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  • Act, 1961 and the provisions contained in Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution
  • Act, 1961.4.2
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  • Act, 1961 and the provisions contained in Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution
  • Act, 1961.4.2
Smart Summary

Summary of the Judgment by P.K. Misra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was a student of Film Direction and Screenplay Writing at M.G.R. Film and Television Institute of Tamil Nadu (a government institute). The dispute concerns the appellant's shortage of attendance during the 2005-2006 academic session (June 2005 to March 2006). Institute regulations required 80% attendance to be eligible to appear for Board examinations, with a principal empowered to condone up to 5% shortage (but not permitting anyone with less than 75% attendance). The Department refused to permit the appellant to sit for the examination on account of inadequate attendance. The appellant filed W.P. No. 19355 of 2006 which was dismissed by the learned single Judge. A writ appeal was initially dismissed on admission on 18.7.2006. A Review Application (No. 99 of 2006) was filed; on consideration of earlier High Court decisions (including Kavitha Rajagopal and Nithya), the Division Bench recalled the dismissal and directed the matter to be heard afresh, which led to the present hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether shortage of attendance due to pregnancy/maternity can be condoned so as to permit the student to appear for Board examinations.
  2. Whether international conventions (specifically Article 12(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) and domestic statutes such as the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, can be invoked to require condonation of attendance shortage in an educational institution.
  3. Whether, in the absence of a statutory notification extending the Maternity Benefit Act to educational institutions, the court should itself extend such benefits as a matter of law rather than leave it to the legislature or executive.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Counsel for the appellant relied on international conventions recognising maternity-related services and protections (citing Article 12(2) of the CEDAW) and on domestic law, notably the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, to contend that the appellant's attendance shortage arising from pregnancy should be condoned.
  • The appellant relied on earlier High Court decisions (including Kavitha Rajagopal and Nithya) where shortage of attendance related to pregnancy/maternity had been condoned in exceptional cases.

Respondent / Department's Position

  • The Department's position, as recorded in the opinion, was that the appellant's attendance was well below the required percentage and therefore she was not permitted to appear for the examination.

Amicus Curiae's Submissions

  • The Amicus Curiae drew attention to international and domestic provisions and relied upon the Supreme Court decision reported as AIR 2000 SC 1274 (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and another) emphasizing the importance of maternity relief for employees.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011 (1997) 6 SCC 241 Permissibility of reading international conventions/norms into constitutional guarantees where domestic law does not occupy the field; use of international norms to interpret fundamental rights. The court relied on Vishaka's statement that international conventions not inconsistent with fundamental rights may be read into constitutional provisions when domestic law is absent; used this as background for considering arguments based on international norms.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and another, AIR 2000 SC 1274 Emphasis on grant of maternity relief to employees, in light of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution. The court acknowledged this authority (cited by the Amicus Curiae) for stressing the importance of maternity relief in employment contexts, but observed it does not establish that international conventions must override clear domestic provisions.
Kavitha Rajagopal v. The Registrar, Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Chennai and another, 2008 (1) CTC 334 Recognition (in that High Court decision) that maternity-related absence could be condoned in exceptional cases even where no specific provision existed for condonation. The Division Bench recalled the earlier dismissal and sent the matter for hearing after counsel relied on this decision; however, the present court found that the ratio of those earlier decisions could not be applied to the facts before it.
Nithya v. University of Madras, 1996 Writ L.R. 802 Earlier single Judge decision referenced in Kavitha Rajagopal, relating to condonation of attendance in pregnancy/maternity cases. The court noted the existence of this earlier authority but concluded the particular facts of the appellant's attendance did not justify applying those precedents to allow condonation in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. The court set out the institute regulations: a student must secure 80% attendance to be eligible to appear for Board examinations (Regulations 3.2 and 3.3), with the Principal empowered to condone up to 5% shortage in genuine cases, but no candidate with less than 75% attendance could be permitted to write the examination.
  2. The court acknowledged the appellant's reliance on international instruments (Article 12(2) of the CEDAW) and domestic law (the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961), and considered authoritative statements from the Constitution (Articles 37, 42, 51 and Article 253 for implementation of international conventions).
  3. The court examined relevant case law. It noted Vishaka's teaching that international conventions may be read into fundamental rights where domestic law does not occupy the field. It also noted the Municipal Corporation decision which emphasised maternity relief for employees.
  4. The court then considered the scope of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, observing that the Act applies to certain establishments expressly (factories, mines, plantations, shops/establishments employing ten or more persons) and that extension of the Act to other establishments requires a State Government notification with Central approval. The court found no notification extending the Act to educational institutions in this case.
  5. The court held that even if one were to assume, for argument's sake, that such provisions could be extended to educational institutions, whether to do so is essentially a policy decision for the State or Central Government and not a matter for the court to create by judicial fiat.
  6. Turning to the facts, the court relied on the pleadings and the counter affidavit: the appellant attended classes until 17.9.2005, was admitted to hospital that day, the child was born on 19.9.2005, and she attended classes again after 15.10.2005. There were 18 working days from 17.9.2005 to 14.10.2005; even giving full credit for those days, the appellant's attendance worked out to about 70.91%.
  7. The court observed that the minimum requirement was 80% attendance and the maximum condonation available under the regulations was 5% (so a minimum of 75% for condonation). As the appellant's attendance (about 70.91%) fell below 75%, the rules permitted no further condonation and the court could not extend such condonation based on international conventions or the Maternity Benefit Act in the absence of statutory applicability or executive policy.
  8. Consequently, the court concluded it could not apply the ratios of the earlier decisions relied upon by the appellant to the present facts and found no ground to interfere with the single Judge's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ appeal is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant remains ineligible to appear for the Board's examination on the basis of the recorded attendance shortfall; the single Judge's dismissal is upheld. No costs were awarded.
  • Broader legal consequence: The court declined to extend the Maternity Benefit Act or international convention obligations to require condonation in this educational-institution context in the absence of a statutory notification or executive/legislative policy. The court explicitly treated the extension of such benefits to educational institutions as a policy matter for the legislature or executive and did not lay down a new rule of law in that regard.
  • The court placed on record appreciation for the assistance rendered by the Amicus Curiae and noted the fair conduct of counsel for both sides.

Order delivered: The writ appeal is dismissed, subject to the observations recorded in the judgment. No costs.

    A. Arulin Ajitha Rani v. The Principal, Film And Television Institute Of Tamil Nadu, Tharamani, Chennai 600 113.

    Judgment — P.K Misra, J.

    Heard Mr. Thirumavalavan for the appellant, Mr. S. Rajasekar, Addl. Government Pleader for Respondents and Mrs. Karthika Ashok, who had been appointed as Amicus curiae to assist the court.

    2. The appellant was a student in Film Direction and Screenplay writing in M.G.R Film and Television Institute of Tamil Nadu, which is a Government institute conducting diploma courses in different fields including the Film Direction. The question relates to shortage of attendance of the appellant during the academic session of 2005-2006, between June 2005 and March 2006 to be precise. It is not in dispute that the rules and regulations relating to attendance of class envisage that a student is required to attend 80% of the classes in the year concerned. Regulations 3.2 and 3.3 are as follows: —

    “3.2 Requirements to appear for Examination:

    The Examinations will be conducted at the end of the year for the first year subjects and at the end of each semester for semester subjects by the Board of Examinations. A candidate will be permitted to appear for the Board's Examinations, only if:

    (i) he/she secure 80% attendance in the year/semester concerned

    (ii) he/she earns a progress certificate from the head of the institution for satisfactorily completing the course of study as required by the regulations, and

    (iii) his/her conduct was satisfactorily during the course of study.

    3.3 Condonation of Attendance:

    The minimum overall percentage of attendance (in all subjects of the current semester/year put together) required for a candidate to become eligible to write the Board's Examination is 80%.

    Under extraordinary circumstances, if there exist genuine and valid reasons, the Principal of the college has been empowered by the Chairman, to condone upto a maximum of 5% shortage to a candidate, subject to the condition that he/she satisfies all the other requirements to appear for the Board's Examination. Under no circumstances a candidate with attendance less than 75% be permitted to write the Board's Examination. The condonement of 5% shortage shall not be done as a routine to all candidates, but only for genuine cases; It shall not be claimed as a matter of right by all candidates.”

    3. In the present case, according to the Department, the appellant was not permitted to appear at the examination as her attendance was much below the required attendance. The appellant filed W.P No. 19355 of 2006, which has been dismissed by the learned single Judge under the impugned judgment. Thereafter, initially an order was passed on 18.7.2006 dismissing the writ appeal on merits at the stage of admission. Subsequently, however, Review Appln. No. 99 of 2006 was filed. While considering such Review Application, counsel for the appellant cited before the Division Bench an earlier order of the High Court, which is reported in 2008 (1) CTC 334 (Kavitha Rajagopal v. The Registrar, Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Chennai and another), decided on 1.12.2004, to the effect that even if there was no specific provision relating to condonation of delay, a pregnant woman was entitled to get maternity leave benefit in the concerned University and the shortage of percentage in attendance can be condoned in exceptional cases. As a matter of fact, in the aforesaid decision, there was reference to another decision of a learned single Judge reported in 1996 Writ L.R 802 (Nithya v. University Of Madras). Taking into consideration the earlier decisions, the Division Bench recalled the earlier order of dismissal and directed the matter to be taken up for hearing. That is how the matter has come before us.

    4. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in view of the International Conventions recognising the necessity to grant maternity leave to pregnant women and in order to avoid any discrimination, the shortage of attendance is required to be condoned. In the above context, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to Article 12(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which is to the following effect: —

    “12(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article, States Parties shall ensure to women appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during pregnancy and lactation.”

    4.1 Similarly, learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance upon the provisions contained in The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961.

    4.2 Mrs. Karthika Ashok, who has been requested to act as Amicus Curiae, has also invited our attention to the aforesaid provisions as well as the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2000 SC 1274 = 2000 3 L.W 236 (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and another).

    5. Part IV of the Constitution contains various Directive Principles of State Policy. Article 37 provides that the provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any Court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.

    Article 42 envisages as under:

    “42. Provision for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief.- The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief.”

    Article 51 contained in Part IV the Constitution of India refers to the necessity relating to respecting of the International Conventions.

    Article 253 envisages the Parliament to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body.

    6. In AIR 1997 SC 3011 = (1997) 6 SCC 241 = 1997 3 L.W 54 (1) S.N (Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan) it has been observed as follows: —

    “7. In the absence of domestic law occupying the field, to formulate effective measures to check the evil of sexual harassment of working women at all workplaces, the contents of international conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the safeguards against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any international convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional guarantee. This is implicit from Article 51(c) and the enabling power of Parliament to enact laws for implementing the international conventions and norms by virtue of Article 253 read with Entry 14 of the Union List in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution….”

    (Emphasis added)

    7. Similarly in AIR 2000 SC 1274 (cited supra), which has been cited by the Amicus curiae, emphasis has been made regarding grant of maternity benefit to the employees. In Vishaka's case, it has not been stated that inspite of clear domestic law on the question, an international convention is required to be followed. In AIR 2000 SC 1274 (cited supra), the importance of grant of maternity relief to the employee, particularly keeping in view the provisions contained in the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 and the provisions contained in Articles 42 and 43 of the Constitution has been emphasised. But, in none of the decisions it has been laid down that notwithstanding any specific provision available under the domestic law, International Conventions are to be implemented.

    8. In the above context, the matter has to be examined. There is no doubt that every educational institution has its own rules and regulations regarding attendance of the students in the classes. It is obvious that such norms are prescribed to ensure that there is regular attendance by the students, with the expectation that by attending the classes either theory or practical, knowledge can be acquired.

    9. There is no doubt that the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 contains several provisions for extending the benefit to the pregnant women in their respective work-field. Section 2 of the Act indicates that the Act applies to (a) every establishment being a factory, mine or plantation including any such establishment belonging to Government and to every establishment wherein persons are employed for the exhibition of equestrian, acrobatic and other performances and (b) to every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State, in which ten or moire persons are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelvemonths.

    However, the proviso contemplates that the State Government may with the approval of the Central Government, declare that all or any of the provisions of the Act shall apply to any other establishment or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise.

    10. Even assuming that an Educational Institution may also come within the aforesaid provisions, there is no dispute that the State Government has not issued any notification declaring that the provisions of the Act would be applicable to the educational institutions. There cannot be any dispute regarding the requirement of grant of maternity benefit to the working women. However, the question is, in the absence of any specific provision applicable to educational institution, whether such provision can be extended.

    11. We do not think that in the context in which such provisions have been made for the working women, such provisions can be ipso facto made applicable. Whether such benefit can be extended or not is essentially a policy decision to be taken by either the State Government or the Central Government.

    12. In the present case, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that by applying the above provisions and the International Conventions, the shortage of attendance was required to be condoned as had been done in two earlier occasions by the learned single Judges in the two decisions reported in 1996 Writ L.R 802 (Nithya v. University Of Madras) and 2008 (1) CTC 334 (Kavitha Rajagopal v. The Registrar, Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University, Chennai and another).

    13. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to apply the ratio of the said decisions to the present case. Even assuming that such provisions can be made applicable, the concerned student could have availed maternity leave of six weeks before the birth of the child and six weeks after the birth of the child. From the factual position, which has been elucidated clearly in the counter affidavit filed in the Review Appln. No. 99 of 2006 and even from the averment made by the appellant herself, it is apparent that the appellant had claimed to have attended the classes till 17.9.2005 and only on that day she was admitted in the hospital and the child was born on 19.9.2005 In other words, it is not the case of the appellant that she was unable to attend the classes because of the pregnancy before 17.9.2005 Similarly, the appellant has stated that she attended the classes after 15.10.2005 During the period from 17.9.2005 to 14.10.2005, 18 working days were available. Even giving full credit for those 18 days, as has been explained in the counter affidavit, the required percentage would come to about 71% (70.91%). Minimum requirement is 80% with provision for condonation of delay upto 5% i.e, a student having attended 75% or above, can be considered for condonation. No other power is envisaged under the rules and regulations for condonation of further period. Therefore, even assuming that such International Conventions or the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act could be made applicable, yet the concerned student fell short of the attendance.

    14. For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to persuade ourselves to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge. The question as to whether similar beneficial provisions should be made applicable to the educational institutions is essentially a policy matter left to the wisdom of the legislature and we do not express any opinion in one way or the other.

    We place on record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by the Amicus curiae as well as the fair manner in which the appeal has been argued by the counsel for the appellant and the respondents.

    15. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed, subject to the observation made above. No costs.

    VCJ/VCS

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    A. Arulin Ajitha Rani v. The Principal, Film ...
    (Jun 27, 2008)