relied on this principle to hold that goods entrusted to customs under Section 80 and not carried beyond the customs barrier are not "imported" within the meaning of the Customs Act; hence they are not liable to confiscation under Section 111(d) or seizure under Section 110(1).
A. Shaukataly v. The Collector of Customs, Madras — (Unreported, Single Judge, 7 Feb 1968, W.P. No. 1924 of 1967) Authority cited by appellants to support that detention under section 80 may not prevent seizure; factual approach to bonding and discovery of precious stones. The court noted the decision but distinguished it on facts: in that case there was no declaration under Section 77 and the passenger did not seek bonding before discovery; the court here considered that the facts and legal posture were materially different and did not accept the appellants' reliance on it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a statutory and contextual interpretation of the relevant provisions and rules. It began by identifying the statutory provisions engaged: Sections 77 and 80 (Chapter XI, special provisions regarding baggage), Section 79 (bona fide baggage), Section 110(1) (power to seize goods believed liable to confiscation), and Section 111(d) (confiscation where goods are imported or attempted to be imported contrary to prohibition). The Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958 (framed under Section 75 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and applicable under the Customs Act, 1962) were also material, in particular clause 3(1) and its Explanation concerning "personal effects."

On the scope of "baggage": the court observed that the Customs Act does not define "baggage" but that "baggage" is included in the inclusive definition of "goods." The court rejected the appellants' argument that because "baggage" is included in "goods" the reverse cannot be true; it pointed out that "goods" includes "any other kind of movable property" and that an item of movable property can be part of or contained in "baggage."

The court relied on ordinary dictionary meanings (Webster and the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary) to conclude that "baggage" is a comprehensive term synonymous with luggage — the trunks, bags and personal belongings of a passenger — and must be given its larger, ordinary meaning in Sections 77 and 80. The court reasoned that if "baggage" in Section 80 were confined to bona fide baggage or the limited category of "personal effects" in the Tourist Baggage Rules, Section 80 would seldom apply. Hence "baggage" in Sections 77 and 80 should be understood broadly to include any article contained in baggage, even when in commercial quantities.

The court interpreted Section 80's phrase "any article" to be sufficiently comprehensive to include articles not forming bona fide baggage or falling within the restricted definition of "personal effects," so long as they are contained in baggage and a declaration under Section 77 has been made and the request under Section 80 given. The court emphasized that by making such a declaration and request the passenger expresses an intention not to import the article. Where an article is entrusted to the proper officer for detention under Section 80 and remains under customs control (not carried beyond the customs barrier), the court concluded there is no "import" within the meaning of the Customs Act.

To support this conclusion the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in The Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Committee, Wardha, which held that "import" involves more than mere bringing into the territorial limits; it requires incorporation and mixing up of the goods with the mass of property in the local area. Applying that test, the court held that goods not unloaded from the carrier or not brought beyond the customs barrier and which are entrusted for re-export are not "imported" for the purposes of Sections 110 and 111.

The court considered and rejected reliance on State of Maharashtra v. George because that decision turned on a specific proviso in a Reserve Bank notification which required manifest declaration; there was no analogous provision in the Customs Act or Tourist Baggage Rules to justify narrowing "baggage" in Section 80 to personal luggage only. The court also examined an unreported Madras High Court decision (A. Shaukataly) cited by the appellants, distinguishing it on its different facts (no declaration under Section 77 and evidence of intent to import).

The court further held that while acceptance of detention under Section 80 may initially be a discretionary act for the proper officer, once the discretion has been exercised and the article entrusted to the proper officer for detention, the officer is under a statutory obligation to return the article to the passenger on his leaving India and cannot later revoke that acceptance.

Finally, the court addressed the contention that statutory appeal and revision remedies precluded exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. It noted the Single Judge had already rejected that contention and that in the circumstances of the case the High Court was right in exercising its discretion to entertain the writ petition.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed. The seizure of the respondent's diamonds was unwarranted and illegal; the order of seizure was quashed and the packet containing the diamonds was to be returned to the respondent (this is the relief previously granted by the Single Judge and sustained on appeal).

Direct consequences recorded in the opinion:

  • The appeal was dismissed with costs.
  • Counsel's fee was assessed at Rs. 250.

Broader implications: The court's reasoning clarifies that, on the facts before it, goods declared and entrusted to the proper officer for detention under Section 80 are not to be treated as "imported" for the purpose of seizure under Sections 110(1) and 111(d) while they remain under customs control and are pending re-export. The opinion does not state that a new binding precedent is being laid down beyond the court's application of statutory interpretation and cited authorities in the present case.

A.N.K — Appeal dismissed.

    Union Of India & Others v. Khalil Kacherim

    S.N Andley, J.:— This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated August 26, 1968 of Tatachari, J. by which a writ petition filed by the respondent was allowed; the seizure of the diamonds belonging to the respondent was declared unwarranted and illegal; the order of seizure was quashed and the appellants were directed to return the packet containing diamonds to the respondent.

    The following facts led up to the filing of the writ petition. On August 14, 1967 the respondent arrived from overseas by an Air France flight at Palam Airport, New Delhi. Upon arrival at the airport, he requested the Customs Officer on duty to keep in customs custody a packet which was declared by him to contain four smaller packets containing diamonds of the value of approximately $ 34,000. Thereupon the Customs Officer on duty issued a detention receipt stating that one packet containing four smaller packets said to contain diamonds of the value of $ 34,000 sealed with the passenger's own seal and the customs seal over his signature had been received. It was further stated on the face of this receipt by the Customs Officer “declared re-export allowed” and “declared-pending re-export out of India.” The respondent thereafter left for Bombay from where he returned on August 24, 1967 on which date he was to fly by an Air France flight leaving New Delhi at night. Before his departure, the respondent requested for return of the diamonds as he was leaving India but they were not delivered back or released. The respondent, therefore, did not leave by the Air France flight and approached the appellants again on the following day for delivery of the diamonds. The diamonds were not returned but in the evening the respondent's statement was recorded. On August 26, 1967 a Panchanama was prepared wherein it was stated, inter alia, “since the diamonds which were detained for re-export on August 14, 1967 vide D.R No. 1372/88 are liable for confiscation under the Customs Act, 1962 (No. 52 of 1962), the diamonds are accordingly seized under section 110 of the same act.” A demand for return of the diamonds was made on August 30, 1967 and since it was not complied with, the respondent filed Civil Writ No. 1300 of 1967 in this Court.

    It is not disputed that the detention receipt aforesaid was issued to the respondent under Section 80 of the Customs Act, 1962 after the respondent had made the declaration contemplated by section 77 of the said Act. These two sections appear in Chapter XI of this Act which contains special provisions regarding baggage, goods imported or exported by post, and stores and are in these terms :—

    Section 77.—“The owner of any baggage shall, for the purpose of clearing it, make a declaration of its contents to the proper officer.”

    Section 80.—“Where the baggage of a passenger contains any article which is dutiable or the import of which is prohibited and in respect of which a true declaration has been made under Section 77, the proper officer may, at the request of the passenger, detain such article for the purpose of being returned to him on his leaving India.”

    Two other provisions of this Act which have a material bearing on this case are Section 110(1) and Section 111(d). Section 110(1) gives power to the proper officer to seize any goods if he has reason to believe that they are liable to confiscation under this Act. Section 111 provides that certain goods brought from a place outside India shall be liable to confiscation and clause (d) provides for confiscation of “any goods which are imported or attempted to be imported or are brought within the Indian customs waters for the purpose of being imported, contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force.”

    The contention of the appellants is that the diamonds in question were seized under Section 110(1) because they were imported or attempted to be imported contrary to the prohibition contemplated by clause (d) of Section 111. The prohibition is said to be contained in the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958 which were framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 75 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 and which, it is not disputed, are applicable in respect of the Customs Act, 1962. Clause 3(1) of these rules provides that the personal effects imported by a tourist shall be allowed to be imported temporarily free of import duty, provided that they are for the personal use of the tourist, are carried on the person of or in the luggage accompanying the tourist, that there is no reason to fear abuse, and that these personal effects are exported by the tourist on his leaving India for a foreign destination. The Explanation to this clause defines “personal effects” as meaning all clothing and other articles which a tourist may personally and reasonably require including, inter alia, personal jewellery but excluding all merchandise imported for commercial purposes.

    There is no doubt that the diamonds in question are in such quantities and are of such value that they cannot be described as “personal jewellery” which is included in the term “personal effects” as defined by this explanation and that being so, they can be treated only as merchandise. These diamonds must, therefore, be treated as goods import whereof or an attempt to import which would make them liable to confiscation under Clause (d) of Section 111 and liable to seizure under sub-section (1) of Section 110 of the said Act.

    The main contention of the appellants is that these diamonds are not “baggage” within the meaning of Sections 77 and 80 read with the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958 and, therefore, the detention receipt issued to the respondent under Section 80 would be of no avail to protect him against the application of Section 110(1) and Section 111(d) of the said Act.

    The expression “baggage” has not been defined by the said Act but it is included in the definition of “goods” in sub-section 22 of section 2. The definition of “goods” given in this act is an inclusive definition and, apart from baggage, it also includes “any other kind of moveable property.” One argument of the appellants is that since “baggage” is included in “goods”, the latter cannot be included in the former. This argument loses sight of the fact that “any other kind of moveable property” is also included in the definition of “goods”. Any item of moveable property or any article which may be “goods” can, therefore, be a part of or contained in “baggage”.

    In the said Act and the rules framed thereunder a distinction has been made between “baggage” and “bona fide baggage”. Section 79 talks of bona fide baggage which is exempt from customs duty and in respect of bona fide baggage the proper officer has been empowered to pass free of duty any article which is in the baggage of a passenger and which has been in his use for a prescribed minimum period or it is for his use or is a bona fide gift or souvenier. Therefore, any article in the baggage of a passenger even though it may be “goods” within the meaning of the Act will be allowed to be imported free of duty if it is passed under section 79 of this act. i, therefore, do not find any force in the contention that an article of moveable property which is included in “goods” cannot be included in “baggage”.

    Baggage is synonymous with luggage. Webster gives the following meaning of baggage :—

    “a group of travelling bags, trunks, or both especially when packed and in transit: personal belongings of travellers either carried by hand or checked with a carrier: luggage”.

    The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives the following meaning to baggage:—

    “The collection of property in packages that a traveller takes with him on a journey: Luggage.”

    Therefore, the word “baggage” is a comprehensive term which means the luggage of a passenger, accompanied or unacompanied, and comprises of the trunks or bags and the personal belongings of the passenger contained therein and it must be in this comprehensive sense in which “baggage” has been used in Sections 77 and 80 of the Customs Act. If “baggage” in section 80 of this act means only bona fide baggage as contemplated by clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958, there will hardly be any occasion for the application of Section 80 of the Customs Act. I am, therefore, of the opinion that “baggage” has to be given the larger and ordinary meaning.

    Section 80 talks of “any article” which is dutiable or the import of which is prohibited and the expression “any article” is comprehensive enough to include an article which is not a part of bona fide baggage as contemplated by section 79 or “personal effects” as specified by clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules. It may be contained in the baggage of a passenger. If the passenger declares such an article under Section 77, he may still import it if he is prepared to pay the duty and if its import is not prohibited. If the passenger is not prepared to pay the duty and/or cannot produce the requisite import license, he will not be allowed to clear it for import. In such a case, he may make a request to the proper officer to detain such article for the purpose of being returned to him on his leaving India. It does not matter if the article is in such quantities or is of such value that it is an article of merchandise and cannot be said to be comprised in bona fide baggage or personal effects. The only requirement of Section 80 is that such an article is contained in the baggage in the larger sense which includes the trunks and bags in which the luggage is contained. By making the declaration under Section 77 and the request under Section 80, the passenger expresses his intention not to import such an article. That being so, it cannot be said that such an article has been imported or attempted to be imported within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 111 or becomes liable to seizure under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act. I am, therefore, of the view that the term “baggage” as used in section 77 and 80 of this act, is not confined merely to bona fide baggage within the meaning of Section 79 of the Act or to personal effects as defined by Clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958 and includes any article contained in the baggage even though it be in commercial quantities.

    Reliance has been placed by the appellants on a decision of the Supreme Court in re: State of Maharashtra v. George(1). That was a case under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The passenger was carrying gold bars concealed in a jacket which he wore. He remained sitting in the plane which was on a flight from Zurich to Manila and which landed enroute at Santa Cruz Airport in Bombay. The passenger was asked by the Customs authorities to come out of the plane and the gold was seized. The gold was not declared or entered in the manifest of the plane. It was contended on behalf of the passenger that the gold was his personal luggage and not cargo and, therefore, it was not necessary to have it declared and entered in the manifest. Such declaration was required by the second proviso to the notification issued on November 8, 1962 under Section 8(1). This notification gave general permission, inter alia, to the bringing of gold into any port or place in India when the gold was on through transit to a place outside the territory of India but the second proviso required that such gold must be declared in the manifest for transit as ‘same bottom cargo’ or ‘transhipment cargo’. This notification superseded an earlier notification dated August 25, 1948 which did not contain any provision like the second proviso to the notification dated November 8, 1962. It is relevant to mention that it was conceded on behalf of the State of Maharashtra “that if the exemption notification which applied to the present case was that contained in the notification of the Reserve Bank dated August 25, 1948 the respondent had not committed any offence since (a) he was a through passenger from Geneva to Manila as shown by the ticket which he had and the manifest of the aircraft, and besides (b) he had not even got down from the plane”. It was, therefore, by reason of the second proviso that it was held by the Supreme Court “that the proper construction of the term ‘cargo’ when it occurs in the notification of the Reserve Bank is that it is used as contradistinguished from personal luggage in the law relating to the carriage of goods.” In the absence of a similar provision under the Customs Act or in the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958, I do not find it possible to accept the contention of the appellants that “baggage” used in Section 80 of the Customs Act means only personal baggage or bona fide baggage under Section 79 or personal effects under Clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules. I may only add that merchandise per se is not excluded from the term “personal effects” used in the explanation to Clause 3 of the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958. The exclusion is in respect of merchandise which is imported for commercial purposes.

    The next question, therefore, that arises is whether the diamonds in question which were undoubtedly merchandise were imported for commercial purposes so as to attract the provisions of Sections 111(d) and 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Tourist Baggage Rules, 1958. Import has been defined in the Customs Act as bringing into India from a place outside India and upon this definition the contention of the appellants is that the moment the plane landed at Palam Airport, there was an import of the diamonds into India which includes the territorial waters of India. I am not prepared to accept this contention because if this contention is accepted any goods or articles which are contained in a plane which has landed in India or in a ship which has entered the territorial waters of India would be liable to the payment of duty or to confiscation if the import thereof is prohibited even though the goods or articles are not unloaded from the plane, or the ship for being brought into India. I find support for this conclusion upon the decision of the Supreme Court in re: The Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., The Express Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Wardha(2) reported in AIR 1958 S.C 341 where it has been held that if goods are not unloaded from the carrier, they would not be said to have been imported into the municipality within the meaning of section 66 (1)(o) which provided for a terminal tax on goods or animals imported into the limits of the municipality. The Supreme Court has further held that :—

    “import is not merely the bringing into but comprises something more i.e ‘incorporating and mixing up of the goods imported with the mass of the property’ in the local area.”

    Unless, therefore, the goods are brought into the country for the purpose of use, enjoyment consumption, sale or distribution so that they are incorporated in and mixed up with the mass of the property in the country, they cannot be said to have been imported or brought into the country. That this is the meaning to be attached to the word “import” as used in the Customs Act is also clear from the explanation to clause (3) of the Tourist Baggage Rules which excludes only such merchandise from the term “personal effects” as is imported for commercial purposes. The object of section 80 is to exclude any article from the purview of section 110 and 111 if a declaration is made under section 77 and the article is entrusted to the proper officer. If the article is so entrusted, there are no commercial purposes which can be achieved. In my view, therefore, there is no import within the meaning of the Customs Act in a case where the goods are entrusted under section 80 and are not carried by the passenger beyond the customs barrier. Reliance has been placed by the appellants upon an unreported decision of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court which was delivered on February 7, 1968 in writ petition No. 1924 of 1967 in re: A. Shaukataly v. The Collector of Customs, Madras(3). In that case no declaration was made under section 77 by the passenger. In fact, it appears from the judgment that the passenger did not ask that the brief-case containing precious stones should be bonded. It further appears that the passenger came out with a request for bonding only after the cloth bags containing the precious stones had been cut and the precious stones had been discovered. On the facts, therefore, there was a clear intention on the part of the passenger to import or to make an attempt to import precious stones. The learned Judge distinguished the Supreme Court decision in the case of the Central India Spinning and Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (2), on the ground that the Municipalities Act did not contain the definition of the word “import”. With respect, I differ from the view expressed because it is apparent from the judgment of the Supreme Court that section 66(1)(o) of the said Act talks of import into or export from the limits of the Municipality.

    The next argument on behalf of the appellants is that it is the discretion of the proper officer whether or not to accept for detention any article which is given to him under Section 80 of the Customs Act and, therefore, even if the discretion has been exercised, it can be revoked subsequently. It may be that it is a matter of discretion with the proper officer to accept or not to accept but once the discretion has been exercised, the proper officer is under a statutory obligation to return the article to the passenger on his leaving India and there is no question of his being entitled to revoke the discretion subsequently.

    The last argument which was addressed by the appellants was that the Customs Act contains provisions for appeal and revision against any action that may be taken under the Act and, therefore, this Court should not interfere in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such an argument was addressed before the learned Single Judge also and was repelled. The learned Single Judge exercised his discretion by entertaining the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In my view, the learned Single Judge was right in exercising his discretion in the circumstances of this case.

    I, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs. 250.

    S.N Shankar, J.—I agree.

    A.N.K Appeal dismissed.
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    Comments

    Union Of India & Others v. Khalil Kacherim
    (Oct 14, 1968)