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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 141 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Section 141(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949
  • Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, similar to Section 24(2) of Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959,
  • Section 28(2) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Land Development Banks Act, 1934 (Tamil Nadu Act X of 1934),
  • provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, under Section 24(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act.
  • Section 24(1) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Section 19(b) the Specific Relief Act and Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • SECTION 100 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • Section 141(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act.
  • Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • Rule 40 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules, 1959,
  • Section 13(2)(i) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957
  • Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act,
  • provisions contained in Order 6, Rule 2(1) of C.P.C
  • Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949.
  • Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax.3.
  • SECTION 27 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • SECTION 3 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • provisions of Ss. 103 and 106, Evidence Act, 1872
  • REVENUE RECOVERY ACT
  • Sections 31, 31-A, 33, 35, 36, 37 or 38.(ii)
  • SECTION 101 EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • Section 24(2) of the Sales Tax Act
  • Section 27(b), Specific Relief Act,
  • sub-section (2) of Section 13,
  • sub-section (1) of Section 24
  • Nadu Revenue Recovery Act.
  • Order 6, Rule 2 of C.P.C,
  • Section 24(1).(ii)
  • 6, Rule 2:
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 141 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Section 141(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949
  • Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, similar to Section 24(2) of Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959,
  • Section 28(2) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Land Development Banks Act, 1934 (Tamil Nadu Act X of 1934),
  • provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, under Section 24(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act.
  • Section 24(1) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)
  • Section 19(b) the Specific Relief Act and Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • SECTION 100 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • Section 141(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act.
  • Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • Rule 40 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules, 1959,
  • Section 13(2)(i) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957
  • Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act,
  • provisions contained in Order 6, Rule 2(1) of C.P.C
  • Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949.
  • Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax.3.
  • SECTION 27 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
  • SECTION 3 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • provisions of Ss. 103 and 106, Evidence Act, 1872
  • REVENUE RECOVERY ACT
  • Sections 31, 31-A, 33, 35, 36, 37 or 38.(ii)
  • SECTION 101 EVIDENCE ACT 1872
  • Section 24(2) of the Sales Tax Act
  • Section 27(b), Specific Relief Act,
  • sub-section (2) of Section 13,
  • sub-section (1) of Section 24
  • Nadu Revenue Recovery Act.
  • Order 6, Rule 2 of C.P.C,
  • Section 24(1).(ii)
  • 6, Rule 2:
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (K. Mohan Ram, J.) — Letters Patent Appeal No. 100 of 1999

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter was before a Full Bench by reference from a Division Bench (order dated 19.12.2002). The reference framed the question: "What is the extent a bona fide purchaser for value is bound by the charge for payment of arrears of Sales Tax created under Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959?"

Procedural history and facts (as set out in the opinion): The plaintiffs purchased the suit property on 25.9.1977 and claimed to be absolute owners in possession. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer issued notices alleging tax arrears due from certain transferors (T.P. Narayanasamy and his son T.N. Subash) and denied the plaintiffs' claim that the sale bound the Department. The plaintiffs filed a claim application and then O.S. No. 254 of 1978 to set aside the Department's order and for injunctions after service of notice under Section 80 CPC.

The defendants (revenue) pleaded assessments and demand notices against the transferors and that a charge under Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act had arisen, the suit property had been attached and brought to sale proceedings, and that the sale to plaintiffs was collusive to defeat recovery. The trial Court framed multiple issues including whether sale deed in favour of plaintiffs was binding, whether a charge had been created prior to sale, and whether plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers without notice.

Trial evidence: Plaintiffs examined P.W.1 and P.Ws.2–15 and produced Exhibits A-1 to A-46. Defendants produced D.Ws.1–8 and Exhibits B-1 to B-36. The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit for plaintiffs; on appeal A.S. No. 613 of 1984 a Learned Single Judge set aside that judgment by judgment dated 28.11.1997. The second plaintiff then filed this Letters Patent Appeal. The Full Bench heard counsel for appellant and respondents and reviewed the legal issues and evidence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the extent to which a bona fide purchaser for value is bound by the charge for payment of arrears of sales tax created under Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959?
  2. Whether, on the facts of this case, the plaintiffs (appellants) were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the charge under Section 24(1) of the Act and thereby their purchased property cannot be proceeded against for recovery of sales tax arrears?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on the Division Bench decision in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels (1998 (1) CTC 124 : 108 STC 161) to contend that the appellant is a bona fide purchaser without notice of a charge under Section 24(1), and therefore the property purchased on 25.9.1977 cannot be proceeded against for recovery of sales tax arrears.
  • Appellant contended that S.V. Traders was a proprietory concern (not a partnership) and pointed to assessment documents (Exs. B-1, B-2) and demand notices (Exs. B-3, B-4) and the manner of description ("Thiru S.V. Traders") to support that position. The appellant submitted that the Trial Court had correctly held S.V. Traders was a proprietory concern and that the Learned Single Judge erred in holding otherwise.
  • Appellant submitted that the assessment records (the roll) and not a later representation to the Board of Revenue should be decisive of character of S.V. Traders; the Single Judge misapplied law and failed to apply R.K. Steels thereby failing to hold plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers without notice.
  • Appellant argued the plaint contained necessary pleadings to infer plaintiffs had no notice and that there was no requirement to plead that enquiries were made with vendors regarding sales tax arrears.

Respondent's (Revenue / Second Respondent) Arguments

  • The Revenue relied upon earlier Division Bench decisions (Coramandel Indag Products India Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, 1993 (3) MTCR 8 and Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 WLR 240) to contend that the charge created under Section 24(1) is enforceable against the transferee.
  • The respondents submitted documentary and testimonial evidence (Exs. A-46, B-15, B-24, B-25, B-26, B-27, B-36 and deposition of D.Ws.1–2) showing S.V. Traders to be a partnership composed of T.P. Narayanasamy and T.N. Subash. The Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Ex.B-36) remarked that the documentary evidence supports the existence of the stated partnership.
  • Respondents argued the plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers: plaintiffs were aware or were constructively aware of tax arrears; the sale deed was collusive; plaintiffs had close relations with transferors; plaintiffs had not pleaded or proved the defence of purchase without notice. Reliance was placed on authorities that the defence of purchase without notice must be specifically pleaded and proved (e.g., Murat Singh v. Pheku Singh and other precedents).
  • The respondents pointed to Ex.A-46 (order of Commissioner for Land Revenue and Commercial Taxes dated 17.11.1975 rejecting revision petitions) as evidence the plaintiffs had knowledge of vendors' sales tax arrears.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels, 1998 (1) CTC 124 : 108 STC 161 Held that a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice of the charge under the Sales Tax Act is protected and the property purchased cannot be proceeded against for recovery of sales tax arrears. The Full Bench treated the R.K. Steels view as the correct position, and noted that the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Papers approved R.K. Steels; the Court followed R.K. Steels and held that an honest purchaser without notice is protected.
Coramandel Indag Products India Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, 1993 (3) MTCR 8 Held that the charge created under Section 24(1) could be enforced in the hands of a transferee; followed Azha Kumari. The Full Bench held this decision to be in conflict with R.K. Steels and, in consequence of the Supreme Court's later ruling, treated Coramandel (and Azha Kumari) as no longer good law for the proposition that transferees cannot be protected.
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 WLR 240 Held that on default the charge under Section 24(1) could be enforced and arrears could be recovered from properties sold by the assessee after a charge attached. The Full Bench concluded Azha Kumari's view conflicted with the Supreme Court's approach in Ahmedabad and, after considering subsequent authority (Shreyas), held Azha Kumari is no longer good law on the issue of transferee protection.
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Haji Abdul Gafur Haji Hussenbhai, AIR 1971 SC 1201 Interpreted Section 141(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act and held that transferee protection (proviso to Section 100 TP Act concept of notice/constructive notice) must be determined on facts; no fixed presumption of constructive notice. The Court relied on Ahmedabad as authoritative on the proposition that a purchaser for consideration without notice is protected unless statute provides otherwise; R.K. Steels relied on Ahmedabad and the Full Bench followed that approach.
State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd. and others, 2006 (1) SCC 615 Considered enforceability of a charge under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act; reiterated concept of charge, Section 100 TP Act proviso and that transferee without notice is protected; approved R.K. Steels. The Full Bench treated Shreyas as approving R.K. Steels; on that basis the Court held prior conflicting Division Bench decisions (Azha Kumari and Coramandel) are no longer good law and adopted the protective rule for bona fide purchasers.
Dattatreya Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar, 1974 (2) SCC 799 Recognised the position that a charge may not be enforceable against a transferee without notice (as part of jurisprudence cited in Shreyas). Referenced in the discussion of the legal position concerning charges and transferee protection; treated as part of established Supreme Court jurisprudence supporting protection for bona fide transferees.
Murat Singh v. Pheku Singh, AIR 1928 Pat. 587 Authority for the proposition that the defence of purchase without notice should be specifically pleaded and proved. The Court relied on this precedent to support the proposition that plaintiffs bore the burden to plead and prove they were bona fide purchasers without notice; plaintiffs failed to plead necessary material facts.
Mt. Renukabai W/o. Sitaramji Wankhade v. Bheosan Hapsaji Junghare and others, AIR 1939 Nag. 132 Held that the burden is on the transferee to establish he is a bona fide transferee for value without notice. The Court cited this in support of the allocation of burden to plaintiffs to prove their bona fides; used to reject plaintiffs' case for lack of pleading/evidence.
Seth Ghasiram Seth Dalchand Palliwal v. Mt. Kundanbai..., AIR 1940 Nag. 163 Affirmed the principle that the transferee bears burden to prove bona fide transfer without notice. Used similarly to emphasise plaintiffs' onus to plead and prove lack of notice and bona fides.
Yajju Adinarayana v. Gurala Jagannadha Rao, 1975 (62) LW 377 Noted that initial burden is on purchaser to show bona fide purchase for value without notice; very little evidence may suffice in particular cases. Appellant relied on this to argue minimal evidence might suffice; Court considered it but concluded plaintiffs had not discharged the initial burden and had not pleaded material facts.
Bhup Narain Singh v. Gokul Chand Mahton and others, AIR 1934 PC 68 Explained that a transferee claiming exception (to be protected) must establish the circumstances (payment in good faith and without notice); placed relevance on Ss.103 and 106 Evidence Act. Referred to on burden questions concerning transferees; the Court applied the principle that plaintiffs must prove their case on lack of notice.
Ramdeni Singh v. Gumani Raut, AIR 1929 Pat. 300 Held that the party alleging subsequent bona fide transfer for value without notice must prove it; the initial onus lies on transferee. Applied to hold that plaintiffs failed to discharge initial burden to establish they were bona fide purchasers without notice.
Rameshwar Singh v. Hari Narayan Singh and others, AIR 1984 Pat. 277 Affirmed that in suits for specific performance, once prior contract proved, burden to prove subsequent bona fide transfer for value without notice lies on the party alleging it; little evidence may suffice. Used to show the legal position on burden of proof and that plaintiffs did not adduce requisite evidence/pleading here.
Dharamdeo Singh v. Ram Prasad Sah, 1918 (4) Pat. LW 152 : 44 I.C. 470 Held that in suits for specific performance the burden to prove a subsequent bona fide transfer for value without notice lies on the transferee. Referenced in the Court's discussion of burden and reliance on Specific Relief Act authorities to show the transferee must prove the exception.
Shri Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, 1977 (1) SCC 511 Definition and discussion of "material facts" that must be pleaded: primary facts that must be proved at trial. Applied to hold that the plaintiffs' plaint lacked the necessary material facts to found their plea of bona fide purchase without notice and thus oral evidence could not be admitted on that omitted matter.
Hem Chander De v. Amiyabala, AIR 1925 Cal. 65 Support for the proposition that the party claiming benefit of exception must prove it. Used in the chain of authorities to support the allocation of burden on the plaintiffs.
William v. Wilcox, 1838 (3) AD & EI 314 Principle of pleading: it is sufficient to allege a state of facts simply without setting out subordinate facts or evidential particulars. Cited to note that while subordinate evidential details need not be pleaded, the primary factual foundation (material facts) that must be proved should have been pleaded by plaintiffs but were not.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages:

  1. Scope of reference and questions: The Full Bench recognized the reference required not only deciding the legal question of how far a bona fide purchaser is bound by a charge under Section 24 but also resolving whether, on the facts, the appellant (plaintiffs) were bona fide purchasers without notice.
  2. Review of conflicting Division Bench precedents: The Court summarized conflicting Division Bench rulings — Azha Kumari and Coramandel (holding the charge enforceable against transferees) versus R.K. Steels (holding transferee protected if bona fide purchaser without notice). The Division Bench that made the reference explained the conflict and sought a Larger Bench.
  3. Examination of Supreme Court authority and subsequent precedent: The Court examined Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AIR 1971 SC 1201) establishing that constructive notice must be determined on facts and that transferee protection under the proviso to Section 100 TP Act depends on whether the transferee had notice; and it emphasized that the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Papers (2006 (1) SCC 615) approved R.K. Steels. On this basis the Full Bench concluded that the law is that a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of charge is protected and that earlier Division Bench decisions (Azha Kumari and Coramandel) are no longer good law.
  4. Legal framework applied to factual dispute: The Court set out and applied relevant statutory and legal provisions:
    • Sections 19 and 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act (liability of firms and creation of charge on default).
    • Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act (definition and protection of a charge and proviso that no charge shall be enforced against property in the hands of a transferee for consideration and without notice, unless law provides otherwise).
    • Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act (definition of "notice" including actual knowledge, wilful abstention from enquiry, or gross negligence).
    • Order 6, Rule 2 CPC (pleadings must state material facts, not evidence) and Section 101 Evidence Act (burden of proof).
  5. Burden and pleading requirements: The Court analyzed pleadings and evidence, emphasizing that plaintiffs must plead the primary material facts necessary to prove they were bona fide purchasers without notice. The Court held the plaint did not plead that S.V. Traders was a proprietory concern, nor that plaintiffs made enquiries of vendors or authorities; thus plaintiffs omitted material facts and could not introduce oral evidence on those omitted matters.
  6. Assessment of plaintiffs' evidence and conduct: The Court noted that P.W.1 admitted in cross-examination that he did not enquire of T.P. Narayanasamy about sales tax arrears; plaintiffs produced Ex.A-46 (an order of Commissioner dated 17.11.1975) which indicated knowledge of arrears; based on Section 3 TP Act the Court found failure to enquire amounted to wilful abstention or gross negligence and therefore constructive notice could be imputed.
  7. Finding on the character of S.V. Traders: The Court reviewed documentary evidence (Exs. B-25, B-26, B-36, etc.), the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal's observation (Ex.B-36) and compared signatures; it concluded that S.V. Traders was a partnership of T.P. Narayanasamy and T.N. Subash and that Trial Court's conclusion of proprietorship was erroneous. The Court agreed with the Learned Single Judge's conclusion that the plaintiffs were aware of arrears and that the sale was fraudulent/collusive to escape tax liability.
  8. Synthesis and outcome: Applying the legal precept that a bona fide purchaser without notice is protected (as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Shreyas and as set out in R.K. Steels), the Court nevertheless found that the plaintiffs in this case were not such bona fide purchasers because they failed to plead and prove their lack of notice and their conduct amounted to wilful abstention/gross negligence; hence they were not entitled to protection.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Letters Patent Appeal fails and is dismissed.

Consequential rulings and legal implications expressly stated by the Court:

  • The Court held that the law as approved by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Shreyas Papers (2006 (1) SCC 615) endorses the Division Bench decision in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels (108 STC 161), namely that a property purchased by a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a charge under Section 24(1) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act cannot be proceeded against for recovery of sales tax arrears.
  • Accordingly, the Court held that the earlier Division Bench decisions in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari (1985 WLR 240) and Coramandel Indag Products India Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer (1993 (3) MTCR 8) are no longer good law to the extent they conflicted with the protective rule adopted in R.K. Steels and approved by the Supreme Court.
  • On the facts of this case, however, the plaintiffs were found not to be bona fide purchasers without notice — because they failed to plead material facts required under Order 6 Rule 2 CPC, failed to discharge the initial burden of proof, and their conduct (including failure to enquire) amounted to wilful abstention or gross negligence under Section 3 TP Act — and therefore their purchased property could be proceeded against to recover the arrears attributable to the transferors.
  • Direct effect on parties: The appeal is dismissed; the earlier order in favour of plaintiffs was set aside by the Single Judge and this outcome is sustained by the Full Bench. The Court ordered no costs. The connected C.M.P. is closed.

The opinion does not purport to create a new principle of law beyond applying and following the Supreme Court's approval of R.K. Steels in Shreyas; it resolves the conflict among Division Bench decisions by applying the controlling Supreme Court authority and by applying statutory and pleading/evidence principles to the facts.

    B. Suresh Chand v. State Of Tamil Nadu, Rep. By The Secretary, Revenue Department, Fort St. George, Madras-9 And Another S

    K. Mohan Ram, J.

    1. The above Letters Patent Appeal No. 100 of 1999 is before us on a reference order dated 19.12.2002 made by a Division Bench consisting of two Learned Judges of this Court. The question referred to the Full Bench for answer is as here-under:

    “What is the extent a bona fide purchaser for value is bound by the charge for payment of arrears of Sales Tax created under Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

    Before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels, 1998 (1) CTC 124: 108 STC 161, to contend that the appellant is a bona fide purchaser without notice of charge under Section 24(1) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and therefore the property purchased by him under a registered sale deed dated 25.9.1977 from the vendors' who were tax defaulters under the Act cannot be proceeded against for the recovery of sales tax arrears.

    2. However, the Revenue relied upon the decision of this Court rendered by two Division Benches in the case of Coramandel Indag Products India Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, 1993 (3) MTCR 8, and in the case of Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 WLR 240. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side, the Division Bench reasoned as here-under and requested the Honourable Chief Justice to constitute a Larger Bench. The reasons given by the Division Bench in making the reference is extracted as here-under:

    “All these cases dealt with the question as to whether the charge created under the Sales Tax is binding on the bona fide purchaser for value. While in the first case it was held it does not, in the other two cases it was held that it does. The Division Bench which decided the Azha Kumari's case and the one that dealt with the case of R.K Steels referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdul Gaful Haji Hussenbhai, AIR 1971 SC 1201, but, read the judgment of the Supreme Court differently. The Division Bench which decided the case of R.K Steels found fault with the Division Bench which decided the case of Asha Kumari and held that it had erroneously distinguished the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdul Gaful Haji Hussenbhai, AIR 1971 SC 1201. Judicial proprietory requires that if there is a disagreement among the two Division Benches it should be resolved, by a Larger Bench. It would have been proper if the Division Bench which decided the case of R.K Steels had itself referred the matter to a Larger Bench instead of following the course that it did. It has been held by the Supreme Court in more than one case that the Co-ordinate Benches are bound by the decision of other Co-ordinate Benches and in case of disagreement the proper course is to refer the matter to a Larger Bench.

    3. We, therefore, refer this case for decision by a Larger Bench having regard to the conflicting views expressed by two different Division Benches of this Court with regard to the extent a bona fide purchaser for value is bound by the charge for payment of arrears of sales tax created under Section 24 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax.”

    3. The scope of the reference, in our considered view, is not only that we have to decide the question of law, but also the question as to whether the appellant is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the charge under Section 24(1) of the Act and as such whether his property cannot be proceeded against for the recovery of sales tax arrears. To decide that the entire factual matrix of the case has to be set out and the facts are as follows:

    ‘For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as per their ranking in the Suit. The case of the plaintiffs is as follows:

    (i) The plaintiffs purchased the suit property on 25.9.1977 and are in possession of the same as absolute owners. The second defendant, Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Thirupathur, alleging that one T.P Narayanasamy and his son T.N Subash are defaulters in the payment of sales tax, issued a notice on 28.10.1977 to the plaintiffs calling upon them to pay tax arrears of a sum of Rs. 1,01,879.67. The plaintiffs filed a Claim Application before the second defendant denying their liability. The second defendant issued an order to the plaintiffs on 11.9.1978 stating that the sale by the defaulters is not binding on the Department and negativing the claim of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers for value without notice on any manner of claim by anyone against the same. The plaintiffs have discharged the earlier debts of the transferors which were prior in point of time over the claim of the department. The claim of the Department can only be against the defaulters and their property. T.N Subash has no right or interest in the property sold to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs after issuing notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the C.P.C”) have filed the Suit in O.S No. 254 of 1978 before the Sub-Court, Thirupathur, to set aside the order of the second defendant dated 11.9.1978 and to raise the attachment on the schedule mentioned property and for injunction.

    4. The defendants filed a written statement contending that one T.P Narayanasamy and his son T.N Subash were the partners of the firm M/s. Kasthuri and Company, Jinnah Road, Thirupathur, carrying on business in sewing machines, motor cycles and spare parts. For the year 1974-75, the said firm was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 1,389.15. The order was served on 17.2.1976 The tax was payable on or before 18.3.1976 Hence the said firm became defaulters on 18.3.1976 For the year 1975-76 the said firm was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 3,862.67. The order of assessment was passed on 31.1.1977 The firm and its partners became defaulters on 2.3.1977 The said T.P Narayanasamy and T.N Subash were partners of another firm by name S.V Traders, Kancheepuram. For the year 1973-74, the firm S.V Traders was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 11,867. It was assessed to another sales tax of Rs. 8,983. The order was served on 7.8.1974 For the year 1974-75, the firm was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 69,846. The order was served on 26.11.1976 For the year 1975-76, the firm was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 5,482. The order was served on 5.12.1976 The said firm and its partners became defaulters for the said three years. The commercial Tax Officer, Chengalpet sent a requisition to the second defendant on 21.3.1977 to institute proceedings for the recovery of the sales tax arrears of Rs. 96,187 due by S.V Traders, Kancheepuram.

    5. It is further contended that under Section 24 of the Act if default is made the whole of the amount outstanding on the date of default shall become immediately due and shall be a charge on the properties of the persons liable to pay the tax. The defaulters are also liable to pay penalty. The second defendant initiated proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Revenue Recovery Act. The suit house was attached and brought to sale after service of demand notice on the defaulters as required under the Act. The demand notice in Form-I dated 30.7.1977 has been served on the defaulter T.N Subash on 4.8.1977 After the receipt of the demand notice the defaulters have executed a sale deed in respect of the said properties in favour of the plaintiffs in order to defraud the defendants. The sale is not binding on the defendants. A copy of the notice dated 22.7.1978 was sent to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are not personally liable but the property purchased by them is subject to charge and is liable for the said arrears. The S.V Traders has been assessed to Sales tax of Rs. 5,793 for 1976-77. The order of assessment was served on 7.4.1978 The said T.N Subash on behalf of S.V Traders in his letter dated 22.9.1977 addressed to the Secretary, Revenue Department, Government of Tamil Nadu had admitted the arrears of sales tax and requested to pay the amount in instalments. The plaintiffs filed the Claim Petition on 11.9.1978 before the second defendant, who had in his reply intimated about the charge over the suit property and the arrears of sales tax by the transferors. The plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the defect in title. The plaintiffs were aware of the arrears of sales tax. The plaintiffs and the defaulters are close friends. The sale deed has been created collusively to defeat and delay the realisation of the sales tax arrears. The defendant does not admit that any consideration was paid towards the sale deed. The order of attachment was issued by way of abundant caution. The plaintiffs have not discharged any alleged earlier debts of transferors.

    6. The Trial Court framed the following issues:

    (i) Whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs is true, valid and binding on the defendant?

    (ii) Whether charge had been created by operation of law over the suit properties prior to said sale?

    (iii) Whether the defendants are not entitled to proceed against the suit properties for recovery of sales tax arrears due by M/s. T.P Narayanasamy and his son T.N Subash?

    (iv) Whether there was no valid notice under Section 80, C.P.C?

    (v) Whether the valuation of suit and court fee paid are not correct?

    (vi) Are the defendants estopped from claiming charge?

    (vii) Whether the suit properties are liable for the claim of defendants against M/s. S.V Traders, Kancheepuram?

    (viii) To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled to?

    7. During trial on the side of the plaintiffs, the second plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 and 14 other witnesses were examined as P.Ws.2 to 15 and Exs.A-1 to A-46 were marked in support of their claim. On the side of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 8 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-36 were marked in support of their defence.

    8. The learned Subordinate Judge on a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced, decreed the Suit with costs as prayed for. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, the unsuccessful defendants filed A.S No. 613 of 1984 before this Court. A Learned Single Judge on a careful consideration of the evidence on record, the reasonings of the learned Subordinate Judge by a detailed judgment, set aside the judgment and decree and allowed the Appeal by judgment and decree dated 28.11.1997 Aggrieved by that the second plaintiff has filed the above Letters Patent Appeal.

    9. We heard Mr. V. Raghavachary learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Srikanth, Special Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent and Mr. R. Subbiah learned counsel appearing for the second respondent.

    10. Mr. V. Raghavachary learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge without properly considering the oral and documentary evidence adduced in the case and without considering the reasonings of the Trial Court has erroneously held that S.V Traders is a partnership firm. The learned counsel submitted that in Ex.A-46 the Department itself has referred S.V Traders as only a proprietory concern and therefore the finding of the learned Single Judge based on the representation of T.N Subash to the Board of Revenue that S.V Traders is a partnership firm is erroneous. The learned counsel further submitted that the assessment of the concern in the books of sales tax authorities is the determinative factor and not the character of the representation made by T.N Subash to the Board of Revenue. The learned counsel further submitted that T.P Narayanasamy has nothing to do with S.V Traders which is a proprietory concern or his son T.N Subash and the tax arrears of S.V Traders has nothing to do with T.P Narayanasamy. The learned counsel submitted that simply because T.N Subash has joined with his father T.P Narayanasamy in the execution of Ex.A-1 sale deed, it would not mean that they are the joint owners of the property. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge has failed to apply the law laid down in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels, 1998 (1) CTC 124 and submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have held that the plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers of the suit property without notice.

    11. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Exs.B-1 and B-2- assessment orders and Exs.B-3 and B-4-demand notices coupled with the evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 show that S.V Traders was only a proprietory concern and the same was described as ‘Thiru. S.V Traders’ and if really it was a partnership firm, it would have been described as ‘Thiruvalargal. S.V Traders’ in Exs.B-1 to B-4. He further submitted that the Trial Court on consideration of the said documents and the deposition of D.Ws.1 to 8 has clearly recorded a finding that S.V Traders was only a proprietory concern, whereas the said oral and documentary evidence has not been properly considered by the Learned Single Judge. He further submitted that the Trial Court on a consideration of Ex.B-21 has observed that for the first time S.V Traders was referred to as Thiruvalargal. S.V Traders, 502 Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram, in the letter dated 6.6.1978, whereas the plaintiffs had purchased the property on 25.9.1977 itself and in all the other documents, demand notices and assessment orders S.V Traders, Kancheepuram was referred to as Thiru S.V Traders. He further submitted that the Trial Court, on a consideration of Ex.B-26-Form-IX alleged to have been signed by T.N Subash and T.P Narayanasamy submitted by them to the Sales Tax Authorities describing them as partners of M/s. S.V Traders Kancheepuram, has held that there is no evidence to show that the signature in Ex.B-26 is that of T.P Narayanasamy. The learned counsel further submitted that the Trial Court has observed that there is no proof that T.P Narayanasamy himself signed in Ex.B-26 and the Trial Court on a comparision of the signatures in Exs.B-14 and B-26 has observed that the signatures differ, but the same have not been considered by the learned Single Judge.

    12. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaintiffs being bona fide purchasers without notice are not liable to pay the sales tax arrears of their vendors and the property cannot be attached and sold for the sales tax arrears of either S.V Traders, Kancheepuram or Kasthuri and Company. According to the learned counsel, the learned Single Judge has not considered the issue whether the plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers without notice in the light of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels, 1998 (1) CTC 124.

    13. Per contra Mr. R. Subbiah learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that the Trial Court has placed too much importance on trivialities and has not properly considered Exs.A-46, B-15, B-24, B-25, B-26, B-27 and B-36, whereas the learned Single Judge has considered the said documents elaborately and has come to the right conclusion that S.V Traders, Kancheepuram was not a proprietory concern as claimed by the plaintiffs, but it was only a partnership firm of which T.P Narayanasamy and his son T.N Subash were partners. The learned counsel drew our attention to the following observation made by the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Main Bench, Madras-1) in Ex.B-36, which reads as follows:

    “These details and documentary evidence give support for the existence of the stated partnership”.

    14. The learned counsel further drew our attention to Ex.B-25 dated 1.7.1974 wherein in column-4 both the names of T.N Subash and T.P Narayanasamy have been specifically mentioned as sharers. The learned counsel further invited out attention to Ex.B-26 dated 1.12.1975 which is Form-IX, prescribed under Rule 40 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules, 1959, wherein T.N Subash and T.P Narayanasamy have declared that they have entered into partnership in regard to the business known as M/s. S.V Traders, Kancheepuram and the form has been signed both by T.N Subash and T.P Narayanasamy. The learned counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge has extracted relevant portions from Exs.A-46, B-25, B-26 and B-36 and discussed threadbare the contents thereof and has rightly come to the conclusion that S.V Traders, Kancheepuram was a partnership concern consisting of T.N Subash and T.P Narayanasamy as partners. The said finding of the learned Single Judge being based on documentary evidence is unassailable. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Single Judge has clearly observed that a perusal of the pleadings of both the parties as well as the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiffs were very well aware of the sales tax arrears from 1973-74 and knowing it fully well they have purchased the property from T.P Narayanasamy. The learned counsel further submitted that the plaint does not contain proper pleadings containing the material facts in respect of their claim that they are bona fide purchasers without notice of the sales tax arrears of their vendors and in the absence of necessary pleadings they are precluded from letting in any evidence in that respect and further submitted that any amount of oral evidence in the absence of necessary pleadings cannot be looked into. He further submitted that since the plaintiffs pleaded that they were bona fide purchasers without notice the initial burden was on them to prove the said plea. According to the learned counsel, the plaintiffs have not discharged their burden and whereas the department by overwhelming documentary evidence has proved that the plaintiffs had knowledge about the sales tax arrears of their vendors. The learned counsel further submitted that Ex.A-46 which is an order dated 17.11.1975 passed by the Commissioner for Land Revenue and Commercial Taxes in a batch of revision petitions filed by the vendors of the plaintiffs, the Commissioner rejected the Revision Petitions filed by the plaintiffs' vendors challenging the assessment orders passed for the assessment year 1974-75 and when Ex.A-46 had been produced by the plaintiffs before the Trial Court, it is evident that they had knowledge about the sales tax arrears of M/s. S.V Traders, Kancheepuram and therefore submitted that the plaintiffs cannot be construed to be bona fide purchasers without notice.

    15. By placing reliance on the following decisions, the learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that the defence of purchase without notice is one which ought to be specifically pleaded and proved by one who pleads so:

    (i) Murat Singh v. Pheku Singh*, AIR 1928 Pat. 587;

    (ii) Mt. Renukabai W/o. Sitaramji Wankhade v. Bheosan Hapsaji Junghare and others, AIR 1939 Nagpur 132;

    (ii) Seth Ghasiram Seth Dalchand Palliwal v. Mt. Kundanbai, W/o. Rameshwar Shukul and others, AIR 1940 Nagpur 163.

    16. The learned counsel for the second respondent further drew our attention to Exs.A-3 and A-7-the reply notice and notice sent by the plaintiffs respectively and submitted that the plaintiffs had not claimed either in Ex.A-3 or Ex.A-7 that they have no notice about the sales tax arrears of their vendors. He further invited our attention to the cross-examination of P.W.1 wherein he had categorically stated that they did not enquire T.P Narayanasamy as to whether there was sales tax arrears. P.W.1 has also stated in his cross-examination that he had not enquired either T.P Narayanasamy or T.N Subash about S.V Traders.

    17. In reply Mr. V. Raghavachary learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the plaint contains the necessary pleadings and it can be inferred from the plaint that the plaintiffs have no notice about the sales tax arrears of their vendors and they are bona fide purchasers. The learned counsel submitted that there is no need to plead that the plaintiffs made enquires with their vendors regarding their sales tax arrears. The learned counsel relied upon the following decisions:

    (i) Yajju Adinarayana v. Gurala Jagannadha Rao, 1975 (62) LW 377;

    (ii) Bhup Narain Singh v. Gokul Chand Mahton and others, AIR 1934 PC 68;

    (iii) Ramdeni Singh and another v. Gumani Raut and another, AIR 1929 Pat. 300;

    (iv) Ram Lakhan v. Ram Govind and others, AIR 1977 Alla. 328;

    (v) Rameshwar Singh v. Hari Narayan Singh and others, AIR 1984 Pat. 277.

    18. The learned counsel on either side submitted that the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision State of Karnataka and another v. Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd. and others, 2006 (1) CTC 290: 2006 (1) SCC 615, has approved the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels, 1998 (1) CTC 124: 108 STC 161 and therefore the law laid down in Coramandel Indag Products India Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, 1993 (3) MTCR 8 and Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 WLR 240, is no longer good law.

    19. Now we have to consider the above submissions of the learned counsel.

    (i) In Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 WLR 240, the Division Bench has laid down as follows:

    “If the tax assessed remained unpaid for a period of 21 days after the notice of demand had been served, that charge can be enforced by invoking the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, under Section 24(2) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. Since the learned Judge has not considered the scope of Section 24(1) but proceeded only on the basis of Section 24(2) we are not inclined to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judge that arrears of sales tax cannot be recovered from the properties sold by the assessee after a charge has fastened itself on the properties of the defaulter, on his default in paying the arrears of sales tax within the time stipulated by Section 24(1).”

    (ii) In Coramandel Indag Products India Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, 1993 (3) MTCR 8, the Division Bench after referring to the decision in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 WLR 240, has observed as follows:

    “The Division Bench held that as a result of Section 24(1) of the Act, a charge was created over the properties for the sales tax amount due by the transferor even before the transfer was actually effected and the said charge can be enforced against the properties transferred which are in the hands of the transferee. The decision in Ahamedabad Municipality v. Haji Abdul, AIR 1971 SC 1201, relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant is not quite relevant, for, that decision was rendered with reference to Section 141 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Section 141(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 merely creates a charge for the property tax. There is no provision in the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, similar to Section 24(2) of Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, providing for enforcement of the charge created under Section 141(1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act. Therefore, the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Municipality v. Haji Abdul, AIR 1971 SC 1201, cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. We are inclined to follow the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 WLR 240, and hold that the charge created for arrears of sales tax over the properties of the defaulter under Section 24(1) of the Act can be enforced in the hands of the transferee by invoking the provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act as provided in Section 24(2) of the Act”.

    (iii) In Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels, 1998 (1) CTC 124: 108 STC 161, the Division Bench in paragraph 15 observed as follows:

    “Having regard to the clear and categorical views expressed by the Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdul Gafur Haji Hussenbhai, AIR 1971 SC 1201, we are not inclined to accept the two Division Bench judgments of this Court in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 (14) STL 164 (Mad.) and Coramandel Indag Products India Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, 1993 (3) MTCR 8, we would have normally referred the issue for decision by a Full Bench, but for the fact that the judgment of the Supreme Court is crystal clear. To repeat unless a provision is made in any statute contrary to the rule of Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, a bona fide purchaser for consideration without notice of the charge is protected. This proposition of law is too very clear and so categorically emphasised by the Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation case, AIR 1971 SC 1201. We therefore with respect differ from the views expressed by the two Division Bench judgments referred to above and propose to follow the judgment of the Supreme Court”.

    and ultimately held as follows:

    “…..following the Supreme Court judgment in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdul Gafur Hani Hussenbhai, AIR 1971 SC 1201, that the respondent is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the charge under Section 24(2) of the Sales Tax Act and therefore, his property cannot be proceeded against for the recovery of sales tax arrears.”

    (iv) In State of Karnataka and another v. Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd. and others, 2006 (1) SCC 615, the Apex Court while considering the enforceability of the charge created under Section 13(2)(i) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 observed as follows:

    “19. While the expression “charge” is not defined by the KST Act, this concept is well known in property law and has been defined by Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter “the TP Act”). Here “charge” is defined as:

    ‘100. Where immovable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the later person is said to have a charge on the property, and all the provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge.

    Nothing in this Section applies to the charge of a trustee on the trust property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his trust, and, save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any properly in the hands of a person to whom such property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of the charge’.

    20. As the Section itself unambiguously indicates, a charge may not be enforced against a transferee if she/he has no notice of the same, unless by law, the requirement of such notice has been waived. This position has long been accepted by this Court in Dattatreya Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar, 1974 (2) SCC 799 and in Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn, of the City of Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai, AIR 1971 SC 1201 (hereinafter “Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn.”). In this connection, we may refer to the latter judgment, which is particularly relevant for the present case.

    21. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. was a case where a person was in arrears of property tax, due under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Consequently, the Municipal Corporation created a charge over the property of the defaulter. However, the property was sold in execution of a mortgage decree. When the Municipal Corporation purported to exercise their charge over the property, the purchaser in Court-auction filed a Suit for a declaration that he was the owner of the property and that the arrears of municipal taxes due by the transferor were not recoverable from him by proceeding against the property purchased in the auction. In the Appeal before this Court, the Municipal Corporation's main argument was that where the local law provided for the creation of a charge against a property for which municipal taxes were due, transferees of such properties were imputed with constructive knowledge of any charge created against the properties that they had purchased. This argument was, however, rejected. This Court held that while constructive notice was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of notice in the proviso to Section 100 of the TP Act, whether the transferee had constructive notice of the charge had to be determined on the facts and circumstances of the case. In other words, this Court held that there could be no fixed presumption as to the transferee having constructive notice of the charge against the property. In fact, the principle laid down in Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. has been correctly applied in a sales tax case similar to the present case”.

    After laying down the law as aforesaid the Apex Court in the light of the facts of that case held as follows:

    “23. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the first respondent was a purchaser for value without notice of the sales tax arrears of the defaulting company or the consequent charge on the property. This would therefore attract the principle laid down by this Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. which is also emboidied in the proviso to Section 100 of the TP Act. Thus, the property in the hands of the first respondent was free of the charge and it is not open to the appellants to enforce the liabilities of the defaulting company in this manner against the first respondent”.

    Thus it is clear that the law laid down by the Division Bench in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels, 108 STC 161, has been approved by the Apex Court.

    20. Therefore we hold that in view of the Honourable Supreme Court's judgement approving the law laid down in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. R.K. Steels, 108 STC 161 (referred to above) by its decision in State of Karnataka and another v. Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd., and others, 2006 (1) CTC 290: 2006 (1) SCC 615, the law laid down by the Division Benches of this Court in the decisions in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Azha Kumari, 1985 WLR 240 and Coramandel Indag Products India Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, 1993 (3) MTCR 8, are no longer good law. We hold that the property purchased by a bona fide purchaser without notice of the charge under Section 24(1) of the Act cannot be proceeded against for the recovery of sales tax arrears.

    21. Now in the light of the law laid down in State of Karnataka and another v. Shreyas Papers (P) Ltd., and others, 2006 (1) SCC 615 (referred to supra) we have to see, in the present case, whether the plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers of the suit property without notice.

    22. To decide the said issue, it will be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Transfer of Property Act:

    (i) Sections 19 and 24 of the Act read as follows:

    “19. Liability of Firms.— (1) Where any firm is liable to pay any tax or other amount under this Act, the firm and each of the partners of the firm shall be jointly and severally liable for such payment.

    (2) Where a partner of a firm liable to pay any tax or any amount under this Act retires, he shall, notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, be liable to pay the tax or other amount remaining unpaid at the time of his retirement and any tax or other amount due up to the date of retirement, though unassessed”.

    “24. Payment and recovery of tax.— (1) Save as otherwise provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 13, the tax assessed or has become payable under this Act from a dealer or person and any other amount due from him under this Act shall be paid in such manner and in such instalments, if any, and within such time as may be specified in the notice of assessment, not being less than twenty-one days from the date of service of the notice. The tax under sub-section (2) of Section 13 shall be paid without any notice of demand. In default of such payment the whole of the amount outstanding on the date of default shall become immediately due and shall be a charge on the properties of the person or persons liable to pay the tax or interest under this Act.

    (2) Any tax assessed on or has become payable by, or any other amount due under this Act from a dealer or person and any fee due from him under this Act, shall, subject to the claim of the Government in respect of land revenue and the claim of the Land Development Bank in regard to the property mortgaged to it under Section 28(2) of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Land Development Banks Act, 1934 (Tamil Nadu Act X of 1934), have priority over all other claims against the property of the said dealer or person and the same may without prejudice to any other mode of collection be recovered:

    (a) as land revenue, or

    (b) on application to any Magistrate, by such Magistrate as if it were a fine imposed by him;

    Provided that no proceedings for such recovery shall be taken or continued as long as he has, in regard to the payment of such tax, other amount or fee, as the case may be, complied with an order by any of the authorities to whom the dealer or person has appealed or applied for Revision, under Sections 31, 31-A, 33, 35, 36, 37 or 38.”

    (ii) With regard to the aspect of notice, the interpretation clause- Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads as follows:

    “a person is said to have notice” of a fact when he actually knows that fact, or when, but for wilful abstention from an enquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it”.

    (iii) Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads as follows:

    “100. Charges.— Where immovable property of one person is by act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another, and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person is said to have a charge on the property; and all the provisions hereinbefore contained (which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to such charge).

    Nothing in this Section applies to the charge of a trustee on the trust-property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his trust, (and save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of the charge).”

    23. From a reading of the above said provisions the following conclusions emerge:

    Under Section 19 of the Act when the firm is liable to pay tax under the Act, the firm and each of the partners of the firm shall be jointly and separately liable for payment of such tax. Under this Section, for the liability of the firm, the partners are also liable and therefore their properties cannot escape the tax liability. When such a person has effected transfer of his property after the assessment proceedings under the Act are completed it cannot be stated that he did not intend to evade the tax and as such the sale will not be binding on the department. But, at the same time, the legislature has intended to protect the honest person who had purchased the property from such a seller, if he had not colluded with the seller and he had no notice of the liability of the vendor. While sub-section (1) of Section 24 creates a ‘charge’ on the properties of a defaulter to the extent of his dues, sub-section (2) states that the dues will have priority over all other claims against those properties, except land revenue and claims of Land Development Bank in regard to property mortgaged to it.

    24. The meaning of the term “charge on the property” is to be found in Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, in which it has been equated to a ‘simple mortgage’, and it has also been laid down therein that, in the absence of a specific provision in any law, no charge shall be enforced against any property in the hands of a person to whom such property has been transferred for consideration and without notice of a charge. Thus, while Section 24(1) of the Act gives the tax dues only the status of a simple mortgage over the properties of the defaulter, Section 24(2) gives these dues a priority over all other claims against that property except claims for land revenue and of Land Development Bank.

    25. A reading of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 leads to the conclusion that, not only a wilful abstention from an enquiry which a person ought to have made, but the gross negligence to make enquiry also would amount to notice of a fact to him. When the prudence of a person requires him to make an enquiry, but due to his own negligence he failed to make enquiry, he falls in the category of a person, with notice. A purchaser of the property who claims the transaction to be bona fide without notice, the yardstick to be applied for the “notice” is given in Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and only by the application of this provision, a purchaser who seeks protection is to be identified, whether he is a purchaser for value without notice. The necessity of the purchase, the intention of the transfer, the relationship between the vendee and vendor are all vital factors to find out the reasonableness of the person in purchasing the property. Sometimes unexplained secrecy or the haste in the transactions may also throw some light on the bona fides or mala fides. To decide whether a transaction was genuine or bona fide or mala fide, all facts relating to the conduct of the parties to the transaction have to be weighed as a whole.

    26. The plaintiffs in this case have not disputed the liability of their vendors to pay the sales tax, even at the time of the sales, but claim protection under the exception clause, for which the parameters of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 have to be applied. Every purchaser from the assessee is naturally interested to protect the property and will claim to be a bona fide purchaser. For the sake of their claim, the Court cannot approve the transaction as a bona fide sale.

    27. Under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability depending on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove, that those facts existed. Therefore, it is for him to establish that there was no wilful abstention of enquiry or search of the facts, on his part about the vendor before the sale transaction was completed.

    28. In this context it will be useful to refer to Order 6, Rule 2 of C.P.C, which reads as follows:

    “Order 6, Rule 2: Pleading to state material facts and not evidence.— (1) Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved”.

    29. A reading of the above provisions show that the party must plead all material facts on which he means to rely at the trial. If any one of the material fact is omitted, the statement of claim is bad and it would mean no pleading and no cause of auction for the Suit. If material facts are not pleaded, a Court cannot permit evidence to be led. In Shri Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia , 1977 (1) SCC 511, the Supreme Court has defined the expression “material facts” in the following words:

    “All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of auction or his defence are material facts”.

    30. The distinction between “material facts” and “particulars” cannot be overlooked. Material facts are primary and basic facts which must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him, either to establish his cause of auction or defence. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet, in absence of pleading a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the Suit. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts. They give the finishing touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative.

    31. If in the light of the provisions contained in Order 6, Rule 2(1) of C.P.C the averments in the plaint are considered, it can easily be seen that all the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the plaintiffs to establish their case that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice have not been stated in the plaint. It is pertinent to point out at this juncture that nowhere in the plaint the plaintiffs pleaded that S.V Traders, Kancheepuram was a proprietory concern and it was not a partnership firm. Likewise nowhere in the plaint it has been stated that the plaintiffs either enquired with their vendors or with the authorities of the sales tax department as to whether any sales tax arrears is due from their vendors.

    32. In the written statement the defendants have put forth the following pleas, viz.:

    (i) Thiru. T.P Narayanasamy and his son T.N Subash were partners of another firm named S.V Traders dealing business in moped scooters and spare parts at No. 502, Gandhi Road, Kancheepuram. For the year 1973-74 the said firm was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 11,876 and AST of Rs. 8,983. For the year 1974-75 the said firm was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 69,846 and for the year 1975-76 the said firm was assessed to sales tax of Rs. 5,482. Due to failure to pay the said amounts, the said firm and its partners became defaulters on 5.9.1974, 24.12.1976 and 3.1.1977 for the said three years respectively.

    (ii) The defendants have specifically pleaded that after receipt of the demand notice the defaulters namely the vendors of the plaintiffs have executed a sale deed in respect of the suit property in favour of the plaintiffs, in order to defraud the defendants and the sale deed is not binding on the defendants.

    (iii) The plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the defects in title. The plaintiffs were aware of the said arrears of sales tax. The said Kundanlal Baffna is a close friend to the said defaulters. The sale deed has been created collusively between the plaintiffs and the said defaulters to defraud the defendants and to defeat and delay the realisation of sales tax arrears.

    But the plaintiffs have not chosen to deny the said pleadings in the written statement by filing a reply statement.

    33. At this juncture we should point out that neither in Ex.A-3-reply notice sent by the plaintiffs through their counsel nor in Ex.A-7-legal notice issued under Section 80 of the C.P.C, the plaintiffs have stated that S.V Traders, Kancheepuram is a proprietory concern and not a partnership firm or the plaintiffs made necessary enquiries to ascertain about the sales tax dues of their vendors and inspite of their enquiries they were unable to ascertain the sales tax liability of their vendors.

    34. Lord Denman, C.J in the case of William v. Wilcox, 1838 (3) AD & EI 314 (331) stated as follows:

    “It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when a state of facts is relied it is enough to allege it simply, without setting out the subordinate facts which are the means of proving it, or the evidence sustaining the allegation”.

    If Exs.A-3, A-7 and the pleadings in the plaint are considered in the light of the above said observation of Lord Denman, C.J, we have to point out that when it is sought to be proved by the plaintiffs that S.V Traders, Kancheepuram was not a partnership firm but it was only a proprietory concern and the plaintiffs claim to be bona fide purchasers and without notice the factual foundation for the same or otherwise the primary facts which must be proved at the trial should have been set out in Exs.A-3 and A-7 and pleaded in the plaint but the plaintiffs have miserably failed to do so. It is settled law that any amount of oral evidence in the absence of pleadings cannot be looked into.

    35. The learned counsel for the second respondent relied upon the following decisions viz.:

    (i) In Murat Singh v. Pheku Singh*, AIR 1928 Pat. 587, the Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held as follows:

    “If the defendants wished to avail themselves of the defence that they were purchasers for value without notice, they should have pleaded it”.

    In the said decision, it is further observed that the defence of a purchase without notice is one which ought to be specifically alleged as well as proved by one who relies upon it.

    (ii) In Mt. Renukabai W/o. Sitaramji Wankhade v. Bheosan Hapsaji Junghare and others, AIR 1939 Nag. 132, it has been laid down as follows:

    “Whether the matter falls squarely within Section 100 or whether it comes under a more general rule of law, the burden is on the transferee to establish that he is the bona fide transferee for value without notice.”

    (iii) In Seth Ghasiram Seth Dalchand Palliwal v. Mt. Kundanbai, W/o. Rameshwar Shukul and others, AIR 1940 Nag. 163 the Division Bench affirmed the law laid down in Mt. Renukabai W/o. Sitaramji Wankhade v. Bheosan Hapsaji Junghare and others, AIR 1939 Nag. 132.

    On the basis of the law laid down in the above said three decisions the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the plaint the plaintiffs have not specifically alleged with material particulars that the plaintiffs were bona fide purchasers without notice and he further submitted that as per Section 101 of the Evidence Act, burden of proving the same is on the plaintiffs but they have not discharged that burden. The said submissions of the learned counsel merit acceptance and as pointed out already by us, the plaint does not contain the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by the plaintiffs to establish their case that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice. In the absence of specific pleadings in the plaint the plaintiffs are precluded from letting in any oral evidence on this aspect.

    36. Now we have to consider the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant on the basis of the following decisions:-

    (i) In the decision in Yajju Adinarayana v. Gurala Jagannadha Rao, 1975 (62) LW 377, while considering the question of bona fides of a subsequent purchaser in a suit for specific performance, it is observed as follows:

    “On the question whether the fifth defendant is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Courts below have differed, the lower Appellate Court holding that he was not. It lies upon the party seeking to defeat a prior contract for the sale of land to prove that he is a purchaser for value before judgment bona fide and without notice of the previous contract. The initial burden is upon the purchaser. It may be that very little evidence on the part of the purchaser is sufficient to discharge the onus in a particular case”.

    (ii) In the decision in Bhup Narain Singh v. Gokul Chand Mahton and others, AIR 1934 PC 68, the Privy Council with reference to Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act (1 of 1877) has observed as follows:

    “……the Section lays down a general rule that the original contract may be specifically enforced against a subsequent transferee, but allows an exception to that general rule, not to the transferor, but to the transferee, and, in their Lordships opinion it is clearly for the transferee to establish the circumstances which, will allow him to retain the benefit of transfer which prima facie, he had no right to get. Further the subsequent transferee is the person within whose knowledge the facts as to whether he has paid and whether he had notice of the original contract lie, and the provisions of Ss. 103 and 106, Evidence Act, 1872 having a bearing on the question”.

    (iii) In Ramdeni Singh and another v. Gumani Raut and another, AIR 1929 Pat. 300, with reference to Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act, it is observed as follows:

    “It is thus clear that the party who wants to take the advantage of the exception has to prove it. It was, therefore, incumbent upon defendants 2 and 3 to prove in the first instance that they were transferees for value and that they had paid their money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. This view is supported by the decision of this Court in Dharamdeo Singh v. Ram Prasad Sah, 1918 (4) Pat. LW 152: 44 I.C 470, where it was held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract if the plaintiff proves his prior contract, the burden of proving a subsequent bona fide transfer for value without notice under Section 27(b), Specific Relief Act, lies on the party alleging it. The same view was taken by the Calcutta High Court in Hem Chander De v. Amiyabala, AIR 1925 Cal. 65: 52 Cal. 121. The learned Subordinate Judge was, therefore, right in throwing the onus upon the defendants to prove that they were transferees for value without notice of the original contract. Very little evidence on the part of the defendants of want of knowledge of the plaintiff's contract would have discharged this onus and shifted the onus on the plaintiff but in this case defendant 2 who gave his evidence does not even say on oath that he was not aware of the plaintiff's contract”.

    (iv) In Rameshwar Singh v. Hari Narayan Singh and others, AIR 1984 Pat. 277, it is observed as follows:

    “In a suit for specific performance of a contract if the plaintiff proves his prior contract, the burden of proving a subsequent bona fide transfer for value without notice lies on the party alleging it. This is the settled law but it is also well settled that very little evidence, and in certain circumstances a mere denial, regarding want of knowledge of the plaintiff's contract would discharge this onus and shift the onus upon the plaintiff”.

    (v) The decision in Ram Lakhan v. Ram Govind and others, AIR 1977 Alla. 328, deals with the scope of Section 19(b) the Specific Relief Act and Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, which in our considered view has no relevance to the facts of this case.

    37. In our considered view the above decisions support the contention of the respondents rather than the appellant. Even as per the above decisions, the initial burden is upon the purchaser and though very little evidence on the part of the purchaser is sufficient to discharge the onus in a particular case. Whether, in this case, the plaintiffs have let in any evidence to discharge the onus will be considered a little latter.

    38. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdul Gafur Haji Hussenbhai, AIR 1971 SC 1201, wherein the plea raised by the purchaser that there was bona fide purchase for value was accepted. But on a thorough reading of the judgment, it could be seen that it is not helpful to the plaintiffs. The case went up to the Supreme Court on a suit initiated by the Court auction purchaser and the court auction purchaser, when threatened by the municipality with a notice of distress warrant for the arrears of the municipal tax filed the suit for declaration that he was the owner of the property purchased in good faith in the court sale. The Supreme Court has thoroughly discussed the evidence adduced on both sides and the conduct of the parties to come to a conclusion that the purchaser had no notice of the charge in the property for the arrears of the municipal tax, that in spite of his best efforts to verify whether there was any tax due, he was not informed about the arrears and the municipal corporation was not active in recovering the arrears. The subject-matter of the property in that Suit had vested with the official receiver, as the owner became insolvent and the official receiver sought the permission of the Court to pay the tax arrears to the municipal corporation. But subsequently the receiver had stated to the court that he did not possess sufficient funds to pay the tax to the municipal corporation and sought the direction of the Court. The insolvency Court also gave certain directions. The Apex Court has also found from the evidence that the purchaser in fact made enquiries from the receivers about the tax for the property but the receiver did not give any intimation. Therefore, it was viewed in that case that the purchaser could not have expected that the receiver, would not have paid tax to the municipal corporation. The Apex Court considering the conduct of the parties with reference to the prudence or negligence makes the following observation:

    “Now the circumstances which by a deeming fiction impute notice to a party are based on his wilful abstention to enquire or search, which a person ought to make or, on his gross negligence. This presumption of notice is commonly known as constructive notice. Though originating in equity this presumption of notice is now a part of our statute and we have to interpret it as such. Wilful abstention suggests conscious or deliberate abstention and gross negligence is indicative of a higher degree of neglect. Negligence is ordinarily understood as an omission to take such reasonable care as under the circumstances it is the duty of a person or ordinary prudence to take. In other words it is an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by considerations which normally regulate the conduct of human affairs would do or doing something which normally a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The question of wilful abstention or gross negligence and, therefore, of constructive notice considered from this point of view is generally a question of fact or at best mixed question of fact and law depending primarily on the facts and circumstances of each case and except for cases directly falling within the three explanations, no inflexible rule can be laid down to serve as a straight-jacket covering all possible contingencies. The question one has to answer in circumstances like the present is not whether the purchaser had the means of obtaining and might with prudent caution have obtained knowledge of the charge but whether in not doing so he acted with wilful abstention or gross negligence. Being a question depending on the behaviour of a reasonably prudent man the Courts have to consider it in the background of Indian conditions. Courts in India should, therefore, be careful and cautious in seeking assistance from English precedents which should not be blindly or too readily followed”.

    In that case a regular Suit was filed by the purchaser himself and the Apex Court has thoroughly considered the entire evidence relating to the conduct of the purchaser to hold that in spite of his best efforts to find out from the receiver with regard to the tax for the property he could not get the details from the receiver and therefore he could not be blamed for the non-payment of the tax and he was protected by the proviso to Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

    39. Whereas in this case as pointed out above it is not even pleaded by the plaintiffs that they have made any enquiry regarding the sales tax arrears of their vendors. It is pertinent to point out that the plaintiffs have not even pleaded in the plaint that they were not aware of the sales tax arrears payable by S.V Traders, Kancheepuram and Kasthuri and Company. It is also pertinent to point out that P.W.1 in his evidence has not even stated that he was not aware of the sales tax arrears due from S.V Traders, Kancheepuram and Kasthuri and Company, but he has only deposed that he was not aware that T.P Narayasamy had to pay sales tax. But unfortunately no such averment has been made in the plaint and therefore this evidence of P.W.1 cannot be looked into. In this case there is absolutely no evidence on the side of the plaintiffs to discharge the initial burden. That being so the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiffs have discharged their initial burden cannot be accepted. But on the other hand P.W.1 in his cross-examination has categorically admitted that he did not enquire T.P Narayanasamy about the sales tax arrears. Therefore, the omission on the part of the plaintiffs to enquire with their vendors regarding their sales tax arrears amounts to negligence on their part and also it will amount to wilful abstention. In this case the plaintiffs had the means of obtaining the necessary information and the plaintiffs with prudent caution might have obtained knowledge of the charge and therefore the failure on their part to make necessary enquiries with their vendors will amount to wilful abstention or gross negligence and therefore it could be held that the plaintiffs have constructive notice.

    40. We have to point out that the fact that the plaintiffs marked Ex.A-46 through D.W.7 will itself show that they had knowledge about the sales tax arrears of their vendors. It is not the case of the plaintiffs anywhere that Ex.A-46 was obtained by them from their vendors or from some other source after filing of the Suit. Therefore, we have to hold that the plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers without notice.

    41. Now the issue whether S.V Traders, Kancheepuram is a partnership firm or a proprietory concern has to be considered. It is pertinent to point out that D.W.1 through whom Exs.B-1 and B-2 were marked was a last grade Government servant in the office of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer. Similarly D.W.2 through whom Exs.B-3 and B-4 were marked was a peon in the Office of the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Kancheepuram. In their cross-examination, D.Ws.1 and 2 have stated that T.N Subash is the owner of S.V Traders, Kancheepuram and much reliance has been placed on this by the Trial Court to come to the conclusion that S.V Traders, Kancheepuram is a proprietory concern. The Trial Court ought not to have attached too much importance on such testimony of D.Ws.1 and 2 since both of them are Last Grade Government Servants, whose services have been utilised by the Deputy Commercial Tax Officer only for the purpose of service of Exs.B-1 to B-4 and they could not be expected to know about the constitution of S.V Traders, Kancheepuram. The Trial Court has observed that there is no evidence to show that the signature in Ex.B-26 is that of T.P Narayanasamy and on the face of it seems to be a fraudulent one and has further observed that the signature of T.P Narayanasamy in Exs.B-14 and B-26 differ. In this context it has to be pointed out that the signature of T.N Subash found in Ex.B-26 has not been disputed. Similarly the submission of Ex.B-26 to the Sales Tax Department is also not disputed. But the signature of T.P Narayanasamy alone is disputed. Even assuming for a moment that T.P Narayanasamy had not signed in Ex.B-26, the statement contained in Ex.B-26 cannot be denied by T.N Subash and as such the above said observations made by the Trial Court in respect of Ex.B-26 are erroneous. The plaintiffs themselves contended before the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Main Bench, Madras-1) that the firm S.V Traders, Kancheepuram was a partnership concern and as evident from Ex.B-36, the Tribunal has observed that the details of documentary evidence give support for the acceptance of the stated partnership. If Ex.B-26 is considered in the light of the contentions put forth by the plaintiffs before the Tribunal, it could be seen that Ex.B-26 is not a fraudulent document as observed by the Trial Court. Further we also compared the signature of T.P Narayanasamy in Ex.B-26 with his admitted signatures in the sale deed-Ex.A-1 to satisfy as to whether the observation made by the Trial Court has got any basis. But we are satisfied, on a comparision of the signatures, that there is no variation between the admitted and disputed signatures and we hold that the signature in Ex.B-26 is that of T.P Narayasamy only. Therefore, the observation of the Trial Court regarding Ex.B-26 is erroneous and without any basis. There is overwhelming evidence available on record to hold that S.V Traders, Kancheepuram is not a proprietory concern but it is only a partnership firm consisting of T.P Narayanasamy and his son T.N Subash.

    42. The Learned Single Judge after considering at length the contents of Exs.A-46, B-15, B-24, B-25, B-26, B-27 and B-36 has rightly observed that the conclusion of the Trial Court that S.V Traders was proprietory concern cannot be sustained and the Trial Court failed to consider the material portions and the documents placed by the defendants in the form of documents. The Learned Single Judge has also rightly observed that a perusal of the pleadings of both the parties as well as the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiffs were very well aware of the sales tax arrears from 1973-74 and knowing fully well they have purchased the property from T.P Narayanasamy. The Learned Judge on a perusal of the entire oral and documentary evidence has further held that T.P Narayanasamy and his son T.N Subash in order to escape from the tax liability after knowing that there was a default committed by them and a charge has been created as per Section 24 of the Act, with the fraudulent intention sold the only property in favour of the plaintiffs. Therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and we concur with the findings.

    43. In the result, the Letters Patent Appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P is closed.

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