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Advocates
  • G.N.Aggarwal
  • B.C.Misra
  • M.Ahmed
Judges
  • Mr. M.M Ismail, J.
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Advocates
  • G.N.Aggarwal
  • B.C.Misra
  • M.Ahmed
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  • Mr. M.M Ismail, J.
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Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — M.M. Ismail, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a tenant occupying one room with kitchen, latrine and a small courtyard at first floor of House No. 5195, Sadar Thana Road, Ward No. XIV, Delhi. The second respondent (landlady) applied to the Competent Authority under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 for permission to institute eviction proceedings against the petitioner, alleging (i) non-payment of rent and (ii) bona fide requirement by the landlady. The landlady's application characterized the tenant as "a man of status and means" able to obtain alternative accommodation.

The petitioner replied, claiming modest earnings (about Rs. 6 per day), a large family (about 16 members), dependence of the family on his labour, and inability to provide alternative accommodation. The parties filed competing affidavits about the petitioner's income, occupation and number of machines in the shop (petitioner said two foot-operated machines; landlady alleged four machines and substantial income). A third person, Munaware Khan, filed an affidavit supporting the petitioner.

While proceedings were pending, the Competent Authority deputed his Head Clerk to inspect the petitioner's premises after the second respondent sought inspections. The Head Clerk produced two inspection reports (one dated 28th May, 1966 and another dated 27th August, 1966) describing the number of machines present, persons working at the shop and operations on the adjacent pavement. On 27th October, 1966, relying on the affidavits and the Head Clerk's reports, the Competent Authority granted the landlady permission to institute eviction proceedings, concluding the petitioner was a man of means able to obtain alternative accommodation.

The petitioner challenged that order by writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, raising two principal contentions: (1) that the Competent Authority failed to consider affidavits (procedural infirmity) and (2) that the Competent Authority's factual findings (that the petitioner had six machines and was a man of means) were unsupported or contrary to the evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Competent Authority failed to consider affidavits and material submitted by the petitioner (procedural fairness and whether the petitioner was given an opportunity to have those affidavits considered).
  2. Whether the Competent Authority's factual finding that the petitioner was a man of means capable of arranging alternative accommodation (based on the number of sewing machines and income inference) was supported by evidence on the record.
  3. Whether, given Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, the Competent Authority was obliged to give reasons when granting permission, and whether an error of fact (or a finding unsupported by evidence) can be corrected by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Competent Authority directed inspections after applications by the landlady without giving notice to the petitioner; subsequently, affidavits (one by the petitioner and one by Aziz) were prepared and submitted but were returned and not kept on the file — the Authority thus failed to consider those affidavits which were objections to the Head Clerk's reports.
  • The Competent Authority misread and misconstrued the inspection reports and reached conclusions (that the petitioner had six machines and thus sufficient income) which were not supported by the reports or evidence.
  • On the facts as supported by affidavits and inspection reports (as the petitioner understood them), the petitioner was poor, had only two foot-operated machines, employed no karigars, and could not obtain alternative accommodation for his large family.

Second Respondent's (Landlady's) Arguments

  • The Competent Authority was not required, by Section 19, to give reasons when granting a permission; only a refusal must be accompanied by brief reasons (section 19(5)).
  • Under the statutory scheme and prior authority, the Competent Authority's quasi-judicial function does not require the same procedure as an ordinary court trial; tenants are not endowed with the same protections as in full trial proceedings and the Competent Authority need not follow Code of Civil Procedure trial procedure.
  • Reliance on precedents: argued that an error of fact, however grave, will not necessarily give the High Court jurisdiction to interfere with a tribunal's order under Articles 226 and 227 (citing Syed Yakoob and Nagendra Nath Borra).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surjit Singh v. Baij Nath, 1957 69 P.L.R. 139D Emphasized that the Competent Authority's function is quasi-judicial but need not replicate trial procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure; noted that a tenant does not have an identical set of rights of appeal or procedure as in regular civil suits; court found no adequate ground for interference in that factual context. The Court observed that this decision did not advance the second respondent's case because the facts differed materially: in Surjit Singh the landlord already had an eviction order and sought permission to execute it; moreover, that judgment did not hold that a tenant can never seek relief under Articles 226/227 against a Competent Authority's grant of permission.
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477 Presented for the proposition that an error of fact, however grave, will not necessarily give the High Court jurisdiction to interfere with an order of a tribunal under Articles 226 and 227. The Court noted the principle but distinguished it: the present challenge was not that the Competent Authority made a mere erroneous fact-finding, but that its finding was unsupported by any evidence on the record; decisions holding that mere errors of fact do not necessarily attract interference do not bar relief where a finding lacks evidentiary support.
Nagendra Nath Borra v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 398 Cited for the same broad proposition as Syed Yakoob — that an error of fact, however grave, may not furnish jurisdiction for interference by the High Court under Articles 226/227. The Court again observed that these authorities do not prevent interference where the tribunal's findings are not supported by any evidence; the present case was characterized as one where the Competent Authority's conclusion was unsupported or contrary to the inspection reports and affidavits on the file.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the petitioner's two contentions in turn.

1. Procedural contention about affidavits

The petitioner alleged that affidavits submitted in objection to the Head Clerk's reports had been filed with the Competent Authority but were not placed on the file or considered. The second respondent denied that such affidavits were filed, and the official file did not contain the documents the petitioner claimed to have filed. The Court held that this was a disputed question of fact — whether those affidavits were filed at all — and that such a factual dispute could not be resolved in proceedings under Articles 226 and 227. Consequently, the Court rejected the petitioner's first contention because the existence and filing of those affidavits remained controverted and was not amenable to resolution in the present writ proceedings.

2. Merits — adequacy of evidence for Competent Authority's finding

The Court found multiple misapprehensions and misreadings by the Competent Authority in his final order. The Competent Authority had concluded (i) that the petitioner had six machines in his shop (including two operated by his father and brother), (ii) that those six machines were operated by family members, and (iii) that the monthly income for a tailor with six family-operated machines could be in the range Rs. 800–1,000, thus supporting the inference that alternative accommodation could be arranged.

The Court examined the Head Clerk's two inspection reports and concluded these did not support the Competent Authority's inferences: both inspection reports indicated that the father and brother were operating machines on the footpath in front of another, neighboring shop (shop No. 5202), not within the petitioner's shop (No. 5192). Thus, the Competent Authority's inference that the petitioner had six machines in his shop was not warranted by those reports. Further, the reports had shown one or more non-family workers (e.g., Aziz and another person who left when inspected), contrary to the Competent Authority's conclusion that all machines were family-operated.

The Court emphasized that the Competent Authority's ultimate finding — that the petitioner was a man of means capable of arranging alternative accommodation — rested exclusively on the three considerations recited by the Authority (existence of six machines, family operation, and the inferred monthly income). Since those considerations were either not supported or were contrary to the inspection reports and other evidence on the record, the finding was unsupported by evidence.

3. On requirement to state reasons

The Court addressed the second respondent's submission that Section 19 does not require the Competent Authority to state reasons when granting permission, pointing out that while Section 19(5) expressly requires brief reasons when refusing permission, the Competent Authority's function under Section 19 is quasi-judicial and requires objective consideration of specified factors (Section 19(4)). The Court held that even if the statute does not statutorily require reasons when granting permission, the nature of the function and the requirement to take account of certain factors means the Competent Authority must consider the matter objectively and give reasons where his conclusions rest on factual inferences. If a conclusion with reference to the statutorily-mandated factors is not supported by evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the order cannot stand.

The Court distinguished authorities relied upon by the respondent: while some cases suggest that mere errors of fact do not automatically justify interference, the Court reiterated the established principle that a tribunal's finding which is not supported by any evidence is liable to be quashed. The present case was found to be of this character — the Competent Authority's conclusion lacked evidentiary support.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed the order of the Competent Authority by issuing a writ of certiorari. The petition is allowed; no order as to costs was made.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the Competent Authority's grant of permission to the landlady to institute eviction proceedings against the petitioner was annulled. The Court did not purport to lay down a broad new precedent beyond applying established principles: specifically, that a quasi-judicial authority exercising the powers under Section 19 must base conclusions on evidence and may be subject to judicial review where its findings are unsupported by the record. The opinion does not discuss or claim to create any broader rule beyond the facts and reasoning applied in this case.

This summary is confined solely to the material and statements contained in the provided opinion and does not add, infer or assume facts or legal holdings beyond those expressly contained in the text of the judgment.

Show full summary ...

    Ali Hasan v. M.S Shami And Another

    M.M Ismail, J.:— The petitioner herein is a tenant of one room along with kitchen, latrine and small courtyard at the first floor of House No. 5195, situate at Sadar Thana Road, Ward No. XIV, Delhi, of which the second respondent herein is the landlady. The second respondent filed an application before the Competent Authority, under section 19 of the slum area (improvement & clearance) act, 1956, for permission to institute a suit or other proceedings for obtaining a decree or order for the eviction of the petitioner from the premises in question. In that application, the second respondent put forward two grounds for obtaining an order of eviction against the petitioner, viz., non-payment of rent and the bona fide requirement for the occupation of the landlady. In that application, the second respondent further stated:

    “That the tenant is a man of status and means and can have alternative accommodation in case an order for eviction is passed against the tenant.”

    2. On 27th October, 1965, the petitioner herein filed a reply to the application of the second respondent putting forward the contention that the application of the second respondent should be dismissed. In that reply, he stated that he was a tailor, his wages amounted to Rs. 6/- per day, his family consisted of 16 members, himself, his wife, seven daughters, three sons, father and two minor brothers; one of his sons was married and his wife was also living with him: he cannot provide any alternative accommodation; his large family would be thrown on the roadside if he is ordered to be evicted. In this application, the second respondent filed an affidavit with reference to means of the petitioner. In that affidavit, the second respondent stated that the petitioner had got 3 machines worked by feet and one machine worked by hand, which were all operated by his employees; that income from one machine came to about Rs. 15/- per day and as such the daily income of the petitioner herein came to about Rs. 60/- per day, while expenses per day came to about Rs. 20/- and after adjusting the expenses the monthly income of the petitioner herein was Rs. 1,200/., that the petitioner herein is a man of means and status and can easily acquire alternative accommodation in case he is evicted from the premises in dispute. The petitioner himself filed an affidavit with regard to his means. He reiterated in the said affidavit that he was a tailor by profession and worked himself and had not employed any karigars and his daily wages did not amount to more than Rs. 6/-; his family consisted of about 16 members, all of whom depended on the manual labour of the petitioner and the family was half-starving; the petitioner did not have any other residential accommodation excepting the tenancy premises which comprised of a single room. The petitioner further stated in that affidavit that he was doing his work of tailoring in a petty shop and he had only two machines which were worked by feet and he had not employed any karigars and he worked himself and his son Mohammed Qasim who was a student came to assist him when he was free from his studies. The petitioner reiterated that his wages amounted to Rs. 6/- per day and denied that he was a man of status or means and contended that it was not possible for him to acquire any alternative accommodation in Delhi. One Munaware Khan also filed an affidavit corroborating the averments of the petitioner in his affidavit with reference to his means and occupation. While the proceedings were pending, the case was posted for arguments on 30th May, 1963. The second respondent on 19th May, 1966 filed an application, requesting the Competent Authority to depute some good person who should all of a sudden visit the shop of the petitioner herein as well as his residential accommodation for reporting about the true facts. In support of this application the second respondent stated that the petitioner had four machines and all the four machines were worked by the employees of the petitioner and that unless somebody is deputed to inspect the shop of the petitioner and his residential accommodation, the true facts could not be ascertained and justice could not be done. On this, the Competent Autority deputed his Head Clerk to inspect the shop of the petitioner. The Head Clerk inspected the shop and made a report on 28th May, 1936. According to this report, there were three pedestal sewing machines in the shop of the petitioner and they were worked by four persons, viz., the petitioner herein, two of his sons and another person by name Aziz. The report further stated that the father of the petitioner and a brother of the petitioner were having their two machines and were working on the footpath in front of another shop near the shop of the petitioner herein. The report also stated that according to the ration card of the petitioner, there were 19 members in the family. After this report, the second respondent herein on 3rd August, 1966, filed another application for another inspection. The Compctent Authority again directed his Head Clerk to make another inspection. The Head Clerk made the inspection and submitted a report dated 27th August, 1966 According to this report, there were four sewing machines (three pedestal and one hand machine) in the shop of the petitioner and at the time ot the inspection, the petitioner was working on one pedestal machine and Aziz was working on another pedestal machine and a person who was also working a third pedestal machine left the premises soon after the arrival of the Head Clerk, without disclosing his name or parcentage, under the direction of the petitioner. This report again brought out the fact that the father and a brother of the petitioner were.working on the pavement as reported by him on the previous occasion. On 27th October, 1966, the Competent Authority passed the order granting the permission applied for by the second respondent. The Competent Authority referred to the affidavits filed by the parties and the two reports of inspection of his Head Clerk and came to the conclusion that the version of the petitioner herein that he worked single handed was incorrect and the deposition ot the second respondent herein that the petitioner herein had got four machines was true. He further observed:

    “Apart from those four machines, two machines are operated by his father and brother in front of the payement of the shop. It means that there are six machines in the respondent's shop. A tailor having six machines in his shop in the main Bazar cannot be considered a poor man. These machines are operated by his family numbers. According to the report of the Head Clark, there was only one man named Aziz at the respondent's shop. Who does not appear to be the member of the respondent's family. The monthly income of a tailor having six machines in his shop and operated by his own family members may be between Rs. 800/ or Rs. 1,000/-. The respondent is, therefore, considered a man of good means to arrange alternative accommodation like the present One. The permission applied for by the petitioner is, therefore, hereby granted.”

    3. It is to quash this order of the Competent Authority the present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Shri M. Ahmad, the learned counsel for the petitioner, put forward two contentions in support of the prayer for the issue of a writ quashing the order in question. His first contention is that, when the Competent Authority, on the applications of the second respondent directed his Head Clerk to make a local inspection of the shop of the petitioner herein and submit a report, the petitioner herein was not given notice of the applications of the second respondent. After the Head Clerk inspected the shop and submitted the two reports, the petitioner filed two affidavits one by the petitioner himself and the other by Aziz who was found to be in the shop by the Head Clerk. These affidavits were submitted to the Competent Authority on 30th September, 1966, but the Competent Authority returned these affidavits to the petitioner on 18th October, 1966, stating that he would not keep them on the file. The further case of the petitioner is that the counsel for the petitioner, on 19th October, 1966, presented these two affidavits along with an application and the Competent Authority received the application and the affidavits and wrote on it that it would be considered on 27th October 1966. Based on these allegations, the case of the petitioner is that the Competent Authority failed to take into consideration these affidavits which were in the nature of objections to the reports of the H ad Clear of the Competent Authority. In paragraph 13 of the petition, the petitioner states that he got the file inspected by his counsel on 19th December, 1966 and the inspection revealed that the application of the petitioner dated 18th October, 1966 and the two affidavits submitted with it were not on the file. The second respondent in her reply in this writ petition denies that the petitioner ever filed the two affidavits. Under these circumstances, before the petitioner can put torward the contention that the Competent Authority failed to consider these affidavits, it must be established that those affidavatis were filed. The petitioner has alleged that he has filed the affidavits while the same has been denied by the second respondent. Admittedly, the files do not contain either the affidavits or the petition said to have been filed along with the said affidavits. Therefore, whether the petitioner filed any affidavits at all is in dispute. It is not possible for me in these proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to go into that disputed question of fact. In view of this, I reject the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

    4. As far as the second contention is concerned, I must point out that the final order of the Competent Authority proceeds on a number of mis-apprhensions and mis-reading of the reports of the Head Clerk on which his conclusion rested. For one thing, the Competent Authority states that there are six machines in the petitioner's shop and a tailor having six machines in his shop in the main bazar cannot be considered a poor man. There was absolutely no evidence to show that there were six machines in the petitioner's shop. Both the reports of the Head Clerk showed that the father of the petitioner and a brother of the petitioner were working on the foot-path in front of another shop in the neighbour-hood of the petitioner's shop and the reports made it appear that those machines were their machines. Therefore, for the Competent Authority to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was having six machines in his shop and was working them is not warranted by the reports of the Head Clerk. Further, the reports of the Head Clerk clearly stated that the father of the petitioner and a brother of the petitioner were having their machines and were working on the foot-path in front of another shop, viz., shop No. 5202, while the shop of the petitioner herein had the No. 5192; on the other hand, the Competent Authority proceeded on the basis that the father and the brother were operating the two machines in front of the pavement of the petitioner's shop. One other mistake that has to be pointed out in this regard is that the Competent Authority stated that according to the report of the Head Clerk, there was only one man named Aziz in the petitioner's shop, who did not appear to be the member of the petitioner's family. On the other hand, as pointed out by me already, on the second occasion when the Head Clerk inspected the shop when alone he found four machines, there was another man who was said to be working on a pedestal machine in addition to Aziz and that man went away after seeing the Head Clerk without disclosing his name or parentage under instructions from the petitioner herein. Thus, the Competent Authority drew the inference that the petitioner was a man of means who could acquire another accommodation, from the following facts:—

    (i) The petitioner had six machines in his shop.

    (ii) The six machines were operated by his family members.

    (ii) The monthly income of a tailor having six machines in his shop and operated by his own family members may be between Rs. 800/- and Rs. 1000/-.

    5. The conclusion of the Competent Authority is based upon these three considerations which are not only not supported by the evidence but also is contrary to the same. In view of this fact, in my opinion, the finding of the Competent Authority that the petitioner is a man of means capable of arranging for an alternative accommodation is not supported by any evidence with reference to the considerations on the basis of which alone the Competent Authority atrived at the said finding.

    6. Shri B.C Misra, the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, oontended that the Competent Authority was not required to give a finding or give reasons when he was granting the permission applied for by the landlady and only whin he was refusing the permission applied for by the landlady, he should give reasons since his order of refusal is subject to an appeal. The contention of Shri Misra is that under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, all that the Competent Authority is required to do is either to grant permission asked for by the landlord or to refuse it and in granting or refusing to grant the permission, the Competent Authority is required to take into account certain factors and because of this, it cannot be said that the Competent Authority is called upon statutorily to give any finding with regard to those factors. In order to appreciate this contention of Shri Misra, it is necessary to refer to Section 19 of the Act and that Section is as follows:—

    “19. Proceedings for eviction of tenants not to be taken without permission of the Competent Authority;

    (1) Noth withstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority:

    (a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance.) Amendment Act, 1934, any suitor proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area; or

    (b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order.

    (2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-section (1) shall make an application in writing to the competent authority in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed.

    (3) On receipt of such application, the competent authority, after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, shall by order in writing, either grant or refuse to grant such per mission.,

    (4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under subsection (3), the competent authority shall take into account the foll-owing factors, namely:—

    (a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available, to him if he were evicted;

    (b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas;

    (c) such other factors, if any, as may be prescribed.

    (5) Where the competent authority, refuses to grant the permission, it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant.”

    7. No doubt it is true that the final order which the Competent Authority passes must be one granting or refusing to grant the permission asked for by the landlord. The other factor that has to be noted is that under section 19(4), the statute compels the Competent Authority to take into account certain factors, one such factor being whether an alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted. It cannot be denied that the function of the Competent Authority under section 19 is a quasi judicial function. Therefore, even if the statute does not require him to state the reasons for his conclusion, by the very nature of his function, he will have to state the reasons for his conclusion even if he grants the permission applied for by the landlord. It is not a subjective satisfaction ot the Competent Authority that is contemplated by the Act and the very requirement that the Competent Authority must take into account certain factors clearly postulates that the Competent Authority will have to consider the case objectively before deciding either to grant or to refuse to grant the permission applied for by the landlord. Therefore, if the Competent Authority comes to any conclusion with reference to the factors which he is called upon to take into account and that conclusion or finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is contrary to the evidence available on record the order of the Competent Authority cannot stand. Shri Misra drew my attention to the decision of I.D Dua, Acting C.J (as he then was), in Surjit Singh v. Baij Nath . 1957 69 P.L.R 139D.. In that case, the argument advanced against an order of the Competent Authority was based on the contention that it was incumbent on the Competent Authority to call upon the parties to adduce evidence and failure to do so had resulted in grave prejudice to the petitioner therein. Another argument that was advanced was that the affidavits relied on by the Competent Authority was not in accordance with the law inasmuch as the declaration appended thereto was defective not being in accordance with Order ‘XIX Rule 3, Code of Civil Procedure. In dealing with the arguments advanced before him, the learned Acting Chief Justice of served as follows:—

    “After considering the arguments addressed at the bar and the facts of the case in my opinion, there is no adequate ground for interfering with the impugned order under Article 227 of the Constitution. The landlord having secured an order for the eviction of the tenant from a Competent Authority under the Delhi Rent Control legislation. I do not think ‘the policy of the Slum Act creates any further vested right in the tenant for the protection of which he may seek to contest the landlord's claim to evict him in proceedings in a manner comparable to a regular trial of a civil suit as is advocated by Shri R.L Aggarwal. I am not unmindful of the fact that the function discharged by the Competent Authority is of a quasi-judicial nature but that is far from saying that this function has to be discharged by means of a procedure known to the ordinary courts of law, when trying suits under the Code of Civil Procedure. That a tenant is not considered to be very much of an aggrieved party when the Competent Authority grants permission to execute a decree for eviction and that he has not been clothed with a vested right which he is entitled to defend in exactly the same mariner and to the same extent as the decree-holder, seems to be obvious from the fact that he has not been given right of appeal under the statute. The function which the Competent Authority is enjoined to perform is related to a public purpose intended to improve and clear the slum area and to see that the slum area is not extended. It is not meant primarily to protect any personal legal right of the tenant.”

    8. I am unable to see how this decision helps the second respondent in this case. It should not be forgotten that in that case, the landlord had obtained an order of eviction and was seeking the permission of the Competent Authority to execute that order and that fact was specifically referred to and taken note of by the learned Chief Justice while making the said observations. Apart from that, that judgment does not say or decide that a tenant cannot come to a Court complaining against an order of the Competent Authority granting permission to the landlord to institute proceedings for eviction of the tenant and the Court cannot quash the older in case the tenant makes out sufficient grounds for the Court to interfere, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 and 22? of the Constitution. Shri Misra further relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhaknshnan . A.I.R 1964 S.C 477., and in Nagendra Nath Borra v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam . A.I.R 1958 S.C 398, and contended that an error of fact however grave it may be will not give jurisdiction to the High Court to interfere with or to quash an order of a Tribunal under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. In this case, it is not a question of error of fact that is urged as a ground for interference. Equally, decision after decision has held that when the finding of a Tribunal is not supported by anv evidence, the order of the Tribunal is liable to be quashed. The ground urged in this case is not that the finding of the Competent Authority is erroneous but that the finding is not supported by any evidence. I have alreadv referred to the considerations which prevailed with the Competent Authority for his final conclusion and how those considerations are not supported by any evidence on record.

    9. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the order of the Competent Authority in this case is liable to be quashed and is accordingly quashed by the issue of a writ of certiorari and this petition is allowed. However, I do not make any order as to costs in this petition.

    10. Petition allowed.

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    Comments

    Ali Hasan v. M.S Shami And Another
    (Aug 18, 1967)