Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

W.A No. 327 of 2010, W.P No. 45821 of 2006, W.A No. 328 of 2010, W.P No. 45822 of 2006, W.A No. 329 of 2010, W.P No. 45823 of 2006, W.A No. 330 of 2010, W.P No. 45824 of 2006, W.A No. 331 of 2010, W.P No. 45825 of 2006, W.A No. 332 of 2010, W.P No. 45826 of 2006, W.A No. 333 of 2010, W.P No. 45827 of 2006, W.A No. 334 of 2010, W.P No. 45828 of 2006, W.A No. 150 of 2013, W.A No. 327 of 2010; W.P No. 45821 of 2006; W.A No. 328 of 2010; W.P No. 45822 of 2006; W.A No. 329 of 2010; W.P No. 45823 of 2006; W.A No. 330 of 2010; W.P No. 45824 of 2006; W.A No. 331 of 2010; W.P No. 45825 of 2006; W.A No. 332 of 2010; W.P No. 45826 of 2006; W.A No. 333 of 2010; W.P No. 45827 of 2006; W.A No. 334 of 2010; W.P No. 45828 of 2006; and W.A No. 150 of 2013

Advocates

Mr. R. Syed Mustafa
Mr. S.T.S Moorthy Government Pleader
For 3rd Respondent: Mr. P. Tamilmani For CMDA
For 4th Respondent: Mr. S. Selvanandam

Judges

Elipe Dharma Rao
M. Venugopal, JJ.

Acts

12, 2013Acquisition and Requisition of Land Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Ss. 16-B and 48-B
Section 4(1) Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1)
Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act
Section 16-B of the Land Acquisition Act
Sec.48-B of the Land Acquisition Act
LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Section 16-B
Section 48-B.

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Division Bench (M. Venugopal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This set of connected matters arises from challenges to Government/authority orders concerning land acquired in Madhavaram Village (total extent mentioned in the judgment includes parcels of 11.06 acres and other extents) originally notified for a Bus and Truck Terminal project. The original acquisition process included notifications under Section 4(1) (G.O. Ms. No. 306 dated 27.03.1985) and a draft declaration under Section 6 (G.O. Ms. No. 196 dated 07.02.1986), with Awards passed in 1986 and 1987 awarding compensation for portions of the land.

The Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) / Government proposed, at one stage, to allot part of the acquired land to the Madras Gunny Bag Merchants' Association (tentative allotments). The original land owners made representations for reconveyance under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and had their claims rejected by Government letter dated 23.10.2006 (Letter No. 22014.UD3(1)/2006-3). Writ Petitions (W.P. Nos. 45821–45828 of 2006 and others) challenged that rejection. The Learned Single Judge (order dated 04.08.2009) set aside the Government letter rejecting the claims, held that allotment to the Gunny Bag Merchants was not a public purpose, and directed the Government to consider exercise of powers under Sections 16-B and 48-B, with additional timelines and directions. The Division Bench proceedings before this Court are Writ Appeals (W.A. Nos. 327–334 of 2010) against that Common Order and W.A. No. 150 of 2013 against an order dated 27.07.2012 in W.P. No. 8350 of 2009. Subsequent Government action included G.O.(Ms). No. 191 dated 31.08.2012 cancelling tentative allotments and directing CMDA to pursue utilisation of the lands for organisation of a Truck Terminal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the allotment of the subject acquired land to the Gunny Bag Merchants constitutes a "public purpose" within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (and the Tamil Nadu amendment provisions, particularly Section 48-B).
Whether the Learned Single Judge was correct in setting aside the impugned Government order rejecting reconveyance and, in particular, whether the directions remitting the matter to Government to examine and act under Section 16-B (including orders forfeiting land to Government) and thereafter, if forfeiture is ordered, examining reconveyance under Section 48-B, were legally maintainable.
Whether after a lapse of more than two decades from acquisition/notification, the Government may invent or advance a fresh public purpose to withhold reconveyance to original owners who have applied under Section 48-B.
What is the proper procedural and legal route (and limitations) for reconveyance under Sections 16-B and 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

The Learned Single Judge erred in rejecting the consequential relief of reconveyance of lands to the original owners and in remitting the matter back to the 1st Respondent for fresh consideration, thereby permitting the Government to invent a fresh public purpose after more than two decades.
Section 48-B is an enabling provision meant to benefit original land owners seeking reconveyance; it does not permit Government to unilaterally withhold reconveyance by inventing new public purposes after the application is made.
The lands in question were not utilised for the purpose for which they were acquired for about 23 years; patta/chitta/adangal remain in the names of the petitioners; possession and compensation issues were raised.

Respondents' (Government / CMDA) Arguments

The lands were acquired for a Bus and Truck Terminal and a large portion (64.80 acres out of 80.92 acres) has been utilised for that purpose; remaining areas were earmarked for future development and are under process of development.
The proposal to allot certain plots to the Gunny Bag Merchants was motivated by public interest (relocation from congested, health-hazardous areas) and supported by the Corporation of Chennai's recommendation and representations from the merchants seeking alternative sites.
Allotments to merchants were only tentative; no plot cost was paid and no plots were handed over; the Government later cancelled tentative allotments by G.O.(Ms). No. 191 dated 31.08.2012 and directed CMDA to pursue use of the land for a Truck Terminal.
When land vests in Government after acquisition, Government may utilise land for the public purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose; thus considerations of continued use and planning are relevant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mahadeo v. State of U.P, 2013 AIR SCW 2239	Discusses and applies principles from Satendra Prasad Jain regarding vesting of land upon possession taken under Section 17 and consequences for Sections 11-A/11; addresses when authority may proceed to utilise or release land.	The Division Bench relied on the observations in Mahadeo (paras 17–18 cited) to underline that a requisitioning body cannot simply release land to original owners or change the position where land has vested with Government and to show limits on directions to authorities to press for release.
Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P (as cited in Mahadeo)	Where Government takes possession under Section 17 prior to award, title vests in Government; Section 11-A (lapse) does not apply where possession has vested; thus reconveyance cannot be predicated on lapse in such cases.	Cited to explain the legal effect of vesting of title and to support conclusion that reconveyance cannot be ordered merely because the Government had not used some parcels; used to limit scope of orders that a court can direct to Government.
The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. I. Ravichandran @ Ravi Sam, 2010 (1) CWC 261	Unless and until possession is divested from the authority by exercise of power under Section 16-B, the Government cannot reconvey the land to original owners under Section 48-B.	Relied on to hold that reconveyance under Section 48-B is not available until the land is divested from the acquiring authority; used to show the limits of an original owner's right absent statutory divestment.
C. Elumalai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1999 M.L.J. (Supp.) 164 (p.165)	The correct date to determine whether the Government requires the land for public purpose is the date on which the transfer is sought by the owner; requisitioning body may not change its mind after request for transfer is made.	Cited to support the proposition that the criterion for reconveyance consideration is whether, on the date of the owner's request, the land was required for the public purpose for which it was acquired or any other public purpose.
Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai v. Lakshmi Bai, (2005) 1 M.L.J. 717	The Tamil Nadu amendment (Section 48-B) must be given effect to; where land acquired for a specific purpose has not been utilised for decades, the original owner has a right to seek reconveyance under Section 48-B.	Used to show that long non-use (decades) of acquired land supports the original owner's entitlement to reconveyance and to justify judicial relief where Government had not considered reconveyance despite representations.
Malarkodi's case (referenced by Single Judge — no full citation in the opinion)	Appears to state that Government must exercise statutory powers under Sections 16-B and 48-B in the manner indicated by law (as relied upon by the Single Judge to resist issuance of a positive direction to Government to reconvey).	The Single Judge relied on it to hold that a court could not issue a positive direction to the Government to pass an order under Section 16-B and reconvey; the Division Bench noted the Single Judge's reliance but considered the legality of the specific directions issued (and partially set them aside).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench proceeded in a stepwise fashion, adhering closely to statutory text and cited authorities:

On the factual question whether the allotment to the Gunny Bag Merchants was a "public purpose", the Court agreed with the Learned Single Judge's conclusion that the allotment — which would result in exclusive private business use by merchants — was not a public purpose within the meaning of Section 3(f) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Single Judge's reasoning that individual commercial benefit does not equate to public purpose was expressly endorsed.
The Court then examined the remedial directions issued by the Single Judge. The Single Judge had set aside the Government's rejection of reconveyance and directed the Government to examine the petitioners' requests under Section 16-B, to forfeit land as penalty if appropriate, and if forfeiture were ordered, to examine reconveyance under Section 48-B; further the Single Judge directed final orders within six months.
The Division Bench held that while setting aside the impugned Government order was correct, the directions in paragraph 51(ii)–(iv) of the Single Judge's order were "per se not legal in the eye of law". The Court's reasoning rested on the statutory role and limits of Section 48-B: it is an enabling provision that provides a right to original land owners to secure reconveyance, and it presupposes the procedural and substantive conditions in the statute (including any necessary divestment under Section 16-B). The Court emphasized that Section 48-B does not permit the Government to unilaterally invent a fresh public purpose after the lapse of more than two decades (i.e., after the date of the original Section 4(1) notification dated 27.03.1985).
The Bench considered and applied precedents on the consequences of vesting (Satendra Prasad Jain as discussed in Mahadeo), the requirement that land must be divested under Section 16-B before reconveyance under Section 48-B (Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Ravichandran), and the principle that the relevant date for assessing Government requirement is the date the transfer was sought (C. Elumalai). It also noted decisions that support reconveyance where land has not been used for decades (Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai v. Lakshmi Bai).
Balancing these authorities, the Court concluded that the Single Judge's general direction remitting the matter to Government to act under Section 16-B and Section 48-B, and directing forfeiture and subsequent reconsideration, went beyond what the law permits a court to direct. Consequently, those portions of the Single Judge's directions (paragraph 51(ii)–(iv)) were set aside to avoid an "aberration of Justice".
The Division Bench nevertheless held that the Single Judge was correct to set aside the Government's order dated 23.10.2006 which proposed allotment to the Gunny Bag Merchants because that allotment did not amount to a public purpose. The appeal succeeded insofar as the remand directions were concerned.
In light of the Court's conclusions in W.A. Nos. 327–334 of 2010, the same reasoning was applied to W.A. No. 150 of 2013 and the order of the Single Judge in W.P. No. 8350 of 2009 dated 27.07.2012 was set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench allowed all the Writ Appeals. The Court (i) agreed with the Single Judge that the proposed allotment to the Gunny Bag Merchants was not a public purpose and (ii) set aside the impugned Government order dated 23.10.2006. However, the Court also found that the directions issued by the Single Judge directing the Government to examine and take forfeiture action under Section 16-B and then consider reconveyance under Section 48-B (and insisting on final orders within six months) were not legally sustainable and were set aside.

The core operative decree is summarized as follows:

Writ Appeal Nos. 327–334 of 2010 and W.A. No. 150 of 2013 are allowed.
The respondents are directed to reconvey the lands to the appellants, provided the appellants (as land owners) are willing to repay the amount paid to them or deposited in their favour as compensation, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment.
There shall be no order as to costs.

Implications

Direct effect on parties: The Government's attempt to allot the subject land to the Gunny Bag Merchants was quashed; the Government (respondents) are directed to reconvey the lands to the original owners on repayment of compensation within six weeks. The Court curtailed the Single Judge's remedial directions that went beyond the statutory scheme (i.e., ordering the Government to initiate forfeiture under Section 16-B and subsequent steps within fixed timelines), holding that Section 48-B is an enabling provision for original owners and that the Government may not invent fresh public purposes after a long lapse.

Broader precedent-setting: The judgment relies on and applies existing authorities about vesting, divestment, and the operation of Sections 16-B and 48-B. The Division Bench did not state a novel legal principle beyond its application of those authorities to the facts; its immediate consequence is to quash the specific allotment and to direct reconveyance on repayment where the statutory conditions are met.

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Dharmalingam v. Dhanikasalam

2. The Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Represented by its Member Secretary, Gandhi Irwin Road, Egmore, Chennai - 600 008 .…. Respondents

For Appellant: Mr. C. Johnson

For 1st Respondent: Mr. S.T.S Moorthy Government Pleader

For 2nd Respondent: Mr. P. Tamilmani For CMDA

W.A No. 327 of 2010; W.P No. 45821 of 2006; W.A No. 328 of 2010; W.P No. 45822 of 2006; W.A No. 329 of 2010; W.P No. 45823 of 2006; W.A No. 330 of 2010; W.P No. 45824 of 2006; W.A No. 331 of 2010; W.P No. 45825 of 2006; W.A No. 332 of 2010; W.P No. 45826 of 2006; W.A No. 333 of 2010; W.P No. 45827 of 2006; W.A No. 334 of 2010; W.P No. 45828 of 2006; and W.A No. 150 of 2013

Decided on July 12, 2013

Acquisition and Requisition of Land — Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 16-B and 48-B — Re-conveyance of land — Acquisition of lands in question — Lands in question were not utilised for the past 23 yrs for the purpose for which they were acquired — Allotment of lands made to Gunny Bag Merchants — Admittedly, on such allotment, the lands were going to be exclusively used by the merchants for their business — Contention that 1 Respondent passed the impugned orders rejecting petitioners claim for re conveyance, by allotting the lands to Gunny Bag Merchants, which is neither a public body nor have any aid from the Government — Single Judge is quite correct in coming to the conclusion that the allotment to Gunny Bag Merchants' is not a public purpose and rightly set aside the impugned order passed by the 1 Respondent — However, the directions issued by the Single Judge directing (i) Government to examine the request of the petitioners as required under S. 16-B of the Act and to issue an order forfeiting the lands in question in favour of it as provided in S. 16-B of the Act — (iii) If any such order is issued under S. 16-B of the Act forfeiting the lands in favour of the Government as a penalty, then the Government is further directed to examine whether the lands in question are required for any other public purpose and if it is found that the lands are not required for any other public purpose, then the Government shall reconvey the same under S. 16-B of the Act to the petitioners, provided they are prepared to fulfil the conditions stipulated in the said provision (iv) In any event, the Government shall pass appropriate final orders on the representations of the petitioners already made within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, are per se not legal in the eye of law — S. 48-B of the Act is an enabling provision enjoined only to the original land owners to secure the acquired land reconvey to them — Further, it is not open to the Government to come out with a fresh reason for public purpose after lapse of more than two decades — Respondents directed to reconvey the lands to the appellants provided, as land owners, they are willing to repay the amount paid to them or deposited in their favour as compensation, within a period of six weeks (Paras 42 and 44) Mahadeo v. State of U.P, 2013 AIR SCW 2239; Tamil Nadu Housing Board, rep. By its Managing Director, Anna Salai, Nandanam, Chennai-35 v. Sivaroja, Order dt. 19-11-2010 in WA 1926 of 2010; C. Elumalai; v. State Of Tamil Nadu, 1999 MLJ (Supp) 164 at page 165, referred to C. Elumalai; v. State Of Tamil Nadu, 1999 MLJ (Supp) 164 p. 165; Commr., Corpn. of Chennai v. Lakshmi Bai, (2005) 1 MLJ 717, relied on Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P, (1993) 4 SCC 369; Managing Director, T.N Housing Board v. I. Ravichandran @ Ravi Sam, 2010 (1) CWC 261, cited

PRAYER: Writ Appeals filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent as against the Common Order dated 04.08.2009 in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006 passed by the Learned Single Judge of this Court.

PRAYER: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent as against the Order dated 27.07.2012 in W.P No. 8350 of 2009 passed by the Learned Single Judge of this Court.

COMMON JUDGMENT

M. VENUGOPAL, J.

The Appellants have preferred the instant Writ Appeal Nos. 327 to 334 of 2010 as against the Common Order dated 04.08.2009 in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006 passed by the Learned Single Judge.

2. The Learned Single Judge, while passing the impugned orders in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006, dated 04.08.2009, in Paragraph 33, has, inter alia, observed that ‘… But, here, the CMDA is allotting the land in question to these individuals. The purpose of allotting these lands may be laudable i.e to help the beneficiaries viz., the allottees. The purpose of shifting these merchants from Royapuram area may be in the interest of public also. But, that is not the relevant consideration. In my considered view, the relevant consideration would be whether the allotment of these lands to these Gunny Bag Merchants would serve any public purpose. Admittedly, on such allotment, the lands are going to be exclusively used by the merchants for their business. They are not going to do any public service. The business interest of an individual trader can, at no stretch of imagination, be for the benefit of the public. They are not going to do any charity. They are only going to do a profitable business for their own interest. Thus, the allotment of the land in question to the Gunny Merchants would be only for the benefit of these merchants. Acquisition of land to provide house sites to the poor homeless is a public purpose as it is a constitutional duty of the Government to provide house sites to poor. But, allotting land for construction of individual shops by the beneficiaries to do their business is not out of any such constitutional obligation of the State and so, the said purpose cannot be termed as a public purpose. Therefore, I have no hesitation to hold that no public purpose as defined in Section 3(f) of the Act is involved in the proposed allotment of the land in question to the Gunny Bag Merchants' and further, in Paragraph 50, held that ‘… in these Writ Petitions, it is not possible to issue a positive direction to the Government to pass an order Under Section 16-B of the Land Acquisition Act and then to reconvey the lands in question to the Petitioners. As held in Malarkodi's case, it is for the Government to exercise its statutory power Under Sections 16-B and 48-B of the Act and such powers should be exercised in the manner indicated therein’ and resultantly, allowed the Writ Petitions in part in the following terms:

(i) The impugned order dated 23.10.2006 in Letter No. 22014.UD/3(1)2006-3 passed by the 1 respondent is set aside;

(ii) The Government is directed to examine the request of the petitioners as required under Section 16-B of the Act and to issue an order forfeiting the lands in question in favour of it as provided in Section 16-B of the Act.

(iii) If any such order is issued under Section 16-B of the Act forfeiting the lands in favour of the Government as a penalty, then the Government is further directed to examine whether the lands in question are required for any other public purpose and if it is found that the lands are not required for any other public purpose, then the Government shall reconvey the same under Section 48-B of the Act to the petitioners, provided they are prepared to fulfil the conditions stipulated in the said provision.

(iv) In any event, the Government shall pass appropriate final orders on the representations of the petitioners already made within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order.

3. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants contends that the Learned Single Judge has committed an error while passing the Common Order in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006, dated 04.08.2009, insofar as rejecting the consequential relief of claim for re-conveyance of lands.

4. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants urges before this Court that the Learned Single Judge, while passing the impugned orders in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006, dated 04.08.2009, has come to the conclusion that the allotment of the subject land to the members of the 4 Respondent Association is not for a public purpose ought not to have remitted the subject matter in issue to the 1 Respondent for fresh consideration.

5. The plea taken on behalf of the Appellants is that the 1 Respondent has not utilised the land for more than two decades after acquisition nor has found out a public purpose to utilise the subject land till the passing of the impugned order in the Writ Petitions.

6. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants contends that the Learned Single Judge has erroneously remitted the issue in question once again to the 1 Respondent in and by which the 1 Respondent has been allotted to invent a fresh public purpose to withhold the subject land even after two decades of acquisition. In fact, the very remand would defeat the main object of Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894).

7. Finally, the Learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act is an enabling provision only to the original land owners to get the acquired land re-conveyed and not for the Government to invent any fresh public purpose after an application for re-conveyance is made.

8. Per contra, the Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 submits that the Government have passed orders in G.O(Ms). No. 191, Housing and Urban Development (UD 3 (1)) Department, dated 31.08.2012, by cancelling the tentative allotment of plots to the Gunny Bag Merchants Association and to pursue further action for the utilisation of the piece of land in Survey Nos. 740 Part, etc., of Madhavaram Village measuring an extent of 11.06 acres for the purpose of organisation of the Truck Terminal.

9. According to the Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2, the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority has developed the bus and truck terminal at Madhavaram Village, Ambattur Taluk, Chengalpet Disitrict and now, this Village falls in Madhavaram Taluk erstwhile Thiruvallur District, now, Chennai District. Further, in regard to the acquisition of the lands for this project, Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was issued by the Government in G.O(Ms). No. 306, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 27.03.1985 A Draft Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued in G.O(Ms). No. 196, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 07.02.1986

10. The Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 brings it to the notice of this Court that the land acquisition proceedings were challenged before this Court in W.P No. 547 of 1986 and the same was allowed. As against the Order passed in W.P No. 547 of 1986, W.A Nos. 785 to 789 of 1996 were filed by the Government, which was allowed on 09.07.2002 The possession of these lands were already taken over and these lands were vested with Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority.

11. Proceeding further, the Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 invites the attention of this Court that out of a total extent of 80.92 acres of land acquired, 64.80 acres of land was utilised for the Bus and Truck Terminal, viz., the purpose, for which it was acquired. The balance of 16.12 acres of land is under process of development, of which, 5.06 acres of land is under challenge before this Court in Writ Petitions and as such, detailed development on the said area could not be continued till date. The remaining area of 11.06 acres of land has been earmarked as “Future Development”, in the scheme lay out approved for the scheme, to accommodate the functional requirement in future.

12. The Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 vehemently contends that the Appellants are the former owners of the lands, who made representation dated 02.07.2006, to the Government for re-conveyance, which was rejected. As such, they filed W.P Nos. 22370 to 22377 of 2006 before this Court praying for issuance of an appropriate direction. By a Common Order dated 14.07.2006, this Court directed the Government to consider the representation of the Petitioners, dated 02.07.2006 and pass orders on merits and in accordance with law, within a period of eighteen weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Order.

13. It comes to be known that on 26.09.2006, the Appellants/Petitioners made another representation and ultimately, the Government in Letter No. 22014.UD3(1)/2006-3, dated 23.10.2006, rejected the claim of the Appellants on the ground that already the lands were taken over possession by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority and it was proposed to allot the land to the Madras Gunny Bag Merchants' Association. Thereafter, the land owners filed W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006.

14. Per contra, the Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 submits that when once the lands were acquired and vested with the Government, it is the property of the Government and as such, it could be utilised by it either for the public purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose.

15. The Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 brings it to the notice of this Court that the members of the 4 Respondent made a representation to allot suitable place for them to run their business since they were running their business in the city in a congest area causing health hazards to the general public and considering the said request and on the recommendation of the Corporation of Chennai, they were allotted the lands in question for running their business.

16. The strenuous plea taken on behalf of the Respondents 1 and 2 is that the purpose for which the lands were now allotted by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority are not against the public purpose and the object of the acquisition is in no way defeated by the allotment made to the Members of the 4 Respondent Association. Moreover, the Corporation of Chennai, in its Letter No. Z.O.II.C No. A.II.O.II/1041/2005, dated 17.09.2005, has informed that the Gunny Bag Shops are located in a thickly populated residential area in the Chennai City, which is causing inconvenience and health hazards to the residents of the locality and the residents also very often complained about the nuisance caused by the Gunny Bag Shops. As such, the Corporation of Chennai has been requested to provide a suitable alternative site for relocating the Gunny Bag Merchants. Also, the said Merchants have requested to provide them alternative site to run their business. Under these circumstances, for a public purpose, the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority prepared a lay-out to accommodate the Gunny Bag Merchants.

17. Yet another contention made on behalf of the Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 is that the allotment orders issued to the Gunny Bag Merchants are only for tentative orders and since no merchant paid any plot cost, the allotment orders were not confirmed and no piece of land handed over to any merchant.

18. The Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 submits that the 3 Respondent/Member Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority wrote a letter to the Government vide Letter No. NTI/13363/2006, dated 20.07.2012, mentioning that the land was acquired for the purpose of organising the Bus and Truck Terminal and earmarked for the future development in the approved lay-out of Madhavaram Bus and Truck Terminal Scheme Area and proposing cancellation of earlier proposal of utilising this land for allotment of shop sites to the Gunny Bag Merchants.

19. According to the Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2, taking note of the latest development and traffic scenario in and around this Truck Complex and in the major transportation corridors in this area, that felt need is to develop truck parking yard in view of the huge demand for heavy vehicular parking in this complex and to address the problem associated with the unauthorised parking of heavy vehicles at road margins in and around this area creating traffic problem and traffic congestion in Chennai City.

20. Moreover, in the present case, the lands are utilised for development of truck parking, which will ensure the utilisation for the public purpose for which it was acquired.

21. While winding up his arguments, the Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 submits that as per the Order of this Court, the Government examined the requirement of lands in question for any other public purpose and issued order in G.O(Ms). No. 191, Housing and Urban Development (UD 3 (1)) Department, dated 31.08.2012, with a direction to the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority to pursue further action for utilisation of the lands in question for the purpose of organisation of the Truck Terminal.

22. The Learned Counsel appearing for the 3 Respondent/Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority reiterated the submissions made by the Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2. Further, the Learned Counsel for the 3 Respondent submits that the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority has already engaged a consultancy firm for preparation of Detailed Project Report and other details for development of Inter City Bus Terminal at the site earmarked for bus terminal in this complex, the consultant has been requested to prepare suitable design for development of Truck Terminal in the piece of land earmarked for future development and passed G.O(Ms). No. 191, Housing and Urban Development (UD 3 (1)) Department, dated 31.08.2012 Besides this, the Government further directed to pursue further action for the utilisation of the piece of land bearing Survey Nos. 740(pt), 743, 744, 747/1 & 2, 748/1 & 2, 749, 750/1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, 3, 751, 752/1, 2, 3, 753/2 (pt), 754 (pt), 758, 767/4B, 768/1 (pt), 768/2 (pt), 769/1 (pt), 769/2 (pt), 770 (pt), 771 (pt) of Madhavaram Village, with a total extent of 11.06 acres of land, for the purpose of organisation of the Truck Terminal.

23. The Learned Government Pleader for the Respondents 1 and 2 cites the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Mahadeo (D) through L.Rs v. State of U.P, [2013 AIR SCW 2239], wherein in Paragraphs 17 and 18, it is observed and laid down as follows:

“17. In the case of Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P, AIR 1993 SC 2517,: (1993 AIR SCW 3184), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court after considering various provisions including Section 17 of the Act observed as under:

“14. Ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under Section 11. Upon the taking of possession the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Section 16 states. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Section 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, lapse. When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11-A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner.”

18. Indisputably, land in question was acquired by the State Government for the purpose of expansion of city i.e, construction of residential/commercial building under planned development scheme by the Meerut Development Authority and that major portion of the land has already been utilized by the Authority. Merely because some land was left at the relevant time, that does not give any right to the Authority to send proposal to the Government for release of the land in favour of the land owners. The impugned orders passed by the High Court directing the Authority to press the Resolution are absolutely unwarranted in law.”

24. Also, he seeks in aid of the Division Bench Judgment of this Court dated 16.02.2010 in W.A No. 991 of 2007 (between The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. S. Gajendran) (where one of us Justice Elipe Dharma Rao is a party), the relevant portion in Paragraph 11 and the observations made in Paragraph 12, run as follows:

“11. …The same view is again reiterated in the Division Bench decision reported in 2010 (1) CWC 261 (The Managing Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. I. Ravichandran @ Ravi Sam). Thus, it is evident that unless and until possession given to the Housing Board is divested in exercise of powers under Section 16-B, the Government cannot re-convey the land to the original owner under Section 48-B of the Act. It is not the case of the first respondent that the land is divested from the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for considering his request for re-conveyance under Section 48-B. Hence the application filed by the first respondent for re-conveyance is not maintainable.

12. The contention of the appellant that the first respondent has no enforceable right for seeking direction to re-convey the land by the second respondent is also well founded. Writ of mandamus cannot be issued merely because a person is praying for. One must establish the right first and then he must seek for the prayer to enforce the said right. If there is failure of duty by the authorities or inaction, one can approach the Court for mandamus. The said position is well settled by in series of decisions. …”

25. By way of reply, the Learned Counsel for the Appellants submits that the possession of lands were not taken by the Respondents till date and notwithstanding the fact that the Award has been passed, the compensation deposited has not been received and also that the possession has not been taken till date.

26. The gist of the argument projected by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants is that the lands in question have not been utilised for the past 23 years for the purpose for which they were acquired and that the 1 Respondent passed the impugned orders dated 23.10.2006 rejecting the Petitioners claim for re-conveyance, by allotting the lands to Gunny Bag Merchants, which is neither a public body nor have any aid from the Government. Besides these, it is further contended on behalf of the Appellants that Patta, Chitta and Adangal stand in the name of the Petitioners till date.

27. The substance of the stand taken on behalf of the Appellants/Petitioners is that W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006 have been projected by them challenging the order of the 1 Respondent dated 23.10.2006 praying to quash the same as illegal. Also, the Appellants also sought for issuance of direction to the Respondents to reconvey their lands in Madhavaram Village, Ambattur Taluk, Chengalpattu District [which are the subject matter in issue] and this Court, on 04.08.2009, allowed the Writ Petitions in part holding that the allotment to Gunny Bags Merchants is not a public purpose and resultantly, sets aside the impugned order dated 23.10.2006 in Letter No. 22014.UD/3(1)2006-3 passed by the 1 Respondent, besides remitting the matter to the Government for consideration. Moreover, the Appellants have preferred the present W.A Nos. 327 to 334 of 2010 as against the orders passed in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006 dated 04.08.2009 relating to the non-consideration of relief of reconveyance.

28. That apart, it is the submission of the Learned Counsel for the Appellants that Writ Appeals have not been preferred either by the Government/CMDA or by the Gunny Bags Merchants till date relating to the orders passed by this Court in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006 dated 04.08.2009 as an aggrieved person.

29. It is not in dispute that the Government, through their Letter No. 19541.UD3(1)/2008-13, dated 13.09.2012, pursuant to the orders passed by this Court in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006 dated 04.08.2009 and taking note of the present traffic scenario mentioned therein, have issued orders in G.O(Ms). No. 191, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 31.08.2012 directing the Member-Secretary, Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority to cancel the allotment of plots to the Gunny Bag Merchants Association and pursue further for the utilisation of the piece of lands bearing S. Nos. 740 part, 743, 744 etc. for the purpose of organisation of the Truck Terminal.

W.A No. 150 of 2013:

30. In so far as W.A No. 150 of 2013 is concerned, the Appellant/Petitioner has challenged the order of the Learned Single Judge in W.P No. 8350 of 2009 dated 27.07.2012 wherein a direction has been issued to the 1 Respondent to consider the representation of the Petitioner, dated 22.12.2008, (said to have been submitted), under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and to pass appropriate orders thereon, after giving an opportunity of hearing to them, as well as the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

31. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant in W.A No. 150 of 2013 contends that the Learned Single Judge should have taken into consideration of a vital fact that the Respondents have not filed any Writ Appeal as against the order dated 04.08.2009 in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006 passed by the Learned Single Judge.

32. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant in W.A No. 150 of 2013 urges before this Court that the Learned Single Judge has not considered that the batch in Writ Appeal No. 327 of 2010 and others preferred by the concerned parties were pending consideration in order to tag or club the W.P No. 8350 of 2009 so as to enable the common disposal of the entire subject land in acquisition.

33. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants relies on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court dated 19.11.2010 in W.A.1926 of 2010 (between The Tamil Nadu Housing Board, rep. By its Managing Director, Anna Salai, Nandanam, Chennai - 35 v. Sivaroja) [where one of us Justice ELIPE DHARMA RAO is a party] wherein while dismissing the Writ Appeal, the Appellant has been directed to reconvey the properties to the Respondents, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment, after complying with all the formalities.

34. Apart from the above, the Learned Counsel for the Appellants brings it to the notice of this Court that the Principal Administrative Officer of the CMDA, in his communication, dated 21.11.2006 addressed to S.R Kalaiselvam of Old Washermenpet, Chennai - 21 has informed that the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority has taken a decision to allot one plot temporarily (viz., Plot No. A-1) measuring an approximate extent of 300 square feet (12 feet × 25 feet) at a plots present price of Rs. 75,000/-, with an advance of Rs. 18,750/- to be deposited and the balance amount to be paid at 12% interest fixing instalments ranging from 12, 24, 36, EMI at the rate of Rs. 4998/-, Rs. 2648/-, Rs. 1868/- respectively.

35. The 3 Respondent/CMDA, in Letter No. M1/1506/2004-2 dated 30.10.2012 addressed to 217 Gunny Bag Traders, has cancelled the tentative allotment order issued in Letter No. M1/1506/2004 dated 21.11.2006

36. It cannot be gainsaid that the Special Tahsildar (L.A) III and Land Acquisition Officer, M.M.D.A, Guindy, Madras-32 has passed an Award No. 1/86 dated 01.04.1986 in respect of land measuring 16.31 acres situated in the Village of Madhavaram in the Taluk Saidapet in he Registration Sub District of Sembiam in the District of Chengalpattu and awarded compensation of Rs. 2,48,815.70. Likewise, in Award No. 2/87, the Special Tahsildar (L.A) III, M.M.D.A, Guindy, Chennai dated 02.06.1987 passed an Award in respect of land measuring 11.06 acres situated in the Village of Madhavaram in the Taluk of Saidapet in the Registration Sub District of Sembiam in the District of Chengalpattu etc. and awarded a compensation by Rs. 2,46,767.80.

37. It is to be borne in mind that the rudimentary requirement relating to Section 16-B under the caption'Land to be forfeited in certain cases' of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) is that the lands were not utilised by the authority concerned for which they were acquired and handed over. Also that, Section 48-B speaks of ‘Transfer of land to original owner in certain cases'.

38. A cursory glance of the ingredients of Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 unerringly point out that the Section employ the words ‘for the purpose for which it was acquired’. The term ‘public purpose’ is to include a purpose in and by which the community's general interest is directly concerned with, in contra distinction to the interest of chosen few. Besides this, the essential factor for acquisition interest of a public purpose is that the cost of acquisition should be borne, wholly or in part, out of public funds.

39. A mere running of the eye of the ingredients of Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in a clear cut fashion necessitates a mutual agreement between the erstwhile land owners and the State Government before it can re-convey the lands vested in it to them, on the return of money paid in regard to the acquisition in question. Also that, Section 48-B of the Act does not visualise an unilateral withdrawal from the acquisition by the State Government.

40. At this juncture, we deem it appropriate to cite the decision of this Court in C. Elumalai v. State of Tamilnadu, [1999 M.L.J (Supp.) 164] at page 165, wherein it is held as follows:

“It has to be considered whether on the date when the landowners sought for the transfer, the Government required the land for the public purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose. It may not be open to the requisition body to change it minds after request for the transfer of the land under S.48-B is made. That is why the criteria for consideration is the date on which the transfer was sought for by the owner of the land which means that on that date the requisitioning body required the land for the public purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose.”

41. We recall and recollect the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in The Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai v. Lakshmi Bai [(2005) 1 M.L.J 717], wherein it is observed as follows:

“So far as the legal position is concerned by introduction of the Tamil Nadu Amendment into the Land Acquisition Act under Sec.48-B, the same has to be given effect to an since it is a fact that the land acquired for a specific purpose has not been utilised for more than two and half decades for the purpose for which it has been acquired, the first respondent herein has the right to seek to re-convey the same from the Government under Sec.48-B of the Land Acquisition Act and since the same has not been considered by the Government in spite of many attempts made on the part of the first respondent, he has rightly come forward to file the writ petition in W.P No. 4154 of 2004 and the same has been allowed by the learned single Judge in giving effect to the position of law and in appreciation of the facts and circumstances in the context of the legal position and there is absolutely no reason for the Court to cause its interference into the well considered and merited order passed by the learned single Judge in a legal manner.”

42. Be that as it may, on going through the order dated 04.08.2009 in W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006 passed by the Learned Single Judge, we are of the considered view that the Learned Single Judge is quite correct in coming to the conclusion that the allotment to Gunny Bag Merchants' is not a public purpose and rightly set aside the impugned order dated 23.10.2006 in Letter No. 22014.UD3(1)/2006-3, passed by the 1 Respondent and in this regard, we are in agreement with the view so taken. However, we are of the considered view that the directions issued by the Learned Single Judge in paragraph 51(ii) to (iv), “viz., (ii) The Government is directed to examine the request of the petitioners as required under Section 16-B of the Act and to issue an order forfeiting the lands in question in favour of it as provided in Section 16-B of the Act. (iii) If any such order is issued under Section 16-B of the Act forfeiting the lands in favour of the Government as a penalty, then the Government is further directed to examine whether the lands in question are required for any other public purpose and if it is found that the lands are not required for any other public purpose, then the Government shall reconvey the same under Section 16-B of the Act to the petitioners, provided they are prepared to fulfil the conditions stipulated in the said provision. (iv) In any event, the Government shall pass appropriate final orders on the representations of the petitioners already made within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order” are per se not legal in the eye of law, because of the simple reason that Section 48-B of the Act is an enabling provision enjoined only to the original land owners to secure the acquired land reconvey to them. Further, it is not open to the Government to come out with a fresh reason for public purpose after lapse of more than two decades viz., after the issuance of Section 4(1) Notification under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 27.03.1985 issued in G.O.Ms No. 306 by the Housing and Urban Development Department. Accordingly, this Court interferes with the said directions issued beginning from paragraph 51(ii) to (iv) as stated supra and sets aside the same, to prevent an aberration of Justice. Resultantly, the Writ Appeal Nos. 327 to 334 of 2010 succeed.

43. Likewise, in the light of the view taken by this Court in allowing the W.A Nos. 327 to 334 of 2010 (relating to W.P Nos. 45821 to 45828 of 2006), this Court holds that the said view will equally apply to the facts of the present case concerned in W.A No. 150 of 2013 and accordingly, allows the W.A No. 150 of 2013, by setting aside the order of the Learned Single Judge in W.P No. 8350 of 2009 dated 27.07.2012

44. In the result, all the Writ Appeals are allowed. The Respondents are directed to reconvey the lands to the Appellants [provided, as land owners, they are willing to repay the amount paid to them or deposited in their favour as compensation], within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this Judgment. There shall be no order as to costs.

Dharmalingam v. Dhanikasalam

Judgment Summary — Division Bench (M. Venugopal, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

Respondents' (Government / CMDA) Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Implications

Dharmalingam v. Dhanikasalam

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