Dua, J.:— The following Notification by the local Government Department (Committees) dated May, 16, 1966 was published on May 17, 1966, in the Punjab Government Gazette Extraordinary :—

“No. 4607-3CI-66/13449. Whereas the Municipal Committee, Simla, in the Simla District, due to the reasons given in the schedule below has been found to be incompetent to perform and has persistently made default in the performance of duties imposed on it by or under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911.

Now, therefore, in excercise of the powers conferred by section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, the Governor of Punjab hereby directs that the said Committee of Simla in the Simla District, shall be superseded with immediate effect and directs that all powers and duties of the said Committee shall until the Committee is reconstituted, be excercised and performed by an Administrator and hereby appoints the General Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Simla as Administrator of the Simla Municipality, in addition to his own duties till the appointment of a wholetime Administrator.

Schedule

(1) The Municipal Committee, Simla has failed to improve the working of Ripon Hospital, Simla.

(2) The Municipal Committee, Simla, has shown utter disregard in respect of proper maintenance of sanitary condition of Simla town.

(3) The Municipal Committee, Simla, has failed to improve the general condition of roads which is very bad. It adopted a discriminatory attitude in allotment of funds for repair of roads, concerning itself more with the patronage of members than with the welfare of general public, and without any consideration to the need of particular areas.

(4) The Municipal Committee, Simla ignored taking any action on the complaints received by it against the installation of a dry-cleaning and dyeing plant by Municipal Commissioner although the said plant was causing nuisance to the inhabitants of the area.

(5) The Municipal Committee, Simla, has been very neglectful in preventing unauthorised cutting of trees, a practice which is extremely harmful in hilly areas. It took no action in a complaint against a Municipal Commissioner and in a number of cases it regularised the unauthorised cutting by imposing fines.

(6) The Municipal Committee, Simla, grossly abused its powers in sanctioning construction of 6 shops by a Municipal Commissioner on the Northern side of the Mall Road, ignoring the orders of the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner putting restrictions on such constructions on the side of the Mall Road in question.

(7) The Municipal, Committee, Simla, acted in a mala fide manner and adopted discriminatory attitude in imposing unnecessary harsh conditions on Shri Avtar Singh while accepting his tender for lease of Stall No. 137, Lower Bazar, Simla.

(8) The Municipal Committee, Simla, has been contemptuously ignoring directions issued by Deputy Commissioner and deliberately delaying replies to his communications.

(9) The Municipal Committee, Simla, has been grossly delaying action on the complaints received from the Municipal employees and the public.

(10) The Municipal Committee, Simla, has failed to make full payment of its contribution to the Improvement Trusts, Simla, for the year 1965-66 and thus has not discharged its statutory obligation under section 68 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922.

P.N BHALLA,

Secretary to Government Punjab,

Local Government Department.”

The validity of this notification susperseding the Municipal Committee, Simla, is challenged before us in the two writ petitions (C. Ws. Petitions Nos. 42 and 44 of 1967).

Suraj Parkash, claiming to be a Municipal Commissioner, Simla, in the superseded Committee, is the sole petitioner in C.W Petition No. 42 of 1967. This petition was presented in the High Court of Judicature for the State of Punjab at Chandigarh on June 30, 1966, before the reorganisation of that State, and it was registered in that High Court as Writ Petition No. 1492 of 1966. The State of Punjab, through the Secretary, Local Self Government Punjab at Chandigarh was impleaded as respondent No. 1, Shri Ajmer Singh, Minister for Local Self Government, Punjab as respondent No. 2 and the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, as respondent No. 3. On 15-7-1966, the Motion Bench of the Punjab High Court consisting of Mehar Singh C.J and D.K Mahajan, J. admitted this writ petition by the following order :—

“Mr. R. Sachar—Notice F.B 1966 Cur. L-J. (P) 290. Early date.” It appears that the Admitting Bench felt that the decision of a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court cited on behalf of the petitioner required re-examination and presumably it was for this reason that hearing of the writ petition by a Full Bench was ordered at the stage of admission.

The other writ petition (C.W No. 44 of 1967) seems to have been presented in the Punjab High Court on 18-6-1966 on behalf of 9 petitioners, namely, (i) The Municipal Committee, Simla, through its President, Shri A.N Dogra, (ii) Shri A.N Dogra, President, Municipal Committee, Simla, (iii) Shri Tilak Ram Sharma, (iv) Shri Sawan Lal Sharma, (v) Shri Kishori Lal, (vi) Shri Suraj Parkash, (vii). Shri Brij Lal, (viii) Shri G.P Parkash Sood and (ix) Shri Bir Singh. Petitioners Nos. 3 to 9 are presumably also members of the superseded Municipal Committee. In this writ petition, the State of Punjab and the Administrator, Simla Municipality, Simla, are the only respondents. This petition was registered in the Punjab High Court as C.W No. 1281 of 1966. The prayer for stay made in C.M No. 2168 of 1966 in this writ petition was declined by the Vacation Judge (Jindra Lal, J.) on 20-6-1966, it being left open to the petitioners to repeat the prayer before the Motion Bench. On 15-7-1966, this petition was heard in limine of the same Motion Bench which heard the other writ petition and both the cases were directed to be heard together.

On 1-11-1966 the pre-existing State of Punjab was reorganised as a result of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 31 of 1966. By virtue of section 5 of that Act, the territories comprising of Simla, amongst some other areas, of the pre-existing State of Punjab, were added to the Union Territory of Himachal Pardesh, and by virtue of section 38, the jurisdiction of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh was also extended to the transferred territories, including that of Simla. As provided by section 39, the two writ petitions were transferred to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh and registered as C.W No. 42 and C.W No. 44 of 1967 respectively. The jurisdiction of the High Court for Delhi was extended to the Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh with effect from 1-5-1967 in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of the Delhi High Court Act (Indian Parliament Act No. 26 of 1966). It is in these circumstances that these two writ petitions have been placed before us for disposal.

There is one other matter to which I may appropriately advert at this stage. Section 92 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act provides as under :—

“92. Where, immediately before the appointed day, the existing State of Punjab is a party to any legal proceeding with respect to any property, rights or liabilities subject to apportionment under this Act, the successor State which succeeds to, or acquires a share in, that property or those rights or liabilities by virtue of any provision of this Act, shall be deemed to be substitued for the existing State of Punjab or added as a party to those proceedings, and the proceedings may continue accordingly.”

According to the deeming provision contained in this section read with section 2(m) and (n) of the said Act, the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh is to be considered to have been substituted for the pre-existing State of Punjab or added as a party to the proceedings, in these two writ petitions. In the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for Himachal Pradesh, it seems that no steps were taken either to formally substitute the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh for the State of Punjab or to add the said Union territory in the array of respondents so that the memorandum of parties may actually conform to the statutory deeming provision. Section 92, on its plain reading, seems to to contemplate both substitution and addition of the successor State. Whether one or the other course is to be adopted, would apparently depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case in hand, there are allegations of mala fides against the Punjab Government, through its representatives the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, and indeed in C.W 42 of 1967, Shri Ajmer Singh, who was the Minister for Local Self-Government at the relevant time, has been impleaded as one of the respondents because he has also been individually charged with mala fide acts in the discharge of his duties and functions as a Minister. In view of this plea, it would appear to be more appropriate to formally add the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh as a respondent in both the writ petitions and to substitute this successor State for the pre-existing State of Punjab and, we direct accordingly.

Notices have, however, already been sent to the appropriate authorities of the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, and indeed we have before us the returns in the form of an affidavit dated 31-5-67 sworn by Shri S.C Jain, I.A.S, Deputy Commissioner, Simla, in C.W No. 42 of 1967 and in the form of an affidavit dated 9-5-1967 sworn by Shri Bhisham Seth, Secretary, Simla Municipality, on behalf of the Administrator in C.W No. 44 of 1967, though in the heading of this affidavit, perhaps by over sight the original number of the writ petition as registered in the Punjab High Court (C.W No. 1281 of 1966) alone is entered.

Turning to C.W No. 42 of 1967, it is averred therein that the elections to the Simla Municipal Committee constituted under the Punjab Municipal Act were last held in 1960 and Suraj Parkash petitioner was one of the sixteen members who were duly elected to the said committee. The Deputy Commissioner, Simla, Shri Pritmohinder Singh, had adopted a hostile attitude to the Committee and had started making all efforts to get it superseded by the State Government. For this purpose, he started writing to the State Government in order to create prejudice against the Committee. One glaring example of public display of his hostility towards the Committee is stated to be when at a function organised to celebrate the centenary of the Late Lala Lajpat Rai, the Deputy Commissioner publically insulted its President. This is attributed to the offence taken by the Deputy Commissioner at the Municipal Committee having invited the Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh to preside over the said function, which honour the Deputy Commissioner was most anxious himself to have. Another instance giving rise to the Deputy Commissioner's hostility towards the Committee is that the Deputy Commissioner had conveyed to the Punjab Government a wholly incorrect impression that the President of the Committee was agreeable to the implementation of octroi duty in Simla. Immediate repudiation of this misrepresentation and clarification of the true position by the President of the Committee is stated to have further annoyed the Deputy Commissioner. As a result of the hostile attitude of the Deputy Commissioner, the Punjab State Government was prevailed upon in 1964 to call for the explanation of the Municipal Committee in regard to several allegations.

The writ petition proceeds to refer to the first seven items contained in the Schedule to the impugned order and reproduces in brief the explanation given by the Committee to those charges. Broadly stated, the Committee had controverted the facts on which the charges were based. In the case of Avtar Singh, the Committee had imputed undue favouritism on the part of the Deputy Commissioner towards him, to the grave prejudice of the financial interests of the Committee. The Committee had also tried to justify its attitude towards its members who were stated to have been guilty of public nuisance and of illegal felling of trees. As the Municipal Committee did hot receive any reply to its explanation submitted to the Government, it thought that the explanation had been considered satisfactory and there was thereafter no question of its supersession on those charges.

In 1965, the Punjab Government decided to constitute an Improvement Trust for Simla. The main purpose of creating this Trust, according to the petition, was to provide a job for one Shri Bhagat Singh, a retired District and Sessions Judge, who was a friend of Shri Ajmer Singh, Minister for Local Self Government, Punjab. The fact that an Improvement Trust was created for Simla is stated to be a further proof that the State Government was satisfied with the reply given by the Municipal Committee.

In lieu of the abolition of octroi duty in the case of Simla Municipal Committee, the State Government was to give a grant amounting to over a lac of rupees to the Committee. This, the Government failed to do, thereby creating a financial problem for the Committee. The State Government also insisted on the Committee contributing to the Improvement Trust two per cent of its budget. The Committee, however, felt that there was no need for creating an Improvement Trust for Simla and accordingly passed a resolution recommending to the State Government to wind up the said Trust, which was an unnecessary liability and drain on the citizens of this town. The Committee nevertheless resolved to contribute Rs. 5,000 towards the expenses for the Trust in part payment of its liability. The suggestions to wind up the Improvement Trust was considered by the Minister for Local Self-Government as a personal affront because of his deep interest as a friend in Shri Bhagat Singh, whom he had appointed Chairman of the Improvement Trust. This annoyance on the part of the Minister is stated to have ultimately led to the hasty supersession of the Committee in an ex parte manner without giving any opportunity to the Committee to show cause. It is substantially on these averments that this writ petition is based and 14 grounds are listed for showing the impugned order to be unconstitutional, ultra vires, mala fide and violative of the principles of natural justice. It is pleaded that out of the 10 items mentioned in the impugned order, the explanation of the Municipal Committee had been asked only with respect to items Nos. 1 to 7 and no opportunity was ever afforded to the Committee to explain the remaining three items. Violation of principles of natural justice in regard to these items is stressed and it is averred that the facts alleged by the Government being disputed, the Committee should have been given an adequate opportunity to establish their falsity. In the absence of such an opportunity the show cause notice with regard to items Nos. 1 to 7 is pleaded to be a mere farce. The reasons mentioned in the impugned order have been stated to be mere conclusions and, therefore, violative of section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act. Charges Nos. 8 and 9 have been described to be vague and indefinite to which it was not possible to reply properly. In regard to charge No. 10 it is averred that the Committee had only asked for time to pay the balance, at the same time requesting the Government to release the balance of its grant-in-aid so as to enable the Committee to make the payment.

Shri S.C Jain, I.A.S, Deputy Commissioner, Simla, respondent “No. 3, has sworn an affidavit dated 31-5-1967 in reply to this petition on behalf of himself and on behalf of respondent No. 1. Paragraph No. 3 of this affidavit states in detail the position of the State. It is pleaded that the working of the Municipal Committee, Simla was not satisfactory and the Committee was found to be incompetent to perform, and had persistently made defaults in the performance of, the duties imposed upon it by or under the Punjab Municipal Act. The State Government had been closely watching its working and finding it unsatisfactory, a show cause notice under section 238 of Municipal Act was served on the Committee by the Government on the 18th of August, 1962. After considering the explanation, the Government vide their memorandum dated 9th Novemeber, 1962, decided not to supersede the Committee for the time being. The Committee was, however, advised to mend its ways. In spite of this advice, the Committee did not improve and mend its ways, with the result that another show cause notice under section 238 was given on 25-5-1964. The explanation to this show cause notice was also considered unsatisfactory and the Committee was again asked to improve its working in respect of almost all the charges levelled in the show cause notice. This decision was conveyed to the Committee on 19-3-1965. Two months earlier, on 22-1-1965, the Deputy Commissioner had already intimated to the Committee the views of the Punjab Government that the explanation of the Committee was not satisfactory and that a stern warning be administered to it to improve its working and that any aspects of commission or omission on the part of the Committee, found at a later stage, would be seriously viewed. In 1966, the Government noticed that the Municipal Committee was not paying its contribution to the Improvement Trust, Simla, as envisaged by section 68 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. On 11-4-1966, therefore, the Government called upon the Committee through its President to pay its contribution within 15 days of the receipt of the communication, adding that if it failed to do so, the Government would be constrained to supersede the Committee under section 238 of the Municipal Act. The Municipal Committee inspite of this warning, paid only a sum of Rs. 5,000 under protest as against the total payment of Rs. 12,046.22 paise due for the period from 12-11-1965 to 31-3-1966 and also desired the Government to dissolve the Improvement Trust, Simla. This failure to pay its contribution has been stated to be one of the reasons leading the Government to supersede the Committee. The allegation of the hostile attitude of Shri Pritmohinder Singh, Deputy Commissioner, Simla, towards the Municipal Committee, has not been admitted and it has been pleaded that the Deputy Commissioner was the agency through whom the Punjab Government was exercising its control over the Committee. The allegation of the Deputy Commissioner having insulted the President of the Municipal Committee publically has been denied for want of personal knowledge, through it is admitted that the Municipal Committee, Simla, did in fact invite Dr. Y.S Parmar, Chief Minister, Himachal Pradesh, to preside over the centenary celebrations of Late Lala Lajpat Rai on 18-1-1965. The allegation that the Deputy Commissioner took exception to this invitation is controverted on the basis of the plea that the concurrence of the Chief Minister, Punjab had in fact been obtained by the President of the Municipal Committee to this course of action. It is also denied that the President had repudiated the recommendation of the Deputy Commissioner to revive octroi duty in Simla. Stress has been laid on the non-cooperative attitude of the Municipal Committee in regard to the improvement in the working of the Ripon Hospital and it is emphasised that the Municipal Committee had, of its own, started direct correspondence with the Government of Himachal Pradesh without taking into confidence the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, or the Punjab State Government which reflected a serious lapse on the part of the Committee. The sanitation of Simla is stated to have received a serious set back during the regime of the Municipal Committee and it is asserted that the Committee had failed to give a free hand to its Medical Officer of Health in improving the working conditions. This, it is pointed out, is due to party factions amongst the various categories of health staff created by the Committee itself. The deteriorating condition of roads has been illustrated by means of a comparative statement from 1961 to 1966. In 1961-62, seal coating and repairs was done to 0.25 miles of road only; in 1962-63 to 1.6 miles only; in 1963-64 to 8.47 miles only; in 1964-65 to 0.1 mile only and in 1965-66 to 0.5 miles only. Shri Asha Ram, Municipal Commissioner, is stated to have felled 117 trees on his land situated in Phagli, but the Municipal Committee failed to take any effective steps against him. Similarly, a relation of Shri Tilak Raj Sharma, Municipal Commissioner, is stated to have felled several trees without permission in the estate known as Tashkend Hotel, Simla. The Municipal Committee had also sanctioned the construction of shops by a Municipal Commissioner in evasion of rules and Government instructions. No name of the Municipal Commissioner has, however, been mentioned in the reply nor have the relevant rules and the Government instructions been specified or stated. In regard to the allegations relating to Avtar Singh, there is a mere bald denial and it is asserted that the Municipal Committee had acted mala fide, adopting a discriminatory attitude to harass the said Avtar Singh. In regard to the contribution towards the Improvement Trust's fund, it is pleaded that the Committee had not been able to pass the necessary resolution with the requisite majority against the enforcement of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, with the result that the Act came into force from 23-11-1965. As a natural consequence of the establishment of the Trust, a Chairman had to be appointed. The allegation that Shri Bhagat Singh was a friend of the Minister for Local Self-Government and that the Trust was created to accommodate him has been denied for want of knowledge. The resolution of the Committee suggesting that the Improvement Trust be wound up has been described to be incompetent and failure to contribute two per cent of the gross income of the Committee is stated to amount to a failure to discharge its statutory obligation. Reference has specifically been made to the memorandum dated 11-4-1966 in support of the order of supersession.

At this stage, it may appropriately be pointed out that Shri Ajmer Singh, respondent No. 2, has not filed any reply to this writ petition. In the course of hearing, we were informed by the office of this Court that Shri K.C Pandit a senior member of the Bar, had orally intimated to the office that he was to appear for respondent No. 2 in this case. We accordingly sent for Shri K.C Pandit, who very fairly and frankly informed us that papers for representing respondent No. 2 had, at one stage, been sent to him, but on Shri Ajmer Singh ceasing to be a Minister, those papers were taken back from him and that in the circumstances, he was no longer a counsel in the case. Shri Pandit had of course not filed any power of attorney or memorandum of appearance in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, or in this Court. When the case was fixed for hearing before this Bench, a notice was again sent to respondent No. 2, had though the writ petition had not intimated to the office the change of address of respondent No. 2, the notice of this hearing does seem to have been received by him, as is clear from the postal acknowledgement receipt purporting to be signed by him. The receipt bears a note thereon that the addressee is no longer a Minister. It is unfortunate and a matter of regret that respondent No. 2 should have, on this tennuous ground, deprived this Court of the legitimate assistance of his sworn version of the serious allegation of a mala fide act which may well be construed as abuse on his part in the discharge of his sacred duties as a responsible Minister elected by the people and who was under oath, as prescribed by the Constitution, “to do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution and the law without fear or favour, affection or ill-will”. But this omission on his part to assist this Court in satisfactorily discharging its judicial functions would not render it helpless and this Court must proceed judiciously to adjudicate on the allegation as best as it can on the existing material in accordance with law. The allegation in question, it may be remembered, can best be answered by respondent No. 2 himself and he alone can deny the serious charge that in establishing the Improvement Trust for Simla, he was solely inspired and guided by the desire to confer benefit on his friend Shri Bhagat Singh. Neither his successor in office nor any other officer can, in the ordinary course, be expected to throw any helpful light on this point. Indeed, the nature of denial in the affidavit in reply would seem to support this view. Nothing more need be said in this connection at this stage. Before turning to the other writ petition (C.W No. 44 of 1967), which was apparently presented to the Punjab High Court earlier in point of time, I find that the name Suraj Parkash as a petitioner is common to both the writ petitions. It is not made clear whether it is the same individual or two different persons figuring as petitioner in them. If it is the same person, then the question of the competency of the later writ petition by Suraj Parkash, for the same relief on practically similar grounds, would arise for consideration. But, the respondents, for reasons best known to them, have not chosen to make any point on this score. It is accordingly unnecessary to express any opinion on this aspect.

Turning now to the other petition (C.W No. 44 of 1967), this petition, after a special pleading complimenting and praising the Municipal Committee by narrating the great services rendered by it to the citizens of Simla, starts with the incident said to have taken place at the function celebrating the centenary of the Late Lala Lajpat Rai. Reference is next made to the creation of an Improvement Trust for the Simla Municipality in 1965 and the resolution passed by the Committee recommending that the Trust, being unnecessary, be wound up. This move is stated not to have found favour with the Punjab Government. Paragraph No. 6 of the writ petition expressly avers that after refusal of the Punjab Government to provincialise the Ripon Hospital, the Municipal Committee approached the Himachal Pradesh Government to take over this hospital subject to the conditions that the existing amenities to the town of Simla be continued. The satisfactory progress of this matter is stated to have alienated the sympathy of the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, who was alrady not on good terms with the Committee. When as a result of the movement for the creation of a separate Punjabi Suba, it became clear that there was going to be reorganisation of the pre-existing State of Punjab and, the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, the Municipal Committee passed a resolution suggesting that on account of cultural affinity, the town of Simla be merged with Himachal Pradesh. This resolution is also stated to have been disliked by the Punjab Government. The petition then refers to the demand made by the said Government in respect of the contribution towards the Improvement Trust Fund and to the Committee's resolution agreeing to pay Rs. 5,000 under protest as part payment of the dues and also requesting the Government to wind up the Trust. It is added that the Committee undertook its willingness to make the payment of its liabilities up to that date. Emphasis is then laid on failure of the Government to give compensatory aid amounting to Rs. 1,35,000 which refusal having been intimated at the fag end of the financial year, caused financial hurdles in the way of the Committee. This is practically all that has been pleaded in this writ petition in support of the challenge to the impugned order. In the reasons stated in paragraph 10, failure of notice or opportunity to show cause against the supersession, and the mala fides on the part of the Punjab Government and the Deputy Commissioner in establishing the Improvement Trust for the purpose of teaching a lesson to the Municipal Committee for having passed a resolution recommending merger of Simla town with Himachal Pradesh and for taking away two percent of the Committee's budget for the Trust, seem to be the Chief grounds and challenge to the validity of the impugned order.

In the affidavit sworn by Shri Chandi Ram, Assistant Secretary, Local Government, Punjab dated 13-10-1966, which is the only version we have on behalf of the Punjab State, a reference has been made to the indiscretion said to have been shown by the President, Municipal Committee, Simla, in levelling criticism against the Punjab Government at the centenary celebration of the Late Lala Lajpat Rai inaugurated by Dr. Parmar, Chief Minister, Himachal Pradesh. The matter is stated to have been considered by the Government which conveyed their displeasure to the President of the Municipal Committee for this lapse. It is, however, denied that this led to any strained relation between the Municipal Committee and the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, or that the Municipality was superseded on the basis of the incident mentioned in the writ petition. The proposal for applying the provisions of the Punjab Improvement Act No. IV of 1922 to the whole of the Municipality of Simla was mooted on 15-12-1964 and it is added that the Municipal Committee could have under section 1(3) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act resolved by two-third majority against the application of this Act. Having failed to do so, the said Act stood automatically extended to the Simla Municipality. One Chairman and three non-official trustees of the Trust were appointed and the Municipal Committee also duly elected its three Municipal Commissioners as trustees on 27-3-1965. The Municipal Committee thus consented to the creation of the Simla Improvement Trust. The later resolution against the application of the Punjab Town Improvement Act has been pleaded to be void and inoperative. The question of provincialisation of Ripon Hospital, according to this affidavit, did not mature because the Municipal Committee declined to agree to contribute on the basis of the expenditure of the previous two years on the other hand, the Committee started direct correspondance with the Government of Himachal Pradesh without reference to the Deputy Commissioner or the Punjab Government which was a serious lapse on its part. In paragraph, 7, it is denied that the Municipal Committee, Simla, was superseded on the basis of the resolution passed by it for the merger of Simla with the Himachal Pradesh, as the Punjab Government was not adversely influenced by this conduct. One of the reasons for superseding this Committee has been stated in paragraph No. 8 of the affidavit to be the omission on the part of the Committee to contribute towards the Improvement Trust Fund as enjoined by section 68 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, and it is repeated that the Committee was superseded in the interest of general public because it was found to be incompetent to perform and had persistently made default in the performance of duties imposed upon it by the Municipal Act as mentioned in the impugned order. The action taken by the Government in 1962 and again in 1964 and the explanations furnished by the Committee in answer to the charges are re-capitulated, and reference is made to the letter dated 22-1-1965 (Annexure R. 3) whereby the Municipal Committee was specifically informed that acts of omission and omission on the part of the Committee found at any later stage would be seriously viewed.

Another affidavit sworn by Shri Bisham Seth, Secretary, Simla Municipality, on 9-5-1967 has also been produced in answer to this writ petition. This affidavit practically repeats all the pleas contained in the other affidavits in reply already on the record and seeks to support the impugned order on all counts.

It may at the outset be stated that the learned counsel for the respondents have not questioned the correctness of the legal position enunciated by a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in the Municipal Committee. Kharar v. State of Punjab, (1) the decision which was cited before the Motion Bench which directed the writ petitions to be heard by a Full Bench. All that has been pointed out at the Bar is that in the main judgment prepared by Narula, J., either by some oversight or as a result of typing or printing mistake, the Supreme Court in the case of Radheshyam Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2) is stated to have held that section 53-a of the c.p & berar municipalities act imposes a duty on the Government to act judicially in ascertaining the objective and jurisdictional fact of incompetency of the Committee. It is contended by Shri Tuli that as a matter of fact, the Supreme Court had held section 53-a of the above act not to impose any obligation on the Government to act judicially and that it was only section 57 which imposed such an obligation. Shri Tuli seems to be right in his submission. The above observation in the judgment of Narula, J. seems to have crept in by oversight or due to some typing or printing error, but this does not in any way touch or affect the real ratio decidendi of the reported decision. Being a party to that decision, and realising that, what lends dignity to the law founded on precedent, or the rule of stare decisis, is that if analysed, the particular cited case should wield authority by the sheer force of its self integrated reasoning, logic and rationale, I have once again scrutinised the scheme of the Punjab Municipal Act in my endeavour to see if there is reasonable ground for holding action under section 238 to be purely administrative so as to completely exclude judicial approach. I am not unmindful of the perpetual difficulty of distinguishing between judicial, quasijudicial and administrative functions of the executive, all of which are sometimes so blended in one and the same transaction that it is far from easy, without a good deal of artificial reasoning, to draw any clear line between them. Principles emerge from decisions only obscurely and executive officers are often confronted with a baffling task in trying to keep their different roles and functions within their proper spheres. Section 238 of the P.M Act is perhaps one of those provisions in which are blended together administrative and quasijudicial functions. This section perhaps does contemplate an administrative act in so far as the actual order superseding a Municipal Committee is concerned, but this order has to be found on a judicial appraisal of the facts and circumstances on which the Government comes to the conclusion that a given Municipal Committee is incompetent to perform or has persistently made default in the performance of duties imposed on it by or under the statute. Speaking with respect, therefore, I am unable to find, as at present advised, any ground for doubting the correctness of the view taken in the case of the Municipal Committee, Kharar. As a matter of fact, in Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (3) Mehar Singh C.J and D.K Mahajan, J. hearing a case referred to a large Bench by Shamsher Bahadur, J. seem to have also approvingly referred to the decision in the case of Municipal Committee, Kharar. D.K Mahajan, J., speaking for the Bench, disagreed with the view taken by Shamsher Bahadur, J. in Brij Lai Talta v. State of Punjab.(4) in which an order of supersession under section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act was held to be an administrative order, and observed that the view taken by the Division Bench was in consonance with the ration decidendi of the Supreme Court decision in Radheshyam Khara's case.

I should like at this stage to refer to an extraordinary feature of the case in hand which has created a somewhat unhappy impression on this Court. All the three affidavits failed in reply to the two writ petitions in this Court have unequivocally controverted the challenge to the impugned order. One of these affidavits has been sworn by the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, as late as 31-5-1967 and another by the Secretary of the Municipal Committee on 9-5-1967. At the Bar, however, Shri B.R Tuli, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Administrator, Simla Municipal Committee in C.W 44 of 1967 alone has in a long elaborate address supported the impugned order and resisted the writ petitions. Shri Bakshi Sita Ram, Advocate on 1-6-1967 merely stated at the Bar that this Court may do justice in the case in the light of the writ petitions and the replies thereto forming part of the records At one stage, on that day, he threw a faint suggestion that he was expecting further instructions in the matter. At the conclusion of the petitioner's arguments, in the absence of Shri Bakshi Sita Ram, Advocate, Shri Prithvi Raj, Advocate, who is a counsel, in both the writ petitions (appearing for respondents Nos. 1 and 3 in C.W 42 of 1967) started arguments on behalf of the respondents with the object of opposing the writ petitions, but he soon gave up the attempt and submitted that Shri B.R Tuli had prepared the case for the respondents and that he may be heard in both the petitions on behalf of all the respondents. Shri Tuli, it may be pointed out, has been engaged only on behalf of the Administrator, Simla Municipality, respondent No. 2, in C.W 44 of 1967. In this situation, we sent for Baksi Sita Ram, the senior counsel for the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, but he, instead of addressing arguments stated that he was waiting for further instructions from the Himachal Pradesh Government. At one stage, during the discussion the counsel threw a faint suggestion even of withdrawing from the case under instructions. The result has thus been that we have only heard Shri B.R Tuli, learned counsel for the Administrator, in C.W No. 42 of 1967, who, with his usual eloquence, has addressed us at great length in opposing the writ petitions on all conceivable points, open to him. The hearing, in these two cases before us, lasted from 1-6-1967 to 5-6-1967, when orders were reserved. During the course of arguments, this Court tentatively expressed disapproval of the conduct of the Committee in failing to make its contributions under section 68, Punjab Town Improvement Act, on untenable grounds and in obstructing the proper functioning of the said Trust. On 6-6-1967, one day after we had reserved orders in the cases, Bakhshi Sita Ram presented an application under section 151, Civil Procedure Code, stating “that on 5th June, 1957, the Himachal Pradesh Government had decided to withdraw the charge relating to the non-payment of 2 per cent share of its income to the Simla Improvement Trust by the superseded Municipal Committee, Simla, and have instructed and authorised the counsel appearing for Himachal Pradesh State to make the statement in this regard vide letter No. 1-19/67-LR, dated 5th June, 1967 addressed by Under Secretary (Judicial) to Himachal Pradesh Government.” The attached letter purporting to come from Shri Joseph Dina Nath, Under Secretary (Judicial) and addressed to (i) Shri Prithvi Raj, (ii) Shri Bakshi Sita Ram and (iii) Shri M.R Gupta, reads as under :—

“It has been decided by the Government that so far as the charge against the Municipal Committee, Simla in regard to the non-payment of share to the Simla Improvement Trust is concerned, the same may be withdrawn and the matter in regard to it may not be pressed any further. You are authorised to make the statement in this regard.”

We heard this application on 7-6-1967 after notice to all the counsel interested and made an order that the charge thus withdrawn be not taken into account. The manner and the stage at which this charge has been withdrawn, is indicative of absence of thorough and responsible timely deliberation on the part of the Himachal Pradesh Administration in the matter in controversy pending adjudication in this Court. It is not the case of the Himachal Pradesh Government that the affidavits in reply sworn by its highly responsible officers like the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, and the Secretary of the Simla Municipal Committee sworn on 31-5-1967 and 9-5-1967 respectively had been sworn without full and proper instructions or as a result of some misunderstanding of the correct instructions or of misapprehension of the true factual position. Indeed, according to the application presented by Shri Bakshi Sita Ram on 6-6-1967, which has not even been verified by anyone, the Government is stated to have decided to drop the charge in question only on 5-6-1967. No reason has been assigned either in the application or in the accompanying letter or at the Bar, as to why and in what circumstances, it has been considered just and proper, at such late stage of the progress of the controversy in Court, to go back on the position maintained both by the Punjab and by the Himachal Pradesh Government up to 5-6-1967, when the arguments were concluded and orders reserved. The position appears quite intriguing when one reads the contents of the two affidavits dated 9-5-1967 and 31-5-1967. As a matter of fact, when the Court enquired from Shri Tuli if the Administrator had, contrary to the suggestion of the Municipal Committee, found the financial position of the Municipal Committee sound enough to enable him to discharge the statutory burden imposed by section 68, P.M Act., Shri Bhisham Seth, Secretary of the Committee, swore a fresh affidavit on 5-6-1967 that the amount due had actually been paid in July, 1966. This affidavit was sworn apparently to fortify and strengthen Shri Tuli's argument that the Municipal Committee had on untenable and mala fide grounds withheld the payment of the statutory dues and had thereby demonstrated its incompetence justifying its supersession. It may be conceded that it is open to the Himachal Pradesh Government even at this late stage to decide whether or not to press any charges against the Municipal Committee, and to take a complete somersault in the present proceedings, but this does not mean that this Court must also approve of this course and consider the manner and stage of change of front on the part of the Government in this Court as befitting a responsible democratic governmental set-up like ours, in the very conception of which there is a moral element. Such superficial approach clearly does not help the cause of justice. Had this Court finally announced orders on 5-6-1967, as it might well have done, the Government would quite clearly have been too late in withdrawing this charge and this aspect illustrates the damage which can be done to the cause of justice by the casual and superficial method of preparation of cases by the legal advisers of the Government.

Coming to the merits of the controversy, it is plain that on 18-8-1962, the Government gave a show cause notice to the Municipal Committee under section 238 requiring explanation in regard to 18 instances of default on the part of the Municipal Committee in the discharge of its duties and disobedience of Government orders. It is unnecessary to refer to the general complaint that the Committee had singularly failed to improve conditions in the city or that it had made no conspicuous contribution for the betterment of the people, whose interest it was supposed to look after. It is equally unnecessary to refer to the general observations like, cases of serious irregularities, corruption, favouritism, abuse of power and violation of Municipal Rules, which the Government claimed to have noticed. Such vague averments are wholly insufficient for the purpose of constituting adequate opportunity of hearing, in conformity with the rule of natural justice, which requires adequate hearing to be given to the party to be proceeded against. After considering the explanation submitted by the Municipal Committee, the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, on 9-11-1962 conveyed to the President of the Municipal Committee the decision of the Government, not to supersede the Committee for the time being. It was added that the Committee should mend its ways. It having been convassed on behalf of the petitioner that this intimation completely exhausted the show cause notice of August, 1962, and this contention having been controverted by Mr. Tuli, according to whom, all those charges were kept pending, we desired to look at the records of the case, but the same were not available. Shri Bakshi Sita Ram, learned counsel both for the State of Punjab and the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, undertook to get the complete records from Chandigarh but, unfortunately, relevant records at that end have been reported to be untraceable. This unfortunate situation seems to reflect inexcusable inefficiency and incompetence on the part of those entrusted with the custody of these important official records. The indifference shown by the authorities concerned towards the proper preservation and safe custody of these records, in respect of which the Government's department is answerable to this Court under the Constitution, so far as its quasi-judicial functions are concerned, cannot but be deplored by this Court. It betrays ignorance of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghaomal v. State of Delhi A.I.R 1959 S.C 65 that when a superior Court issues a rule on the application for certiorari, it is incumbent on the body exercising quasi-judicial function, to whom the rule is addressed, to produce the entire relevant record before the Court along with its return. The affidavit on behalf of the Punjab State was sworn by the Assistant Secretary, Local Government Punjab, on 13-10-1966. The notice must have been served on the Punjab State very much earlier. That during all this length of time the Punjab State and its successor State should not have been able to trace relvant records and make them it available to this Court, only reflects inefficiency and incompetence which is difficult to appreciate. As a matter of fact, the return must be assumed to have been prepared after carefully going through the relevant records, and if that is so, then the excuse of the records bing untraceable would require some convincing explanation as to the circumstances rendering them untraceable. None, however, is forthcoming. The replies sent by the Municipal Committee to the show cause notices were stated to be available at Simla, but even those replies were not produced in Court, and indeed neither party expressed any inclination to refer to them in the course of arguments. We have, however, considered it necessary to refer to these replies for the purpose of determining, whether the decision of the Government after considering the explanation completely exhausted the show cause notice or kept the charges alive. After considering the replies, in our view, the Government must be understood to have exhausted the enquiry into the charges on which explanation was sought in August, 1962. Although the intimation given by the Government does suggest that the decision was taken not to supersede the Committee only “for the time being”, in my view, it is not possible to construe this decision to mean that the matter of final disposal of the charges was kept pending. I am fortified, in taking this view, by the fact that for a period of nearly 2 years thereafter, the Government did not take any step, to pursue those charges against the Committee or, which would show that the enquiry into them was still pending. On 25-5-1964 we find another show cause notice issued by the Punjab Government through the Deputy Commissioner, Simla to the Municipal Committee under Section 238 of the P.M Act. It is noteworthy that no reference has been made in this show cause notice to the charges contained in the earlier notice of 1962 and there is no suggestion that the Government considered the earlier charges to be still awaiting final disposal. In the second notice, after similarly repeating general allegations of serious irregularities, corruption, favourtism and abuse of power etc., 33 specific charges were enumerated to which the Committee was expected to reply. This time again, after considering the explanation of the Committee, the Government decided not to supersede it, as is clear from Memo. No. 9709-3CI-64/1548 dated 18-1-1965 from the Secretary, Local Government Punjab, to the Deputy Commissioner, Simla, signed by the Section Officer Committee (I) for the Secretary. According to its copy produced in this Court, the Deputy Commissioner is directed to give a stern warning to the Committee to improve its working. We had also a look at the original memo and we find that the last line therein has been scored out with ink so as to make it somewhat illegible. This scoring out does not bear either the signatures or the initials of anyone and it is difficult to express any opinion as to when, by whom and for what purpose, this was done, The words scored out seem to us to read “and not to disobey Government orders in future.” If we are right in our reading of this line, which has been scored out in undisclosed circumstances, it does seem to indicate the working of the mind of the authorities, dealing with this matter. But we are not inclined on the existing material to attach much importance to this factor. The communication dated 22-1-1965 from the Deputy Commissioner to the President of the Committee contains the required warning. This communication concludes with the following sentence :—

“The acts of omission, commission on its part found at any later stage will be seriously viewed.”

It is quite obvious that the Government did not consider those charges to justify supersession of the Committee and the Deputy Commissioner merely conveyed to it a warning about future defaults. Two months thereafter, it appears that the Secretary to Government Punjab Local Self-Government sent a memo dated 19-3-1965 to the President of the Committee to the following, effect:—

“The Municipal Committee, Simla is expected to improve its working in respect of almost all the charges levelled in the show cause notice served upon it as its explanation to this notice was not considered satisfactory by the Government.”

According to the petitioner's counsel, the Government had expressed its final verdict against supersession, whereas Shri Tuli has contended that on this occasion too, the Government kept all the charges alive and pending, awaiting final disposal. I am afraid it is not possible to sustain Shri Tuli's submission. The only reasonable and probable conclusion, on the circumstances disclosed on the present record, seem to be that the Government had finally disposed of the second set of charges as well, considering them insufficient for superseding the Municipal Committee, however unsatisfactory their nature may have been otherwise. It is common ground that apart from the letter No. 2471-4CIII-66/10148 dated 11-4-1966 from the Secretary Local Government Punjab to the President Municipal Committee, no other show cause notice was given to the Municipal Committee. Shri Tuli has, however, relied on the above letter as a show cause notice, in conformity with the recognised rule of natural justice requiring opportunity to be heard, in which it was stated that if the contribution due under section 68, P.M Act, was not paid within 15 days, the Government would be constrained to supersede the Committee. In veiw of the fact that this charge has been withdrawn by the Government and Shri Bakhshi Sita Ram, learned Advocate, both for the State of Punjab and for the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh, has stated that this charge is not to be pressed, this Court has no option but to exclude it from consideration while considering the sustainability of the impugned order, Indeed, we have already made an order to this effect on 7-6-1967 after hearing the parties concerned. I am, however, expressing no considered opinion either way on the merits, whether or not, if this charge had been open for consideration, it would have sustained the impugned order. It may be recalled that after the decision of the Government on the second show cause notice was conveyed to the Committee on 18-1-1965, and even after the memorandum of the Deputy Commissioner dated 19-3-1965, the Government did not care to point out to the Municipal Committee any subsequent acts of commission or omission justifying its supersession, till it suddenly passed the impugned order on 16-5-1966.

Now, the grounds on which this order seems to be founded, are either convered by the earlier show cause notices or they are not covered. If they are, then the Government has already considered them and found them insufficient to sustain an order of supersession; if they are not, then quite clearly the Municipal Committee was entitled to an adequate opportunity to show cause against supersession on those grounds. Whether subsequent to the order of the Government, made on the second show cause notice in 1965, the Committee had or had not been guilty of acts of commission or omission, which by themselves or considered in conjunction with the earlier alleged defaults justify supersession, is a matter on which, in my opinion, the Committee can, in accordance with the elements of fair procedure, legitimately demand adequate opportunity of presenting its case, which indisputably has not been afforded. On the view that I have taken, it is unnecessary to consider Shri Tuli's argument that even if one out of several charges can be held to have been substantiated, the impugned order must be upheld because the adequacy or sufficiency of the material on which the impugned order is based, does not fall for adjudication by this Court in writ proceedings. In fairness to Shri Tuli, I propose merely to notice the decisions cited by him in support of this contention, State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan A.I.R 1963 S.C 779 in a case which is concerned with Article 311 of the Constitution; Sahela Ram. v. State of Punjab(7) deals with the removal of member of the Market Committee under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act No. XXIII of 1961; Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan A.I.R 1964 S.C 477 deals with the scope of interference by the High Court in writ proceedings with questions of fact determined by the Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act; and Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab (9) is a case in which a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court held that if the first notification under section 238, P.M Act, is void, a second notification can be issued without a fresh show cause notice, when a complete explanation of the Municipal Committee is before the Government. In that case the first notification was held to be void because of the decision in the case of Municipal Committee, Kharar(1). Shri Sushil Malhotra has also very fairly and properly drawn our attention to the recent decision of the supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. B.K Takkamore C.A No. 2340N of 1966 decided on 2-2-67 C.A No. 2340 (N) of 1966 decided on 2-2-1967, noted at S. No. 75 of 1967 Supreme Court Notes. According to the ratio of this decision in the case of an order made by the State on several grounds, some of which may be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court can sustain the order, if it comes to the conclusion that the State Government would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds alone, excluding the irrelevant or non-existent grounds.

Shri Tuli has as a last resort submitted that the record amply justifies the conclusion that the Municipal Committee has not been discharging its statutory obligation with the anxiety and care demanded of it, and that, its activities have apparently been inspired more by the selfish interests and personal motive of gain on the part of the members than by the considerations of general public good. It is further emphasised that the normal life of a Municipal Committee under the P.M Act is only three years and the superseded Committee having been elected in 1960, its normal life came to an end in 1963. It is accordingly argued that this Court should, in the judicious exercise of its discretion, decline relief to the Municipal Committee, which would have the effect of putting it back into power because the members of this Committee cannot be considered to be the proper representatives of the electorates of Simla in 1967 on the basis of the elections held in 1960. Situation has greatly changed in Simla since then, says Shri Tuli.

It is not controverted before us that the normal term of office of members of a Municipal Committee is three years, but notwithstanding the healthy democratic limit on the term of office, the existing members are apparently entitled to continue in office under the statute till the new members take the oath of allegiance. I am neither unmindful nor do I propose to minimise the importance of the limit fixed by the statute on the term of office of the members of a Municipal Committee. Being, presumably, conscious of the subtle corrupting effect of power, the Legislature has fixed this time limit with a desire to insulate the democratic set-up from power intoxication. History all the world over shows that, again and again, men put in power for temporary periods seek, for some new reasons, to retain it. Craving for power is an appetite which grows most with what it feeds upon. It is for this very reason that democracy has, in its practical wisdom, sought to make its own tenure of power temporary and to hedge its exercise with limitations and restrictions. These elements seem to constitute the essential pre-requisites of a true democratic set-up. The limitation placed on the life of the members of a Municipal Committee seems to be inspired by this democratic instinctive foresight on the part of the Legislature. I have found this maximum period of three years fixed even in the Punjab Municipal Act No. XX of 1891 by section 6 thereof, which was passed by the Governor-General in Council, when the British Parliament was perhaps exercising somewhat closer scrutiny over the British Indian Legislation. I have not been able to get copies of the earlier statutes viz., P.M Act No. XIII of 1884 repealed by the Act of 1891 or P.M Act No. IV of 1873. May be, that those status also constained a similar limit. But having found the impugned order to be tainted with the vice of violation of rules of natural justice, and under the existing law, the members of the Committee being entitled to retain their office till fresh elections are held, it seems to me, on the facts and circumstances of this case, to be sounder exercise of judicial discretion to set aside and quash the impugned order, rather than to allow it to stand, which would mean replacement of a popularly elected Municipal Committee by an official Administrator. This Court cannot ignore the fact that in spite of the Municipal Committee having been superseded as far back as May, 1966, no concrete steps seem to have been taken to hold fresh elections, which was perhaps the obvious course, if our local self-government institutions are to function and grow on proper healthy democratic lines so as to satisfy the ambitions and aspirations of a fast-developing free liberal democratic society. If the principles enshrined in our Constitution are not to remain mere decorative or ornamental phrases, and if we anxiously desire to develop into a strong healthy self-reliant democratic nation, the Government as well as the citizens must, in actual practice, adopt the democratic way of life. A democratic State, it must always be kept in view, is a legal State or a limited State, harnessed and gripped by the Rule of Law. Anything tending to weaken this grip would seem to deprive the democratic set-up of its beacon-light or the guiding star, with all the paralysing and damaging consequences of such a course of action. On the facts of the present case, I, for my part, find it extremely difficult to appreciate the omission on the part of the Punjab Government to hold elections in 1963 as enjoined by the Statute. Even the Himachal Pradesh Administration does not seem to have taken any effective steps since 1-11-1966 to hold fresh elections. The pendency of the writ petitions seem to me to be of little consequence because on no conceivable rational grounds can this circumstance stand in the way of the constitution of a fresh Municipal Committee in accordance with law. In any event, an application could always have been made to the Punjab High Court or to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner between 1-11-1966 and 30-4-1967 or to this Court after 1-5-1967, intimating the Government's desire tohold fresh elections and seeking necessary directions. It is not without significance that we have not been informed even during the hearing that the Government was prepared to hold fresh elections as soon as the petitions are disposed of. Had this representation been made to us, it could legitimately have been taken into account in considering the final order to be made. The circumstances disclosed in this case unfortunately seem to give an unhappy impression that whereas the Punjab Government was for certain reasons somewhat unfavourably inclined towards the members of the superseded Committee, the Himachal Administration is more favourably disposed towards them. They have also given us an impression that the Government has been considering the Committee to be bound to obey all of its directions, whether or not authorised by the statute, and that the autonomy of the Committee was something which did not require to be recognised or respected. I may here appropriately repeat, what has been pointed out in some earlier judgements, that full awareness of the ethical component in democratic law is an important corrective to many misunderstandings of the doctrine of Rule of Law and that the social heart of this doctrine lies in the recognition by those in power that in a legal State, they are not absolutely free from the restraint of socio-ethical conviction embodied in law. This awareness and recognition represents the principle on which power is wielded and tolerated. The central legal point of the Rule of Law that the State officials and ideally the State organs themselves must be answerable in the Courts, like all other citizens and bodies, seems but a concrete application of this principle. This basic doctrine calls for allegiance from the members of the Committee as well, who are mere trustees of the people, required to act in a fiduciary capacity in the larger interest of the community as a whole, neither seeking personal benefit nor acting with fear or favour. Considering the entire case with the requisite judical detachment, this Court in constrained on the present record to allow the writ petitions and to quash the impugned order.

For the foregoing reasons, these petitions are allowed and the impugned order quashed. Before finally parting with the case, it may be clarified that this judgement would not stand in the way of the Government to proceed to supersede the Committee, if it is so advised, after giving the requisite opportunity of hearing in accordance with law. The charges already dealt with should ordinally be considered to have been finally disposed of. Any subsequent acts of omission or commission may, either by themselves, or in conjunction with the earlier defaults, be taken into account, as prescribed by law. We however, do not express any opinion in advance, on the course which the Government may decide to adopt and which may happen to be brought before this Court for adjudication in due course. It is in the end hoped that speedy and effective steps would be taken for holding fresh elections so that electorates of Simla are not deprived, for a day longer than is absolutely necessary, of the exercise of their cherished democratic right of franchise to elect their representatives to manage their own local affairs. Arbitrarily depriving them of this right, seems to me to be a grave violation of their basic statutory right, tolerated only in the State which pay mere lip homage to democracy. Such violations in this Republic are an affront to the wisdom and labour of the framers of our Constitution. Mere drafting of Constitution, it may be remembered, does not make the State democratic. It is the people who have to exert themselves to enforce the Constitution and to adopt the principles enshrined therein in their day-to-day life. To this end, the Government department, the local bodies as well as every patriotic citizen must strive, if we have to survive as a free democratic nation. Before closing, I should point out the truism that it is the close watchful eye of the public that makes both the Administrator and the statement virtuous. The word “public” is not to be confused with the few selfish opportunists, but it means the men of integrity and intelligence interested in having an honest and efficient administrative set-up. It is unnecessary to say anything more in this context.

As observed earlier, the impugned order is quashed and set aside, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, I do not think the petitioners are entitled to any costs of these proceedings.

S.K KAPUR, J.—I agree

HARDYAL HARDY, J.—So do I

A.N.K Petition allowed.