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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Tehl Chand, father of the petitioners, filed a suit on 20th May 1958 for the eviction of the respondent Noor Khan under section 13(1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, concerning a portion of property No. 10020 Gali Naiwala, Nawab Ganj, Pul Bangash, Delhi. He obtained a decree for eviction on 19th February 1960. As the premises were situated in a slum area, under section 19(1)(b) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, the decree was executable only after permission from the Competent Authority, which was initially refused on 2nd April 1962. An appeal against this refusal was dismissed. Subsequently, the decree-holder filed a suit for possession on the basis of title, which was dismissed on 1st April 1968.

After Tehl Chand's death, his sons Des Raj and Nand Lal applied for permission under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, to execute the decree dated 19th February 1960. They also filed an execution application on 17th July 1980. During the pendency, permission was granted on 8th May 1981. The judgment debtor Noor Khan objected to the execution, contending the decree was a nullity, barred by limitation, and not executable without permission. The execution court held on 15th October 1984 that the decree was not a nullity but the execution application was barred by limitation due to delay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the execution application filed by the decree-holder is within the period of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963?
  2. Whether permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 is a precondition for execution, and from when the limitation period commences?
  3. Whether the decree-holder was entitled to file a fresh application for permission after an earlier refusal and dismissal of appeal?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the decree became enforceable only when permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was granted, i.e., on 8th May 1981.
  • The limitation period of twelve years for execution commenced only from the date when the decree became enforceable (8th May 1981), making the execution application timely.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The petitioner’s initial application for permission was refused on 2nd April 1962 and the appeal was dismissed, barring any fresh application for permission.
  • The permission granted on 8th May 1981 was contrary to law and should not have been considered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdal Rashid v. Sri Sitaramji Maharaja Brajman, AIR 1974 All 275 Execution application limitation period begins when the decree becomes executable, not from the date of decree. Supported the principle that limitation for execution starts when decree becomes enforceable, not at decree date.
Shri Chandra Mouli Deva v. Kimar Binoya Nand Singh, AIR 1976 Pat 208 Decrees may become enforceable on a future date or upon occurrence of a specified event. Reinforced that a decree is executable only when it becomes enforceable, confirming the approach to limitation commencement.
Patel Chaturbhai Nanabhai v. Patel Mohanbhai Nanabhai, AIR 1972 Guj 217 Right to apply for execution arises only when decree becomes enforceable if not immediately executable. Applied to hold that decree became enforceable only when permission was granted under the Slum Areas Act, thus execution application was timely.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the applicability of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a twelve-year limitation period for execution of decrees, starting from when the decree becomes enforceable. The decree in question was not immediately executable due to statutory restrictions under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, which required permission before execution.

The Court found that permission was first granted on 8th May 1981, marking the date when the decree became enforceable. Consequently, the limitation period commenced from this date, not from the original decree date in 1960. The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that no fresh application for permission could be filed after refusal and dismissal of the appeal, observing that there was no statutory limitation on filing such applications and that the status of the judgment debtor had changed, enabling permission to be granted in 1981.

The Court relied on precedents to affirm that the limitation period for execution begins only when the decree becomes enforceable, and not at the date of the decree itself. The impugned order holding the execution application barred by limitation was therefore found to be contrary to law and illegal.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is allowed.

The impugned order declaring the execution application barred by limitation is set aside, and the execution application is held to be within time. The parties are directed to appear before the executing court for issuance of warrant of possession in accordance with law. No order as to costs was made. This decision directly affects the parties by permitting execution of the decree but does not establish any new precedent beyond the application of existing limitation principles.

    Tehl Chnad v. Noor Khan

    Sultan Singh, J.—The question for decision in this revision petition is • Whether the execution application is within limitation? Tehl Chand, father of the petitioners filed a suit for eviction of the respondent Noor Khan on 20th May, 1958 under section 13(l)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 with respect to a portion of property No. 10020 Gali Naiwala, Nawab Ganj, Pul Bangash, Delhi. He obtained a decree for his eviction on 19th February 1960. Under section 19(l)(b) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 the decree becomes executable only after obtaining the permission from the Competent Authority under the said Act as the suit premises are situated in a slum area. The decree-holder applied for permission to execute the decree but it was refused on 2nd April, 1962. His appeal filed under section 20 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was also dimissed. Subsequently it appears, the decree-holder filed a suit for possession on the basis of title but his suit was also dismissed on 1st April, 1968.

    2. Tehl Chand, decree-holder died leaving behind his sons Des Raj and Nand Lal. They applied for permission under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 to execute the decree dated 19th February, 1960. They also filed an application on 17th July, 1980 for execution of the said decree. The judgment debtor Noor Khan filed objections. During the pendency of the Execution application the decree-holder was granted permission on 8th May, 1981 under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 to execute the decree dated 19th February, 1960.

    3. The judgment debtor had objected that the decree by the civil court was a nullity, it was barred by time and was not executable without permission of the Slum Authority. The execution court by the impugned order dated 15th October, 1984 held that the decree was not a nullity that though permission had been obtained the decree became nnexecutable as the decree-holder did not take any action for a long time and the execution application was barred by time.

    4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the decree became enforceable only one on the date when the permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was granted for execution of the decree and the limitation commenced from 8th May, 1981 when the decree became enforceable.

    5. Learned counsel for the respondent-judgment debtor submits that the petitioner filed an application for permission which was dismissed on 2nd April, 1962 and the appeal was also dismissed and therefore he was not entitled to file a fresh application seeking permission to execute the decree and the permission granted on 8th May, 1981 is contrary to law.

    6. Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under

    Description of application Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 136. For the executionofany decree(other than a decree granting'a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil court. Twelve years When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at, recurring periods, when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought, takes place Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of a decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation.”

    Under this Article a decree is executable within a period of 12 years from the date when it becomes enforceable. If the decree is not enforceable no execution lies and the period of limitation does not commence. It is not disputed that the permission to execute the decree dated 19th February, 1960 was obtained for the first time on 8th May, 1981. The decree thus became enforceable on 8th May, 1981 and the period of 12 years under Article 136 of the Limitation Act commenced from that date and not earlier.

    7. In Abdal Rashid v. Sri Sitaramji Maharaja Brajman, AIR 1974 All 275 a compromise decree for possession of lands in dispute was passed on 27th January, 1954. The decree provided that the judgment debtor would remove the constructions and deliver possession to the decree-holder after the latter served him with a notice giving him two months' time to remove the construction. The decree-holder served a notice on 22nd October, 1962 asking the judgment debtor to deliver possession. The judgment debtor did not deliver possession. The execution application was filed on 2nd May, 1963. It was held that the execution application was not barred by time, that immediate execution of the decree was negatived by the terms of the compromise decree and that a period of limitation commenced from the time when the decree became executable.

    8. In Shri Chandra Mouli Deva v. Kimar Binoya Nand Singh, AIR 1976 Pat 208 referring to Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 it has been observed that cases are not unknown when decrees become enforceable on some future date or on the happening of certain specified event. It has been further observed that the decree comes into existence as soon as the judgment is pronounced but it is executable only when it becomes enforceable.

    9. In Patel Chaturbhai Nanabhai v. Patel Mohanbhai Nanabhai AIR 1972 Guj 217 it has been observed that when the decree is not immediately capable of execution but on the happening of the specified event, the right to apply for execution arises only when the decree becomes enforceable. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the decree in the instant case became enforceable only on 8th May, 1981 when the permission was granted to the decree holder under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956. The execution application is, therefore, within time.

    10. Learned counsel for the judgment debtor respondent submits that the permission was refused on 2nd April, 1962 and therefore the decree-holder had no right to make a fresh application seeking permission to execute the decree. I do not agree. There is no limitation on the right of the decree-holder to make application under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 seeking permission to execute the decree. It appears that the status of the judgment debtor changed during the period from 1962 to 1980 and therefore the decree-holder was in a position to obtain permission to execute the decree on 8th May, 1981.

    11. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment and order of the executing court holding the execution application to be barred by time is contrary to law and it acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The revision petition is accepted setting aside the impugned order. The execution application is held to be within time. No order point has been argued.

    12. Parties are directed to appear before the executing court on 12th April, 1985 for the issue of warrant of possession with respect to the property in suit in accordance with law. No order as to costs.

    Revision allowed
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    Comments

    Tehl Chnad v. Noor Khan
    (Feb 26, 1985)