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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • III Additional Sub Court, Madurai.Motor Vehicles Act (1988), Section 164.Insurance, Cause
  • Order 22 Rule 1 and 11 as well as Order 1 Rule 3 and 9 of Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 306 of Indian Succession Act 1925.Section 306Demands
  • Section 306 of Indian Succession Act 1925. English
  • Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act,
  • (Indian) Succession Act (1925), Section 306.Right
  • Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act.
  • SECTION 173 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT 1988
  • Order 1 Rule 1 of CPC;Order 1 Rule 1
  • Order 1 Rule 1 and Order 22 Rule 1,
  • C.P.C, Order 22, Rule 1.Abatement
  • Order 22 Rule 1 of CPC,
  • 22 Rule 1
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • III Additional Sub Court, Madurai.Motor Vehicles Act (1988), Section 164.Insurance, Cause
  • Order 22 Rule 1 and 11 as well as Order 1 Rule 3 and 9 of Civil Procedure Code.
  • Section 306 of Indian Succession Act 1925.Section 306Demands
  • Section 306 of Indian Succession Act 1925. English
  • Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act,
  • (Indian) Succession Act (1925), Section 306.Right
  • Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act.
  • SECTION 173 MOTOR VEHICLES ACT 1988
  • Order 1 Rule 1 of CPC;Order 1 Rule 1
  • Order 1 Rule 1 and Order 22 Rule 1,
  • C.P.C, Order 22, Rule 1.Abatement
  • Order 22 Rule 1 of CPC,
  • 22 Rule 1
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Motor Accident Claim Appeal (MCOP No. 912 of 2006)

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17.02.2006 the injured claimant, G. Sithivinayagam, was allegedly knocked down by an autorickshaw (Regn. No. TN 58 B 2898) while he was riding his two-wheeler (Bajaj M 80, Regn. No. TN 59 D 9426). He sustained grievous injuries to his right leg (comminuted fracture of both bones). He filed MCOP No. 912 of 2006 claiming Rs. 3,00,000/-.

The autorickshaw owner (first respondent) did not contest the claim; the insurance company (second respondent and present appellant) contested the petition. During the pendency of the claim petition the injured claimant died. His wife was impleaded as claimant (second claimant/first respondent) and prosecuted the claim. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal found the autorickshaw driver at fault but also found that the claimant's death was not proximately caused by the accident. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 75,000/- to the claimant's wife (Rs. 50,000 for loss of love and affection and Rs. 25,000 for loss of consortium), with interest.

The insurance company appealed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 challenging the Tribunal's award dated 26.04.2010.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the cause of action to maintain the claim proceedings (for personal injury) survives in favour of the claimant's legal representative (the wife) where the claimant died during pendency but the death was not caused by the accident injury.
  2. Whether, given the driver allegedly did not possess a valid licence on the date of the accident, the insurer should be liable under the policy and whether any award should have been passed against the owner alone for violation of policy terms.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Insurance Company) — Arguments

  • The cause of action does not survive to the first respondent/second claimant (the wife) because the death of the injured claimant was not due to the accident injury; accordingly, she is entitled only to actual expenses (if any) such as loss of estate, etc., and not to compensation for personal injuries.
  • The driver of the autorickshaw did not possess a valid driving licence on the date of the accident (as per RW 1 from the Regional Transport Office). Therefore, the insurer contended that the claim against the insurance company ought to be dismissed and, if any award is to be made, it should be against the vehicle owner alone for breach of policy conditions by entrusting the vehicle to an unlicensed driver.

Respondent(s) — Position in Proceedings

The opinion records that the injured claimant initially filed the claim and, after his death during the pendency, his wife was impleaded and prosecuted the claim; however, the judgment does not set out a detailed list of adversarial legal arguments advanced on behalf of the claimant's legal representative in the appeal. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 75,000/- in her favour.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prisca Rozario v. Ford Foundation, 1969 Cal 394 Dictum that a cause of action based on personal injuries causing the death of the deceased survives to his heirs and they can be substituted in his place in the claim petition. The court cites this case to explain that where personal injuries cause death, the heirs may continue the claim under Section 306; it distinguishes that principle where death is not caused by the accident.
Jogindra Kuer v. Jagdish Singh, AIR 1964 Patna 548 Affirms the maxim "action personalis moritur cum persona" and applies Section 306 proviso: personal actions (including personal injuries not causing death) generally do not survive to legal representatives. The court relies on this decision for the ratio that an action for personal injury not causing death does not survive to heirs; it uses this to hold the claimant's wife's claim cannot stand because death was not proximately caused by the accident.
Ratanlal Bhannalal Mahajan v. Baboolal Hajarilal Jain, AIR 1960 Madhya Pradesh 200 Explains limits of the maxim "action personalis moritur cum persona" and that Section 306 indicates the boundaries of survival of actions. The court refers to the case to support the proposition that Section 306 confines the English maxim and that those limits apply to legal heirs in India.
The Managing Director, Pandiyan Roadways Corporation, Madurai v. S. Rajalakshmi, 2000 (IV) CTC 528 Considered whether legal representatives are entitled to the entire compensation when the claimant dies during pendency and death was not due to the accident; addressed survival of claims where death is not caused by the accident. The court invokes this decision as persuasive authority in holding that where death is not caused by the accident the legal representatives are not entitled to compensation for personal injuries.
Pushpam v. Nirmala (C.R.P No. 2307 of 1988, dated 03.01.1991) Addressed distinction between claims where death entitles legal representatives to continue an action and claims for personal injuries where the claimant dies not due to the accident; referred to higher court decisions. Referred to by the court (via Pandiyan Roadways) as part of the body of case law distinguishing survivability of personal injury claims; used to support the view that claims for personal injuries not causing death do not survive.
Melapurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Gopalankutty Nair, (1986) 1 SCC 118 Referred to in the context of survival of claims and related distinctions (cited by Pushpam). Referred to as part of authorities considered in discussing survival of claims; court uses the chain of authority to support its conclusion on survivability under Section 306.
M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Segulira, (1988) 1 SCC 556 Referred to in the context of authorities concerning survival of legal rights and claims. Referred to as part of the jurisprudential background considered by the court in reaching its conclusion that personal-injury claims not causing death do not survive under Section 306.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in a series of clear steps, grounded in statutory text and precedent cited in the opinion:

  1. Factfinding and procedural posture: It is undisputed that the original claimant (G. Sithivinayagam) died during the pendency of the claim petition and his wife was impleaded and pursued the claim. The Tribunal had found fault of the driver but also found that the claimant's death was not proximately caused by the accident.
  2. Legal question defined: The primary legal issue is whether the cause of action to maintain the claim proceedings survives to the claimant's legal representative (the wife) when the claimant died and his death was not caused by the accident injury.
  3. Invocation of the maxim and statutory rule: The court applies the maxim "action personalis moritur cum persona" (a personal action dies with the person) and explains that English common law in this regard may be applied in India to the extent recognised by statute. The court expressly relies on Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which provides that rights to prosecute or defend actions survive to executors/administrators except for causes of action including "other personal injuries not causing the death of the party."
  4. Use of authority to delimit application: The court reviews and relies upon earlier decisions (including Prisca Rozario, Jogindra Kuer, Ratanlal Bhannalal Mahajan, Pandiyan Roadways, and others) to explain that where personal injuries cause death, heirs may be substituted (survive), but where death is not caused by the accident and the claim is for personal injuries, such causes of action do not survive under Section 306.
  5. Application to the present facts: The materials on record establish that the claimant's death was not proximate to the injuries sustained in the alleged accident. Therefore, the cause of action before the Tribunal was an action for personal injury that did not result in death caused by the accident. Under Section 306 and the cited precedents, that cause of action does not survive to the claimant's wife.
  6. Conclusion on merits: Because the cause of action did not survive, the claimant's wife's substitution and the Tribunal's award (Rs. 75,000/-) were not justified. The court further observes that once the award was unjustified on this ground, the separate contention about invalid driving licence becomes insignificant.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court's final decision is summarized as follows:

APPEAL ALLOWED; the award dated 26.04.2010 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, III Additional Sub Court, Madurai, is set aside and the claim petition in MCOP No. 912 of 2006 is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The claimant's wife's entitlement to the Rs. 75,000/- award was set aside and the underlying claim petition was dismissed. The insurance company's appeal succeeds and there is no order as to costs.
  • Legal principle applied: The court applied Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act and related precedent to hold that a cause of action for personal injuries that did not result in death caused by the accident does not survive to legal representatives. Thus, substitution of the claimant's wife was ineffective to sustain the personal injury claim in these circumstances.
  • Scope and precedent: The opinion applies existing statutory provision and case law; it does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond the established interpretation of Section 306 and the authorities cited. The decision's consequence is the dismissal of this claim on the specific ground of non-survival of the cause of action where death was not caused by the accident.

Source constraint notice: This summary is derived exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond what the opinion itself records.

    New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. S. Pooranam

    Prayer: Appeal is filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act 1988 against the award dated 26.04.2010 and made in MCOP. No. 912 of 2006 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, III Additional Sub Court, Madurai.

    Motor Vehicles Act (1988), Section 164.Insurance, Cause of action does not survive, when the death of the injured was not due to the accident injury, (Indian) Succession Act (1925), Section 306.Right of action of, or against deceased survives to and against executor or administrator/Illustration C.P.C, Order 22, Rule 1.Abatement by party's death, Right to sue when survives. Claim for compensation was preferred for injuries sustained by being knocked down by autorickshaw — Pending the RCOP the claimant died and his wife got impleaded and proceeded with the case and Tribunal awarded her the compensation — On appeal, (CMA) by Insurance Company, held: As the death of the injured claimant was not caused as a result of the accident, this Court without any hesitation holds that the first respondent/second claimant being the wife of the injured, is not entitled to any relief as the cause of action does not survive to her — Appeal (CMA) by Insurance Company allowed. During the pendency of the claim petition preferred by the injured S who was knocked down by an autorickshaw, he died and hence, the second petitioner being the wife of the injured claim petitioner got impleaded in the claim petition and prosecuted the proceedings. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal had proceeded to find that the first respondent, driver was at fault for the accident. As the injured S had died during the pendency of the claim petition, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, had also found that the death of the injured S, did not have any proximate cause to me accident and therefore, it had concluded that the second petitioner being the wife of the injured S was entitled to have a sum of Rs. 75,000/- towards compensation under the following heads; namely Loss of love and affection and towards consortium for loss of marital life. Para 2.3 Insurance Company filed this appeal contending mat the cause of action does not survive to the first respondent/second claimant being the wife of the injured S, when the death of the injured S was not due to the accident injury and that the first respondent/second claimant is entitled only for the actual expenses if any incurred by the deceased being loss of estate, etc. Para 3 Held : It is not disputed that the original claimant viz., injured S, had passed away during the pendency of the claim petition. The prime question to be considered in this appeal is as to whether the cause of action to maintain the claim proceedings would survive to the first respondent/second claimant who is the wife of the injured S. In so far as this question is concerned, the maxim “action personalis moritur cum persona” can be applied here. This maxim embodies within it, the English Principle that a personal action dies with the injured. Though the above said maxim has been inbuilt with English principle, it may be given effect to in India to the extent it has been recognised in Section 306 of Indian Succession Act 1925. English Common Law is applied to India in the absence of any statutory provision and in consonance with principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In England the maxim has been criticised as harsh, unconscionable, and unjust. Therefore, by reason of the principles underlying the provision under Section 306, a cause of action based on personal injuries causing the death of the deceased survives to his heirs and they can be substituted in his place in the claim petition preferred by the deceased before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal. Para 4 In the instant case on hand, evidently it is established through the materials available on record that the death of the injured is not proximate to the injury sustained by him in the alleged accident. When such being the case an action for personal injury not causing death of the injured S, does not survive to the first respondent/second claimant who is none other than the wife of the original claimant S. Para 5 On coming to the instant case on hand as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the death of the injured claimant was not caused as a result of the accident and hence this Court without any hesitation holds that the first respondent/second claimant being the wife of the injured is not entitled to any relief as the cause of action does not survive to her. Appeal (CMA) allowed. Para 14
    Prisca Rozario v. Ford Foundation, 1969 Cal 394;
    Jogindra Kuer v. Jagdish Singh, AIR 1964 Patna 548 (V 51 C 164);
    Ratanlal Bhannalal Mahajan v. Baboolal Hajarilal Jain, AIR 1960 Madhya Pradesh 200 (V 47 C 90);
    The Managing Director, Pandiyan Roadways Corporation, Madurai v. S. Rajalakshmi, 2000 (IV) CTC 528;
    Pushpam v. Nirmala, (C.R.P No. 2307 of 1988, dated 03.01.1991);
    Melapurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Gopalankutty Nair, (1986) 1 SCC 118; and
    M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Segulira, (1988) 1 SCC 556; — Referred to.
    CMA allowed.
    For Appellant: Mr. A.K Baskara Pandian
    For Respondents: Mr. S. Elangovan For R1.
    Mr. A. Haja Mohideen For R2.

    JUDGMENT

    Challenge is made in this appeal to the award of Rs. 75,000/- dated 26.04.2010 and made in MCOP. No. 912 of 2006 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, III Additional Sub Court, Madurai by the second respondent/Insurance Company.

    2. The facts which giving rise to the memorandum of civil miscellaneous appeal may be summarised as under.

    2.1 That on 17.02.2006 at about 07:55 am., the injured G. Sithivinayagam, was knocked down by an autorickshaw bearing registration No. TN 58 B 2898, opposite to Devika Scans on Theni Road, when he was proceeding in his two wheeler Bajaj M 80 bearing registration No. TN 59 D 9426 and as a result of which he had sustained grievous injuries at the bottom of his right leg which resulted in communited fracture of both bones right leg mid 1/3 lower 1/3. Hence the injured, Sithivi-nayagam had filed a claim petition in MCOP No. 912 of 2006 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, (III Additional Sub Court), Madurai claiming a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs.

    2.2 The first respondent being the owner of the autorickshaw has not chosen to contest the claim petition. On the other hand the second respondent, who is the appellant Insurance Company has alone contested the claim petition on various grounds. In order to substantiate their respective cases the parties to the claim petition went for trial.

    2.3 During the pendency of the claim petition the injured Sithivinayagam, had died and hence, the second petitioner being the wife of the injured claim petitioner got impleaded in the claim petition and prosecuted the proceedings. Three witnesses which includes the second petitioner Tmt.S Pooranam were examined on behalf of the claimant and during the course of their examination Ex.P1 to P7 were marked. On the other hand one Jalaluddin, who has been working as Junior Assistant in the Regional Transport Office in Dhindigal was examined as RW 1, and during the course of his examination Ex.R1 was marked. On appraising the evidences both oral and documentary and on considering the related materials, the Motor Accident Claims Tribuanl had proceeded to found that the first respondent, driver was at fault for the accident. As the injured Sithivinayagam, had died during the pendency of the claim petition, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, had also found that the death of the injured Sithivinayagam, did not have any proximate cause to the accident and therefore, it had concluded that the second petitioner being the wife of the injured Sithivinayagam was entitled to have a sum of Rs. 75,000/- towards compensation under the following heads;

    1. Loss of love and affection Rs. 50,000/-

    2. Towards consortium for loss of marital life Rs. 25,000/-

    Total Rs. 75,000/-

    2.4 Ultimately, the second respondent was directed to pay the compensation amount of Rs. 75,000/- within a period of two months with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition. Being aggrieved by the impugned order the second respondent, Insurance Company has chosen to filed this appeal.

    3. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Insurance Company has projected his arguments on two grounds;

    1. The cause of action does not survive to the first respondent/second claimant being the wife of the injured Sithivinayagam, when the death of the injured Sithivinayagam was not due to the accident injury and that the first respondent/second claimant is entitled only for the actual expenses if any incurred by the deceased being loss of estate.

    2. The driver of the autorickshaw was not having valid license on the date of accident as per the evidence of RW 1 Junior Assistant From Regional Transport Office, Dhindigal and therefore the claim petition as against the appellant/insurance company ought to have been dismissed and if any award has to be passed it ought to have been passed only against the owner of the autorickshaw, as he had violated the terms and conditions of the policy by entrusting the vehicle to a person who had no valid license on the date of accident.

    4. It is not disputed that the original claimant viz., injured Sithivinayagam, had passed away during the pendency of the claim petition. The prime question to be considered in this appeal is as to whether the cause of action to maintain the claim proceedings would survive to the first respondent/second claimant who is the wife of the injured Sithivinayagam. In so far as this question is concerned, the maxim “action personalis moritur cum persona” can be applied here. This maxim embodies within it, the English Principle that a personal action dies with the injured. Though the above said maxim has been inbuilted with English principle, it may be given effect to India to the extent it has been recognised in Section 306 of Indian Succession Act 1925. English Common Law is applied to India in the absence of any statutory provision and on its consonance with principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In England the maxim has been criticised as harsh, unconscionable, and unjust. Therefore, by reason of the principles underlying the provision under Section 306, a cause of action based on personal injuries causing the death of the deceased survives to his heirs and they can be substituted in his place in the claim petition preferred by the deceased before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal. This dictum is laid down in Prisca Rozario v. Ford Foundation reported in 1969 Cal 394.

    5. But in the instant case on hand, evidently it is established through the materials available on record that the death of the injured is not proximate to the injury sustained by him in the alleged accident. When such being the case an action for personal injury not causing death of the injured Sithivinayagam, does not survive to the first respondent/second claimant who is none other than the wife of the original claimant Sithivinayagam. This ratio has been laid down in Jogindra Kuer v. Jagdish Singh reported in AIR 1964 Patna 548 (V51 C 164). In this case a question as to whether the right to sue in personal actions survives the death of the plain-tiff was arisen. In order to answer this question a full bench of Patna High Court has taken the assistance of the proviso to Order 22 Rule 1 and 11 as well as Order 1 Rule 3 and 9 of Civil Procedure Code. While writing the judgment Mr. Justice Tarkeshwar Nath, has observed that;

    “The common law maxim “action personalis moritur cum persona” means that “personal right of action dies with the person”. In other words “death destroys the right of action”. Personal action is one which does not relate to immovable properties. As a general rule, an action in respect of tort should commence in the life time of the person injured, but if that person dies before an adjudication, the action abates and cannot be continued by his legal heirs and representatives. There being no specific statute in India on this topic, that maxim of the English Common Law has been followed here to some extent. The matter was at one time governed by Section 89 of the Probate and Administration Act, and now by Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act. According to this section, all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease survive to and against his executor or administrator except certain causes of action including those for other personal injuries not causing the death of the party.”

    6. Similar view was taken in Ratanlal Bhannalal Mahajan v. Baboolal Hajarilal Jain reported in AIR 1960 Madhya Pradesh 200 (V 47 C 90). In this case it is observed that;

    “though Section 306 speaks of right to prosecute or defend any action surviving to the executors or administrators still it indicates the limits within which the maxim “action personalis moritur cum persona” should be confined and those limits should be held equally applicable to legal heirs.”

    7. It is also observed that;

    “the expression ‘personal injuries’ in Section 306 is not confined to physical injuries but would include mental injuries as well. Therefore, a claim for compensation for loss of reputation or mental agony would not survive to the legal representative after the death of the party injured.”

    8. In this connection it may be relevant to extract the proviso to Section 306 of Indian Succession Act 1925.

    “Section 306—

    Demands and rights of action of or against deceased survive to and against executor or administrator - All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory.

    Illustration;

    (i) A collision takes place on a railway in consequence of some neglect or default of an official, and a passenger is severely hurt, but not so as to cause death. He afterwards dies without having brought any action. The cause of action does not survive.”

    9. It may also be relevant to refer the proviso to Order 1 Rule 1 of CPC;

    “Order 1 Rule 1 — Who may be joined as plaintiffs - All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where—

    (a) any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and

    (b) if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law of fact would arise.”

    10. Reference to the proviso to Order 22 Rule 1 of CPC, may also add an extra strength to this issue.

    “Order 22 Rule 1 — No abatement by party's death, if right to sue survives - The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives.”

    11. From the proviso to Order 1 Rule 1 and Order 22 Rule 1, it is thus made clear that if any person wants to continue the suit or claim, it is very much essential that the right to sue must survive to him. In the given case on hand admittedly the injured Sithivinayagam had died during the pendency of the claim petition. Subsequently, the first respondent/second claimant has been impleaded as his legal representative. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, the cause of action to continue the claim proceedings does not survive to the first respondent/second claimant. In this regard this Court consider that the decision in The Managing Director, Pandiyan Roadways Corporation, Madurai v. S. Rajalakshmi reported in 2000 (IV) CTC 528 will throw more light on this issue.

    12. In the above case a similar question was arisen as to whether the legal representatives are entitled for the entire compensation, awarded in favour of the claimant. Similar to the present case after the filing of the claim petition, the claimant had died during the pendency of the proceedings and subsequent to his death, the legal representatives of the claimant were impleaded as parties. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the death of the claimant was not due to the accident and as such the legal representatives of the claimant were not entitled to be compensated in respect of the personal injuries sufferred by the deceased claimant. Reference was made to a judgment in Pushpam v. Nirmala, (C.R.P No. 2307 of 1988, dated 03.01.1991). In that case the learned judge had made a distinction between a case of death over which the legal representatives could maintain a claim for compensation and the case of the personal injuries suffered by the claimant after referring the decision viz., Melapurath Sankunni Ezhuthassan v. Thekittil Gopalankutty Nair, (1986) 1 SCC 118 and M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Segulira, (1988) 1 SCC 556.

    13. The learned single judge of this Court has held that in the case of an injured claimant the cause of action will not survive in respect of the legal representatives of the claimant. He has also held that in all the above decisions, the Division Bench as well as the Supreme Court have taken note of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act and have held that claim for compensation in respect of personal injuries will not be availed for the legal representatives provided the death was not caused as a result of the accident.

    14. On coming to the instant case on hand as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the death of the injured claimant was not caused as a result of the accident and hence this Court without any hesitation holds that the first respondent/second claimant being the wife of the injured is not entitled to any relief as the cause of action does not survive to her. Though the arguments in this connection was put forth before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, unfortunately, the Tribunal has lost sight upon it and proceeded to pass an award of Rs. 75,000/- without any justifiable cause. Under this circumstances, the award of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside.

    15. Where the claims Tribunal has not justified its award, the other ground with regard to non possession of valid driving licence by the driver of the autorickshaw has become pale into insignificance.

    In the result, the appeal is allowed. The award dated 26.04.2010 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, III Additional Sub Court, Madurai, is set aside and the claim petition in MCOP. No. 912 of 2006 is dismissed. No order as to costs.

    VCJ/VCS

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    New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. S. Pooranam
    (Mar 16, 2011)