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  • provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958, and Patents and Designs Act II of 1911
  • provisions contained in sections 48 to 53 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
  • section 25(b) read with Article 15 Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act
  • section 25 read with Article 15 of Schedule 1-A.4.
  • Sub-Section (2) of section 56 of the Stamp Act, 1889,
  • s. 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the English rule
  • provisions of Section 57(1) of the Stamp Act
  • section 57(1)(b) of, the Indian Stamp Act
  • Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958,
  • U/S 33 of the Indian Stamp Act.
  • section 38(2) of the Stamp. Act,
  • section 2(5) of the Stamp Act
  • SECTION 25 STAMP ACT
  • SECTION 40 STAMP ACT
  • section 25(b)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958, and Patents and Designs Act II of 1911
  • provisions contained in sections 48 to 53 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
  • section 25(b) read with Article 15 Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act
  • section 25 read with Article 15 of Schedule 1-A.4.
  • Sub-Section (2) of section 56 of the Stamp Act, 1889,
  • s. 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the English rule
  • provisions of Section 57(1) of the Stamp Act
  • section 57(1)(b) of, the Indian Stamp Act
  • Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958,
  • U/S 33 of the Indian Stamp Act.
  • section 38(2) of the Stamp. Act,
  • section 2(5) of the Stamp Act
  • SECTION 25 STAMP ACT
  • SECTION 40 STAMP ACT
  • section 25(b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a reference under section 57(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act. On 11 September 1964 Messrs Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf), Delhi executed two agreements: one in favour of the Institute of Medicines and Medical Research (annexure A) and another in favour of Hamdard National Foundation (India) (annexure B). Both agreements were presented for registration on 15 September 1964 before the Sub-Registrar (I), Delhi and were executed on non-judicial stamp paper of Rs. 2 each.

The Sub-Registrar impounded the documents under section 33 of the Indian Stamp Act, taking the view that they were chargeable under section 25(b) read with Article 15 of Schedule I-A and that higher duty was payable (annexure A allegedly requiring Rs. 1,200 stamp and annexure B Rs. 14,400, based on stated minimum royalties). The Collector of Stamps referred the matter to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under section 56(2) and, subsequently, proceedings under Section 40 of the Stamp Act were started with notices issued to the respondent.

The Collector posed two specific questions for decision and the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, after considering the matter, referred the case to this Court under section 57(1) of the Stamp Act on the points whether the documents are covered by section 25 and chargeable under Article 15 of Schedule I-A, and whether the documents are "bonds" as defined in section 2(5) of the Stamp Act or are simple agreements covered by Article 5(c) of Schedule I-A.

The opinion quotes the operative clauses of the agreement (annexure A) including exclusive grant of use of trade name, trade marks and patents in India in consideration of royalties (five per cent of selling price subject to a minimum and maximum per annum, with specific provisions for calculating selling price and turnover and for quarterly payments of royalty).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the documents (annexures A and B) are covered by Section 25 of the Indian Stamp Act, and if so, whether they are chargeable under Article 15 of Schedule I-A of the Stamp Act, 1899.
  2. Whether these documents are "bonds" as defined in section 2(5) of the Indian Stamp Act (specifically s.2(5)(b)) or are simple agreements covered by Article 5(c) of Schedule I-A.

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments

  • The Revenue contended that the documents are "bonds" within the meaning of section 2(5)(b) of the Stamp Act because they are instruments attested by witnesses, not payable to order or bearer, and they oblige one party to pay money to the other.
  • The Revenue further submitted that the instruments were executed to secure payment of sums payable periodically for an indefinite period not terminable with any life in being, bringing them within section 25(b), and therefore chargeable under Article 15 of Schedule I-A.
  • The Sub-Registrar and Collector believed higher duties were payable (specific stamp values were calculated on the basis of the agreements' minimum royalties).

Respondent's (Hamdard Dawakhana's) Arguments

  • Learned counsel Shri R.L. Aggarwal contended that, to fall within section 25, there must be a unilateral undertaking by one party to pay money to the other; where an undertaking is given in consideration for something done or to be done by the other party, the instrument would not fall within section 25.
  • It was also argued (by implication from references to prior authorities) that certain instruments of this nature might be characterized as agreements rather than bonds depending on their remedial architecture (i.e., whether the aggrieved party claims a fixed sum or only damages).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gishorne & Co. v. Subal Bowri, I.L.R. 8 Cal 284 (decision of Garth, C.J.) Distinction between a "bond" and a covenant/agreement: a bond permits recovery of the sum named; a covenant with a penal clause gives rise to a claim for damages (and under s.74 Indian Contract Act the English rule on liquidated damages is abolished). The Court adopted the test set out by Garth, C.J. — looking to the remedy and whether liability is a fixed sum recoverable under the instrument (bond) or only damages to be fixed by a court (agreement). Applying that test, the Court found the instruments before it to be "bonds" because the liability to pay the stipulated royalty was fixed.
Collector of Rangoon v. Maung Aung Ba, 1916 I.C. 920 Accepted the ratio of the earlier Calcutta decision distinguishing bonds from agreements; focused on remedies available on breach (specific sum vs damages). The Court noted that in Rangoon the instrument was held to be an agreement because the aggrieved party could only claim damages; the present Court used that distinction to reinforce its analysis but reached the opposite conclusion on the facts before it.
Linotype and Machinery Co. and Windsor Press In re (Calcutta case referred to) Consideration of whether an instrument is a "conveyance" or an "agreement" (the instrument there was a hire-purchase agreement and did not effect a transfer of property). The Court observed that that case was not deciding the bond/agreement point; it merely held the instrument to be an agreement for lack of conveyance. The present Court noted that Linotype did not conflict with the bond test it applied.
In re Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. (referred to) Applied and quoted with approval the Garth, C.J. test regarding bond vs agreement; considered an instrument concerning payment of commission and allowances. The Court noted that Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. treated the instrument as an agreement on its facts, and that decision quoted Garth, C.J. with approval. The present Court relied on the same governing principle (remedy and fixed liability) in reaching its conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by analysing the instruments as a whole to determine their dominant purpose. It emphasised that:

  1. The instruments are attested by witnesses and are not payable to order or bearer; they impose obligations on Hamdard Dawakhana to pay royalty sums — prima facie bringing them within the definition of "bond" under section 2(5)(b).
  2. The payments secured by the instruments are periodic and the instruments do not prescribe a definite period during which they will be in force; therefore the sums are payable for an indefinite time not terminable with any life in being, which corresponds to section 25(b) of the Act.
  3. To determine character, the dominant purpose of the instrument must be ascertained: the Court found the dominant purpose to be securing the right to use trade marks etc. in consideration for the royalty payments, and the payment obligation is an essential feature rather than ancillary.
  4. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that consideration or reciprocity negates the application of section 25. It held that the presence of a legal obligation by a party to pay money to another is the relevant criterion for characterising an instrument as a "bond"; whether the obligation arises in consideration of services or rights granted does not exclude the operation of section 25.
  5. The Court applied the test from Garth, C.J. (Gishorne & Co.) distinguishing a bond from a covenant/agreement: where the instrument fixes a sum payable (and the remedy is recovery of that sum), it is a bond; where only damages could be claimed and quantum is to be fixed by a court, it is an agreement. On the facts, the royalty liability was fixed and recoverable as stipulated, not merely a claim for damages.
  6. The Court noted that the rights granted were subject to provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act (sections 48 to 53), but held that that circumstance did not detract from the instruments' character as "bonds".
  7. Consequently, the Court concluded the instruments fall within section 25(b) and are chargeable as bonds under Article 15, Schedule I-A of the Stamp Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The reference is answered: the instruments (annexures A and B) fall within section 25(b) of the Indian Stamp Act and are chargeable to duty under Article 15 of Schedule I-A as "bonds".

Direct Implications:

  • The instruments in question are to be treated as bonds for the purposes of stamp duty assessment under the Stamp Act and will therefore attract duty under Article 15, Schedule I-A (as determined by the authorities on the basis of the amounts secured).
  • The Court ordered that a copy of the judgment be sent to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Delhi, and recorded that there should be no costs in the matter.
  • This decision resolves the specific reference: "Reference answered." The opinion does not discuss or establish any broader novel legal principle beyond applying established tests; accordingly, the immediate effect is to determine the character and stampability of the two instruments before the Court without purporting to lay down a new precedent beyond the application of existing principles cited in the opinion.

Note: All statements above are drawn exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and do not add information beyond that text.

    In The Matter Of Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Delhi

    K.S Hegde, C.J and Khanna and Tatachari JJ.:— This is a reference under section 57(1)(b) of, the Indian Stamp Act (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act)

    2. The letter of the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Delhi, referring this case to this Court reads as follows:

    “The Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, respectfully showeth:

    1(a) That on 11th September, 1964 Messrs Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf)., Delhi, executed an agreement in favour of the Institute of Medicines and Medical Research, Delhi A copy of the agreement is submitted herewith as annexure A.

    (b) That on the same date Messrs Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf), Delhi executed another agreement in favour of Messrs Hamdard National foundations (India), Delhi. A copy of this agreement is submitted herewith as annexure B.

    2. That on 15th September, 1964 both the agreements were presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar (I), Delhi. They had both been executed by the respondent on a non-judicial stamp paper of Rs. 2.00 each.

    3. That the Sub-Registrar, impounded the two documents U/S 33 of the Indian Stamp Act. He was of the opinion that these documents were chargeable under section 25(b) read with Article 15 Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act with a higher rate of duty and as such the: agreement annexure A was liable to be stamped with a stamp of the value of Rs. 1,200.00 and that the agreement annexure B required a stamp of the value of Rs. 14,400.00 on the basis of the minimum royalties of Rs. 6,000.00 and Rs. 72,00.00 per annum respectively as provided in these agreements. The matter was forwarded by him to the Collector of the Stamps under section 38(2) of the Stamp. Act, The Sub-Registrar also desired it to be taken-into consideration if the two agreements did not amount to a sale of trade rights for the consideration of the royalties,

    4. That proceedings Under Section 40 of the Stamp Act were accordingly started in the case of the two agreements and notices were issued to the respondent.

    5. That the Collector of Stamps being unable to resolve the doubt regarding the chargeability of these documents with duty, made a reference to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority under Sub-Section (2) of section 56 of the Stamp Act, 1889, on the following two points.

    (i) Whether the documents were covered by Section 25? If so, whether they were chargeable under Article 15 Schedule 1—A of the Stamp Act, 1899?

    (ii) Whether the documents are bonds as defined in Section 2 sub-section (5) of the Indian Stamp Act? or are simple agreements covered by Article 5 sub-clause (c) of Schedule 1-A.

    3. A copy of the reference order of the Collector is submitted herewith as annexure C. A 6. That the matter was very carefully considered by your petitioner as the Chief Controlling Revenue Ruthority. The documents annexures A and B are covered by section 25 as they operate to secure the payment of certain sums periodically and the stamp duty on the same as envisaged in section 25 has to be calculated under Article 15 of Schedule 1-A, because documents of this nature are covered by the clause “not being otherwise provided for by the Act.” as appearing in this Article. The Stamp Act, it is submitted contains no, officer article dealing with a document covered by section 25 and this, section in clear terms provides for the ascertainment of the amount which is to be taken into account for purposes of assessment of the Stamp Duties.

    (b) That since the definition of bond contained in section 2(5) is not exhaustive, the document though not strictly covered by this definition could also be treated as a bond for the purposes of the Stamp Act.

    (c) That in the submission of your petitioner the agreements A and B are thus covered by section 25 read with Article 15 of Schedule 1-A.

    4. That the matter, however, involves important points of law, it is considered to be desirable and, proper by your petitioner to state the case and refer the same to this Hon'ble Court under the provisions of Section 57(1) of the Stamp Act on the following points:—

    (a) Whether the documents annexures A and B are covered by Section 25 of the Stamp Act, and if so whether they are chargeable under Article 15 Schedule T-A of the Stamp Act, 1899?

    (b) Whether these documents are bonds as defined in section 2(5) of the Stamp Act or are simple agreements covered by Article 5(c) of the Schedule I-A.

    5. It is therefore, prayed that the matter may be decided in accordance with law to enable further action.

    Sd/- XXX

    Chief Controlling Revenue,

    Authority, Delhi.

    6. On 11th day of September 1964, Hamdar Dawakhana entered into two agreements one with Institute of History of Medicine and Madical Research, Delhi, and the other with Hamdard National Foundation (India), Delhi. Both these agreements are drawn up more or less in similar terms. Therefore, it will be sufficient if we quote the material clauses from the agreement entered into by the Hamdard Dawakhana with the Institute of History of Medicine and Medical Research, Delhi. The clauses in that agreement which are relevant for our present purpose read thus:—

    “This agreement witnesseth the Terms and Conditions on which the Institute of History of Medicine and Medical Research has agreed to permit and the Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf), has con venanted to make exclusive use of the Trade Name, Trade Marks and Patents, within the territory of the Union of India in the manufacture and sale of the User's products within the territory of the Union of India. The terms and conditions are:

    7. The owner shall have the right to charge to the user and the User shall be bound to pay to the Owner the said royalty at the following rates:—

    8. The royalty for the use of Trade Marks and Patents shall be five per cent (inclusive of know-how) of the selling price of the said medicines and products subject to the Minimum of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand) and Maximum of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) per annum. In case the Turnover (inclusive of Free suppliers) of the said medicines and products exceeds Rupees ten laks (Rs. 10,00,000)- in any Gregorian calendar Year.,” the royalty payable on the turn-over in excess of Rs. 10,00,000/- will be at the rate of two and a half (2.5) per cent.

    9. The selling price means the gross selling price less the trade discount and rebates at a flat rate of twenty-five per cent in all and nothing more irrespective of the amount of discounts, rebates, commissions and/or any other deductions, off the selling price, actually allowed by the User to its customers, agents, distributors and others. The Publicity and Advertisement, in all its aspects and kinds shall be paid for wholly and solely by the User and shall not be deductible from the Turnover.

    10. The Royalty shall normally, be paid quarterly but the Owner shall have the option of obtaining interin advances from the User.

    11. For calculating the Turn-over (inclusive of Free supplies) also, the trade discount and rebates at the flat rate of twenty-five per cent, as aforesaid, will be deducted.

    12. The aforesaid rate of royalty being inclusive of “know-how” the owner shall not claim any charge for “know-how, nor for any Goodwill.

    13. In consideration of the payment of the aforesaid royalty the User shall have the exclusive right, during the currency of this Agreement, to use Trade Name, Trade Marks and Patents in the manufacture and sale of the User's products within the territory of the Union of India, but the User shall not have any right to export outside the said territory, any of its products bearing the Trade Name, Trade Mark and Patents, of which, only the right of use is hereby convenanted for royalty consideration.

    14. This Agreement shall subsist, so long as the Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) continues as a Wakf under the Mutawalliship of the Wakf (Hakim Haji Abdul Hameed) and thereafter, under the Mutawalliship of his heirs, successors or legal representatives, SUBJECT to the relevant provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958, and Patents and Designs Act II of 1911 in this behalf.

    15. In the event of the said period exceeding the maximum period prescribed by the said Acts, the Owner shall renew this Agreement for such tenure (sj as is permissible under the said Acts, from time to time.

    16. The user shall have the right to secure registration, for itseif,.’ as Registerad User, and to do such other things and acts as it is entitled under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 43 of 1958, within the territory of the Union of India.”

    17. It is the contention of the Revenue that these documents are “bonds” within the meaning of that expression found in section 2(5)(b) of the Act. That definition to the extent it is material for our present purpose, reads as follows:—

    “2. In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context,—

    (5) ‘Bond’ includes—

    (b) any instrument attested by a witness and not payable to order or bearer whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another.

    ****”.

    18. It is admitted that the instruments, that are before us, are attested by witnesses. They are not payable to order or bearer. On a reading of those intruments, it is clear that the Hamdard Dawakhana had incurred an obligation to pay money to the other parties to the agreements. Prima facie, the case before us falls within the scope of section 2(5)(b) of the Act.

    19. Section 25 of the Act provides that—

    “25. Where an instrument is executed to secure the payment of an annuity or other sum payable periodically, or where the consideration for a conveyance is an annuity or other sum payable periodically the amount secured by such instrument or the consideration for such conveyance as the case may be, shall, for the purposes of this Act be deemed to be—

    (a) Where the sum is payable for a definite period so that the total amount to be paid can be previously ascertained such total amount;

    (b) Where the sum is payable in perpetuity or for an indefinite time not terminable with any life in being at the date of such instrument or conveyance the total amount-which according to the terms of such instrument or conveyance, will or may be payable during the period of twenty years calculated from the date on which the first payment becomes due; and

    (c) Where the sum is payable for an indefinite time terminable with any life in being at the date of such instrument or conveyance the maximum amount which will or may be payable as aforesaid during the period of twelve years calculated from the date on which the first payment becomes due.

    20. It is the contention of the Revenue that the facts of the case, before us, fall within the scope of section 25(b) It is said on its behalf that the instruments, that are before us, were executed to secure payments of sums of money payable periodically and those sums are payable for an indefinite time not terminable with any life in being at the date of such instruments.

    21. Those instruments do not prescribe the period during which they are to be in force. Therefore, it should be held that the amounts, which the Hamdard Dawakhana is required to pay under those instruments, are payable for an indefinite time. There can be-no denying the fact that those instruments secure the payments of certain sums periodically.

    22. For finding out the true character of an instrument, one has to read the instrument as a whole, and then find out its dominant purpose. A single instrument may embody several purposes. But what is relevant for the purpose of the Act, is the dominant purpose of the instrument. If we look at the instruments, that are before us, it is clear that their dominant purpose was to secure for the Hamdard Dawakhana the user of the trade mark mentioned therein in consideration for the royalty prescribed. The payment of the royalty by the Hamdard Dawakhana is one of the essential features of those instruments. The other clauses in the instruments respecting the rights of Hamdard Dawakhana are merely ancillary in character.

    23. Shri R.L Aggarwal, learned counsel for the Hamdard Dawakhana contended that before an instrument can be brought within the scope of section 25, there must be an unilateral undertaking by one of the parties to the instrument to pay money to the other party. According to him, if that undertaking is given in consideration for something done or to be done by the other party, then the case would not come within the scope of section 25. We are unable to accept that contention as correct. Consideration is an essential part of a contract. Otherwise, it is a nudum pactum. But what brings an instrument within the scope of section 25 is the act of any party to that instrument obliging himself to pay money to the other party to the instrument: which can only mean a legal obligation. For the purpose of determining the true character of the instruments before us, all that we have to see is whether under those instruments any of the parties thereto has obliged itself to pay money to others. If there is such an obligation, then those instruments are “bonds”. The possibility of an instrument becoming ineffective on a future date, or the chance of its being avoided by one of the parties thereto, are wholly irrelevant circumstances for the purpose of determining whether that instrument is a “bond” or not. For the purpose of determining that fact, we have to take the instrument as it is and see whether any of the parties thereto obliges itself to pay money to another If so looked at, we have no doubt that the instruments before us are “bonds”

    24. It is true that the rights conferred on the Hamdard Dawakhana under those instruments are subject to the provisions contained in sections 48 to 53 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. But that circumstance in our opinion, in no manner detract from the fact that those instruments are “bonds”.

    25. It is trite to say that every bond is an agreement. So is the case with a mortgage or sale or exchange. But what we have to see is whether that agreement has acquired the character of a “bond”. We have already noticed the relevant clauses in the instruments in question. There is no dispute that under those instruments one of the parties thereto had obliged itself to pay money to others.

    26. The distinction between an “agreement” and a “bond” is well brought out by the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gishorne & Co. v. Subal Bowri . I.L.R 8 Cal 284.. Therein Garth, C.J observed:—

    “I am of opinion that the instrument in question is not a bond within the meaning of the Stamp Act of 1869; and that it requires (so far as I can see) an eight-anna stamp only.

    The definition of a bond in s. 5 of the Act is precisely what we understand by a bond in England, and it is an obligation of a different character from a convenant to do a particular act, the breach of which must be compensated in damages.

    Whether a penal clause is attached to such a covenant or not, the remedy for the breach of it is in form and substance a suit for damages; and by s. 74 of the Indian Contract Act, the English rule with regard to liquidated damages is abolished, and the plaintiff in such a suit has no right under any circumstances to claim the penalty itself as such. He can only recover such compensation, not exceeding the amount of the penalty as the Judge at the trial considers reasonable; but he is entitled to that compensation whether he proves any actual damages or not.

    “The remedy upon a bond is very different. The plaintiff in the the case of a simple money-bond recovers the sum named in the bond, or in the case of a bond conditioned for the performance of convenants he recovers the actual damage which he can prove that he has sustained. In either case not only is the bond a contract of a different form and nature from a convenant with a penal clause, but the remedy upon it, and thp amount recoverable for the breach of it, is also different.”

    27. The test laid down by the learned Chief Justice, for distinguishing a “bond” from an “agreement”, is: In the former case in the event of breach, the party to the instrument, who had obliged to pay money to the other, is liable to pay the sum stipulated, in the instrument. In the latter case, the quantum of damages has to be fixed by the Court If we apply that test to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the liability of Hamdard Dawakhana is fixed. Its liability is to pay the same stipulated. There is no question of damages in this case.

    28. In the Collector of Rangoon v. Maung Aung Ba . 1916 I.C 920., the Lower Burma Chief Court accepted the ratio of the decision referred to earlier. But on the facts of that case, their Lordships came to the conclusion that the instrument that was before them, was an agreement, as in the said case the aggrieved party could have claimed only damages and not any specific sura of money.

    29. We are unable to agree with Mr. R.L Aggarwal that: the Calcutta High Court in Linotype and Machinery Co. and Windsor Press In re3., took a different view of the law. In that case, the Court was called upon to consider whether the instrument before them was a “conveyance” or an “agreement”. The instrument before them was a hire purchase agreement. After examining the various clauses in that instrument, the Court came to the conclusion that the same did not evidence any transfer of, property and, therefore, it cannot be considered as a “conveyance”. Their Lordships were not called upon to decide whether the instrument in question could have been considered as a “bond” or not. Hence, they held that the instrument before them was an “agreement. In re Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd4, the Court quoted, with approval, the decision of Garth, C.J reported in Gisheren & Co, referred to earlier. Therein, the Court was considering an instrument under which the Dhampur Sugar Mills, Ltd, had agreed to pay certain commission and allowances to one Kanwar Murli Manohar, its Managing Agent. The Court had to consider whether that condition in the instrument amounted to an “agreement” or to a “bond”. On a reading of the various clauses in that instrument, the Court came to the conclusion that the instrument in question evidenced an ‘agreement” and not a “bond”. But in so doing, they did not depart from the rule laid down by Garth C. J. noticed earlier.

    30. For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the instruments marked Annexures A and B in the letter addressed to this Court by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Delhi, fall within the scope of section 25(b) of the Act, and consequently, they are chargeable to duty under Article-15, Schedule l-A, of the Act, as “bond”. No costs.

    31. A copy of this jugdment shall be sent to the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Delhi.

    32. Reference answered.

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    In The Matter Of Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Delhi
    (Feb 27, 1967)