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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (I.D. Dua, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the tenant's second appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, from the Rent Control Tribunal's order dated 18 November 1963 affirming the Rent Controller's eviction order dated 12 June 1963. The Rent Controller had directed eviction and recovery of possession in favour of the landlord.

The appellant (tenant) took on rent premises bearing Municipal No. 8014, Ramjas Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi, by a lease dated 31 March 1955, at a monthly rent of Rs. 250. Eviction proceedings commenced on 10 January 1962 on two grounds:

  • The premises were let for residential purposes but the tenant began running "Gupta College" there.
  • The tenant used the premises in a manner contrary to conditions imposed on the landlord by the Delhi Development Authority when the landlord was given the lease of the land (risking forfeiture of the landlord's lease).

The Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal had both concluded (concurrently) that the premises had been let for residential purposes, the tenant changed the user to run a college, and despite notice the tenant did not stop the misuser. The misuser was held to be detrimental to the landlord's interest because it exposed the landlord to possible forfeiture of his lease.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the premises were originally let for residential purposes and, if so, whether the tenant's subsequent use as a college amounted to misuse justifying eviction under section 14(1) proviso (c)(i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
  2. Whether the landlord's knowledge of the college user (through correspondence and address used) amounted to acquiescence or waiver, barring the landlord from seeking eviction.
  3. Whether the matters raised (including construction of documents and alleged waiver/acquiescence) raise a substantial question of law under section 39(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 sufficient to sustain a second appeal.
  4. Whether section 14(5) (and sub‑section referenced as (II) in the opinion) is applicable — specifically whether misuse must amount to a public nuisance or may be actionable if it is detrimental to the landlord's interest.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Initially argued that the lease language did not necessarily establish that the property was let for residential purposes; however, on being confronted with Exhibit P.9 (which expressly stated the premises were let for the tenant's personal residence only), the appellant conceded the premises were initially let for residential use.
  • Contended that the tenant began using the premises as a college in July 1955 and that the landlord was aware of this user from the start; therefore the landlord must be taken to have acquiesced or consented (i.e., waived the right to claim eviction).
  • Relied on precedents to support the presumption of consent or to attack the controller/tribunal findings (mentioned reliance on Dr. Gopal Das v. Dr S.K. Bhardwaj and Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao).
  • Argued that construction of documents and the landlord's knowledge raise questions of law suitable for consideration in a second appeal under section 39.
  • After hearing, the appellant expressed willingness to stop running the college but sought time until March 1969 to enable students to sit the matriculation examination (the opinion also references examinations to be held in March 1958; both dates appear in the text).

Respondent's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • Maintained that the premises were let for residential purposes and that running the college was a change of user contrary to the lease and prohibited without written consent under section 14(1) proviso (c)(i).
  • Argued that the misuse was detrimental to the landlord's interest because the Delhi Improvement Trust (and/or relevant authority) threatened termination/forfeiture of the landlord's lease if the breach was not stopped.
  • Produced documentary evidence: a September 1956 notice from the Delhi Improvement Trust calling on the landlord to close Gupta College (forwarded to the tenant on 12 December 1956 — Exhibit A.4) and a registered notice dated 11 January 1957 from the landlord's advocate (Exhibit A.15) objecting to the use as a college and mentioning threat of termination and rent arrears.
  • Relied as needed on earlier precedents cited in the opinion (Ram Gofial v. Mohan Lal; Siri Chana v. Jot Ram) in support of eviction — court states these were placed on behalf of the respondent.
  • Respondent's counsel was reluctant to press for any indulgence to the tenant in view of the risk of cancellation of his lease if misuser continued.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. Gopal Das v. Dr S.K. Bhardwaj, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 337 Cited by appellant to support presumption of landlord's consent/acquiescence. The court held this decision unhelpful: facts were different and that case dealt with the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 rather than the provisions (section 14(1) proviso (c)(i)) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 relevant here.
Hyde v. Pimley, 1952 2 All E.R. 102 Cited by appellant by analogy to English authority regarding tenancy/use matters (impliedly to support consent/acquiescence argument). The court regarded it as irrelevant and to be ignored because it dealt with the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933 (a different British statute) and no analogy was drawn; hence it was not helpful.
Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 884 Cited by appellant to argue that construction of documents and legal inferences from proved facts raise questions of law amenable to second appeal. The court considered the precedent and rejected the appellant's broad reading. It concluded Nedunuri did not change settled law on mixed questions of fact and law; inferences from proven facts are generally findings of fact not open to second appeal unless there is a legal infirmity. The court applied this principle to limit the scope of the appellant's challenge under section 39(2).
Ram Gofial v. Mohan Lal, A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 225 Cited by respondent (context: eviction/misuser jurisprudence relevant to the dispute). The court observed it was unnecessary to refer in detail to this decision for its conclusion but acknowledged it had been cited on behalf of the respondent.
Siri Chana v. Jot Ram, 1961 63 P.I.R. 915 Cited by respondent (context: eviction/misuser jurisprudence). The court stated it was unnecessary to discuss this decision in detail for its conclusion but acknowledged the decision was cited on behalf of the respondent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from the established factual findings of the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal and addresses the legal contentions raised on second appeal:

  1. Determination of initial user: The court accepted that the premises were initially let for residential purposes. The tenant's initial attempt to argue otherwise failed when confronted with Exhibit P.9, which expressly stated the premises were let for the tenant's personal residence.
  2. Statutory rule for change of user: The court emphasised the statutory requirement in clause (c)(i) of the proviso to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 — where premises let on or after 9 June 1952 cannot be used for a purpose other than that for which they were let without written consent of the landlord, and that failure to obtain such consent is a ground for recovery of premises by the landlord.
  3. Rejecting case-law analogies: The court examined cases relied upon by the appellant. It found Dr. Gopal Das distinguishable and unhelpful because it concerned an earlier statute (Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952). Hyde v. Pimley was rejected as irrelevant as it concerned a British statutory regime (the 1933 Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act) and no analogy had been shown.
  4. Scope of second appeal and nature of inferences: The court reviewed the appellant's reliance on Nedunuri Kameswaramma and analysed the law on mixed questions of fact and law. The court reiterated the settled rule: inferences from proved basic facts that lead to conclusions of fact are findings of fact and generally not open to re‑evaluation on second appeal unless there is a legal infirmity in the inference. A legal inference from facts becomes a pure question of law only when the existence of certain facts gives rise to legal rights or liabilities, or where documents are documents of title (or the cause of action rests on them) such that their construction raises questions of law. The court stated that section 39(2) further restricts second appeals to matters involving a substantial question of law — not merely any question of law.
  5. Plea of acquiescence/waiver — procedural and evidentiary requirements: The court explained that acquiescence or waiver is not a pure question of fact but a legal inference from basic facts; however, such a plea must be properly pleaded, put in issue and adjudicated at trial. The court found no foundation in the pleadings to sustain an acquiescence/waiver plea on second appeal, and noted that this plea had not been argued before the Rent Controller or the Rent Control Tribunal (no discussion of it in the impugned orders).
  6. Evidence on landlord's knowledge and reaction: The court addressed the appellant's contention that the landlord's correspondence (addressing letters c/o Gupta College) evidenced knowledge and therefore acquiescence. The court found this insufficient in light of two documentary notices:
    • A September 1956 notice from the Delhi Improvement Trust calling on the landlord to close Gupta College as contravening the lease conditions, which the landlord forwarded to the tenant on 12 December 1956 (Exhibit A.4).
    • A registered notice dated 11 January 1957 from the landlord's advocate (Exhibit A.15) objecting to the use as a college, repeating that the landlord had been threatened with termination of his lease if the breach was not stopped, and mentioning arrears of rent.
    The court held these notices "completely demolish" the plea of acquiescence or waiver made for the first time on second appeal.
  7. On the applicability of section 14(5) and (II): The court dealt with the contention that section 14(5) applies only if misuse amounts to a public nuisance. The court noted that this ignores the statutory alternative in that sub‑section which applies where the misuse is detrimental to the landlord's interest. The court found that threat of termination of the landlord's lease plainly amounted to detriment to landlord's interest and thus section 14(5) could apply.
  8. Conclusion of legal sufficiency for eviction: Given the concurrent findings of fact by the Rent Controller and Tribunal (residential letting and subsequent change of user to a college), the statutory requirement for written landlord consent on change of use, and documentary evidence of the landlord's objections and the authority's notice threatening termination of the landlord's lease, the court found no substantial legal infirmity to sustain a challenge on second appeal. The court therefore sustained the eviction order.
  9. Equitable consideration limited to students: Although the appellant later asked for time to wind up the college to allow students to sit examinations, the court declined to grant indulgence to the tenant as a matter of right but granted a short period (six weeks) to protect the students' immediate interests. The court awarded costs to the respondent in this Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The eviction order of the Rent Controller (12 June 1963), as affirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal (18 November 1963), is upheld by this Court.
  • The tenant is required to vacate the premises; the Court granted the tenant a period of six weeks from the date of the judgment to vacate for the limited purpose of making arrangements for the students of the college.
  • The respondent (landlord) is entitled to his costs in this Court.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent or alter established principles on mixed questions of fact and law; the court expressly rejected the proposition that the cited Supreme Court decision (Nedunuri) effected a change in the settled legal position and treated the case as one where no substantial legal infirmity justified interference on second appeal under section 39(2). Accordingly, no new legal doctrine was announced on the larger legal questions beyond the application of existing law to these facts.

Note: This summary strictly reflects the reasoning, findings and materials cited in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text of that opinion.

    Parkash Chander Gupta v. Tara Chand Malik .

    I.D Dua, C.J:— This is the tenant's second appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958 from the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated 18th November 1963 affirming on the tenant's appeal the order of the Kent Controller dated 12th June 1963 directing eviction of the tenant and ordering recovery of possession of the suit premises in favour of the landlord. The appellant, a tenant under the respondent in the premises bearing Municipal No. 8014 situated in Ramjas Road, Karolbagh, New Delhi at Rs. 250/- per mensem, took the said premises on rent on 31st March 1955. The eviction proceedings were started on 10th January 1962 on a two fold ground namely, (i) that the premises had been let for residential purposes but the tenant had started running a College therein known as Gupta College and (ii) that in spite of previous notice, the tenant had used or dealt with the premises in a manner contrary to the conditions imposed on the landlord by the Delhi Development Authority at the time of giving him the lease of the land on which the premises are situated. The main point considered by the Rent Controller to require determination was as to the purposes for which the building in question had been let to the tenant. Both the Rent Controller and the Tribunal have come to the concurrent conclusion that the premises had been let to the tenant for residential purposes but the’ tenant changed its user later on and he did not stop the misuser in spite of service of notice. The misuser was held to be detrimental to the interest of the landlord because the lease of the land on which the building is constructed is likely to be forfeited if the misuser is not stopped.

    2. On second appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant, to begin with, submitted that the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal have both failed to notice the distinction between the nature of the property which is leased out and the purposes for which it is leased out. According to him, the mere fact that in Exhibit A. 7 dated 31st March 1955, which evidences the lease, it is stated that Shri Parkash Chander the tenant had undertaken to take on rent as a tenant Shri Tara Chand Malik's residential house does not-necessarily mean that the said house was let out for residential purpose. But when Shri A.R Wig, the learned counsel for the tenant appellant, was confronted with Exhibit P. 9 in which it is expressly stated that the premises in question had been let out to Shri Parkash Chander for his personal residence only, he was constrained to drop this argument and to concede that the premises in question had been initially let out for residential purpose.

    3. Shri Wig next contended that the tenant had started using the premises for a College in July, 1955 and the landlord was fully aware of this user from the very start and he must, therefore, be deemed to have acquiesced in it. As a matter of fact, the initial argument put forth by Shri Wig was that consent of the landlord must be presumed in these circumstances and he referred me to a decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopal Das v. Dr S.K Bhardwaj . A.I.R 1963 S. C. 337, but this decision is, in my view, wholly unhelpful to the appellant. Not only are the facts of the reported case different, but there the Court was concerned with the provisions of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, whereas in the case in band clause (c)(i) of the proviso to section 14 (i) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 59 of 1958 calls for determination. According to this clause, if the premises had been let, on or after 9th June 1952, the tenant can use the premises for a purpose other than for which they were let only after obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord. Failure to do so is, according to section 14, a ground for rendering recovery of premises on the landlord's application to the Rent Controller. The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Hyde v. Pimley . 1952 2 All. E. R. 102., may also be ignored because that decision obviously deals with Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act of 1933 of the British Parliament and not with the statute which concerns us. No attempt has been made to bring out any analogy between the two provisions, with, the result that I must hold the decision of the English Court of Appeal to be wholly unhelpful and irrelevant.

    4. Shri Wig next contended that the landlord must be held to have waived his right to claim an order of eviction against the appellant on the ground of section 14(1) proviso (c)(i) because he had ever since July, 1955 known of the use of the premises as a college by the tenant-appellant and had indeed been corresponding with the appellant sending to him letters c/o the Gupta College. It was contended that a plea, of fact and law and, therefore, on the admitted facts, such a plea can be argued in a Court of Appeal and even in a Court of second Appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. According to Shri Wig the argument that the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal were bound in law to consider the effect of the documents which show knowledge on the part of the landlord about the premises being used as a College on the tenant's contention that the landlord had waived his right, raises a substantial question of law and it is emphasised that an argument on these lines was actually raised in the grounds of appeal. This submission has been sought to be supported by the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Nedunuri Kameswaramma v. Sampati Subba Rao . A.I.R 1963 S. C, 884.. It was observed in that decision that a construction of documents (unless they are documents of title) produced by the parties to prove a question of fact does not involve an issue of law, unless it can be shown that the material evidence contained in them was misunderstood by the court of fact and that the legal inference from the proved facts may still raise a question of law. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that this decision has brought about a change, in the earlier legal position that inference of fact from basic conclusions of fact still remains a question of law and does not become a question of law because now a legal inference from proved facts must always be considered to be a question of law. I must express my complete inability to agree with the submission that this decision of the Supreme Court was intended to bring about any change in the settled legal position about the nat-are of the inference drawn from proved facts. The legal position on the point canvassed before me is settled beyond doubt and decisions are a legion which have authoritively established that even in case ‘of a mixed question of fact and law, an inference leading to a conclusion of fact must nevertheless be a finding of fact not challengable on second appeal, if there is no legal infirmity in drawing such inference from evidentiary or proved basic facts. It is only when the existence of certain lacts give rise to a legal right or liability that the inference from these existing facts becomes an inference of law. If, therefore, the inference is not drawn in a legal manner, it would amount to an error of law reviewable on second appeal. As is obvious, a mixed question of fact and law arises when to come to a conclusion it would necessitate answering both question of fact and a question of law and such a conclusion would be open to second appeal only if an error on the matter of law can be made out. The question of fact requiring answer can by no means be open to revaluation by the Court of second appeal. Of course, when a document is one of title or one on which a party's cause of action is founded its construction would raise a question of law, and in case of other documents, there misreading would also similarly raise a question of law. In other cases, interpretation or construction of documents, which are not documents of title or on which the cause of action is not founded, would merely amount to a question of fact, without giving rise to any question of law which can be agitated on second appeal. In a case of this type, the Court merely evaluates documents as pieces of evidence. The legal position just enunciated appears to me to be settled beyond doubt and the ratio of the Supreme Court decision does not. state the legal position differently. And then, under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Act of 1958, the scope of challenge is further restricted by sub-section (2) thereof which shuts out a second appeal unless some substantial question of law is involved therein. A substantial question of law, it is again beyond dispute, does not mean a mere question of law. In order to be “substantial”, a question of law must at least be such that there is some doubt or difference of opinion or there is room for difference of opinion on the legal aspect, though generally a question of law of general public importance or even one which may affect materially the rights of the parties has been considered to be substantial in some decisions. However, the law is well-settled, the mere application of the settled principles to a particular set of facts would scarcely constitue a substantial question of law The appellant has, therefore, still another hurdle to cross by showing that the impugned order is tainted with a legal infirmity of a substantial nature.

    5. Now I quite agree that acquiesence is not a pure question of fact but of legal inference from basic facts found and upon the question of acquiesence, the judgment of the Court of first Appeal drawing the inference may not be final. But the plea of acquiesence or waiver must be raised in the pleadings, put into issue and adjudicated upon at trial, for, the lacts on which such a plea is to be founded must find place in the pleadings. The appellants' learned counsel, however, argued that if basic facts are pleaded, even though for sustaining another plea which has failed, then on such admitted or founded facts, the arguments lor sustaimrg the plea of acquiesence or waiver, which is a mixed question of fact of law. would be permissible even on second appeal, its restricted scope as provided by section 39 21 of the Delhi Act of 1958 notwithstanding, with the object of substantiating this contention. Shri Wig has taken me through his client's written statement and also through the application for eviction. I must confess that I do not find any foundation of factual pleas in the pleadings which can sustain a plea of acquiesence or waiver in'this Court. But be that as it may, the plea of acquiesence or waiver was not even remotely argued before the Kent Controller and of course the parties did not seem to have realised that facts considered necessary for establishing such a plea were the subject matter of controversy. Even before the Rent Control Tribunal, the plea of acquiescence or waiver was not argued because there is no discussion on this aspect in the impugned order.

    6. The next question are the facts on the basis of which the aforesaid plea is sought to be established in this Court, admitted or established? The only point which the learned counsed for the appellant Shri Wig and Shri D.K Kapur have been able with their industry and research to make out is that the landlord must have known by reason of the address on which he used to correspond with the tenant after July, 1955 that a College was being run in the premises and, therefore, he must be assumed to have acquiescence in such user and waived his right to have the premises vacated under section 14(1) proviso(c)(1) of the Delhi Act of 1958. The counsel has of course very eloquently asserted that a reading of these letters must necessarily amount to acquiescence or waiver, but my attention has not been drawn to any preceqent or principle on which acquiescence or waiver can be thus supported Of course nothing has been said at the bar as to how the tenant has suffered or been prejudiced by the knowledge on the part of the landlord that a Collepe was being run in the premises, it is note worthy that in September, 1956, the landlord was served with a notice from the Delhi Improvement Trust calling upon him to close the Gupta College within 30 days as it was being run in cortravention of the condition of the lease in his lavour This notice was apparently forwarded by the landlord to the tentant on 12th December, 1956 per Exhibit A. 4. This document, in my view, completely domolishes any plea of acquiesence or waiver as is sought to be made out now for the first on second appeal in this Court on behalf of the tenant. On 11th January, 1957; a registered notice by Shri Naubat Rai Sun, Advocate, on behalf of the landlord. Exhibit A. 15 was also served objecting to the cause of the demised premises as College known as Gupta College. It is expressly repeated in this notice that the landlord has been threatened by the Delhi Improvement Trust with the termination of his lease if the breach of its trust is not stopped, it is also mentioned in this notice that the tenant was in arrears of rent. Without going into the other material on the record, in my view, these two notices are sufficient to expose the futility of the contention sought to be raised now. I am on this view refraining to express any opinion on the question if the landlord's right could in law be defeated by a plea of waiver or acquiescence.

    7. I need not and that even if there were a question of law of the kind suggested on behalf of the appellant, it would be a matter for consideration if it constituted a substantial question of law because the essential ingredients of acquiescence and waiver are very well settled. A question of this type, even it it arose, may not stand the test of section 39(2) of the Rent Act. Of course, no other substantial legal infirmity has been pointed out in this context.

    8. In regard to the applicability of section 14(5) and (II) of the Delhi Rent Act of 1958, Shri Wig with his usual ingenuity submitted that if the user of the house for a different purpose was waived by the landlord, then these sub sections would be wholly inapplicable. Here I am afraid the learned counsel is unaware, of the record, of the notices, to which I have adverted a little earlier. Those notices are a complete answer to this plea, though, in my view if on the first ground discussed above, the order of eviction is to be sustained, the second ground would lose much of its importance. The submission that according to. section 14(5) unless the misuse of the premises by the tenant amounts to a public nuisance, this provision would not be attracted, also ignores the last alternative in the sub-section which attracts its applicability if the misuse detrimental to the interest of the landlord. It is undeniable that the threat of terminating the landlord's lease would be deterimental to the landlord's interest.

    9. In view of what I have observed on the necessity of the plea being raised in the pleadings, it is unnecessary to refer to the decisions in Ram Gofial v. Mohan Lal . A.I.R 1960 Punj. 225. and Siri Chana v. Jot Ram . 1961 63 P. I. R. 915, on behalf of the respondent. For the foregoing reasons, in my view, the order of eviction is fully justified and there is no cogent ground for not granting to the londlord the relief claimed by him.

    10. After the arguments were concluded by the parties, the appellant expressed his willingness to give up runing the College in the premises, but for that purpose he wanted time upto March, 1969 because, according to him, the students attending the College would sit at the Matriculation Examination in that month. The respondents learned counsel, however, felt, hesitant in arguing to this suggestion because he apprehended concellation of his lease on the continuance of the use of the premises as a College. In my view, the attifute adopted by the tenant does not entitled him to any indulgence, but the only consideration that is weighing with me is the lot’ of the students who are studying in this College and are preparing for their exumiration to be held in March, 1958. In my opinion, some time must be given to the tenant to make suitable arrangements for the benefit of the students and I would accordingly give him six weeks from today to vacate the premises. The respondent is entitled to his costs in this Court.

    11. Appeal dismissed

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    Parkash Chander Gupta v. Tara Chand Malik .
    (Dec 11, 1967)