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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (H.R. Khanna, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a regular first appeal by Parkash Dev Chopra (defendant No. 3) against a judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge I Class, Delhi. The trial Court awarded a preliminary decree in favour of the New Bank of India Limited (plaintiff) for recovery of Rs. 31,960 with interest, to be realized by sale of the mortgaged property, against Devi Das Chopra & Sons (defendant No. 1) and Devi Das Chopra (defendant No. 2) and insofar as relevant to this appeal, against the appellant (defendant No. 3).

The underlying suit (filed 16 March 1959) sought recovery of Rs. 31,960 by sale of mortgaged property. Facts as pleaded by the plaintiff: in May 1952 the plaintiff sanctioned a Cash Credit limit of Rs. 15,000 to defendant No. 1 (a firm said to be a joint Hindu family firm with Devi Das Chopra as Karta) and later increased it to Rs. 20,000. On 12 October 1953 defendants Nos. 1–3 executed a pronote for Rs. 20,000 (Exhibit P.2) and deposited title deeds of house No. 15A/18 (equitable mortgage) as collateral security. Plaintiff claimed Rs. 20,000 principal and Rs. 11,964 interest (at 9% p.a. from date of mortgage to 4 March 1959), total suit claim Rs. 31,960.

During the suit Ram Rakha Mal Gupta (defendant No. 4), Jai Pal (defendant No. 5) and Pushpa Devi (defendant No. 6) were impleaded as subsequent mortgagees (dates of their mortgages: 10 December 1958 and 22 April 1959). Defendants 1–3 contested the suit on multiple grounds including alleged requirement of registration for the documents relied on by the bank, competence/authority of the plaintiff's pleader, denial of creation of an equitable mortgage, and claims as to ownership (defendant No. 3 claimed sole ownership and misrepresentation).

The trial Court framed multiple issues (enumerated below) and decided several in favour of the plaintiff, including that an equitable mortgage was created and that Rs. 20,000 principal and Rs. 11,964 interest were due. The Court granted a decree for Rs. 31,960 with interest at 9% from institution to decree and 6% after decree until realization by sale. This appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is defective for lack of particulars of interest and principal separately?
  2. Whether the suit is filed by a competent and duly authorised person?
  3. Whether the signature of defendant No. 3 on pronote dated 12th October 1953 for Rs. 20,000 and on letter of waiver and cash credit agreement of the date were meant only as a proposal and did not constitute a Cash Credit agreement?
  4. Whether the letter dated 13th October 1953 is inadmissible for want of registration? If not, whether signature on that letter did not constitute an equitable mortgage on the property?
  5. Whether defendants Nos. 1 & 3 created an equitable mortgage on 12th October 1953 on the property in suit for Cash Credit account in suit? (Issue 4A)
  6. Whether the property in dispute is mortgaged with defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6, and for what amounts?
  7. Whether the property belongs to defendant No. 3 also? If so, with what effect?
  8. What amount is due to the plaintiff from defendants Nos. 1 to 3?
  9. To what rate of interest is the plaintiff entitled?
  10. Whether plaintiff served a valid notice on defendant No. 3? If not, what is its effect?
  11. Relief and against whom?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Parkash Dev Chopra / Mr. Khanna) Arguments

  • The letters dated 13 October 1953 (Exhibits P.6 and P.7) which related to deposit of title deeds required compulsory registration and, being unregistered, could not support a decree for an equitable mortgage.
  • The title deed (Exhibit P.8 dated 14 June 1950) was in favour of "Parkash Dev Chopra & Brothers" while the deposit was made by defendants Nos. 1–3; thus, the depositor did not show title and no equitable mortgage arose (relying on a Madras High Court decision).
  • The property in dispute was not shown to belong to the joint Hindu family (challenging the characterization of the property as joint family property).
  • Pran Nath Abrol (the bank's principal officer who instituted the suit) was not competent to file the suit on behalf of the bank.
  • An attempt was made to challenge the validity of mortgages in favour of defendants Nos. 4–6 (this challenge was later not pressed to finality on appeal and was left to execution or separate proceedings if surplus arises).

Respondent / Plaintiff (New Bank of India Ltd.) — Pleadings and Contentions as Recorded

  • The plaintiff relied on the pronote of 12 October 1953 (Exhibit P.2) for Rs. 20,000 and on deposit of title deeds as creating an equitable mortgage; Exhibits P.6 and P.7 were records acknowledging deposit and declaring absence of other title deeds/encumbrances.
  • The bank's manager, Pran Nath (P.W.2), explained the correction of dates on Exhibit P.7 and the circumstances of deposit.
  • The bank relied on affidavit Exhibit P.36 (filed by the appellant/defendant No. 3) in which the appellant admitted that the property was joint Hindu family property and that family funds were used to purchase/build it; this admission was used against the appellant.
  • The plaintiff produced a power of attorney (Exhibit P.1) authorising Pran Nath Abrol to act on its behalf and relied on his status as manager and principal officer as establishing competence to institute the suit.
  • As to subsequent mortgagees (defendants 4–6), the plaintiff maintained it had prior charge and therefore subsequent alienations did not affect the bank's claim; any dispute as to their priorities could be dealt with in execution if surplus remains.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rechpal Mahraj v. Bhagwandas Daruka and others, 1950 SCR 548 The decisive factor is whether parties intended to reduce the bargain regarding deposit of title deeds into the form of a document; if the document is merely evidential of an already completed transaction it does not require registration. Cited to support the proposition that Exhibits P.6 and P.7, being records of a prior completed deposit and not the bargain itself, did not require registration.
United Bank of India Ltd v. Messrs Lekharam Sonaram & Co. and others, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1591 When title deeds are deposited with intent to secure an advance, law implies a contract creating an equitable mortgage and no registered instrument is needed unless the parties choose to make a written document the sole repository of the bargain; if they do, such document requires registration under section 17. Applied to show that an implied mortgage arises from deposit of title deeds and that only where parties make the writing the integral bargain is registration required; used to conclude Exhibits P.6 and P.7 were not integral bargains requiring registration.
Dwarka Das v. New Bank of India Ltd. (Amritsar), A.I.R. 1958 Punjab 218 Letters which merely acknowledged or recorded an already-completed mortgage do not require registration. Relied upon to treat Exhibits P.6 and P.7 as records of the transaction completed by the pronote and deposit and therefore admissible without registration.
Chaluvadi Balaiah v. Central Government and the Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1967 (Andhra Pradesh) 51 A memorandum executed after creation of a mortgage which merely records the past transaction does not require registration under section 17 and is admissible in evidence. Used as supporting authority for the view that the memorandum-type letters (P.6, P.7) were recording a prior transaction and did not themselves create the mortgage requiring registration.
K.J. Nathan v. S.V. Maruthi Rao and others, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 430 Physical delivery of title deeds is not the only mode of deposit; constructive deposit may suffice and the Court must examine whether, in substance, the documents were delivered. Applied to reject the contention that prior possession of title deeds by the bank (from earlier cash credit of Rs. 15,000) defeated creation of a later equitable mortgage; constructive deposit and substantive delivery principles were invoked.
Venkataramayya Pantulu v. U.B. Narasinga Row and others (Madras H.C.), 9 Indian Cases 309 Equitable mortgage may not be created if the only deposited document shows no title in the depositor. Referenced by appellant; Court dealt with the point but held that relevant material (applications and Exhibit P.36) showed that those depositing the deed had title/interest and that the Madras decision did not assist the appellant on the facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through focused legal and factual analysis constrained by the record:

  1. Chronology and nature of documents: The pronote for Rs. 20,000 (Exhibit P.2) was executed on 12 October 1953; the two letters acknowledging deposit of title deeds (Exhibits P.6 and P.7) were dated 13 October 1953. The letters enumerated the title deeds and declared the property unencumbered.
  2. Legal test for registration: The Court reiterated the established principle that whether a writing must be registered depends on whether the instrument itself constitutes the bargain/contract or whether it is merely evidential of an already completed transaction. If it is merely evidential, it need not be registered; if it is the repository of the bargain, registration is required under section 17 of the Registration Act.
  3. Application of precedent: The Court applied Rechpal Mahraj, United Bank of India, Dwarka Das, and Chaluvadi Balaiah to conclude that Exhibits P.6 and P.7 were evidential records of a transaction concluded on 12 October 1953 and did not constitute the bargain itself. Therefore, they did not require registration and were admissible.
  4. Constructive deposit and earlier possession: The Court accepted the K.J. Nathan authority that physical delivery is not the only mode and that a constructive deposit or continuing possession by the bank does not defeat a later asserted equitable mortgage; hence the fact that some title deeds were earlier with the bank (from the earlier Rs. 15,000 limit) did not invalidate the 12–13 October 1953 transaction.
  5. Title and capacity of depositors: On the contention that the title deed was in favour of "Parkash Dev Chopra & Brothers" while depositors were defendants 1–3, the Court examined the loan application and Exhibit P.36 (affidavit by defendant No.3) in which defendant No.3 admitted the property was joint Hindu family property and that family funds were used to acquire it. Given that admission and the application materials, the Court found that the record supported the depositor's title/interest and thus rejected the argument that the documents showed no title in the mortgagor depositor.
  6. Onus and admissions: The Court noted that defendant No.3's admission in Exhibit P.36 shifted the onus onto him to prove that the admission was erroneous; he failed to displace it.
  7. Competence to sue: The Court held that Pran Nath Abrol, as manager and principal officer of the bank and authorised by a power of attorney (Exhibit P.1), was competent to institute the suit; the fact that the registered office had formerly been in Lahore and later shifted to New Delhi did not undermine the power of attorney.
  8. Subsequent mortgagees (defendants 4–6): Challenges to the validity/priority of those mortgages were not resolved on appeal; counsel for parties conceded those matters could be addressed in execution or separate proceedings if sale proceeds produce a surplus after satisfying the bank's prior charge.
  9. Conclusion of legal questions: On the basis above, the Court found no merit in the key contentions advanced by the appellant (registration necessity, lack of depositor title, non-joint-family status, incompetence of plaintiff's agent) and affirmed the trial Court's findings on the central issues (creation of equitable mortgage, amounts due, rates of interest).

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The decree of the Court below is upheld: Rs. 31,960 found due (Rs. 20,000 principal and Rs. 11,964 interest) with interest at 9% per annum from the date of institution to the date of decree and at 6% per annum from the date of decree until realization by sale of the mortgaged property.
  • The sale of the mortgaged property ordered by the trial Court stands subject to the decree and costs; the appellant must bear costs of respondent No.1 as awarded.
  • Matters concerning subsequent mortgagees (defendants 4–6) and disputes as to their mortgages' validity/priority were left to be addressed in execution or separate proceedings if a surplus arises — the appeal did not decide those points on the merits.

Broader implications: The judgment applies and reaffirms established principles of equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds — specifically, the distinction between a document that is the bargain (requiring registration) and a document that merely records an already-completed deposit (not requiring registration). The Court did not announce any novel principle; it applied existing authorities to the facts before it.

A.N.K — Appeal dismissed.

    Parkash Dev Chopra v. The New Bank Of India, Ltd. & Others S

    H.R Khanna, J.:— This regular first appeal filed by Parkash Dev Chopra, defendant No. 3, is directed against the judgment and decree of learned Subordinate Judge I Class, Delhi, whereby he awarded a preliminary decree for recovery of Rs. 31,960 with interest from the date of the institution of the suit till realization by sale of the mortgaged property in favour of the New Bank of India Limited plaintiff against the appellant, Devi Das Chopra & Sons defendant No. 1 and Devi Das Chopra defendant No. 2.

    The appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of Rs. 31,960 by sale of mortgaged property which was brought by the respondent-bank through its principal officer Pran Nath Abrol against Devi Das Chopra & Sons, Devi Das Chopra and Parkash Dev Chopra. Parkash Dev Chopra is the son of Devi Das Chopra. According to the allegations of the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 is a joint Hindu family firm of which Devi Das Chopra is the Karta. Defendant No. 3, who is a member of the joint family, was working with his father in the said firm. It is stated that in May 1952 on the application of defendant No. 1 through defendants Nos. 2 and 3 the plaintiff sanctioned a Cash Credit limit to defendant No. 1 up to Rs. 15,000 against the security of documents by way of equitable mortgage of their house No. 15A/18, situated in Western Extension Area, Karol Bagh, Delhi. Again on application of defendant No. 1 through defendants Nos. 2 and 3 the plaintiff increased the Cash Credit limit from Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 20,000 against the same security. To cover the Cash Credit account, defendant No. 1 through defendants Nos. 2 and 3 executed a pronote for Rs. 20,000 on 12th October 1953 in favour of the plaintiff agreeing to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum. By way of collateral security the defendant-firm deposited the title deed in respect of the above-mentioned house of the value of Rs. 56,000 by way of equitable mortgage with the plaintiff. The said title deed and a declaration form signed by defendant Nos. 2 and 3 to the effect that the property was free from encumbrances, were handed over to the plaintiff. Defendants Nos. 1 to 3 also hypothecated and charged as collateral security their brick-kiln. But as the plaintiff did not find such a brick-kiln to be in existence, the above security was not pursued. The plaintiff claimed that Rs. 20,000 as principal and Rs. 11,964 on account of interest at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum from the date of mortgage till the 4th March 1959, were due from defendants Nos. 1 to 3. The present suit was, accordingly, filed on 16th March 1959 for recovery of Rs. 31,960.

    Ram Rakha Mal Gupta defendant No. 4, Jai Pal defendant No. 5 and Pushpa Devi defendant No. 6 were impleaded as parties during the pendency of the suit on the ground of being the subsequent mortgagees of the property in dispute. The date of mortgage in favour of defendants Nos. 4 and 5 is stated to be 10th December 1958, while that in favour of defendant No. 6 is stated to be 22nd April 1959.

    The suit was resisted by defendants Nos. 1 to 3. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in their written statement stated that though the loan was applied for from the plaintiff the equitable mortgage was not enforceable because the document embodying the terms of the loan required registration. It was averred that there was no valid mortgage in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant No. 3 in his written statement pleaded that the suit had not been filed by a competent and authorised person on behalf of the plaintiff. Defendant No. 3 denied that defendant No. 2 was the Karta of the firm. According to defendant No. 3, defendant No. 1 was a partnership firm. Defendant No. 3 further denied that any equitable mortgage was created in favour of the plaintiff. As regards the property in suit, the plea of defendant No. 3 was that he was the sole owner of the same and it did not constitute joint Hindu family property. According further to defendant No. 3, he was made to sign a number of documents by the plaintiff-bank on misrepresentation that those documents were merely applications for loan.

    Following issues were framed by the Court below:

    (1) Whether the suit is defective for lack of particulars of interest and principal separately?

    (2) Whether the suit is filed by a competent and duly authorised person?

    (3) Whether the signature of defendant No. 3 on pronote dated 12th October 1953 for Rs. 20,000 and on letter of waiver and cash credit agreement of the date were meant only as a proposal and did not constitute a Cash Credit agreement?

    (4) Whether the letter dated 13th October 1953 is inadmissible for want of registration? If not, whether signature on that letter did not constitute an equitable mortgage on the property?

    4(A) Whether defendants Nos. 1 & 3 created an equitable mortgage on 12th October 1953 on the property in suit for Cash Credit account in suit?

    (5) Whether the property in dispute is mortgaged with defendants Nos. 4, 5 and 6, and for what amounts?

    (6) Whether the property belongs to defendant No. 3 also? If so, with what effect?

    (7) What amount is due to the plaintiff from defendants Nos. 1 to 3?

    (8) To what rate of interest is the plaintiff entitled?

    (9) Whether plaintiff served a valid notice on defendant No. 3? If not, what is its effect?

    (10) Relief and against whom?

    Issues Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 4(A), 6 and 9, were decided in favour of the plaintiff and against defendants 1 to 3. On issue No. 5 the finding was that defendants Nos. 4 to 6 were subsequent alienees of the property in dispute but that had no effect on the plaintiff's claim as the plaintiff had a prior charge over the property in dispute. On issue No. 7 the finding was that Rs. 20,000 on account of principal amount and Rs. 11,964 as interest were due to the plaintiff. On issue No. 8, the finding was that the plaintiff was entitled to recover interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum which was the agreed rate of interest. In the result a decree of Rs. 31,960 with interest from the date of the institution of the suit till the date of decree at the rate of 9 per cent and from the date of decree till realization at the rate of 6 per cent per annum was awarded by sale of the mortgaged property.

    In appeal Mr. Khanna on behalf of the appellant has argued that the letters, which were addressed by defendants 1 to 3 to the plaintiff-bank in connection with the deposit of the title deeds, required registration and as those letters were not registered the plaintiff-bank could not get a decree on the basis of an equitable mortgage in its favour. In this connection we find that after the Cash Credit limit of defendants Nos. 1 to 3 had been raised by the plaintiff-bank to Rs. 20,000, defendants No. 1 to 3 executed pronote Exhibit P. 2 on 12th October 1953. This pronote was signed by both defendants Nos. 2 and 3, and according to this pronote defendants Nos. 1 to 3 promised to pay on demand the sum of Rs. 20,000 with interest at a minimum rate of 9 per cent. per annum. On the following day, i.e, on 13th October 1953 letter Exhibit P. 6 signed by defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on behalf of defendant No. 1 was addressed to the Manager of the plaintiff-bank as under :—

    “Please acknowledge receipt of the following title deeds deposited with you by us in connection with the C/C Limit of Rs. 20,000 allowed to us on 12-10-1953.”

    The letter enumerated the title deeds which consisted of a sale deed dated 14th June 1950 and site plan of the property in dispute. Another letter Exhibit P. 7 signed by defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on behalf of defendant No. 1 was also addressed to the Manager of the plaintiff-bank on 13th October 1953 to the following effect :—

    “With reference to the title deeds of our property deposited with you in connection with the Cash Credit Limit of Rs. 20,000 allowed to us on 12-10-1953, We hereby declare that excepting the title deeds deposited with you there are no other title deeds either with us or lodged with anybody else and that the property covered thereby is uncharged and free from all encumbrances whatsoever,”

    It may be stated that the date put on Exhibit P. 7 was initially written as ‘12-10-1953’ but later it was altered into ‘13-10-1953’, and the alteration was initialled by both defendants Nos. 2 and 3 Another date ‘13-10-1953’ was also then written on the letter. It appears, as deposed by Shri Pran Nath (P.W 2), Manager of the plaintiff-bank, that as a correction of the date was made the same was got initialled from defendants Nos. 2 and 3 on 13-10-1953, and another date ‘13-10-1953’ was also inserted to put the thing beyond any pale of controversy. According to Mr. Khanna, letters Exhibits P. 6 and P. 7 require compulsory registration as the effect of these letters was to create, an equitable mortgage in favour of the plaintiff-bank. This contention, in our opinion, is devoid of force. A mortgage by deposit of title deeds does not require any writing but it is usual for the mortgage to be accompanied by a memorandum in writing. In order to decide as to whether the writing requires registration the Court has to see whether the writing itself constitutes the bargain or contract between the parties, or whether it is a record of an already completed transaction. In the former case the writing would require registration, but in the latter case it would not. It would also depend upon the intention of the parties. If the parties intend to reduce their bargain regarding the mortgage by deposit of title deeds in the form of a document and want that document to be the only repository and appropriate evidence of their contract of equitable mortgage, the document would require registration. If on the other hand the Court comes to the conclusion on construction of the document and consideration of the surrounding circumstances that the parties did not intend to reduce the bargain into writing, the contract to create the mortgage would arise by implication of law by the deposit of title deed with the requisite intention and a letter or a memorandum sent about the deposit of title deeds would not require registration. This question was gone into by their Lordships in the case of Rechpal Mahraj v. Bhagwandas Daruka and others, 1950 SCR 548, (1) Patan-Jali Sastri C.J, as he then was, while speaking for the Court, observed—

    “The crucial question is : Did the parties intend to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit of the title deeds to the form of a document? If so, the document requires registration. If on the other hand, its proper construction and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to do so, then, there being no express bargain, the contract to create the mortgage arises by implication of the law from the deposit itself with the requisite intention, and the document, being merely evidential does not require registration”

    In the above-mentioned case accounts relating to the appellant's dealings with the respondents were taken and the appellant gave certain title deeds to the respondents for being held as security for the amounts then found due and which may become due, and on the same day the appellant gave a memorandum to the respondents in the form of a letter addressed to the respondents stating —

    “We write to put on record that to secure the repayment of the money already due to you from us on account of the business transactions between yourselves and ourselves and the money that may hereafter become due on account of such transactions we have this day deposited with you the following title deeds relating to our properties at … with intent properties to secure all moneys including interest that may be found due…”

    It was held that the parties did not intend to create a charge by the execution of the document, but merely to record a transaction which had already been concluded and under which rights and liabilities had already been created and the document did not require registration. In United Bank of India Ltd v. Messrs Lekharam Sonaram and Co. and others, A.I.R 1965 SC 1591, (2) Ramaswami J., speaking for the Court, observed —

    “When the debtor deposits with the creditor title deeds of his property with an intent to create a security the law implies a contract between the parties to create a mortgage and no registered instrument is required under section 59 as in other classes of mortgage. It is essential to bear in mind that the essence of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is the actual handing over by a borrower to the lender of documents of title to immovable property with the intention that those documents shall constitute a security which will enable the creditor ultimately to recover the money which he has lent. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, this implication of law is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage. It follows that in such a case the document which constitutes the bargain regarding security requires registration under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest in immovable property, where the value of such property is one hundred rupees and upwards. If a document of this character is not registered it cannot be used in the evidence at all and the transaction itself cannot be proved by oral evidence either.”

    The question, which arose for determination the above cited case, was whether the following letter would require registration :—

    “I hereby authorise my son Mr. Babulal Ram to deposit with you on my behalf at your Calcutta office the following title deeds with a view to create an equitable mortgage on the said properties to make your advances in the A/C of Messrs Lekharam Sonaram and Co. Giridih, better secured. I hereby further declare that I am the sole owner of the Giridih property as per schedule below and am legal joint heir with my sons dealing in the name of Messrs Lekharam Sonaram and Co. of the Malho property as described in the schedule below. I hereby further declare that both the properties described in the schedule are free from all encumbrances and nobody else has any claim, right or title to the properties. And I hereby declare that the deposit will give you a valid legal title over my said properties as mortgagee until all the obligations of the Messrs Lekharam Sonaram and Co. with your Giridih branch are duly satisfied.

    Particulars of Properties.

    1. Giridih property.

    2. Malho property.”

    It was held that the above letter was not intended to be an integral part of the transaction between the parties and did not by itself operate to create an interest in the immovable property and, therefore, it did not require registration.

    In Dwarka Das v. New Bank of India Ltd. Amritsar and others, A.I.R 1958 Punjab 218, (3) the question arose before a Division Bench as to whether the following two letters required registration :—

    “Please acknowledge receipt of the following title deeds, deposited by me with you, in connection with an advance of Rs. 11,000 made to me by the Bank on 29-10-1946, jointly with S.A.S Jaspal.”

    “With reference to an advance of Rs. 11,000 made to me by the Bank on 29-10-46, jointly with S.A.S Jaspal against the deposit of the title deeds of my houses and premises known as ‘Dove villa’ with attached place of land measuring about 1713 Sq: yards, situated below main Railway Station Simla. I hereby declare that there are no other title deeds in respect of the above property with me or lodged with anybody else excepting those deposited with you. I further declare that the above property is free from all sorts of encumbrances and that I am the sole owner of the property.”

    The above two letters were written on 30th October 1946, while the pronote by the debtor has been executed a day earlier on 29th October 1946. It was held that the letters purported to acknowledge or record the transaction which was completed a day earlier and by which an equitable mortgage had been created, and therefore did not require registration. The head-note of a Division Bench case Chaluvadi Balaiah v. Central Government and the Union of India and others, A.I.R 1967 (Andhra Pradesh 51, (4) which is based upon observation in the body of the judgment, reads as under :—

    “On settlement of accounts a certain sum was found due from B to A. B executed a promissory note for the amount due and title deeds with respect to B's property were immediately handed over to A as security for repayment of the debt. The next day a memorandum executed by B and addressed to A merely recorded the transaction completed on the previous day and gave a list of the title deeds deposited with A. The memorandum did not contain the terms of mortgage itself. Held that the execution of the promissory note accompanied by the deposit of title deeds and the execution of the memorandum did not form part of the same transaction. A valid mortgage had been created the previous day and the memorandum which merely recorded a past transaction did not require registration under section 17 Registration Act and was therefore admissible in evidence in a suit to enforce the mortgage.”

    Keeping the principles enunciated above we have no doubt in our mind that letters exhibits P. 6 and P. 7 do not require registration. Both the letters relate to the liability which had been undertaken by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 on 12th October 1953 i.e, a day earlier on account of the cash credit limit of Rs. 20,000. Further, according to both the letters the title deeds had already been deposited with the plaintiff-bank. No terms of the mortgage were embodied in either of the two letters and it cannot be said that the parties intended the two letters to be the repository and evidence of the transaction of equitable mortgage. On the contrary perusal of the letters shows that they are record of a transaction which had already been concluded and under which the rights and liabilities had already been created.

    Reference has been made by Mr. Khanna to the fact that title deeds of the property in dispute were already with the plaintiff bank since the time a Cash Credit limit of Rs. 15,000 had been allowed to defendants Nos. 1 to 3. This fact, in our opinion, would not make any material difference, because, as observed by Subba Rao J. (as he then was), speaking for the Court in the case of K.J Nathan v. S.V Maruthi Rao and others, A.I.R 1965 S.C 430, (5), physical delivery of documents by the debtor to the creditor is not the only mode of deposit. There may be a constructive deposit. A court will have to ascertain in each case whether in substance there is a delivery of title-deeds by the debtor to the creditor. If the creditor was already in possession of the title-deeds, it would be hyper-technical to insist upon the formality of the creditor delivering the title-deeds to the debtor and the debtor re-delivering them to the creditor.

    Stress has been laid by Mr. Khanna upon the fact that title-deed Exhibit P. 8 dated 14th June 1950 in respect of the property in dispute, which was deposited by defendants Nos. 1 to 3 with the plaintiff, was in favour of Parkash Dev Chopra and Brothers, while the persons actually depositing the title-deed were defendants Nos. 1 to 3. It is urged that as the persons depositing the title-deeds were different from the one in whose favour the title-deed was executed, the deposit of title-deeds would not create an equitable mortgage. Reliance in this connection is placed upon the Division Bench case of Madras High Court Venkataramayya Pantulu v. U.B Narasinga Row and others, reported in 9 Indian Cases 309, (6) wherein it was held that an equitable mortgage is not created where the only document deposited shows no kind of title in the mortgagor depositor. There is no force in the above contention. At the time when defendants Nos. 1 to 3 applied for loan they wrote in the application that the joint Hindu family consisting of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and another minor son of defendant No. 2 had been doing trade under the name and style of Devi Das Chopra & Sons, and Parkash Dev Chopra & Brothers. It was further stated that Parkash Dev Chopra & Bros. was no longer doing any business, and the whole business was being done under the name and style of Devi Das Chopra & Sons. Affidavit Exhibit P. 36 was also given by Parkash Dev Chopra defendant No. 3 to the plaintiff and in that affidavit it was stated that the property in dispute, which had been purchased in the name of Parkash Dev Chopra and Brothers was the property of the joint Hindu family and the money for purchasing and building the same had been spent from the joint Hindu family funds by Devi Das Chopra defendant No. 2 who was the Karta of the joint Hindu family. We thus find no force in the argument that the material on record with the bank did not show that the persons depositing the title-deed had a title in the property in dispute.

    Argument has then been advanced on behalf of the appellant that the property in dispute has not been shown to belong to the joint Hindu family. This argument too is devoid of force, for in the affidavit Exhibit P. 36 filed by the appellant he clearly admitted, as stated above, that the property in dispute was joint Hindu family property and the money for purchasing and building the same had been spent from joint Hindu family funds by Devi Das Chopra who was the Karta of the joint Hindu family. In the face of this admission by the appellant the onus shifted upon him to show that the same was erroneous and that the property in dispute was not joint Hindu family property. The appellant has failed to discharge this onus.

    Lastly Mr. Khanna has argued that Pran Nath Abrol was not competent to file the present suit on behalf of the plaintiff-bank. It is, however, not disputed that Pran Nath Abrol was the manager and principal officer of the bank. As such Pran Nath Abrol should be held to be competent to file the present suit. A power of attorney Exhibit P. 1 was also executed by the plaintiff-bank in favour of Pran Nath Abrol authorising him to act as the lawful attorney of the plaintiff-bank. The fact that the registered office of the bank at the time the power of attorney was executed was in Lahore but was subsequently shifted to New Delhi, would not in any way detract from the power of attorney.

    An attempt was also made on behalf of the appellant to challenge the validity of mortgage in favour of defendants Nos. 4 to 6 but as the arguments proceeded it was conceded by the learned counsel for all the parties that this is a matter which can be gone into either in execution or other separate proceedings if some surplus is found from the sale proceeds of the property in dispute after payment of the amount due to the plaintiff.

    As a result of the above, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of respondent No. 1.

    A.N.K Appeal dismissed.
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    Parkash Dev Chopra v. The New Bank Of India, Ltd. & Others S
    (Jul 21, 1967)