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  • merits.(d) Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sections 323, 324, 325, 323 and 452, Indian Penal Code,
  • provisions of section 247, Criminal Pioccduie Code,
  • section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 247 of the Code by Act 26 of 1955,
  • SECTION 202 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 247 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 247 of the Code. Rule 3 (ii)
  • section 323, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 247 Cr. P. C,
  • section 323, I. P. C,
  • Rule 3 (ii)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • merits.(d) Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sections 323, 324, 325, 323 and 452, Indian Penal Code,
  • provisions of section 247, Criminal Pioccduie Code,
  • section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 247 of the Code by Act 26 of 1955,
  • SECTION 202 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 247 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 247 of the Code. Rule 3 (ii)
  • section 323, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 247 Cr. P. C,
  • section 323, I. P. C,
  • Rule 3 (ii)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from a private complaint filed by Mohd. Yamin on 30th January 1965 against two accused (Zaiar Mohammad and Mohd. Akal) alleging assault with an iron rod on 16th January 1965. The complaint originally included charges under sections 323, 324, 325, 323 and 452, Indian Penal Code. The police reportedly declined action; a police report was attached to the complaint. The complaint included five witnesses and the complainant was hospitalized from 16th to 27th January 1965.

The matter was referred for enquiry under section 202, CrPC. Four witnesses were examined during the enquiry and the Sub Divisional Magistrate (Shri V.K. Bhalla) concluded that only a case under section 323 IPC was made out and forwarded the file to the Additional District Magistrate (A.D.M). The file passed through various adjournments and administrative transfers. On 15th October 1965 the accused were present and released on bail. Trial was fixed before a Magistrate transferee and after multiple adjournments and partial recording of evidence, the case was adjourned to 10th February 1966.

On 10th February 1966 Shri A.C. Kher, Magistrate 1st Class, recorded an order stating that the complainant was absent after being called three times and acquitted the accused in accordance with section 247, CrPC, treating the case as one only under section 323 IPC and describing it as a "sua non sene" case (sic). The order did not state whether the accused were present when acquitted and contained no recorded reasons explaining the exercise of discretion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Magistrate was legally bound to acquit the accused under section 247 CrPC when the complainant was absent as the case was called, or whether the Magistrate retained discretion (including under the proviso to section 247) to adjourn or to proceed without the complainant.
  2. Whether the Magistrate complied with the High Court Rules & Orders (Vol. III, Chapter 1-A) and, in particular, Rule 3(ii) regarding dismissal of cases in default, the obligation to give complainants full opportunity to appear and to record reasons when dismissing in default.
  3. Whether the impugned order of acquittal was arbitrary or unjudicial because it failed to disclose compliance with the instructions governing dismissal in default and did not disclose sufficient facts (such as intervals between calls) to permit appellate scrutiny.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Complainant Mohd. Yamin)

  • The learned Magistrate erred in acquitting the accused without waiting at least for some time for the complainant to appear and prosecute the case.
  • On the day in question the complainant had gone to the W.C. for a few minutes and the case was disposed of in his absence by acquittal.
  • The acquittal contravened the provisions of section 247 CrPC as well as the instructions in the High Court Rules & Orders, Vol. III, Chapter 1-A.
  • Authorities cited in support included Ram Narain v. Moot Chand (Single Bench, Lucknow) and Naresh Prasad v. Mahavir Singh (Single Bench, Allahabad).

Respondents' Arguments (Accused)

  • Counsel for the respondents argued a literal reading of section 247 CrPC compelled the Magistrate to acquit the accused when the complainant did not appear upon the case being called.
  • Authorities cited for that literal position included Natesa Naicker v. Mari Grzmari and Kagarmbilli Torhya v. Matra Jagannatha (Devadoss and Waller, JJ).
  • It was contended that the Magistrate had no option but to acquit once the complainant failed to appear on the day fixed or a subsequent adjourned day when the case was called.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Narain v. Moot Chand (Single Bench, Lucknow) Cited by appellant in support of the appeal (specific principle not elaborated in the opinion excerpt). The court noted it was brought to their attention by the appellant; no detailed analysis of this case is recorded in the text.
Naresh Prasad v. Mahavir Singh (Single Bench, Allahabad) Cited by appellant in support of the appeal (specific principle not elaborated in the opinion excerpt). The court acknowledged it was cited by appellant; no detailed discussion of its holdings is set out in the opinion excerpt.
Natesa Naicker v. Mari Grzmari Cited by respondents to support a literal/mandatory construction of section 247 (decision in revision and before the 1955 amendment). The court observed this decision was given before the 1955 amendment and that the Single Judge in that case had recognized the power in the Magistrate to adjourn for proper reasons; the decision was not followed as an absolute precedent.
Kagarmbilli Torhya v. Matra Jagannatha (Devadoss and Waller, JJ) Cited by respondents to support the contention that section 247 required acquittal when complainant absent. The court noted reliance upon it by respondents but observed this and similar pre-amendment authorities do not dictate a rigid mandatory rule after the proviso was widened by the 1955 amendment.
The State v. Gurdial Singh Gill (A.I.R. 1901 Puni 71) Referenced by the court as supporting the view favouring judicial discretion in applying section 247. Listed among authorities that, according to the court, favour the discretionary approach adopted by the court in this opinion.
Krishan Das v. Manohar Lal Cited by the court as supportive authority for the view that magistrates must exercise discretion and not act arbitrarily in dismissing complaints in default. Included by the court in the list of decisions that support its approach; no extended analysis of the case is provided in the excerpt.
Prabh Dyal v. R. Mudgl (1966 68 P.L.R. 363) Referenced as supporting the court's view regarding discretion under section 247 and proper exercise of judicial mind. Referred to as favoring the view taken by the court; no further elaboration in the text excerpt.
Majallul Manilal Shah v. C. C. Shah (A.I.R. 1965 Guj. 180) Cited as a decision that dissented from the Nagarambilli authority. The court noted the Gujarat High Court dissented from Nagarambilli and relied on Majallul Manilal Shah as one of the reasons not to follow Nagarambilli.
Nagarambilli (case referred to as "Nagarambilli") Relied upon by respondents (or their counsel) in support of the mandatory view; decision was given before the 1955 amendment. The court explained Nagarambilli was a revision decision predating the 1955 amendment; one judge in that decision recommended latitude to complainants called early in the day and the court gave reasons for not following it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining section 247 CrPC and its proviso. It quoted the provision in full and emphasised that the proviso (allowing the Magistrate to dispense with the complainant's personal attendance where it is unnecessary) negates any contention that the word "shall" in the main clause creates an absolute, mandatory rule compelling acquittal whenever a complainant is absent.

The court explained its interpretative approach to the word "shall": the term does not always connote mandatory intent and must be construed in light of the statute's purpose, context, connected provisions, and practical consequences. The court stressed that construing section 247 as rigidly mandatory could produce serious inconvenience or injustice, especially because an acquittal under that section is final and there is generally no provision for review or setting aside such dismissals in default.

The opinion then turned to the High Court Rules and Orders (Vol. III, Chapter 1-A), particularly Rule 3(ii) on "Dismissal of Cases in Default." These rules require magistrates to consider legality and justification before dismissing cases in default, to record reasons where a case is dismissed, to give complainants full opportunity to appear (ordinarily calling the case again later in the day), and to avoid dismissals where the magistrate is on tour unless the complainant had due notice. Rule 3(ii)(c) distinguishes summons-cases from warrant-cases and notes that section 247 does not apply when evidence is concluded and the case is adjourned for judgment.

The court concluded that the High Court Rules compel a judicial, discretionary approach rather than an automatic acquittal. Rule 3(ii) imposes a "grave responsibility" upon magistrates and rules out arbitrary or rigid conduct. The court cited and grouped authorities that, in its view, support this discretionary, justice-oriented approach.

Applying these principles to the present record, the court found: the complainant in this matter had actively and diligently prosecuted the case and was not dilatory; the impugned order contained no reasons and on its face reflected arbitrariness and an absence of judicial approach; the record did not disclose when the case was first called or the interval between calls; administrative convenience, rather than justice, appeared to have influenced the Magistrate; and the Magistrate's action betrayed an unawareness of relevant legal provisions and binding High Court decisions and rules.

The court also expressed broader concerns about the quality of criminal justice in the Magistrates' Courts in Delhi, attributing some of the problem to the conferral of judicial powers on executive officers with heavy executive duties, thereby impairing proper judicial conduct. It emphasized that considerations of administrative convenience have no place in judicial decision-making.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: The appeal was allowed. The impugned order of acquittal was set aside and the case was remanded to the learned Magistrate for further proceedings in accordance with law and in the light of the court's observations.

Direct Consequences: The order of acquittal is vacated and the trial Court is directed to proceed further. The parties were ordered to appear before the Magistrate on 6th November 1967 when a further date would be given for proceedings in conformity with the directions in this opinion.

Broader Observations and Implications:

  • The court underscored that magistrates must exercise judicial discretion and record reasons before dismissing complaints for absence of the complainant, following Rule 3(ii) of the High Court Rules & Orders.
  • The opinion contains a judicial admonition that administrative convenience or executive duties should not undermine the quality and impartiality of judicial decision-making in criminal trials.
  • The court's order emphasises improving the quality of criminal justice in Delhi and the need for magistrates to have adequate time and judicial temperament to decide criminal matters conscientiously.

Note: The opinion does not state that a new binding legal precedent was formulated; rather, it interprets existing statutory provision (section 247 CrPC) and High Court Rules and applies them to set aside the impugned acquittal and remand the case for proper judicial proceeding.

    Mohd. Yamin v. Zafar Mohammad .

    I D. Dua, C.J and T.V.R Tatachari J.:— This is an acquittal appeal in a case started on a private complaint by Modh. Yamin comolainant appellant, The impugned order was passed by Shri A.C Kher, Magistrate 1st Class, Delhi, on 10th February 1965 and reads as under:—

    “The complainant Mohd. Yamin is absent today. It is 11.15 A. M. and he has open called three out he is absent. The accuse) are, therefore, acquitted in accordance with rovisions of section 247 Cr. P. C, as the case standing trial before this Court is of section ‘323, I. P. C, which i a sura nons case. This file may be consigned to record room.”

    2. It is'obvious that there is no mention of the fact whether or not the. accused persons were present on the date of hearing when they were acquitted on account of the absence ot the complainant. The complaint under sections 323, 324, 325, 323 and 452, Indian Penal Code, was filed on 3oth January. 1965, against two accused persons Zaiar Mohammad and Mohd. Akal, in which it was alleged that accused No. 1 had beaten the complainant mercilessly afrer using filthy language because of a customer having come to the complainant's shop after visiting the shoo of the said accused The matter was reported to the Police Station, Jama Majid, but the police declined to take any action. A copy of the report was attached with the complaint. Since that incident, the two accused pepsons, who are running-a common shop of motor parts at a few pays from that of the comolnnant in Kabari Bazar, lama Masjid, have been feeling inimical towards the complainant. On 16th January, 1935 at 11 A M, when the complainant was working in his shop, the two accused persons arrived there and all of a sudden gave a blow with an iron rod on his head, as a result of which the complainant became unconscious. They also beat the complainant with the same iron rod on his leg and at his back. Some persons, including the neighbouring shop-keepers arrived at the spot and saved the complainant from the clutches of the accused. This matter was reported to the Police Station, Jama Masjid by one Mohammad Babu, an eyewitness to the occurrence. The comolainant was taken to the Police Hospital and thereafter was sent to Irwin Hospital, where he remained from 16th January, 1965 to 27th January, 1965. This complaint was accompanied by a list of five witnesses. It appears that the matter was referred for enquiry under section 202 Criminal Procedure Code, and Shri V.K Bhalla, Sub Divisional Magistrate on 18th September, 1965, after going through the evidence of four witnesses produced by the complainant, came to the conclusion that the injuries suffered by the complainant were simple, caused, by some blunt weapon, with the result that only a case under section 323, Indian Penal Code, was made out. With this opinion, the file was submitted to the learned Additional District Magistrate (Central) and the complainant was also directed to appear before the said A.D.M on 20th September. 1965. It is worth pointing out that in the course of enquiry under section 202, Criminal Procedure Code, the first two witnessess wpre examined on 20th March, 1965, the third witness was examined on 16th April, 1965 and the fourth on 9th August, 1965. From the older sheet, I find that on 19th August, 1965, the Magistrate had ordered the complainant to appear before the Additional District Magistrate on 13th September, 1965, but the file was directed to be placed before the Court for a suitable order on 6th September, 1965. This order is obviously difficult to understand. On 13th September, 1965, the complaint was stated to be present, but the presiding officer was stated to be busy with emergency work, with the result that the file was directed to be placed before the Court for suitable orders on 16th September, 1965. It was added that the file should be sent to the Additional District Magistrate on 20th September, 1965. On lftth September, 1965 again, the complainant was present with his counsel, but the Presiding Officer was again busy with some emergency work, with the result that the case was adjourned to 20th September, 1965 for suitable proceedings. It was thereafter that the papers were according to the order, forward to the Additional District Magistrate. On 20th Stptemoer, 1965, the comolainant was pie-sent with his counsel and it was noted that the file had been sent to the Additional District Magistrate, but its receipt had not yet arrived. The file was thus oidered to be sent on 27th September, 1965 and the complainant was also directed to appear in the Court of the Additional District Magistrate on that date. This order is again difficult to understand. On 27th September, 1965, Shri R Jain, who was presumably A.D.M, made an order that the accused were to be proceeded against only under section 323, I.P.C The case was adjourned to 15th October, 1965. On that date, the complainant was present, and so were the accused persons, who were released on bail by Shri R. Jain. The case was transferred to a Magistrate who was to hold the trial and the parties were directed to appear in the transteree Court on 19th October, 1965 On that date, Shri A. C Kher, Magistrate 1st Class, adjourned the case to 24th November, 1965 for evidence, the complainant being directed either to bring his witnesses with him or to summon them. He was required to deposit the process-fee within two days. On 24th November, 1965, the complainant and both the accused were present, but a request was made by the complainant's counsel for adjournment because of his being busy in the High Court. The case was accordingly adjourned to 1st December, 1965 for evidence. On that date, however, though the complainant and the accused were present, the case could not be taken up on account of, what is described by the learned Magistrate to be, rush o work. The case was thus adjourned to 22nd January, 1966. On that date, in the presence of the complainant and the accused persons, the statement of one witness was recorded. No other witness being present, the case was adjourned for the remaining evidence to 10th February, 1966. The impugned order made on 10th February, 1966 has already been reproduced.

    3. It is very strongly argued on behalf of the complainant that the learned Magistrate has errtd in acquitting the accused and not waiting, at least for some time for the complainant to appear and prosecute the case. According to the counstl's argument before us, the com-plairant had just get e to the W.C fir a few minutes and the case was disposed of in his absence by acquitting the accused persons. This order isdescrided to be corttary to the provisions of section 247, Criminal Pioccduie Code, and also violative of the instructions contained in the High Court Rules & Orders. Vol. III, Chapter 1 F. Our attention has also been drawn to Ram Narain v. Moot Chand,1 Single Bench decision of the Lucknow Bench, and to Naresh Ptasad v. Mahavir Singh,2 another Single Lench decision of the Allahabad Court, in Support of the appeal.

    4. Shri Parkash Narain has on behalf of the respordents supported the correctness of the impugned order by contending on the literal language of section 247, Criminal Procedure Code, that the learned Magistrate had no option and that he was bound, as a matter of law, to acquit the accused when the complainant did not appear on the case being called He has cited Natea Naicker v. Mari Grzmari,3 (Yahya Ali J.) and Kagarmbilli Torhya v. Matra Jagannatha,4 (Devadoss add Waller, JJ), for the legal position convassed by him.

    5. Let us first read section 247 of the Code:—

    “247. If the summons has been issued on complaint, and upon the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant docs not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hererbeore contained, acquit the accused, unless for Some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day:—

    Provided that where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance, and proeed with the case”.

    6. The proviso seems to us to negative the respondents' contention that the trial Magistrate is enjoined by premptory mandate to acquit the accused if the complainant does not happen to be present in Court when the case is called. The word ‘shall’, it may been membered does not always necessarily cannote a mandatory intent on the part of the lawmaker. The purpose for which the provision is made and its nature, considered in its setting, the conected provisions and other similar matters the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting frr m reading the provision as directory or mandatory, whether the cause of justice is promoted or retarded as a consequence of consttuing the provision one way or the other, have all to be taken into account by the judicial mind for the purpose of construing the word shall” which, normally, may of course be considered to suggest an imperative tendency. No general rule running in fixed grooves is either possible or desirable to be prescribed, and indeed each case depends on the object sought to be achieved by the legislature. Not being rigid and fixed the construction of the word “shall” in a given staute must be adapted to the fitness of the matter of he statutory provision. Realising that punishment of crimes by the State Courts of law and justice serve as a check on the tendency by the private aggrieved parties themse Jyes to take revenge by acts of violence and lawlessness for the actual or supposed wrong considered to have been done to them, and in view of the fact, that, in the trials of criminal cases according to our Code, normally there is neither a general provision for a review nor for sitting aside dismissals in default, we are disinclined to impute to the Legislature a rigid mandatory intent in enacting section 247 such as is suggested on behalf of the respondents. The fact that the order of acquittal would be final, is also not unimportant in discovering the legislative intent.

    7. We may now turn to the rules made by the High Court on this subject. They are contained in chapter IF, Vol. 111, High Court Rules and orders and may be read with advantage.

    “DISMISSAL OF CASES IN DEFAULT.

    Some magistrates are inclined to dismiss cases in default hastily.

    2. Before a case is dismissed by reason of the absence of complainant, the magistrates should carefully consider—

    (a) whether such an order is legal; and

    (b) whether it is justified by the circumstances.

    In view of the proviso added to section 247 of the Code by Act 26 of 1955, even in summons cases the magistrate can proceed with the case on complainant's failure to attend when he considers that complainant's personal attendance is not necessary.

    Reasons should always be recorded where a case is dismissed in default.

    3. In applications for revision of orders dismissing complaints or cases instituted on complaint, by reason of the absence of the complainant, it is frequently urged—

    (a) that the complainant was not called;

    (b) that the case was dismissed very early in the day; or

    (c) that the magistrates being on tour, the complainant had no or insufficient, notice of the place of sitting.

    (ii) The magistrates records often furnish no definite information on any of these points. The following instructions are accordingly issued for guidance to subordinate Courts:

    (a) magistrate should not dismiss complaints or cases instituted on complaint without giving complainants full opportunity for appearance. Ordinarily, it a complainant is absent when his case is first called on, his case should be ca led on again later, and the time of dismissal should always be noted on the record

    (b) When the magistrate is on tour, complaints or cases instituted on complaint should not be dismissed unless the complainant has hod due notice of the piace of hearing.

    (c) In carrying out these instructions magistrates should bear in mind that if a summons cases in which a summons has been issued, is dismissed on account of the absence of the complainant, the accused must be acquitted, unless the magistrate decides to proceed with the case under proviso recently added to section 247 of the code. A warrant-case, in which proceedings have been instituted on complaint, can only be dismissed in the absence of the complainant, if the offence is one that can lawfully be compounded, or is not a cognizable offence. In the later case the magistrate may, in his discretion, discharge the accused at any time before a charge has. been framed under section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the offence is cognizable or is one that cannot lawfully be compounded the magistrate is bound to proceed with the case and decide it on its merits.

    (d) Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply when the entire evidence in a case has been concluded and the case has been adjourned only for judgment without the attendance of the complainant having been specially directed.

    8. These rules remove all doubts on the point and quite clearly suggest that the Magistrate has to exercise his judicial discretion in making an order under section 247 of the Code. Rule 3 (ii) contains the broad instructions for the guidance of the Magistrate, prominently bringing out the grave responsibility which rests on the trying Magistrate when deciding whether to adjourn the case or to proceed with the trial, even in the absence of the complainant, or to acquit the accused. They completely rule out arbitrariness or fixed automatic rigidey of action on the part of the Magistrate. Speaking with respect, we think that these rules are supported by considerations of practical good sense and are designed to promote the cause of substantial justice Indeed, the view taken by us was also favoured in The State v. Gurdial Singh Gill . A.I.R 1901 Puni 71. Krishan Das v. Manohar Lal,6 and Prabh Dyal v. R. Mudgl . 1966 68 p.L R. 363.

    9. The decision in the case of Nagarambilli, on which Shri Parkash Narain very strongly relied, was a revision and was given before the amendment in the proviso to section 247 made in 1155. This amendment does seem evidently to widen the scope of the proviso, thereby making section 247 more liberal in favour of complainants. Besides, even one of the learned Judges, Wall-r, J., expressly recorded his view that a Magistrate would be well advised to give a complainant, whose case is called early in the day, some latitude before section 247 is applied. Devadoss, J. also declined to interfere, for one reason, because the case was before that Court on revision. This case also appears to have been dissented from by the Gujarat High Court in Majallul Manilal Shah v. C. C. Shah . A.I.R 1965 Guj. 180. It would be obvious that there are more reasons than one for us not to follow this decision. The decision in the case of Natesa Naicker was also in a revision and was given prior to the amendment of 1955. In that case, however, the learned Single Judge recognised the power in the Magistrate to adjourn the case tor proper reasons. We need say nothing more about this case as well.

    10. The object of section 247, as it emerges on a consideration of the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to ensure that private complainants are not dilatory in prosecuting the criminal proceedings. As the history of the present case shows, the complainant-appellant has by no means been dilatory in conducting the proceedings: on the contrary, he has been earnestly and diligently prosecuting the case with all seriousness: the acquittal ot the accused based merely on the absence of the complainant, when the case was called, without considering the merits, in face of the dire consequences of such an order, clearly calls for a conscientious application of judicial mind by the learned Magistrate. The order of acquittal being appealable, it is only fit and proper that it must disclose on its face compliance with the instructions contained in Rule 3 (ii) reproduced above and any infirmity in this respect would render the order open to examination by this Court. In the case in hand, the impugned order on its face reflects its arbitrary and unjudicial character. It is not possible to know from the record as to when the case was first called and what, was the interval, whereafter it was called the second and third time. Of course, the time of making the order of acquiral is contained in the order, but that by itself is quite clearly not a sufficient compliance with Rule 3 ii). The ordor betrays absence of judicial approach by the learned Magistrate and his unawareness of the relevant legal provisions and of the binding derisions of the High Court. Administrative convenience seems to us to have weighed with him more than the cause of justice. The present case has only added one more instance to the list of cases which have come to the notice of this Court disclosing the poor and unsatisfactory quality of criminal justice administered in the Courts of Magistrates in Delhi which, as the capital of Republic, is expected to provide to its citizens ideal administration of justice befitting a welfare democratic set up whih has Justice as its most cherished and prominent beacome ght in the Preamble of the Constitution. One of the main reasons for this serious but avoidable infirmity in the criminal justice, as administered in the magisterial Courts of Delhi is the conferment of judicial powers on executive officers who being far too busy with executive functions, understandably find it difficult to imbibe the essential judicial spirit required in satisfactorily dealing with court cases. For the administration of criminal justice to inspire confidence of the people that they may not, in frustration, be overtaken by the natural human instinct of revenge, it is of the greatest importance that the Courts possess the requisite ability, aptitude, objective approach and knowledge of law and have reasonably adequate time at their disposal to deal with criminal cases conscientiously with the necessary detached judicial poise and in an a mosphere of judicial calmness.

    11. Considerations ot administrative or executive convenience is foreign to and has no place in the judicial mind and arbritrariness is tabobed in judicial orders. This Court his more than once emphasised the emergent importance of improving the quality of criminal justice in Delhi which provides to the visitors from abroad that first glimpse of our constitutional set up and our democratic Constitution at work We accordingly consider it proper to repeat once again that the sooner the criminal administration of justice is improved in Delhi, the better for the Rule of Law, for our orderly society and for cur democratic mode of life. In the result, this appeal succeeds and allowing the same, we set aside the impugned order of acquittal and remit the case back to the learned Magistrate tor further proceedings in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. If the learned Magistrate is overworked on the executive side, we hope he would seek relief from other unjudicial work as envisaged in the High Court Rules and orders Vol. III, Chapter 1-A, Rule 9. Judicial cases must never be allowed to suffer if our civilised orderly democratic life is to survive and grow to a healthy stature. It must never be forgotten that nothing makes the citizens more content with their state than unadulterated, pure and speedy justice and nothing makes people more frustrated than unjust or poor quality of justice.

    12. The parties are directed to appear in the Court below on 6th November 1967 when another date would be given for further proceedings in accordance with law and the foregoing directions.

    13. Case remanded.

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    Comments

    Mohd. Yamin v. Zafar Mohammad .
    (Oct 18, 1967)