Sathasivam, J.:— Aggrieved by the order, dated 10 February, 2005, of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, directing to fix the pension of the applicant (second respondent) for his service as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal under Rule 15, of Railway Claims Tribunal Rules read with Para. 9 of Part I of Sch. I to the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 and as amended by Central Act 7 of 1999 at Rs. 51,190 per annum from 1 June, 1998 and other allowable benefits, the Railway Administration has filed the above writ petition.

2. (a) The applicant-second respondent herein was directly elevated from the Bar as a Judge of the Madras High Court on 23 March, 1990 and he retired on 31 May, 1995 on attaining the age of 62 years. When he was serving as a Judge of the Madras High Court, he was appointed as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal, Delhi under the order, dated 20 January, 1995, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Railways. The appointment was for a period of 5 years from the date of his joining the Railway Claims Tribunal or till he attains the age of 65 years whichever was earlier. He assumed charge as Chairman, Railway Board on 1 March, 1995 and retired on 31 May, 1998, on attaining the age of 65 years. At the time of appointment, the President of India has intimated the nomination of the applicant as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal with the prior approval of the Chief Justice of the High Court, Madras. The order dated 3 January, 1995, mentioned the condition of service, according to which, the time spent by the second respondent as Judge, High Court, Madras, in the performance of the function as Chairman will count as actual service within the meaning of Para. 11(b)(i) of Part D of second schedule to the Constitution of India read with S. 2(1)(c)(i) of the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. The applicant will not be entitled to any extra remuneration for the work except travelling allowance and dearness allowance as admissible judder the High Court Judges (Travelling Allowance) Rules, 1956. The said order also stipulated that the salaries and allowances payable to the second respondent herein as Chairman of the Railway Claims Tribunal and the Conditions of Service by which he was to be governed will be in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Salaries and allowances and conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules, 1989 as amended from time to time.

(b) The second respondent, after demitting his office on 31 May, 1998, made representations requesting for calculation of his pensionary benefits and other allied benefits such as commutation, gratuity and leave encashment for the period of service rendered by him as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal from 1 March, 1995 to 31 May, 1998 in terms of High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 and not in terms of Railway Claims Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members). Rules, 1989. By communication, dated 29 May, 2002, the said request of the second respondent was negatived and challenging the same initially he filed Writ Petition No. 25298 of 2002 on the file of this Court. On the orders of this Court, the second respondent approached the Central Administrative Tribunal and filed O.A No. 441 of 2003, challenging the communication, dated 29 May, 2002, and seeking other relief. Before the Tribunal, it was contended that Rule 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules, 1989, specifically deals with conditions of service and other perquisites available to the Chairman and as per the same, notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 4 to 14, the condition of service and other perquisites available to a Chairman shall be the same as admissible to a serving Judge of a High Court. In other words, according to him, the retirement benefits payable to him for his service as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal from 1 March, 1995 to 31 May, 1998 shall be the same as admissible to a serving Judge of a High Court on his retirement. The Railway administration has not considered the case of the applicant in accordance with Rule 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Rules, 1989 read with Para. 9 of Part I of First Schedule to High Court Judges (Condition of Service) Act, 1954 as amended by Central Act 7 of 1999 and wrongly interpreted the provisions and denied his rights of the applicant as prayed for in his representation.

3. (a) The Railway administration have filed a reply before the Tribunal denying all the allegations except the service particulars of the applicant. The applicant having elected to higher salary of Rs. 30,000 per month according to Railway Claims Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Services of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members), Rules, 1989 and is therefore entitled to draw pension, leave encashment and other settlement dues only under the same Rules. The salary of the applicant as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal was Rs. 8000 (basic) from 1 March, 1995 to 31 December, 1995 and subsequently it was revised to Rs. 26,000 (basic) from 1 January, 1996 to 25 May, 1996 and the basic pay was further increased to Rs. 30,000 P.M with effect from 26 June, 1996 and the entire arrears payable towards the applicant is amounting to Rs. 2,49,395 (minus income tax Rs. 1,10,561) was paid to the applicant in December, 1999.

(b) Under the provisions of the Constitution, a High Court Judge holds office up to the age of 62 years and his service rendered is treated as “actual service”. The service as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal has to be treated as separate. Rule 15 of the Railways Claims Tribunal Service Conditions Rules is a general provision which clarified that service conditions irrespective of whether or not he has been a High Court Judge, will be the same as those of High Court Judges. A Judge, on his retirement ceases to be governed by the provisions of High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions) Act, 1954. Reckoning of pensionary benefits for the service rendered in Railway Claims Tribunal by a retired Judge of High Court under the provisions of High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions) Act, 1954, will amount to extending the date of superannuation as a Judge which is not permissible tinder the rules. The applicant is entitled to pension, leave encashment and under retiral benefits only under Railway Claims Tribunal Service and he is not covered by the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954.

4. The Tribunal after considering the claim of the applicant and the stand taken by the Railway Administration as well as the provisions of Railway Claims Tribunal Rules, 1989 and High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954, by impugned order, dated 10 February, 2005, accepted the case of the applicant and quashed the order of the Railway Board dated 29 May, 2002 and issued direction as prayed for. Questioning the same, the present writ petition has been filed.

5. Heard Sri V.T Gopalan, learned Additional Solicitor-General for petitioners/Railway administration and Sri Vijaynarayan, learned counsel for the applicant/second respondent.

6. The only point for consideration is, whether the claim of the applicant/second respondent herein that notwithstanding contained in Rules 4 to 14 of Railway Claims Tribunal Rules, 1989, the conditions of service and other perquisites available to the Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal shall be the same as admissible to a serving Judge of the High Court is sustainable and whether the Central Administrative Tribunal is right in answering the same in the affirmative?

7. It is seen from the representations of the second respondent, dated 27 March, 1999, 3 April, 1999, 23 June, 1999, 30 July, 1999, 4 August, 1999 and 11 October, 2000 made to the petitioners, that he (second respondent herein) has made a claim for pensionary benefits and other allied benefits such as commutation, gratuity and leave encashment for the period of service rendered by him as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal from 1 June, 1995 to 31 May, 1998 based only on Rule 15 of Railway Claims Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions” of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as RCT Rules, 1989) and reference was made to the relevant provisions of the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 only for the purpose of calculation of the quantum of the pensionary benefits payable to him as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal in terms of Rule 15 of RCT Rules, 1989. It is further seen that on his appointment as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal and pursuant to the Presidential request, the second respondent herein relinquished the office of Judge of the Madras High Court on 28 February, 1995 and assumed charge as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal on 1 March, 1995. It is also seen that on 31 May, 1995 on completing the age of 62 years, he retired as a Judge of the High Court. It is not in dispute that for the period from 1 June, 1995 to 31 May, 1998 for his service as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal, he was getting only the salary of a High Court Judge, namely, Rs. 8,000 per month in terms of Para. 10 Part D of schedule to Constitution of India as it stood then from the Railway Claims Tribunal. After relinquishing his office as Judge of the Madras High Court on 28 February, 1995 during “actual service” period as High Court Judge between 1 March, 1995 and 31 May, 1998 according to the second respondent, he did not draw any salary from the Madras High Court or State of Tamil Nadu. It is also his claim that he had not drawn extra remuneration-in contravention of presidential request. It is not in dispute that after the expiry of the “actual service period” contemplated in the presidential request, for his service as Chairman, RCT, the second respondent was drawing the pay fixed under Rule 3 of the RCT Rules, 1989. Rule 3 of the said Rules deals with pay, and allowances payable to Chairman, Vice-Chairman and members of the RCT. It is not in dispute that there is no other option to the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and members of the RCT except to draw the salary fixed as per the provisions of Rule 3 of the RCT Rules. Rule 4 deals with dearness allowance and city compensatory allowance; Rule 5 relates to retirement from parent service on appointment as member; Rule 6 speaks about leave; Rule 7 refers to leave sanctioning authority; Rule 8 refers to pension; Rule 9 Provident Fund; Rule 10 journeys on tour/transfer; Rule 11 leave travel; Rule 12 accommodation; Rule 13 facility of conveyance; Rule 14 facilities for medical treatment; Rule 15 conditions of service etc., of the Chairman. Among those Rules, Rules 8 and 15 are relevant which read as follows:

“Rule 8. Pension.— (1) Every person appointed to the Tribunal as Chairman, Vice-Chairman or Member shall be entitled to pension:

Provided that no such pension shall be payable to such a person-

(i) if he has put in less than two years of service; or

(ii) if he has been removed from an office in the Tribunal under Sub-sec. (2) of see of the Act.

(2) Pension under Sub-rule (1) shall be calculated at the rate of rupees seven hundred per annum for each completed year of service or a part thereof and irrespective of the number of years of service in the Tribunal, the maximum amount of pension shall not exceed rupees three thousand five hundred per annum.

Provided that the aggregate amount of pension payable under this rule, together with the amount of any pension including commuted portion of pension (if any) drawn or entitled to be drawn while holding office in the Tribunal, shall not exceed four thousand rupees per mensem.

Rule 15. Conditions of service, etc., of the Chairman: Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 4 to 14 of these rules, the conditions of service and other perquisites available to the Chairman shall be the same as admissible to a serving Judge of a High Court.”

8. The claim of the applicant/second respondent herein is to fix the pension for his services as Chairman, RCT under Rule 15 of the RCT Rules, 1989 read with Para. 9 of Part 1 of I schedule to High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 as amended by Central Act 7 of 1999 at Rs. 51,190 per annum from 1 June, 1998. The learned Additional Solicitor-General by drawing our, attention to relevant Rules, particularly Rules 3, 6, 8 and 15, would contend that in the case of appointment of a sitting Judge of the High Court as Chairman of the Tribunal, till the age of 62 years, their condition of service will be that of a High Court Judge and thereafter the conditions of service will only be that of the Chairman of the Tribunal. By drawing our attention to S. 5 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, he would also submit that even a person who has held the post of Vice-Chairman for a period of two years is eligible to be appointed as Chairman and for appointment to the post of Vice-Chairman, it is not required that the person must have been functioning as a Judge of the High Court. According to him, if the finding of the Tribunal that by virtue of Rule 15, the person appointed as Chairman is eligible to receive the same pensionary benefits as that of a retired High Court Judge is to be accepted, then an anomalous situation would arise in that even a person who had not served as a Judge of the High Court but who was elevated to the post of Chairman of the Tribunal will be entitled to draw pensionary benefits not as a retired Chairman of the Tribunal, but as a retired Judge of the High Court, which will be against the principles enshrined in the Constitution of India and also the High Court Judges (Conditions of Services) Act, 1954. He also submitted that the claim of the second respondent was based on Rule 15 of the RCT Rules, 1989 and the interpretation of the Tribunal for the same is untenable. He further contended that the age of the High Court Judge having been constitutionally fixed, no law much less the Rules, more particularly Rule 15 can enable the second respondent to claim pension as a serving Judge of the High Court, for the period of service rendered as Chairman of the Tribunal beyond the age of 62 years. He also pointed out that the judgement of the Supreme Court of India rendered in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea [1996 (1) L.L.N 29], is not applicable to the facts of the present case and that the Tribunal committed an error in not considering the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court and the Division Bench of this Court in the other cases, cited before it.

9. We have already referred to the relevant rules, namely, Rules 3, 5, 6, 8 and 15 of the Rules, 1989. It is the case of the Railway administration that after attaining the age of 62, RCT Rules alone are applicable, including Rule 8 to the second respondent. It was argued that in spite of “non obstante” clause in Rule 15 in so far as pension and other retirement benefits, Rule 8 of the RCT Rules, 1989 alone is applicable.

10. While elaborating the above contentions, Sri V.T Gopalan, learned Additional Solicitor-General, at the foremost, relied on a judgement of the Supreme Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [A.I.R 1952 S.C 369]. The following statement is pressed into service: (Para. 27)

“27. Nor can we read the non obstante clause as specifically repealing only the particular provisions which the learned Judges below have been at pains to pick out from the Bar Councils Act and the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts. If, as we have pointed out, the enacting part of S. 2 covers all advocates of the Supreme Court, the non-obstante clause can reasonably be read as overriding ‘anything contained’ in any relevant existing law which is inconsistent with the new enactment, although the draftsman appears to have had primarily in his mind a particular type of law as conflicting with the new Act. The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously; for, even apart from such clause, a later law abrogates earlier laws clearly inconsistent with it.…”

11. The other decision relied on by him is in the case of R.S Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [1991 (2) L.L.N 837], wherein the Supreme Court, after referring to earlier on the point of “non obstante” clause, has observed, in Paras. 11 and 12, at page 844 and 845:

“11. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [A.I.R 1952 S.C 369] (vide supra), it was observed as under:

…On a conspectus of the above authorities it emerges that the non obstante clause is appended to a provision with a view to give the enacting part of the provision an overriding effect in case of a conflict. But the non-obstante clause need not necessarily and always be co-extensive with the operative part so as to have the effect of cutting down the clear terms of an enactment and if the words of the enactment are clear and are capable of a clear interpretation on a plain and grammatical construction of the words the non obstante clause cannot cut down the construction and restrict the scope of its operation. In such cases the non-obstante clause has to be read as clarifying the whole position and must be understood to have been incorporated in the enactment by the Legislature by way of abundant caution and not by way of limiting the ambit and scope of the Special Rules.

12. Further, the influence of a non-obstante clause has to be considered on the basis of the context also in which it is used. In State Of West Bengalplaintiff; v. Union Of Indiadefendant [A.I.R 1963 S.C 1241], it is observed as under:

‘The Court must ascertain the intention of the Legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs.’

It is also well settled that the Court should examine every word of a statute in its context and to use context in its widest sense.”

12. The other decision heavily relied on by learned Additional Solicitor-General is in the case of A.G Varadarajulu v. State of Tamil Nadu, [(1998) 4 SCC 231]. The following passage is relevant:

“It is well settled that while dealing with a non-obstante clause under which the Legislature wants to give overriding effect to a section, the Court must try to find out the extent to which the Legislature had intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. Such intention of the Legislature in this behalf is to be gathered from the enacting part of the section. In Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose (vide supra), Sri Patanjali Sastri, J. observed:

‘The enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously.’

In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, [(1971) 1 SCC 85], Sri Hidayatullah, C.J observed that the non-obstante clause is no doubt a very potent clause intended to exclude every consideration arising from other provisions of the same statute or other statute but ‘for that reason alone we must determine the scope’ of that provision strictly. When the section containing the said clause does not refer to any particular provisions which it intends to override but refers to the provisions of the statute generally, it is not permissible to hold that it excludes the whole act and stands all alone by itself. A search has, therefore, to be made with a view to determining which provision answers the description and which does not.”

13. It is clear from the above decisions that while considering non obstante in an enactment, it is the duty of the Court to find out the extent to which the Legislature had intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. As said earlier, we are concerned with the pension payable to the second respondent who retired as the Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal. In the normal circumstance. Rule 8 of the RCT Rules, 1989 applies to the claim of the second respondent. We have already referred to the fact that while in service as Judge, High Court, the second respondent was appointed as Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal. We have also referred to S. 5 of the RCT Act, 1987 which speaks about the qualifications for appointment as Chairman. As per Sub-sec. (1) a person who has been a Judge of a High Court or has, for at least 2 years, held the office of the Vice Chairman is eligible to be appointed as Chairman, RCT. In the event of appointment of a Judge of a High Court as Chairman, RCT in view of specific provision, namely, Rule 15 of RCT Rules, 1989, the conditions of service and other perquisites available to the Chairman shall be the same as admissible to a serving Judge of a High Court, Sri Vijaynarayan, learned senior counsel for second respondent by drawing out attention to similar rule, namely Rule 15-A of Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules, 1985 (CAT Rules, 1985 in short), would contend that inasmuch as the similar issue was considered in that rule by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea [1996 (1) L.L.N 29], the decision rendered therein is directly applicable to the case of the second respondent. Before considering the principles laid down in that decision, it would be useful to refer Rule 15-A of CAT Rules, 1985 and Rule 15 of RCT Rules. 1989:

CAT Rules, 1985 RCT Rules, 1989 “15-A Condition of service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman etc. 15. Condition of service, etc., of the Chairman. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 4 to 15 of the the said rules, the conditions of service and other perquisites available to the Chairman mand and Vice-Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal shall be the same as admissible to a serving Judge of a High Court as contained in the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 and High Court Judges (Travelling Allowances) Rules, 1956. Notwithstanding any thing contained in Rules 4 to 14 of these rules, the conditions of service and other perquisites available to the Chairman shall be the same as admissible to a serving Judge of a High Court.

In Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea (vide supra), two questions were raised. They are the Central Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application, and (ii) the Tribunal was wrong in holding that the pension admissible to the respondent as Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal had to be determined under Part I of the First Schedule to the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. Pratibha Bannerjea, first respondent before the Supreme Court, was appointed as a Judge of the High Court of Calcutta on 13 January, 1978 and she retired as such with effect from 16 February, 1989. Soon thereafter on 3 March, 1989 she was appointed as a Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal which post she relinquished on 16 February, 1992 on retirement. She was drawing pension on retirement as High Court Judge. For the period between 3 March, 1989 and 16 February, 1992, she served as the Vice-Chairman and was entitled to pension. It was her contention that her pension should be fixed under Part I whereas the Union's contention was that she was entitled to pension admissible under Part III of the First Schedule to the Act. As her contention was not conceded, she filed O.A No. 513 of 1992 in the Central Administrative Trrbunal for relief as per her point of view. The Tribunal upheld the claim of the respondent, hence an appeal by special leave by the Union of India before the Supreme Court. After considering the provisions of the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 and Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules, 1985, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

“6. From the scheme of the Constitution to which we have adverted briefly it is obvious that the Constitution makers were evidently keen to ensure that the judiciary was independent of the executive. An independent, impartial and fearless judiciary is our constitutional creed. The Constitution has tried to insulate the judiciary from outside influence both from the executive and the Legislature. The provisions of Chap. VI in Part V of the Constitution dealing with Courts below the State High Court also show that the constitution-makers were equally keen to insulate even the subordinate judiciary. Articles 233 to 237 have, therefore, provided a wholly different mode of selection and appointment of judicial officers at the grass roots level and up to the District Courts from the one provided for other civil posts. No doubt the initial appointment has to be made by the Governor of the State, albeit after selection as provided in that chapter, but thereafter the posting and promotion, grant of leave, etc., is with the High Court and not the Government. Thus the judicial officers belonging to the subordinate Courts are placed under the protective umbrella of the High Court. We have already pointed out the provisions dealing with the appointment of High Court Judges. The entire procedure outlined for their appointment, is totally different from that provided for other services. That is because the constitution-makers were conscious that the notion of judicial independence must not be diluted. If the relationship between the Government and the High Court Judge is of master and servant it would run counter to the constitutional creed of independence for the obvious reason that the servant would have to carry out the directives of the master. Since a High Court Judge has to decide cases brought by or against the Government day in and day out, he would not be able to function without fear or favour if he has to carry out the instructions or directives of his master, the whole concept of judicial independence and separation of judiciary from the executive would crumble to the ground if such a relationship is conceded. High Court Judges would not be true to their oath if such a relationship is accepted. That is why not only Judges but even the staff members are insulated from executive influence. Article 229 clearly provides that appointments of officers and servants of a High Court shall be made by the Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer as he may direct. Even the conditions of service of officers and servants shall be such as may be prescribed by the Chief Justice or his nominee authorised by him to make rules, the approval of the Governor is necessary only if the Rules relate to salaries, allowances, leave or pension. This provision also shows that officers and servants of the High Court are also under the exclusive control of the Chief Justice and not the Government. If that be the relationship between the officers and servants of the High Court vis-a-vis the Government, it is difficult to imagine a master and servant relationship between the Government and Judges of the High Court. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the relationship between the Government and High Court Judges is not of master and servant. They cannot be said to be holding a post under the union/State.”

By holding so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the order of the Tribunal and dismissed the appeal filed by the Union of India.

14. We have already extracted Rule 15-A of CAT Rules, 1985 which is in pari materia of Rule 15 of RCT Rules, 1989. The said decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea [1996 (1) L.L.N 29] (vide supra), is directly on the point and applicable to the case of the second respondent.

15. Learned Additional Solicitor-General drew our attention to a 3-Judge decision of the Supreme Court in V.S Mallimath v. Union of India [2001 (3) L.L.N 56], and contended that the dictum laid down in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea [1996 (1) L.L.N 29] (vide supra), has been virtually overruled. He also placed reliance heavily on another judgement of the Supreme Court in Justice P. Venugopal v. Union of India, [(2003) 7 SCC 726]. First we shall consider the decision of the Supreme Court in V.S Mallimath case (vide supra). Justice V.S Mallimath, retired Chief Justice of Kerala High Court, filed a petition before the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. His grievance is that he has been illegally denied certain monetary benefits when he served as a Member of the National Human Rights Commission. It is his case that after retiring as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court on 11 June, 1991, he was appointed as Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal on 5 December, 1991. On his retirement from the Tribunal, he was appointed as a Member of the National Human Rights Commission on 14 September, 1994 and continued there till he attained the age of 70 years. While he was continuing as a Member of the National Human Rights Commission, he was not granted full salary, which he was entitled to under the relevant Rules and on the other hand deductions were made under the proviso to Rule 3 of the Rules. The contention of the petitioner is that the said proviso will have no application. The further grievance of the petitioner is that on his retirement from the Commission, he was entitled to retiral benefit of gratuity for the period he rendered service as a Member of the National Human Rights Commission, but even that was illegally denied. The third grievance of the petitioner is that the leave which he earned as a Member of the National Human Rights Commission was not allowed to be encashed on an erroneous interpretation of the Rules and thereby he was illegally denied of his rights. The Union of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs rejected all the claims of the petitioner on the ground that the relevant Rules do not permit the claims of the petitioner. The bone of contention of the petitioner is that the pension he receives as a Retired Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court cannot be deducted from his salary as a Member of the National Human Rights Commission under the proviso to Rule 3(b), in asmuch as the services of the Chief Justice cannot be held to be a service under the Government of the Union or the Government of a State. While considering the above claim, in the light of specific proviso to Rule 3(b) of the National Human Rights Commission Chair person and Members (Salaries, Allowances and other Conditions of Service) Rules, 1993, the Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the claim of the petitioner therein. As discussed above and in the light of the specific provision in Rule 15 of the RCT Rules, 1989 as well as non obstante clause therein, which is similar to Rule 15-A of the CAT Rules, 1985, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea [1996 (1) L.L.N 29] (vide supra), we are of the view that the decision rendered in Mallimath case is not directly on the point in issue.

16. Coming to the decision in Justice P. Venugopal v. Union of India (vide supra), the principles laid down in that case are that

(i) an ad hoc Judge does not become a part of the High Court. If an ad hoc Judge is not considered to be a Judge of the High Court in terms of the legal fiction created, the question of computing his pension for the period he is appointed as an ad hoc Judge would hot arise inasmuch as a person is not entitled to any further pensionary benefits after he demits the constitutional office which he holds in terms of Art. 217 of the Constitution.

(ii) The period during which he served as the commission of inquiry or as the Commissioner of Payments under the Madras Race Club (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking) Act, 1986 cannot be taken into consideration for computing the pensionary benefits. Both the above answers are not applicable to the case on hand. No doubt, learned Additional Solicitor-General by drawing our attention to Para. 20 in Justice P. Venugopal case (vide supra), particularly a reference to the decision in Union of India v. K.D Khare [1995 (2) L.L.N 342]. would contend that Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not accepted the principle laid down in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea [1996 (1) L.L.N (vide supra). On perusal of the same and in the absence of any specific reference to Rule 35 of the RCT Rules, 1989 we are unable to appreciate the said contention.

17. Sri Vijaynarayan, learned senior counsel, by drawing our attention to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Devendra Kumar Agarwal v. Union of India [(2003) 3 A.I.S.L.J 177], would contend that the said decision is directly on the point. Justice Vijender Jain, learned Judge of the Delhi High Court, while considering similar claim of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Central Administrative Tribunal, after considering Rule 15-A of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules, 1985 and I schedule of High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 as well as basing reliance on Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea. [1996 (1) L.L.N 29] (vide supra), arrived at a conclusion that the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Central Administrative Tribunal are entitled to same condition of service as Judges of the High Court. In that case, the petitioner retired as Vice-Chairman of Central Administrative Tribunal. Jabalpur. He retired at the age of 58 years on superannuation with effect from 20 February, 1988 as District Judge, Ghaziabad. He was subsequently appointed as Member of the CAT at Allahabad Bench, Allahabad with effect from 1 March, 1988. After attaining the age of 62 years with effect from 27 February, 1992 he was appointed as Vice-Chairman of the CAT, Jabalpur with effect from 15 May, 1992. He retired as Vice-Chairman of CAT with effect from 27 February, 1995 after attaining age of 65 years. In the writ petition before the Delhi High Court, the petitioner has contended that in view of Rule 15 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Salaries and Allowances and Conditions of Service of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members) Rules, 1985, he was entitled to pension under Para. 2 of Part III of first schedule of High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 on the basis of Rule 15-A of the said Rules. Before the learned Judge, basing reliance on Rule 8, it was contended by the counsel appearing for the respondent-union of India that entitlement of pension in respect of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of Central Administrative Tribunal is governed by Rule 8 as the petitioner was appointed after he superannuated as a District Judge as a Member of Central Administrative Tribunal and thereafter as Vice-Chairman. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that he was entitled to pension as Vice-Chairman in the light of Sub-paras (a) and (b) of Para. 2 of Part III of first schedule to High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. In view of the contentions, the question which has to be answered before the learned Judge was, whether the petitioner is entitled for pension under Rule 8 or Rule 15-A of the said Rules. Rule 15-A provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 4 to 15 of the said Rules, the conditions of service and other perquisites available to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the CAT shall be same as admissible to a serving Judge of High Court as contained in High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 and High Court Judges (Travelling Allowances) Rules, 1956. After referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea (vide supra) the learned Judge has observed as follows:

“7… In Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea Supreme Court had ruled that the conditions of service and other perquisites available to the Vice-Chairman shall be the same as admissible to a serving Judge of a High Court. A serving Judge of a High Court is entitled to pension under Part III of the Act. The Court held that the pension has to be same as admissible to a serving Judge of the High Court as per Rules made therein.”

Finally, the learned Judge has concluded:

11. … The tenure of Vice-Chairman was treated at par for the purposes of service conditions as that of a Judge of High Court for determination of pension. In view of discussion above, I hold that grant of pension in terms of Rule 15-A of the Rules and Service Conditions of Act, 1954 has to be applied to the petitioner and his pension be determined in accordance with Part III of first schedule to High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 and additional pay in accordance with Sub-paras. (a) and (b) of Para. 2 of Part III of first schedule to Central Administrative Tribunals (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 on the basis of Rule 1-A of the said Rules and memo, dated 27 August, 1999, issued by the Department of Personnel and Training be fixed……”

As observed earlier, since Rule 15-A of the CAT Rules, 1985 and Rule 15 of the RCT Rules, 1989 are identical and in the light of the dictum laid down in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea (vide supra), we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the learned Judge of the Delhi High Court. It is also brought to our notice that the above said judgment of the Delhi High Court has been implemented by the Government of India. Sri Vijaynarayan has also placed copy of the communication of the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training, North Block, New Delhi, dated 21 February, 2003, addressed to Registrars of various Administrative Tribunals throughout India. The following direction in the said communication is relevant:

“3. In view of above position, it is, requested that pensionary benefits in respect of such Vice-Chairmen of the Central Administrative Tribunal who prior to their appointment in the Tribunal had held any pensionable post under the Union or a State, be revised in the manner provided in Para. 2(a) and (b) of Part III of first schedule to High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 referred to above. It is also requested that a copy of this letter be sent to all concerned for compliance. Since the order of the Hon'ble High Court is clarificatory in nature it will be applicable to all the Vice-Chairman of the Central Administrative Tribunal who retired on or after 31 March, 1989, the date on which Rule 15-A came into force provided their case is otherwise covered in terms of Part III of first schedule to High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 referred to above.”

18. In the light of our discussion, we conclude that Rule 15 of the RCT Rules, 1989 is the relevant substantive Rule which lays down that the conditions of service available to the Chairman, Railway Claims Tribunal shall be the same as admissible to serving Judges of High Court and the claim of the second respondent based on Rule 15 of the RCT Rules, 1989 is sustainable Further, as rightly, pointed out, when the language of Rule 15 is plain and simple, the question of reading down of Rule 15 as wanted by the Department does not arise. We also held that when the age of retirement of Chairman, RCT fixed as 65 years by the provisions of the RCT Act, 1987, and when the conditions of service of Chairman Railway Claims Tribunal is specifically dealt with in Rule 15 of RCT Rules, 1989, the payment of retirement benefits as contemplated in Rule 15 will not amount to extending the date of superannuation of the High Court Judge upto the age of 65 years, as contended by the department. We have already held that Rules 6, 8 and 15 of RCT Rules, 1989 are identical to Rules 6, 8 and 15-A respectively of CAT Rules, 1985. As pointed out earlier, pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Pratibha Bannerjea [1996 (1) L.L.N 29] (vide supra), when the Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training, accepting the interpretation of Rule 15-A of the CAT. 1985, in an identical provision contained in Rule 15 of RCT, 1989, it cannot be interpreted differently by different Ministries of Government of India. We are of the view that the dictum laid in Pratibha Bannerjea case (vide supra), still holds good and was not specifically overruled. We are satisfied that the Tribunal after considering all the relevant materials with reference to RCT Rules, 1989 and the dictum of the Supreme Court, granted the relief as claimed by the applicant/second respondent herein which is just, legal and proper and there is no valid ground for interference. There is no merit in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed; accordingly dismissed. No costs. The Railway Administration is directed to implement the order of the Tribunal within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Consequently, the stay petition, namely, W.P.M.P No. 18274 of 2005 is closed.

Petition dismissed.