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  • provisions of section 12, sub-section (2)(c) and sub clause (1) of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act
  • section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act (hereafter called the Abolition Act)
  • section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1963,
  • section 29 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
  • section 11 of the Abolition Act. Looking at section 92 of the Abolition Act,
  • provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Abolition Act. Rule 4
  • Punjab Tenancy Act (16 of 1887 as applied to Himachal Pradesh).
  • section 7(1) of the Orrissa Tenints Protection Act 3 of 1948,
  • provision similar to section 9 of the Madras Abolition Act
  • section 12 of the Abolition Act, the Compensation
  • provisions contained in section 12(2)(c) and (4).
  • section 12(2)(c) and 12(4) of the Abolition Act
  • section 12(2)(c) and (4) of the Abolition Act.
  • section 9 of the Abolition Act, section 11
  • section 9(4)(c) of the Madras Abolition Act
  • section 12(2) and (4) of the Abolition Act.3.
  • Bhopal State Land Revenue Act 4 of 1932,
  • section 9 of the Madras Abolition Act.
  • sections 79, 92, 95, 97, 104, 105 and 106
  • SECTION 188 SEA CUSTOMS ACT
  • Abolition Act. Rule 3 of the Rules
  • section 11 of the Abolition Act
  • section 20 of the Abolition Act
  • section 12 of the Abolition Act
  • provision of sub-section (2),
  • Abolition Act. Section 11
  • section 9(1) of that Act
  • section 11, Civil P. C.
  • Land Reforms Rules,
  • issue.8. Section 10
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 12, sub-section (2)(c) and sub clause (1) of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act
  • section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act (hereafter called the Abolition Act)
  • section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1963,
  • section 29 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
  • section 11 of the Abolition Act. Looking at section 92 of the Abolition Act,
  • provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Abolition Act. Rule 4
  • Punjab Tenancy Act (16 of 1887 as applied to Himachal Pradesh).
  • section 7(1) of the Orrissa Tenints Protection Act 3 of 1948,
  • provision similar to section 9 of the Madras Abolition Act
  • section 12 of the Abolition Act, the Compensation
  • provisions contained in section 12(2)(c) and (4).
  • section 12(2)(c) and 12(4) of the Abolition Act
  • section 12(2)(c) and (4) of the Abolition Act.
  • section 9 of the Abolition Act, section 11
  • section 9(4)(c) of the Madras Abolition Act
  • section 12(2) and (4) of the Abolition Act.3.
  • Bhopal State Land Revenue Act 4 of 1932,
  • section 9 of the Madras Abolition Act.
  • sections 79, 92, 95, 97, 104, 105 and 106
  • SECTION 188 SEA CUSTOMS ACT
  • Abolition Act. Rule 3 of the Rules
  • section 11 of the Abolition Act
  • section 20 of the Abolition Act
  • section 12 of the Abolition Act
  • provision of sub-section (2),
  • Abolition Act. Section 11
  • section 9(1) of that Act
  • section 11, Civil P. C.
  • Land Reforms Rules,
  • issue.8. Section 10
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — I.D. Dua, C.J. (Revisions Nos. 41, 42 & 47 of 1967)

Factual and Procedural Background

The three revisions arising from common questions were heard together; the opinion adverts to the facts of Civil Revision No. 41 of 1967.

Plaintiffs Balak Ram and Shiv Ram instituted a suit for a perpetual injunction against Kanehya (defendant), seeking to restrain him from interfering with their possession of land (15 bighas 13 biswas, village Rajana). Plaintiffs alleged they were owners in possession, while the defendant appeared in revenue records as a tenant. The defendant applied under section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act ("the Abolition Act") to acquire proprietary rights on the basis of the entries in the revenue papers.

The Compensation Officer initially rejected the defendant's application, holding the defendant was neither a tenant nor in possession. On appeal the District Judge, Mahasu, reversed that finding and held that the defendant was a tenant and in possession and thus entitled to acquire ownership under the Abolition Act. The plaintiffs claimed the District Judge's judgment was illegal and sought a perpetual injunction to prevent the defendant from taking possession on the basis of that judgment.

At trial five issues were framed (two of them preliminary raising questions under section 12(2)(c) and section 12(4) of the Abolition Act and res judicata). The trial Court treated issues Nos. 1 and 2 as preliminary, admitted the District Judge's judgment in evidence, found for the defendant on those issues and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with costs. The plaintiffs' first appeal to the learned District Judge was dismissed on 21st December, 1966, the appellate Court agreeing with the trial Court's decision on the preliminary issues and declining to try the remaining issues as a matter of convenience and avoidance of delay.

The plaintiffs then filed the present revisions. Two central questions were referred for decision (formulated during earlier proceedings before Andley, J.), and the present Division Bench considered those questions and the scheme of the Abolition Act to decide whether civil courts have jurisdiction to decide whether an applicant under section 11 is a tenant and whether a Compensation Officer's decision on tenancy is res judicata in a civil suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit in a civil Court challenging the finding of the Compensation Officer that an applicant under section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1963, is or is not a tenant is competent?
  2. Whether a decision of the Compensation Officer holding a person to be a tenant will be res judicata in a civil suit where the aforesaid finding is challenged?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Compensation Officer is invested only with the power to determine the amount of compensation payable under the Abolition Act and not to decide the title or status questions conclusively.
  • Consequently, the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts to determine whether the applicant under section 11 is a tenant is not ousted by the Abolition Act either expressly or by necessary implication.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The order of the learned District Judge under the Abolition Act is final and binding and operates as res judicata; the defendant has become owner by virtue of that order and is in possession, so no injunction should issue against him.
  • The civil Court's jurisdiction is barred by the provisions of section 12(2) and (4) of the Abolition Act (as interpreted by an earlier decision, Daulat Ram v. Huma Nand).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Daulat Ram v. Huma Nand, A.I.R. 1965 H.P. 64 The decision (by the learned Judicial Commissioner) holding that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred by the Abolition Act (i.e., that Compensation Officer's orders are final and exclude civil court jurisdiction). The Court questioned the correctness of this decision and concluded that it does not correctly construe section 12 of the Himachal Abolition Act for the purposes of the question before it.
Addanki Tiruvekata Thata v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 807 Held that under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act the question whether an inam village is an "inam estate" is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal on appeal; civil Courts have no jurisdiction to determine it (exclusion by necessary implication). The Court treated this Supreme Court decision as the authority relied upon by Daulat Ram; it was used for comparison (Madras Act provisions) and the Court found Addanki distinguishable on statutory differences.
The Queen v. The Commissioners For Special Purposes of the Income Tax, 21 Q.B.D. 313 (1882) General principle: when statute creates a tribunal to decide facts, the legislature may give it power to determine preliminary facts; whether tribunals can conclusively decide such facts depends on the statute and appeals provided. The Court quoted and applied the principle to explain the general approach to interpreting statutes that create special tribunals and to frame the issue of whether the Abolition Act intended to exclude civil court jurisdiction.
Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. Established that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred; such exclusion must be explicit or clearly implied; civil courts can examine non-compliance with fundamental provisions or lack of adherence to basic judicial procedure. Used to support the proposition that statutes ousting civil court jurisdiction must be strictly construed and that civil courts retain jurisdiction where statutory tribunals have acted in violation of fundamental principles.
Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesfer (quoted) Principle that where statute creates a liability and prescribes a specific remedy, the party must adopt statutory remedy for that class of cases. Quoted as part of the general principles governing the exclusion of civil court jurisdiction; used to emphasize that the particular terms of a statute govern whether ordinary courts are ousted.
Neville v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., 1919 A.C. 368 House of Lords approval of Willes J.'s reasoning regarding statutory remedies and exclusive procedure. Cited for the general principle on statutory remedies and exclusive jurisdiction; used as part of the doctrinal background.
Firm I.S. Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1934 S.C. 322 Commentary on Mask & Co.: even if jurisdiction is excluded, civil courts can examine non-compliance with fundamental provisions or breach of essential principles of judicial procedure; but not every error on merits justifies civil court intervention. Quoted to qualify the scope of Mask & Co. and to show limits of civil court review where statutory machinery exists.
Custodian Evacuee Property Punjab v. Jafran Begum, 1968 3 D.L.T. 36 Noted that observations in Mask & Co. were in some respects too widely stated; referenced the limits of the Mask doctrine. Referred to as further authority refining the principles about exclusion of civil court jurisdiction.
Magiti Sasamal v. Punjab Bissol, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 547 Dealt with scope and effect of a statutory provision postulating landlord-tenant relationship and conferring exclusive jurisdiction on an administrative authority for specified disputes; observed it unreasonable to hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant fell within the Collector's exclusive purview. Used to support the proposition that statutes conferring exclusive jurisdiction should be strictly construed and that status questions may remain open to civil courts.
Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani, A.T.R. 1966 S.C. 1718 Principle that the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a civil Court must establish that contention; statutes ousting civil court jurisdiction deserve strict construction. Cited to reinforce that exclusion of ordinary court jurisdiction is not presumed and must be shown clearly.
Shri Raja Durga Singh v. Tholu, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 361 Earlier Supreme Court view consistent with strict approach to statutory exclusion of civil jurisdiction. Referred to as supporting precedent for allowing civil courts to try suits raising title questions despite statutory regimes.
Husein Miya Documiya v. Chandubhai Jethabhai, A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 239 Case cited by respondent (no detailed principle extracted in the opinion). Cited by the respondent; the Court recorded the citation among other authorities referred to by parties.
Edward Keventars v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (L.P.A. 113 D of 1963) 1967 2 D.L.T. 16 S.N. An unreported Bench decision of this Court referenced by the respondent (no detailed principle extracted in the opinion). Recorded as a citation relied upon by the respondent in support of his contention; no further detailed reliance explained in the opinion.
Beant Singh v. State of Punjab, 1966 68 P.L.R. 221 Listed among additional cases referred to at the bar (no specific principle extracted in the opinion). Noted by the Court among other decisions referred to; the opinion did not treat it as determinative for the present questions.
Faqir Singh v. Mst. Gurbachan Kaur, A.I.R. 1961 Puni. 16; Kundun v. Sardara Ramji Lal, A.T.R. 1959 Puni. 206; Des Raj v. Ram Singh, A.I.R. 1955 Punj. 92; Sir Sobha Singh & Sons v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1967 Puni. 193; Girish Chandra v. Manilal, A.I.R. 1960 Assam 59; Benudhar Dalai v. The State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1958 Orissa 197; Kithan Sah v. Harinanian Prasad Sah, A.I.R. 1963 Pat. 79 F.B; Patna Municipal Corporation v. Ram Bachan Lal, A.I.R. 1961 Pat. 142 Various regional decisions cited by counsel at the bar; the opinion does not extract detailed principles from each citation. Collectedly noted by the Court as decisions cited by the parties; the opinion records these citations but does not base its primary reasoning solely upon them.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act (the "Abolition Act"), focusing on Chapter III (sections 9 to 27) which deals with tenants acquiring proprietary rights. The Court summarized key statutory provisions and rules as they bear on the questions raised:

  • Section 9: provides for appointment and guiding instructions for the Compensation Officer (broad administrative and adjudicatory functions connected with the Act).
  • Section 10: empowers the State Government to exercise superintendence over Compensation Officers and to cancel or revise their orders, subject to exceptions for orders which are appealable under the Act.
  • Section 11: provides for tenants' applications to acquire proprietary rights.
  • Section 12: prescribes determination of compensation; notably, section 12(2)(c) provides for a second appeal to the Judicial Commissioner "whose decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court or before any authority" and section 12(4) states decisions are binding on all persons claiming an interest in the holding concerned, subject to subsection (2).
  • Section 20: contemplates reference by the Compensation Officer to a competent civil Court where a dispute arises between persons claiming compensation.
  • Section 25: grants Compensation Officers powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for certain purposes.
  • Rules (Rule 3 and Rule 4): prescribe procedures for applications under section 11 and for objections and determination of compensation.

The Court then evaluated the central contention that the Compensation Officer's jurisdiction extended beyond determining compensation to conclusively adjudicating the tenant status of applicants and that, by necessary implication, civil courts are thereby ousted from deciding such status questions.

The Court acknowledged that, for the confined purpose of determining the amount of compensation under section 12, the Compensation Officer might, by necessary implication, determine whether an applicant is a tenant. However, the Court drew a distinction between (a) determining the preliminary question of tenant status insofar as that fact is necessary to calculate compensation under the Act, and (b) conferring finality on that determination so as to exclude civil courts from adjudicating title or status disputes in suits properly brought before them.

To test the argument of exclusive finality, the Court compared the relevant provisions of the Himachal Act with the Madras Estates Act considered in Addanki's case. The Court observed that Addanki (and the Madras Act provisions relied upon there) contained specific wording, notably in section 9(4)(c) and section 9(6) of the Madras Act, which expressly barred judicial questioning of the Tribunal's decision and made findings conclusive in a way that the Himachal provisions do not replicate.

The Court reviewed governing principles from authorities on statutory exclusion of ordinary jurisdiction:

  • Where a special tribunal is created, whether it can conclusively determine preliminary facts depends upon the statute and any appeal provisions (quoting The Queen v. Commissioners...).
  • Exclusion of civil jurisdiction must be explicit or clearly implied; civil courts retain the power to examine non-compliance with fundamental statutory provisions or breaches of essential principles of judicial procedure (Mask & Co.; Firm I.S. Chetty).
  • Statutes intended to oust ordinary jurisdiction are to be strictly construed, and the onus is on the party asserting exclusion to establish it (Abdul Waheed Khan; related authorities).

Applying these principles, the Court concluded:

  • Although a Compensation Officer may have to decide whether an applicant is a tenant for the narrow purpose of determining compensation, the Abolition Act does not (expressly or by necessary implication, on the language before the Court) vest such a finding with conclusive, binding effect that ousts the ordinary civil courts from deciding title or status questions in suits.
  • Section 20, which contemplates reference to civil courts for disputes between persons claiming compensation, indicates that the legislative scheme did not intend to deprive civil courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate title or status disputes when such disputes arise among claimants.
  • The binding effect declared in section 12(2)(c) and 12(4) is, in the Court's view, confined to the determination of the amount of compensation (and proceedings under the Act) and was not intended to make the Compensation Officer's finding on tenant status absolutely conclusive in all fora.
  • The Court found that Daulat Ram's interpretation (that civil courts were barred from trying such questions) did not correctly construe section 12 of the Himachal Abolition Act and was distinguishable from Addanki because of textual differences in the Madras Act.

On this analysis, the Court held that the trial Court erred in treating the District Judge's order under the Abolition Act as a bar to the plaintiffs' suit and in dismissing the suit on preliminary issues without allowing the civil suit to proceed to trial on the merits of title and possession.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revisions are allowed. The Court set aside the trial Court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that the findings under the Abolition Act barred civil court jurisdiction, and remitted the case to the trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law and in light of the Court's observations. The Court expressly held that the plaintiff's suit was not barred.

Implications:

  • The direct effect: The trial Court's dismissal is set aside and the matter is remitted for further proceedings; the plaintiffs' civil suit may proceed to have the question of ownership and possession (tenant status) adjudicated by the civil Court.
  • The Court expressed the view that the earlier decision in Daulat Ram's case did not correctly state the law insofar as it held that the Abolition Act ousted the civil court's jurisdiction to decide whether an applicant under section 11 is a tenant; the present decision rejects that construction for the issues before this Bench.
  • The Court limited the binding reach of section 12(2)(c) and 12(4) to the determination of compensation under the Act rather than to conclusively determining title/status for all purposes; section 20's provision for reference to civil courts supports that limitation.
  • Costs: In the peculiar circumstances of this case, there was no order as to costs.

Disposition: Revision allowed; order of trial Court set aside; case remitted for further proceedings.

    Balak Ram v. Kanehya

    I.D Dua, C.J:— These three revisions (Civil Revisions Nos. 41, 42, and 47 of 1967) raising, as they do, a common question, are being disposed of by one judgment. The facts of C.R No. 41 of 1967 alone may be adverted to. Balak Ram and Shiv Ram, sons of Bali Ram, instituted a suit for permanent injunction against Kanehya, son of Bhajju. restraining him from interfering with, their possession of the suit land measuring 15 bighas 13 biswas situated in village Rajana, Fargana Jajhot, Kasumpti. It was alleged by the plaintiffs that they were the owners in possession of the land in dispute and that Kanehya defendant had been wrongly recorded in the revenue papers to be in possession of the suit land as a tenant. The defendant had made an application before the Compensation Officer, Mahasu for acquiring proprietary rights of the land in dispute under section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act (hereafter called the Abolition Act) on the basis of the aforasaid entries in revenue papers. The Compensation Officer had rejected that application by holding that the defendant was neither a tenant nor in possession of the land in dispute. On appeal, however, the learned District Judge, Mahasu, reversed that finding and held that Kanehya defendant was a tenant of the land in dispute and was also in possession thereof and was thus entitled to acquire its ownership under the Abolition Act. The plaintiffs pleaded that the judgment of the learned District Judge was illegal, against facts and inoperative. As Kanehya defendant was threatening to take possession of the land in dispute on the strength of the judgment of the learned District Judge, it was prayed that he be restrained by a perpetual injun-tion from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession.

    2. The suit was contested by the defendant and it was inter alia pleaded that the order of the learned District Judge under the Abolition Act was final and binding on the parties to the suit and operated as res judicata. The defendant claimed to have become the owner of the land in dispute by virtue of the said order and being in possession, there was no point in granting any injunction against him. The jurisdiction of the civil Court was also challenged on the basis of section 12(2) and (4) of the Abolition Act.

    3. The trial Court framed on 7th July. 1965 the following five issues on the merits:—

    “1. Whether the suit is not barred by the provisions of section 12, sub-section (2)(c) and sub clause (1) of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act and is maintainable in face of the judgment of the learned District Judge, Mah-asu dated 5th September 1964? O P.P

    2. Whether the suit is barred by res-judicata in view of the judgment of the learned District Judge, Mahasu dated 5th September 1964? O.P.D

    3. Whether the plaintiffs are in possessien cf the land in suit as owners and as such the suit for mere injurction in maintainable? O.P.P

    4. Whether the defendant interferes with the possession of the plaintiffs? O.P.P

    5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to permanent injunction? O.P.P”

    4. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 were treated as preliminary issues. No evidence was led by the plaintiffs thereon, but the defendant produced a copy of the judgment of the learned District Judge dat d 5th September, 1964 which was exhibited as Exhibit D.A The Court found both these issues in favour of the defendant and dismissed the plaiatiffs' suit with. costs.

    5. The plaintiffs took the matter on appeal to the Court of the learned District Judge, but the conclusions of the trial Court were affirmed by him on 21st December, 1966. After agreeing with the trial Court on the decision of the two issues, the learned District Judge dealt with another point raised on behalf of the appellants It was argued that these two issues could not be treated as prelimina’.y issues and that the trial Court should also have decided issues Nos. 3, 4 and 5 and afforded an opportunity to the plaintiffs to prove their case. * * and observed that trial of all the issues would have unnecessarily delayed the final disposal of the case, thereby causing to the parties inconvenience and unnecessary expenditure In the final result, however, as the conclusions of the trial Court were affirmed, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

    6. These revisions came up for hearing before Andley, J. before whom, the following two questions were raised by the counsel for the petitioners:—

    “1. Whether a suit in a civil Court challenging the finding of the Compensation Officer that an applicant under section 11 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1963, is or is not a tenant is competent? and

    2. Whether decision of the Compensation Officer holding a person to be a tenant will be res judicata in a civil suit where the aforesaid finding is challenged?”

    7. The correctness of the decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, in Daulat Ram v. Huma Nand . A.I.R 1965 H. P. 64., according; to which the jarisdiction of the civil Court is barred, was questioned on behalf of the plaintiff-petitioners As Andlev, J entertained some doubt about the correctness of the decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner, the case was directed 11 be placed before a Division Bench and it is in these circumstances that these three revisions have been posted tor disposal before us. To answer the two questions contained in the referring order, we have to turn to the scheme of the Abolition Act. The Abolition Act was brought on the statute book to provide for the abolition of big landed estates and to reform the law relating to tenancies in the Himachal Pradesh. It consists of 148 sections, divided into 10 Chapters and two Schedules. We are, however, concerned only with Chapter III which deals with acquisition of proprietary rights by tenants. This Chapter consists of sections 9 to 27. section 9 provides for the appointment of Compensation Officers to carry out the purposes of the Abolition Act, including partitions, operations in holdings, assessment of compensation and settlement of disputes between the landowners and their tenants Such officer is to be guided by such instructions, not inconsistent with the Act, as the State Government may from time to time issue.

    8. Section 10 empowers the State Government to give effect to the provisions of the abolition act and in particular to exercise control and superintendence over Compensation Officers and also to issue instructions for their guidance and to cancel or revise any of the orders acts or proceediags of such Compensation officers other than those orders in respect of which an appeal lies under the Abolition Act. Section 11 deals with the rights of tenants to acquire interests of landowners by means of an application to the Compensation Officer. Section 12 on which emphasis has been laid at the bar, provides for the determination of compensation and is in the following terms

    “12. Determination of compensation. (1) The amount of compen sation payable by a tenant for acquisition of the right, title and interest of the landowner in the land of. the tenancy shall be determined by the Compensation Officer in accordance with the provisions of the Schtdule.

    (2)(a) Any person aggrieved bv any order of the compensation officer under sub section (1) may, within forty-five days from the date of the order, appeal to the District Judge.

    (b) Where any such appeal is preferred to the District Judge, he shall cause to be published in the prescribed manner a notice requiring the landowner or the tenant, as the case may be, to appear before him and after-giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard shall give his decision.

    (c) As against the decision of the District Judge an appeal shall lie within such period as may be prescribed to the Judicial Commissioner whose decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court or before any authority.

    (3) No decision of the District Judge or the Judicial Commissioner under sub-section (2) shall be invalid by reason of any defect in the from of notice or manner of its publication.

    (4) Every decision of the Compensation Officer under this section shall, subject to the provision of sub-section (2), be binding on all persons claiming an interest in the holding concerned, notwithstanding any such person not having appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Compensation Officer, the District Judge or the Judicial Commissioner, as the case may be.’

    9. Section 20, providing for reference to civil Court, lays down that where a dispute arises between persons claiming compensation, the Compensation Officer shall require th m to refer their claims to a competent civil Court of Jurisdiction. By virtue of section 25 the compensation Officer has the powers of a civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of administering oaths, taking evidence and of enforcing attendance of witnesses and compelling production of documents and material objects. In Chapter III, no other section has been referred to at the bar. The only other sections of the abolition act to which reference has seriously been made, may now briefly be noticed. Thev are sections 79, 92, 95, 97, 104, 105 and 106 occaring in Chapter VIII dealing with the assumption of management and acquisition bv the State. Section 79 confers on the State Government the power to make rules relating to efficient cultivation and management, but this provision obviously does not help us in solving the problem before us. Section 92 preserves the right of persons to establish their claim in respect of any land or part theieof by due process of law in the Courts having jurisdiction. According to section 95, the order of the Compensation Officer deciding objections regarding entries in the Compensation Assessment Roll, is to be deemed to be a decree of the civil Court and it is to contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon an I the reasons for such decisions. Section 97 lays down that except a Court or authority before whom an appeal under Chapter VIII is pending against an order or decree of the Compensation Officer, no Court or authority shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, issue any jurisdiction against any person in respect of any proceedings pending before the Compensation Officer under Chapter VIII, which has the effect of staying the proceedings. Section 10 provides for appeals to the District Judge from any order of the Compensation Officer and a second appeal to the Judicial Commissioner from the decision of the District Judge. Section 105 provides for interference on revision by the Judicial Commissioner. Section 106 fixes the period of 45 days for appeals to the District Judge and of 90 days for appeals to the Judicial Commissioner under section 104.

    10. Reference at the bar has also been made to the Rules framed under the Abolition Act. Rule 3 of the Rules prescribes the form in which an application under section 11 of the Abolition Act for the grant of proprietary rights is to be made. Immediatelv on receipt of such application, the Compensation Officer has to cause it to be entered in his register in the prescribed form. After making necessary enquiries, the Compensation Officer is enjoined to proceed to determine the amount of compensation payable by the tenant to the landowner in accordance with the provisions of sections 12 and 13 of the Abolition Act. Rule 4 makes a provision for objections, but these objections are invited after the Compensation Officer has determined the amount of compensation If within the time allowed no objections, are received, or if they are received, and disposed of, the Compensation Officer is to finally determine the amount of compensation payable by the tenant to the landowner and direct the deposit of the amount in the treasury or the sub-treasury within the prescribed period.

    11. The learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioners has very strongly argued that the Compensation Officer constituted under the Abolition Act is invested with the power only of determining the amount of compensation and nothing else. If, therpfore, the landlord claims that the applicant under section 11 of the Abolition Act is net a tenant then the civil Court's jurisdiction is not barred by any provision contained in the Abolition Act either expressly or by necessary implication.

    12. Turning now to the decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner in Daulal Ram's case, we find that the finality of the orders of the Compensation Officer and the bar of jurisdiction of civil Court were founded on section 12(2)(c) and (4) of the Abolition Act. By virtue of section 9 of the Abolition Act, section 11 was held to extend to the controversies whether or not the petitioner under section 11 is a tenant. Section 92 being a general provision, was held not to override the special provisions contained in section 12(2)(c) and (4). In this decision, reliance was placed on a decison of the Supreme Court in Addanki Ttr-uvenkata Thata v. State of Andhra Pradesh . A. I. R. 1964 S.C.807, in which while dealing with the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Tyotwari) Act of 1948, it was held that the question as to whether an inam village (shro-triem) is an “inam estate” is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal on appeal and the civil Courts have no jurisdiction to determine it or retry it. The bar was held to arise by necessary implication. That implied exclusion of the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts in the reported case was founded on section 9 of the Madras Abolition Act. The section may now be read:—

    “9. (1) As soon as may be after the passing of the Act, the Settlement Officer may suo motu and shall, on application, enquire and determine whether any inam village in his jurisdiction is an inam estate or not

    (2) Before holding the inquiry, the Settlement Officer shall cause to be published in the village in the prescribed manner, “a notice requiring all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village to file before him statements bearing on the question whether the village is an inam estate or not.

    (3) The Settlement Officer shall then hear the parties and afford to them a reasonable opportunity of adducing all such evidence either oral or documentary as they may desire to, examine all such documents as he has reason to believe are in the possession of the Government and have a bearing on the question before him and give his decision in writing.

    (4)(a) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by a decision of the Settlement Officer under sub section (3) may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal.

    (b) Where any such appeal is preferred, the Tribunal shall cause to be published in the village in the prescribed manner, a notice requiring all persons who have applied to the Settlement Officer under sub sec. (l) or filed before him statements under sub-sec. (2) to appear before it, and after giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard give, its decision.

    (c) The decision of the Tribunal under this sub section shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law.

    (5) No decision of the Settlement Officer under sub-sec. (3) or of the Tribunal under sub-sec. (1) shall be invalid bv reason of any defect in the form of the notice referred to in sub-see. (2) or sub-sec. (4). as the case may be, or the manner of its publication.

    (6) Every decision of the Tribunal and subject to such decision everv decision of the Settlement Officer under this section shall be binding on all persons claiming an interest in any land in the village, notwithstanding that anv such person has not preferred any application or filed any statement or adduced any evidence or appeared or participated in the proceedings before the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal as the case may be.

    (7) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal may presume the an inam village is an inam estate.”

    13. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff petitioners the Supreme Court decision is distinguishable and the provisions of the abolition act which concern us, do not contain any provision similar to section 9 of the Madras Abolition Act which was, by necessary implication held to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in regard to the question of the statue as a tenant of the person applying under section 11 of the Act

    14. The general principles governing the exclusion of civil Court's jurisdiction, when a special Tribunal is created for the purpose of deciding a specified dispute under a statute, are quite well settled. The well known observations of Lord Esher, M R in The Queen v. The Commissioners For Special Purbos's of the Income Tax . I. R 18821 21 Q. B. D. 313 at 319, contain a clear enunciation of the basic principle. It was observed there thus:—

    “When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exer-cise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may by questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may entr-ust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or to do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none.,’ In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.”

    15. In Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.,4 it was staged to be settled law that the exculsion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exculsion must either be explicity expressed or clearly implied. It was also considered to be well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts hare jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. While considering the question whether section 188 of the Sea Customs Act excluded the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, it was clarified that the determination of this question must rest on the terms of the particular statute which is under consideration, and decisions on other statutory provisions are not of material assistance, except in so for as general principles of construction are laid down. The main principles were stated to be found in the well-known judgment of Willes J. in (Wolverhanpton New Waterworks Co v. Hawkesfer)5 which was held to be approved of in the House of Lords in Nevlley v. London Exbnss Newspaper Limited . 1919 A.C 368.. The following quotation from the judgment of Willes J was reproduced:—

    “Where the statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it …. with respect to that class it has always been held, that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute.’

    16. In Firm I.S Chetty & Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh . A.I.R 1934 S.C 322.. Gajendragadhkar, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of a Bench of five Judges, while commenting on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Mask & Co., made the following observations:—

    “Lord Thankerton who delivered the opinion of the Board, however, proceeded to add that ‘it is also well-settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in confirmity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. It is necessary to add that these observations, though made in somewhat wide terms, do not justify the assumption that if a decision has been made by a taxing authority under the provisions of the relevant taxing statute, its validity can be challanged by a suit on the ground that it is incorrect on the merits and as such, it can be claimed that the provisions of the said statute have not been complied with. Non compliance with the provisions of the statute to which reference is made by the Privy Council must, we think, be non compliance with such fundamental provision of the statute as would make the entire proceedings before the appropriate authority illegal and without jurisdiction. Similarly, if an appropriate authority has acted in violation of the fundamental principles or judicial procedure, that may also tend to make the proceedings illegal and void and this infirmity may effect the validity of the order passed by the authority in question. It is cases of this character where the defect or the infirmity in the order goes to the root of the order and makes it in law invalid and void that these observations may perhaps, be invoked in support of the plea that the civil court can exercise its jurisdiction notwithstanding a provision to the contrary contained in the relevant statute.”

    17. That the observations in Mask & Co'scase were in some respects too widely stated was repeated by the Supreme Court in Custodian Evacuee Property Punjab v. Jafran Begum . 1968 3 D.L.T 36, and reference was made to the earlier Supreme Court decision in the case of Firm I.S Chetty. In Magiti Sasamal v. Punjab Bissol . A.I.R 1962 S.C 547., while dealing with the scope and effect of section 7(1) of the Orrissa Tenints Protection Act 3 of 1948, the Court observed that this provision of law postulated the relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties and proceeded to provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Collector to try the five categories of disputes arising between the landlord and the tenant. It was unreasonable said the Court, to hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant also fell within the purview of that provision. In Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani . A.T.R 1966 S.C 1718., it was accepted as settled principles that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of a civil Court to establish his contention and that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a civil Court deserves to be strictly construed. While dealing with the Bhopal State Land Revenue Act 4 of 1932, the suit raising a question of title was held to be open to decision by a civil Court. Earlier, similar views had been expressed by the Supreme Court in Shri Raja Durga Singh v. Tholu . A I.R 1963 SC, 361., while dealing with the Punjab Tenancy Act (16 of 1887 as applied to Himachal Pradesh).

    18. It is unnecessary to refer to large number of other decisions cited at the bar. We may merely note them. The petitioner's learned counsel has in addition refered to Beant Singh v. State of Punjab . 1966 68 P.L.R 221., Faqir Singh v. Mst. Gurbachan Kaur . A.I R. 1961 Puni. 16., Kundun v. Sardara Ramji Lal . A.T.R 1959 Puni. 206., Des Raj v. Ram Singh . A.I.R 1955 Punj. 92., Sir Sobha Singh & Sons v. Delhi Administration . A.I.R 1967 Puni. 193, (a case of writ in the High Court), Girish Chandra v. Manilal . A I.R 1960 Assam 59. Benudhar Dalai v. The State of Orissa . A.I R. 1958 0rissa 197.. Kithan Sah v. Harinanian Prasad Sah . A.I R 1963 Pat. 79 F.B, and Patna Muicipa’ Corporation v. Earn Bachan Lal . A.I.R 1961 Pat 142.,.

    19. The respondent's learned counsel has in addition to the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh referred as to Husein Miya Documiya v. Chandubhai Jethabhai . A.I.R 1954 Bom. 239. and an unreported Bench decision of this Court in Edward Keventars v. New Delhi Municipal Committed . 1967 2 D.L.T 16 SN., L.P.A 113 D of 1963 decided on 31st January, 1967, noted in the Short Notes of Cases of 1967 D.L.T 16 S.N at p 9.

    20. Now, applying the principles of law discussed earlier to the provisions of the abolition act, it is obvious that the Compensation Officer is appointed only for carrying out the purposes of the Act including partition, operations in holdings, assessment of Compensation and settlement of disputes between the landowners and their tenants. There is no express power conferred on this officer to adjudicate upon the status or title of the parties for the purposes of determining the applicability of the Act. The sole argument is based on the contention that by necessary implication, such power must be deemed to be possessed by the Compensation Officer and must also by necessary implication be intended to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the civil Court. We have to see if this argument is valid. For the purpose of determining the amount of compensation under section 12 of the Abolition Act, the Compensation Officer may, by necessary implication, be held to possess the power to determine whether or not the applicant under section 11 of the Abolition Act is a tenant, but we are disinclined, as at present advised, to hold that such a finding would be binding on the parties even when the civil Court is approathed to adjudicate upon the existence of tenancy rights so as to exclude such Court's jurisdiction to finally determine the controversy. The binding effect as contemplated by section 12(2)(c) and 12(4) of the Abolition Act would seem to us to be confined to the determination of the amount of compensation and not to the question of the status of the alleged tenant, that the lawmaker did not intend the question of title to be finally determined by the Compensation Officer, may also be spelt out from section 20 of the Abolition Act which postulates reference to civil Court by the Compensation Officer of’ any dispute between the rival claimants to compensation. If an ancillary dispute in regard to title of the. rival claimants to the apportionment of compensation has been intended to be finally ‘settled by the civil Court, it is not easy to comprehend an intendment on the part of the law-maker to deprive a party of his right to have the question of title to the land itself finally determined by the civil-Court: Neither any principle nor any other binding precedent in support of such deprivation has been brought to our notice and the submission has been confined mainly to the ratio of the decision in Dauldt Ram's case. This decision.’ speaking with great respect, dress not seem to its to construe section 12′ of the Abolition Act correctly. As observed earlier, the decision in this case followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Addanki's case which dealt. with section 29 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, which has already been reproduced. It is quite clear that section 9(4)(c) of the Madras Abolition Act in terms expressly barred the jurisdiction of all Courts of law from questioning the correctness of the appellate decision. This clause read with section 9(6) can, in our view, rightly be held, to the extent of the question stated in section 9(i), to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the’ Settlement Officer and to preclude the civil Courts from trying or re-trying the same question. Now, the question posed in section 9(1) of that Act relates to thedeter-mination whether any inam village in the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer is or is not an inam estate. The Supreme Court after referring to various decisions, which we have already noticed, and quoting certain passages therefrom, expressed its opinion on the scope and effect of section 9 of the Madras Abolition Act in the following words:—

    “Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under S. 9 question the character of the property as not falling within the description of an ‘inam village’, he has of necessity to decide the issue, for until he holds that this condition is satisfied, he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which’ by S. 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct. On the terms of S. 9(1) the property in question being an ‘inam village’ is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the Settlement Officer to'detetmine'the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the forner; he cannot confer’ jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary ondition’ to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question, therefore, is (subject to the result of an appeal to the Triounal) bidding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings;’ under the ‘Act, ‘but no further. The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceeding in the ordinary Courts of the land where the question might arise for decision. The determination by him of the second question whether the ‘inam village’ is an inam estate is, however, within his exclusive jurisdiction and in regard to it the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is clearly barred. In this connection, we might refer to the decision of the Madras High Court in Venkatanarasayya v. State of Madras . I L R. 1962 Mad. 680 at p. 681., where Rajamannar, C.J said:—

    “if the grant is less than a village then obviously Madras Act XXVI of 1948 can have no application whatever. section 9 of that act provides for the determination after inquiry of the question whether any inam village is an inam estate or not. Presumably, when the contention is that the grant does not comprise a village, the proceedings under section 9 would not be strictly open to the aggrieved party………The aggrieved party will have a right of suit as he would have a good cause of action when proceedings are taken under colour of an Act which does not apply to the facts of the case.

    21. This correctly expresses the distinction between the two related questions and the effect of the decision on the preliminary condition.”

    22. On this ratio, the decision of the Compensation Officer on the question of the applicant under section 11 being a tenant, cannot be conclusive so as to exclude the jurisdiction of civil Courts to examine or re examine whether or not he is a tenant. In the Madras Abolition Act, the question whether an inam village is an inam estate alone was to be held to be excluded from the jurisdiction of civil Courts, but the finding whether the property in question is an inam village was not held to be solely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer so as to deprive the ordinary civil Courts of their jurisdiction to decide this question, if properly raised before them The Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Rules, also do not seem to us to contemplate any exclusive jurisdiction in the Compensation Officer to determine the question of the status as a tenant of the applicant under section 11 of the Abolition Act. Looking at section 92 of the Abolition Act, in the background of the foregoing discussion, in our view, the right of the Jand holder to establish in a competent civil Court that the person claiming to be his tenant is not a tenant, cannot be deemed to have been taken away or lost to him by virtue of sections 9, 11 and 12 or any other section in Part III of the Abolition Act. Once this question is decided in favour of the plaintiff-petitioners the second question would seem to present no difficulity. In so far as section 11, Civil P. C. is concerned, it can be attracted only when the prior Court was competent to try the subsequent suit. The general rule of res judicata is also difficult to apply, for, in suits, section 11 alone can be urged and not the general rule, and indeed no attempt has been made on behalf of the respondent to convass for a favourable decision on question No. 2 by applying either section 11 or the general doctrine of res judicata if the exclusion of jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Courts is not upheld under the first question.

    23. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that the plaintiff's suit in the case in hand was not barred, and the decision in Daulal Ram's case, if we may say so with all respect does not lay down the law correctly. This revision accordingly succeeds and allowing the same, we set aside the order of the trial Court and remit the case back to it for further proceedings in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. In the peculiar circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs.

    24. Revision allowed.

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    Balak Ram v. Kanehya
    (May 6, 1968)