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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944);(b) the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957);(c) the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of 1978);(d)
  • Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001 (14 of 2001), as amended by Section 169 of the Finance Act, 2003 (32 of 2003)
  • Rule 12 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 r/w Rule 3 of the Automobile Cess Rules, 1984, Govt.,
  • PROVISIONAL COLLECTION OF TAXES ACT 1931
  • SECTION 157 FINANCE ACT 2003
  • Section 91 read with Section 95 of the Finance Act, 2004.9.
  • SECTION 3 FINANCE ACT 2004
  • CENTRAL EXCISE ACT 1944
  • Section 91 and 93 of the Finance Act, 2004,
  • Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002
  • 52 of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.
  • subsections (1), (2) & (3) of Section 93.18.
  • Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985
  • Central Excise Tariff Act,
  • FINANCE ACT 2004
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944);(b) the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957);(c) the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of 1978);(d)
  • Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001 (14 of 2001), as amended by Section 169 of the Finance Act, 2003 (32 of 2003)
  • Rule 12 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 r/w Rule 3 of the Automobile Cess Rules, 1984, Govt.,
  • PROVISIONAL COLLECTION OF TAXES ACT 1931
  • SECTION 157 FINANCE ACT 2003
  • Section 91 read with Section 95 of the Finance Act, 2004.9.
  • SECTION 3 FINANCE ACT 2004
  • CENTRAL EXCISE ACT 1944
  • Section 91 and 93 of the Finance Act, 2004,
  • Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002
  • 52 of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.
  • subsections (1), (2) & (3) of Section 93.18.
  • Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985
  • Central Excise Tariff Act,
  • FINANCE ACT 2004
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, M/s. Loyal Textile Mills Ltd., Kovilpatti, manufactures cotton yarn and polyester-cotton yarn (Chapter Heading 52 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985). Following imposition of an education cess as a duty of excise by provisions of the Finance Act, 2004 (effective from 9 July 2004), the petitioner exported goods after paying Central Excise duty and the education cess and sought refund/rebate of the excise duty inclusive of the education cess under the existing rebate/notification regime.

The petition challenges an order (identified in the opinion as passed by respondent No.1 dated 28-4-2006) refusing the petitioner's claim for refund of the education cess. Procedurally, the claim for refund was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, Kovilpatti Division (order dated 26-4-2005). The petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals), which appeal was rejected by an order dated 12-9-2005. The petitioner then filed a revision petition under Section 35EE of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the revision petition was dismissed by the Government (revisional order reproduced in the opinion). The petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 226 seeking quashing of the governmental revisional order and refund of the claimed education cess.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the education cess, levied and collected as part of excise duty from 9 July 2004, is eligible for rebate/refund on exported goods under the notifications granting rebate of duty on export.
  2. Whether the explanatory clause (Explanation I) issued to Notification No.90/2004 (dated 6-9-2004) is clarificatory and should be read as part of the original notification with retrospective effect (operating from the original notification date), or whether it must be treated as prospective and thus not available for the petitioner's claim for the period in question.
  3. Whether absence of an express mention of "education cess" in the enumerative explanation to the earlier notification precludes rebate of that cess for the relevant export period.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The education cess is part of Central Excise and was paid as such; consequently, the petitioner was entitled to refund/rebate of Central Excise inclusive of the education cess.
  • The Explanation (issued on 6-9-2004) is clarificatory in nature and must be read as part of the original notification; therefore it applies from the date of the original notification and is not to be treated as prospective only.
  • The judicial authorities and decisions relied upon by the revisional authority do not apply to the facts of the present case because the petitioner complied with the terms of the relevant notification; the petitioner disputes that its claim depends on strained constructions of the notification wording.
  • The petitioner relied on the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Banswara Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India (2007 (216) E.L.T 16 (Raj.)) as supporting the proposition that the education cess was a duty of excise and that the explanatory clarification made rebate available for the period in question.

Respondent / Revisional Authority's Position (as reflected in the revisional order)

  • The revisional order held that the Explanation-I to the earlier notification did not expressly mention education cess and that the notification regime is restrictive; only the duties specifically enumerated in the explanation were eligible for rebate.
  • The revisional authority read Notification No.19/2004-C.E.(N.T), dated 6-9-2004 (and related notifications) as not being given retrospective effect, implying the education cess could not be rebated for the earlier period.
  • The revisional authority relied on judicial precedents (e.g., Mahar Dairies; Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand; Commissioner of Central Excise v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.) to support the principle that benefit under a notification must be strictly construed and cannot be conferred by expanding or adding words to a notification.
  • The revisional authority concluded that no rebate of education cess was admissible for the period from 9-7-2004 to 3-9-2004 and accordingly upheld the order-in-appeal rejecting the petitioner's claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mahar Dairies (supra) Principle that, to claim benefit of a notification, a party must strictly comply with the terms of the notification; benefits cannot be conferred by stretching or adding words to a notification. Relied upon by the revisional authority to deny rebate; the revisional order cited the principle in support of its restrictive reading. The writ court found that the revisional authority's reliance on such precedents did not justify denial in the facts of the present case (i.e., the court found the precedents distinguishable or inapplicable to the petitioner's situation).
Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand - (2005) 4 SCC 272 Affirmation of strict construction of notifications for claiming their benefits; cannot add words to confer benefit where wording does not permit. Revisional authority cited this decision in support of a restrictive interpretation. The opinion records that the petitioner argued this decision did not apply to the present facts; the court accepted that the cited judgments were not applicable to the petitioner's case.
Commissioner Of Central Excise v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., 1991 (53) E.L.T 408 (Tri.) Held that rebate of cess on export of automobiles was not admissible in absence of a specific notification under the relevant rules (Rule 12, Central Excise Rules, 1944 read with Rule 3 of Automobile Cess Rules, 1984). Used by the revisional authority to support refusal of rebate where specific rule-based notification was absent. The writ court did not treat that precedent as decisive for the petitioner's factual matrix and ultimately allowed the petition.
Banswara Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India - 2007 (216) E.L.T 16 (Raj.) Held that the education cess (levied under the Finance Act provisions) is a duty of excise and that the explanatory notification clarifying the meaning of "duty" was clarificatory and thus made rebate available as from the original date; explanatory notification was not a substantive independent levy and was to be read as part of the earlier notification. The court cited and relied on the reasoning in this Rajasthan High Court decision to support the proposition that the explanatory notification is clarificatory, should be read as part of the original notification, and thus supports rebate/refund of education cess for the relevant period. The present court found this authority supportive of allowing the petitioner's claim and quashing the impugned orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the legislative and notification history: an existing notification dated 26-6-2001 allowed rebate of the whole of the duty paid on excisable goods exported. Subsequently the Finance Act, 2004 enacted education cess as a duty of excise payable from 9-7-2004, and an explanatory provision (Explanation I to Notification No.90/2004 dated 6-9-2004) defined "duty" to include a range of duties, expressly including "Educational cess on excisable goods as levied under Clause 81 read with Clause 83 of the Finance (No.2) Bill, 2004".

The revisional authority had interpreted the notification and its explanation restrictively, holding that because education cess was not mentioned in the explanation to the earlier 26-6-2001 notification, rebate was not available for the education cess for the period 9-7-2004 to 3-9-2004; the revisional authority further found no retrospective effect for the 6-9-2004 notification/explanation. It relied on precedents advocating strict compliance with notification wording.

The court confronted that reasoning with the petitioner's submission that the Explanation issued on 6-9-2004 was explanatory/clarificatory and should be read as part of the original notification, thereby making the education cess rebated from the original notification's operative date. The court accepted the petitioner's position that explanatory notifications interpret existing rights and do not create independent substantive rights; accordingly, a clarification that the term "duty" includes education cess operates to clarify the scope of duties rebated under the earlier notification from the date the original notification operated.

The court found persuasive the reasoning in the Rajasthan High Court decision in Banswara Syntex Ltd., which held that education cess, being levied as a surcharge on excise duties and given the character of a duty of excise by Section 93(1) et seq. of the Finance Act, falls within the rebate mechanism attached to excise duties and that an explanatory notification including education cess in the definition of "duty" was clarificatory and operative from the original notification date. The court observed that the revisional authority's reliance on strict-construction precedents did not render those precedents dispositive in the present factual matrix.

On this basis, the court concluded that the impugned orders of the Assistant Commissioner, Commissioner (Appeals), and the revisional authority that disallowed rebate of the education cess during the period from 9-7-2004 to 3-9-2004 were unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed; the impugned revisional order and related orders refusing refund/rebate of the education cess are set aside. The court issued a writ in the nature of mandamus directing refund of the claimed education cess to the petitioner within two months of receipt of the certified copy of the order. The court ordered no costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner is entitled to refund of the claimed education cess for the period in question; the relevant administrative orders refusing rebate are quashed and the Government is directed to refund within two months.
  • On legal reasoning: The court accepted the view that an explanatory notification that clarifies the meaning of "duty" (to include education cess) is clarificatory in nature and should be read as part of the original notification, thereby operating from the date of the original notification rather than being treated as purely prospective. The court found that the revisional authority's restrictive construction and reliance on precedents of strict compliance were not applicable to the facts at hand.
  • Costs: The opinion records that there is no order as to costs.

    Loyal Textile Mills Ltd. v. Jt. Secretary, M.F (D.R)

    1. The petitioner M/s. Loyal Textile Mills Ltd., Kovilpatti, has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court, under Article 226 of the Consti-tution of India, with a prayer, for issuance of a writ, in the nature of certiorari, for quashing order passed by the respondent No. 1 dated 28-4-2006, declining the claim of the petitioner, for the refund of education cess.

    2. The petitioner is engaged in manufacture of Cotton Yarn and Polyester Cotton Yam, falling under Chapter Heading 52 of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The petitioner pays the Central Excise duty, with respect to clearances, effected for domestic requirements, as also for the export. According to the notification of the Government, the party is entitled to rebate for all the duties and excise paid, on the goods exported. Vide notification, under Section 91 and 93 of the Finance Act, 2004, education cess was levied as duty of excise, effected from 9th July 2004, as per the provisions of Clause 81, 83 and 84 of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931.

    3. The petitioner Company, exported Cotton Yam on payment of duty and education cess, and claimed refund of excise duty and education cess, under the notification under the Finance Act, 2004.

    4. The benefit of rebate of whole of the duty paid on all excisable goods, falling under the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, exported to any country, was under notification, dated 26th June 2001.

    5. This notification was adopted subsequently. The notification, imposing Central Excise and education cess with effect from 9th July 2004 was by way of partial modification, superseding the notification thus in force.

    6. Thereafter, on 6th September 2004, the Central Government issued explanation to the notification No. 90/2004.

    7. The explanation issued reads as under:—

    “Explanation I— “duty” for the purpose of this notification means duties of excise collected under the following enactments, namely:

    (a) the Central Excise Act, 1944 (1 of 1944);

    (b) the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957);

    (c) the Additional Duties of Excise (Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978 (40 of 1978);

    (d) the National Calamity Contingent duty leviable under Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001 (14 of 2001), as amended by Section 169 of the Finance Act, 2003 (32 of 2003) and further amended by Section 3 of the Finance Act, 2004 (13 of 2004);

    (e) special excise duty collected under a Finance Act,

    (f) additional duty of excise as levied under Section 157 of the Finance Act, 2003 (32 of 2003);

    (g) Educational cess on excisable goods as levied under Clause 81 read with Clause 83 of the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 2004”.

    8. Thereafter, Notification No. 28/2004-C.E. (N.T), dated 21st October. 2004, was issued under Section 91 read with Section 95 of the Finance Act, 2004.

    9. The petitioner, claimed that Notification No. 90/2004, dated 6-9-2004 was effected from on 9th July 2004 and was not prospective. The petitioner, accordingly, claimed refund of the education cess, paid as part of excise duty. The claim was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, Kovilpafti Division, vide order, dated 26th April 2005.

    10. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise, before the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals). The appeal filed by the petitioner was also rejected, vide order, dated 12th September 2005.

    11. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred a revision petition before the Government, under Section 35EE of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The revision petition was also dismissed.

    12. The operative part of the revisional order, reads as under:—

    “6.4 On a careful consideration of the Notification No. 40/2001-C.E.(N.T) dated 26-6-2001, as amended, Government, finds that the notification permits rebate of whole of the duty paid on all excisable goods falling under the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 and explanation I further clarified duties which can be rebated. It is admitted fact that education cess is not mentioned in the explanation-I to Notification mentioned above. A plain reading of the explanation-I of the Notification 41/2001-C.E. (N.T), dated 26-6-2001, as amended reveals that it is of restrictive nature and under Notification such duties can be rebated which have been mentioned in above said explanation of the Notification. The provisions of the said Notification regarding duties to be rebated are very clear and there is no ambiguity which requires any clarification. Similarly perusal of the Notification No. 19/2004-C.E.(N.T), dated 6-9-2004, issued in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 and in supersession of the Ministry of Finance Dept., of Revenue, Notification No. 40/2001-Cx.(N.T), dated 26-6-2001, G.S.R 469(E) dated 26th June 2001 also reveals that there is nothing in the Notification to show that the provisions of the Notification have been given retrospective effect.

    6.5 In Mahar Dairies (supra), a Division Bench of the Apex Court observation:—

    “8. It is settled law that in order to claim benefit of a Notification a party must strictly comply with the terms of the notification. If on wording of the notification the benefit is not available then by stretching the words of the notification or by adding words to the Notification benefit cannot be conferred……………”. A similar view has been express by a Division Bench of this Court in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand - (2005) 4 SCC 272, in which one of us was a party, stating;

    6.6 Similarly Hon'ble Tribunal in case of Commissioner Of Central Excise v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., 1991 (53) E.L.T 408 (Tri.), held that rebate of cess on export of automobiles is not admissible in the absence of notification issued under Rule 12 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 r/w Rule 3 of the Automobile Cess Rules, 1984, Govt., respectively concurs with the decisions of CEGAT.

    6.7 Govt., would also observe that cited judgments have already been examined by the Commissioner (Appeals), as evident from perusal of the impugned Order-in-Appeal and Gov., agrees with the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals), that facts of the cited judgments are totally different from the facts of the instant case and accordingly not applicable.

    7. In view of the above facts and circumstances Govt., would agree with the findings and orders of the Commissioner (Appeals), that no rebate of education cess is admissible to the applicants during the period from 9-7-2004 to 3-9-2004, and Govt., accordingly upholds the impugned Order-in-Appeal in this regard.

    8. These Revisions Application are accordingly rejected”.

    7. In view of the above facts and circumstances, Govt., feels that issue the instance Revision Applications is exacted identical/similar to the facts of the Revisionary Order mentioned above, and the Revision Applications deserve similar treated. Govt., accordingly upholds the impugned Order-in-Appeal, and reject the Revision Applications.

    8. So ordered.”

    13. The learned counsel for the petitioner, challenged the order, declining the relief of education cess to the petitioner, by contending, that the education cess is a part of Central Excise and was also paid as such. Therefore, the petitioner was entitled to the refund of Central Excise, inclusive of the education cess.

    14. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that in any case, if there was any doubt regarding interpretation of the notification, that stood clarified by way of explanation.

    15. The explanation being explanatory in nature, was required to be read as part of original notification, and could not be treated as prospective, as held by the authorities under the Act.

    16. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the judgments, relied upon by the revisional authority in the order, has no application to the facts of this case, as the petitioner had complied with the terms of notification, and the claim raised was not by stressing the word, as was case of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand - (2005) 4 SCC 272.

    17. The other judgment relied upon by the revisional authority also has no application to the facts of the present case, and it is not in dispute that the notification did cover, the case of the petitioner. The only question was as to whether the explanation given to the notification can be treated to be an independent notification or the notification already issued, and thus, operative from the date of original notification.

    18. There is force in this petition. The custom authorities are not right in rejecting the claim of refund of education cess, by treating the explanatory notification to be prospective. The explanatory notifications are in the nature of judgment of courts, which only interpret the existing rights. The explanatory notification thus is to be treated as part and parcel of notification, which is clarified, by explanatory notification, there is operative from the date of original notification, as in absence of clarificatory notification, the original notification is required to be read, as explained in subsequent explanatory notification. The explanatory notification being part of original notification therefore has to apply from the date of original notification and does not operate with prospective effect, as it does not give any substantive right independently. This view finds support from the judgment of Rajasthan High Court, in the case of Banswara Syntex Ltd. v. Union of India - 2007 (216) E.L.T 16 (Raj.), wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Rajasthan, has pleaded to lay down as under:—

    “12. Under Section 93(1) the Education Cess has specifically been directed that. Education Cess levied under Section 91 shall be a duty of excise. In sub-section (2), it was further ordained that Education Cess on excisable goods shall be in addition to excise duty chargeable under Central Excise Act, 1944 or under any other law. Thus, statutorily the Education Cess levied on excisable goods was directed to be Duty of Excise itself and has to be collected as Excise Duty in addition to Excise Duty otherwise chargeable under Central Excise Act or any other law.

    15. The very fact that the surcharge is collected as part of levy under three different enactments goes to show that scheme of levy of Education Cess was by way of collecting special funds for the purpose of Government project towards providing and financing universalised quality of basic education by enhancing the burden of Central Excise Duty, Customs Duty, and Service Tax by way of charging surcharge to be collected for the purpose of Union. But, it was made clear that in respect of all the three taxes, the surcharge collected along with the tax will bear the same character of respective taxes to which surcharge was appended and was to be governed by the respective enactments under which Education Cess in the form of surcharge is levied & collected.

    16. Apparently, when at the time of collection, surcharge has taken the character of parent levy, whatever may be the object behind it, it becomes subject to the provision relating to the Excise Duty applicable to it in the manner of collecting the same obligation of the tax payer in respect of its discharge as well as exemption concession by way of rebate attached with such levies. This aspect has been made clear by combined reading of subsections (1), (2) & (3) of Section 93.

    18. The Explanation appended to Notification dated 26-6-2001 included within the ambit of Excise Duty any Special Excise Duty collected under any Finance Act when under Finance Act, 2004 it was ordained that Education Cess to be collected as surcharge on Excise Duty payable on excisable goods and shall be a Duty of Excise, it became a special Duty of Excise by way of Education Cess chargeable and collected under Finance Act, 2004 and fell within the ambit of Clause (3) of Explanation appended to Notification dated 26-6-2001. Consequently, rebate became available on collection of surcharge on Excise Duty under Finance Act, 2004 in terms of existing Notification dated 26-6-2001 immediately. Later Notification including the Education Cess in enumerative definition in the circumstances was only clarificatory and by way of abandoned caution, but not a new rebate in relation to Excise Duty or any part thereof as statutorily pronounced as well as specified Excise Duty levied and collected under the Finance Act.

    19. The order of appellate authority as well as revisional authority disallowed the rebate on excise duty payable by the petitioner as surcharge levied on excise duty named as “Education Cess” for the purpose of appropriating the same for specific project of the Government in funding universalised quality basic education cannot be sustained. If we read Section 93 as a whole, it becomes clear that existing Notification providing exemption to the Duty of Excise is otherwise applicable to Education Cess also w.e.f it became payable as part of the Duty of Excise or at any rate Special Excise Duty collected under Finance Act, and did not need a separate Notification in that regard. The position may have been different if the Education Cess would have been collected not as surcharge but as an independent levy and matter would have been left to be considered independently for the purpose of providing rebate in respect, thereof. The Notification dated 6-9-2004 had included the definition of Excise Duty only in consonance with the meaning of Excise Duty as was existing on the date Notification was issued, even if Explanation would not have been there the term Duty of Excise in ordinary circumstance would have included the surcharge levied as Education Cess in terms of Section 93 of the Act of 2004.

    20. In view thereof, we have no hesitation to hold that impugned orders, of Central Government as revisional authority and appellate order of Commissioner (Appeals) are patently erroneous and deserve to be quashed.

    21. Accordingly, writ petition is allowed, impugned orders are set aside to the extent the petitioner has been dented the claim to rebate on surcharge on Excise Duty appropriated by Union of India as Education Cess for funding Universalised quality basic education programme but was paid by the petitioner only as Duty of Excise w.e.f 9-7-2004 to 5-9-2001. There is no contention about eligibility to rebate w.e.f 6-9-2004. There shall be no order as to costs. Rule is made absolute.”

    19. For the reasons stated, the writ petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside. The writ, in the nature of mandamus, is issued to refund the claimed education cess to the petitioner within a period of two months of the receipt of certified copy of this order.

    20. No costs.

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    Loyal Textile Mills Ltd. v. Jt. Secretary, M.F (D.R)
    (Aug 5, 2011)