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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.15.
  • Sections 147, 148, 447, 342, 506(II) and 379 (NP), I.P.C
  • Sections 447, 342, 506(II) and Section 379 (NP), I.P.C
  • Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 173, Cr.P.C (Protest Petition)
  • Section 447, 342, 506(2) and 379, I.P.C,
  • sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173,
  • Section 173, Cr.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.15.
  • Sections 147, 148, 447, 342, 506(II) and 379 (NP), I.P.C
  • Sections 447, 342, 506(II) and Section 379 (NP), I.P.C
  • Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 173, Cr.P.C (Protest Petition)
  • Section 447, 342, 506(2) and 379, I.P.C,
  • sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173,
  • Section 173, Cr.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The present revision arises from a criminal complaint lodged on 22.4.2007 at Sambavar Vadakarai Police Station registered as Cr. No. 61 of 2007 under Sections 147, 148, 447, 342, 506(II) and 379 (NP) of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant alleged that while supervising a coconut thope belonging to A.R.S. Ramalingam, on 24.7.2007 at about 10:00 a.m. one Jabarullah S/o Peer Mohammed and about 20 others entered the thope, plucked coconuts and removed them by tractors (registration numbers TN-76-B-3700, TN-72-Z-1375 and TDT-8560). The complainant said he arrived at the scene around 4:00 p.m., saw about 20 persons led by the first accused, alleged removal of around 20,000 coconuts worth about Rs. 50,000/-, and alleged that he and five others were intimidated and detained until about 10:00 p.m.; the accused allegedly left in a Maruti Omni (TN-76-B-4154) threatening to kill the complainant if he identified them.

Following investigation, a final report/charge-sheet was filed and a charge-sheet was presented before the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi under Sections 447, 342, 506(II) and 379 (NP) IPC against Jabarullah and three named persons. Cognizance was taken and the matter proceeded as C.C. No. 230 of 2008 before the Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah. Fourteen witnesses were examined and the matter was posted for hearing of arguments. The complainant (petitioner) filed a protest petition under Section 173 Cr.P.C seeking further investigation by another police station and an adjournment to pursue writ remedies; the learned Judicial Magistrate dismissed that petition relying on Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal. The petitioner challenged that dismissal by way of the present criminal revision.

The Court confined the dispute for disposal to a single issue: whether the learned Judicial Magistrate issued notice to the de facto complainant before taking cognizance of the offence, and, if not, the legal consequences of that omission. The High Court called for and received a report from the Judicial Magistrate which confirmed that no notice was issued to the de facto complainant either by the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi (when the final report was first filed and taken on file on 27.11.2007) or later by the Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah (when the matter was transferred and taken on file on 4.8.2008).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Judicial Magistrate issued notice to the de facto complainant before taking cognizance of the offence after filing of the final report, and, if not, what are the legal consequences of such omission.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. S. Murugan)

  • Absence of notice to the de facto complainant before taking cognizance vitiates the entire subsequent proceedings.
  • When the Investigating Officer omitted some accused who were mentioned in the FIR, the Court ought to have issued notice to the complainant before taking cognizance.

Respondents' Arguments (Mr. P. Rajendran and Mr. R. Alagumani)

  • There is no legal flaw in the proceedings taken by the Judicial Magistrate.
  • The Investigating Officer, upon due investigation, concluded that only four accused were involved and therefore deleted other unnamed persons; hence, even if notice was not given prior to taking cognizance, no adverse consequence follows.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal, 2009 SAR (Cri) 851 Discussed the scope of further investigation/reinvestigation; Supreme Court turned down the complainant's claim for further investigation in that decision. The learned Judicial Magistrate had relied on this decision when dismissing the complainant's protest petition seeking further investigation. The High Court noted that Reeta Nag concerns further investigation, but distinguished the present revision which hinges on non-issuance of notice before taking cognizance.
C. Ve. Shanmugam v. Deputy Superintendent Of Police, 2010 (2) MLJ (Crl) 833 Held that before accepting a final report where some persons named in the FIR are omitted, the Magistrate must issue notice to the de facto complainant and give him an opportunity to be heard; follows Supreme Court principles. The High Court followed the view in C. Ve. Shanmugam and treated it as authoritative on the point that notice is required when the magistrate proposes to drop or not proceed against some persons mentioned in the FIR.
Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, 1985 (1) MLJ (Crl.) 536 (SC) When the Magistrate, on consideration of the police report under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 Cr.P.C., decides not to take cognizance or decides there are insufficient grounds for proceeding against some persons mentioned in the FIR, the informant must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Court relied on this Supreme Court principle to hold that acceptance of a final report without giving notice to the de facto complainant is illegal where the magistrate takes a view that some persons mentioned in the FIR should not be proceeded against; such acceptance vitiates the cognizance and subsequent proceedings.
Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2009 (3) SCC (Cri) 76 Addresses the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction; holds that the High Court, apart from Articles 227 and 135, has a duty to exercise continuous superintendence over Judicial Magistrates under Section 483 Cr.P.C. The Court cited this case to support the proposition that the High Court can and must exercise supervisory/revisional powers to correct proceedings before subordinate courts.
Popular Muthiah v. State (rep. by Inspector of Police), 2006 (2) MLJ (Crl) 779 (SC) Discusses the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and the scope of revisional and suo motu powers while exercising appellate/revisional jurisdiction. The High Court relied on the principle that the High Court can exercise inherent jurisdiction (including suo motu) while exercising revisional jurisdiction to set right proceedings not provided for elsewhere in the Code.
Union Public Service Commission v. S. Pappiah, AIR 1997 SC 3876 Referred to in the context of principles followed in C. Ve. Shanmugam regarding notice and related procedural obligations of the Magistrate. Referred by the High Court (via C. Ve. Shanmugam) as one of the precedents supporting the requirement of notice to informant when necessary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court limited its consideration to the specific procedural question of whether notice was issued to the de facto complainant before the Magistrate took cognizance of the offences. It obtained a report from the trial magistrate which confirmed that no notice had been issued either by the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi (when the final report was first taken on file on 27.11.2007 as C.C. No. 438 of 2007) or by the Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah (when the case was transferred and taken on file on 4.8.2008 as C.C. No. 230 of 2008).

The Court examined the legal consequences of that omission in light of the precedents it considered determinative. It accepted the line of authority, particularly Bhagwant Singh and the High Court decision in C. Ve. Shanmugam (which follows Supreme Court principles), that when a magistrate, while considering the police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., proposes not to proceed against some persons named in the FIR (i.e., omits them from the charge-sheet), the informant (de facto complainant) must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before cognizance is taken or the report is accepted insofar as it drops or does not proceed against such persons.

Applying that principle to the facts, the Court noted that although the complainant mentioned only the first accused by name, he expressly stated that he did not know the names of the other approximately 20 persons but that they could be identified by him. Given that the Investigating Officer omitted several of the persons referred to in the FIR and filed a charge-sheet against a subset of individuals, the Court held that it was incumbent upon the Magistrate to issue notice to the de facto complainant and hear him before taking cognizance.

The Court addressed procedural objections: it observed that although the absence of notice was not specifically pleaded in the initial protest petition, it was raised in the revision grounds and could be considered. The Court relied on authorities (including Popular Muthiah and Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai) to justify exercising revisional and inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to correct the proceedings before subordinate courts.

The Court distinguished the Reeta Nag decision: Reeta Nag concerns requests for further investigation (which the Supreme Court disallowed in that case). The present challenge, by contrast, was not primarily about further investigation but about procedural compliance (issuance of notice before taking cognizance) when the police report omitted several persons mentioned in the FIR.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Criminal Revision is allowed: the cognizance taken by the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi without issuing notice to the de facto complainant is set aside; all consequent proceedings, including recording of evidence, are also set aside.

Immediate consequences and directions:

  • The learned Magistrate, Shencottah is directed to issue notice to the de facto complainant in accordance with the procedure, and to issue notice to the parties concerned in the case, hear them and pass further orders in accordance with law.
  • All earlier proceedings consequent upon the cognizance (including the recording of evidence) have been vitiated and are set aside.
  • Other grounds raised by the de facto complainant that were not decided on merits are left open for fresh agitations in appropriate proceedings.

Broader implications (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The decision applies established precedents to reinforce that a magistrate must give an informant an opportunity to be heard where the police report takes a view that there is insufficient ground to proceed against some persons named in the FIR.
  • The High Court may exercise revisional and inherent jurisdiction (including suo motu aspects) to correct procedural lapses in subordinate court proceedings under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and supervisory constitutional powers, as discussed in cited precedents.

    Madasamy Devar v. State

    1. The Revision Petition had laid a Complaint on 22.4.2007 before Sambavar Vadakarai Police Station and the same was registered in Cr. No. 61 of 2007 under Sections 147, 148, 447, 342, 506(II) and 379 (NP), I.P.C In the Complaint he had alleged that he is supervising the coconut thope belonging to A.R.S Ramalingam, that on 24.7.2007 at about 10.00 a.m one Jabarullah S/o Peer Mohammed and 20 other persons, whose names are not known to the Complainant, but they could be identified by him, entered into the coconut thope, plucked coconut and removed in tractors, that he received information at 4.00 p.m and proceeded to the occurrence place where he saw about 20 henchmen under the leadership of the First Accused trespassed to the coconut thope and removed about 20,000/- coconuts worth about Rs. 50,000/- by Tractors bearing Registration No. TN-76-B-3700, TN-72-Z-1375 and TDT-8560, that while the Complainant prevented them along with 5 other persons, they criminally intimidated them, that they were detained in the thope by the trespassers upto 10 p.m and while the Accused left the place in Maruti Omni Van bearing Registration No. TN-76-B-4154, they threatened him that they would kill him if he identified them.

    2. After the investigation, the First Respondent laid a charge-sheet before the Judicial Magistrate Court, Tenkasi under Sections 447, 342, 506(II) and Section 379 (NP), I.P.C against Jabarullah and three named persons. The learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offences and assigned C.C No. 230 of 2008. He proceeded with the trial of the case. As many as 14 witnesses were examined before the learned Judicial Magistrate and the case was posted for hearing arguments of both sides. At that time, the Petitioner filed an Application under Section 173, Cr.P.C (Protest Petition) requesting the Court to order for further investigation by some other Police Station. For the said purpose he intended to file a Writ Petition before the High Court and to adjourn the case by two months to enable him to get the orders.

    3. In the said Petition he has raised so many grounds for ordering reinvestigation. Both the Respondents filed objections to the Petition by the Complainant/Petitioner. The learned Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah has dismissed the Petition filed by this Petitioner by observing that he is not entitled to seek for reinvestigation of further investigation as per the decision of the Supreme Court in Reeta Nag v. State of West Bengal, 2009 SAR (Cri) 851. Hence, this Revision.

    4. Even though in the protest Petition and the present Revision Petition, various other grounds have been raised by the Petitioner for ordering reinvestigation or further investigation, for the disposal, it is sufficient to deal with only one issue in this matter, i.e, whether the learned Judicial Magistrate issued notice to the Complainant before taking cognizance of the offence against the Accused? If not, what is the legal consequences?

    5. After hearing the learned Counsel for both sides, this Court on 1.7.2010 passed a direction calling for a report from the Judicial Magistrate, Shenkottah, Tirunelveli District, as to whether notice was issued from the Court concerned to the de facto Complainant before taking cognizance of the offence after filing of the final report in this case. Responding to this, the learned Judicial Magistrate submitted a report stating that final report under Section 173, Cr.P.C in Cr. No. 61 of 2007 of Sambavarvadakarai Police Station was filed before the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi on 27.11.2007 and the same was taken on file on the same date as C.C No. 438 of 2007 under Section 447, 342, 506(2) and 379, I.P.C, that no notice was issued to the defacto Complainant from the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi, at the time of taking cognizance, subsequently Sambavarvadakarai Police Station was brought under Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi and consequently the said CC. No. 433 of 2003 was transferred to the Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah and the same was taken on file on 4.8.2008 as C.C No. 230 of 2008 under the above sections by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah and that no notice was issued to the de facto Complainant from the Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah also.

    6. The above said report submitted by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah would definitely show that neither the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi nor the Judicial Magistrate Shencottah had issued notice to the de facto Complainant before taking cognizance of the offences.

    7. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner Mr. S. Murugan would strenuously contend that absence of notice to the de facto Complainant before taking cognizance would vitiate the entire subsequent proceedings and that when the Investigating Officer omitted some of the Accused, about whom there was mention in the F.I.R, the notice should have been issued to the Complainant from the Court.

    8. Contending contra, Mr. P. Rajendran, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) for the First Respondent and Mr. R. Alagumani learned Counsel for R2 would submit that there is no legal flaw in the proceedings taken by the Judicial Magistrate, that the Investigating Officer on due investigation of the case found that only 4 Accused were involved in the case and he thought fit to delete other unnamed persons in the F.I.R and hence even if the notice were not sent to the de facto Complainant anterior to taking cognizance of the offence, no adverse consequences would follow.

    9. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner in support of his contention placed much reliance upon a decision of this Court, reported in C.Ve. Shanmugam v. Deputy Superintendent Of Police, 2010 (2) MLJ (Crl) 833 in which the learned Judge has elaborately dealt with the subject following the principles laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court of India. The learned Judge has observed that before accepting a final report where some of the Accused whose names found place in the F.I.R have been omitted, the learned Magistrate must issue notice to the de facto Complainant. The following cases have been referred and followed by the learned Judge:

    1. Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, 1985 (1) MLJ (Crl.) 536 SC;

    2. Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2009 (3) SCC (Cri) 76;

    3. Popular Muthiah v. State, rep. by Inspector of Police, 2006 (2) MWN (Cr.) 42 (SC) : 2006 (2) MLJ (Crl) 779 (SC); and

    4. Union Public Service Commission v. S. Pappiah, AIR 1997 SC 3876.

    10. In Bhagwant Singh's case the Apex Court has observed thus:

    “4. … … … There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer in charge of a Police Station under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. We are accordingly of the view that in a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report. It was urged before us on behalf of the Respondents that if in such a case notice is required to be given to the informant, it might result in unnecessary delay on account of the difficulty of effecting service of the notice on the informant. But we do not think this can be regarded as a valid objection against the view we are taking, because in any case the action taken by the police on the First Information Report has to be communicated to the informant and a copy of the report has to be supplied to him under sub-section (2)(i) of Section 173 if that be so, we do not see any reason why it should be difficult to serve notice of the consideration of the report on the informant. Moreover, in any event, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant cannot possibly provide any justification for depriving the informant of the opportunity of being heard at the time when the report is considered by the Magistrate.”

    11. In the above said C.Ve Shanmugam's case, the earlier judgment in S. Papaiah's case has been referred to and identical view was taken. In Bagawant Sing's case, the Supreme Court held that accepting final report without notice to the de facto Complainant is illegal, when the Judicial Magistrate taken a view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons in the F.I.R. Taking cognizance of the offence was held to have been vitiated and the committal of the case to the Court of Sessions for trial and all other consequential proceedings before the Court of Sessions were set aside.

    12. Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is true that the Petitioner has not mentioned the names of all the 20 persons. He has mentioned the name of the First Accused alone. But he has specifically stated in the Complaint that he does not know names all the others, but they could be identified by him. In such case, when the Investigating Officer deletes number of persons referred to in the F.I.R and filed charge-sheet against remaining some persons, it is incumbent upon the Court to issue a notice to the de facto Complainant before taking cognizance and hear him. Following the above said decision, it is my considered view that admittedly, the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi has not issued notice to the de facto Complainant earlier to taking cognizance of the offence and hence all other subsequent proceedings have been vitiated, which are liable to be set aside.

    13. In the Protest Petition, the Petitioner has not categorically stated that he was not given notice by the Court before taking cognizance of the offence. But in the Revision Petition, in the grounds it has been clearly mentioned that the version of the Revision Petitioner was not believed by the Investigating Officer with regard to the participation of 17 left out Accused and in such case the Respondent-Police as well as the Judicial Magistrate, Shencottah ought to have issued notice to the de facto Complainant/Petitioner since regarding the left out Accused 17 in number, the police report is a negative one. This Court sees considerable force in this contention. Even though absence of notice to the Petitioner is not mentioned in the Protest Petition, it cannot be a bar for him to raise it before this Court. In this context, in C.Ve Shanmugam's case supra the answer is available. It has been observed that, the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code can always be exercised for which there is no provision, nor any prohibition in the code. For this proposition a decision of the Suprme Court in Popular Muthiah's case has been referred and followed by the learned Judge, in which it is held as under:

    “While exercising its Appellate power, the jurisdiction of the High Court although is limited but, in our opinion, there exists a distinction but a significant one being that the High Court can exercise its Revisional jurisdiction and/or inherent jurisdiction not only when an Application therefor is filed but also suo motu. It is not in dispute that suo motu power can be exercised by the High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction. There may not, therefore, be an embargo for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary inherent jurisdiction while exercising other jurisdictions in the matter. Keeping in view the intention of the Parliament, while making the new law the emphasis of the Parliament being ‘a case before the Court’ in contra-distinction from ‘a person who is arrayed as an Accused before it’ when the High Court is seized with the entire case although would exercise a limited jurisdiction in terms of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same, in our considered view, cannot be held to limit its other powers and in particular that of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the matter which is not before it.”

    14. In Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai's case supra also it has been held that the High Court, apart from exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 227 and 135 of the Constitution of India, has a duty to exercise continuous superintendence over the Judicial Magistrates in terms of Section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    15. The above said illuminating judicial pronouncements would throw light on the subject clarifying that the High Court in its Revisional jurisdiction can exercise its suo motu power to set right the proceedings before the Subordinate Courts.

    16. In Reeta Nag's case supra, the question of further investigation and reinvestigation was discussed and the Supreme Court has turned down the claim of the de facto Complaint in seeking for further investigation. But the present revision has arisen on the ground that no notice was issued to the de facto Complainant before taking cognizance of the offence. If the Court enters into the discussion whether further investigation or reinvestigation has to be ordered, then the decision in Reeta Nag's case has to be followed.

    17. In the light of the what have been stated above, I am of the firm view that taking cognizance by the Judicial Magistrate, Tenkasi without notice to the de facto Complainant is not lawful and the same gets vitiated. Consequently, all other proceedings including the proceeding involving recording of evidence also are vitiated and they are also set aside. The Revision deserves to be allowed.

    18. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed, setting aside the cognizance taken by the Judicial Magistate, Tenkasi on the offences and the same is set aside. The consequent proceedings including recording of evidence are also set aside.

    19. The learned Magistrate, Shencottah is directed to issue notice to the de facto Complainant as per the procedure and also the parties who are concerned with the case, hear them and pass further orders in accordance with law. The other grounds raised by the de facto Complainant are left open to be agitated afresh in appropriate proceedings.

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    Madasamy Devar v. State
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