Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Art. 122 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. Art. 123
  • Art. 137 of the Limitation Act.20.
  • Art. 137 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 123 of the Limitation Act
  • Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Art. 122 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. Art. 123
  • Art. 137 of the Limitation Act.20.
  • Art. 137 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 123 of the Limitation Act
  • Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Revision against I.A. No. 540/2001 in I.A. No. 283/2001 in O.S. No. 34/2000

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit O.S. No. 34/2000 was filed by the plaintiffs (also described as Defendants 1 and 2 in some pleadings) for partition and allotment of a one-fourth share in various immovable properties (Schedules A to E). Defendants 1 to 3 filed written statements raising claims of differing entitlements and some items being self-acquired by D-3.

Several interlocutory applications were filed: I.A. No. 230/2000 (appointment of a Receiver for Schedule A and B), I.A. No. 283/2001 (application to appoint an Advocate Commissioner/Receiver for D Schedule property — Door No. 28, South Bagh Road, T. Nagar), and I.A. No. 540/2001 (filed under Order IX Rule 7 CPC seeking to set aside the ex parte order dated 26.4.2001 appointing the Advocate Commissioner for the D Schedule property).

I.A. No. 283/2001 was taken up in April 2001. Notices were ordered but the matter was allowed ex parte on 26.4.2001 because there was no representation for Respondents 1 and 2. The Advocate Receiver appointed in I.A. No. 283/2001 took possession and leased the D Schedule property. I.A. No. 540/2001 was later filed on 10.8.2001 to set aside that ex parte order; that petition was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, Maduranthakam on 2.11.2001. The second Defendant (Revision Petitioner/D-2) filed the present revision against that dismissal. Respondents remained ex parte before the revisional court. Because the question of limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was involved, the Court appointed an Amicus Curiae to assist.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Subordinate Judge was correct in allowing I.A. No. 283/2001 and appointing an Advocate Receiver for the D Schedule property having regard to the circumstances and the procedural record (including reliance on earlier averments in I.A. No. 238/2000).
  2. Whether the trial Court's conclusion that the application to set aside the ex parte order (filed under Order IX Rule 7 CPC) was barred because it was filed beyond thirty days is legally sustainable — specifically, whether the limitation for such applications is governed by Article 123 of the Limitation Act or by the residuary clause in Article 137 of the Limitation Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner / Second Defendant (Appellant)'s Arguments

  • The trial Court erred in holding that Article 123 of the Limitation Act applied so that the application to set aside the ex parte order had to be brought within thirty days; instead, applications under Order IX Rule 7 CPC to set aside ex parte orders are governed by the residuary Clause (Article 137) of the Limitation Act.
  • The ex parte appointment of an Advocate Receiver for a commercially important property (D Schedule at T. Nagar) has serious implications; such appointment should not have been made in a casual manner without sufficient opportunity to defendants to file their counter.
  • The averments relied upon by the trial Court from the counter-statement filed earlier in I.A. No. 238/2000 were merely argumentative and could not be treated as an admission justifying the appointment of a Receiver for the D Schedule property.
  • On facts, the Revision Petitioner explained non-appearance on 26.4.2001 by illness of his father-in-law and inability to instruct counsel, and sought to set aside the ex parte order on that basis.

Opposing Party / First Defendant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The petition to set aside the ex parte order was belatedly filed (beyond thirty days) and the Petitioner should have sought condonation of delay; therefore the petition was not maintainable.
  • The Advocate Receiver had already taken possession of the D Schedule property and leased it out; the Petitioner could not object since such acts had occurred.
  • The Petitioner/D-2 had allegedly removed pipes and a motor and committed acts of waste, acting against the interests of co-owners.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1988 Calcutta 358 (Full Court decision) The decision is cited for the principle that where no specific provision of limitation applies to an application (for example, a miscellaneous application arising under Order IX), the residuary Clause (Article 137) of the Limitation Act may govern; such applications must then be filed within the period specified by Article 137 (three years), and not necessarily within a thirty-day period applicable to ex parte decrees under Article 123. The Court relied on this decision to support its conclusion that an application under Order IX Rule 7 CPC to set aside an ex parte order is governed by Article 137 (residuary clause) rather than Article 123, and therefore the thirty-day period of Article 123 does not apply to the present application to set aside an ex parte order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main strands of reasoning: (1) the law applicable to limitation for applications under Order IX Rule 7 CPC to set aside an ex parte order, and (2) the discretionary principles governing appointment of a Receiver (Advocate Commissioner).

On limitation, the Court drew a clear distinction between a "decree" and an "order" and relied on the definition and treatment of those terms in the Civil Procedure Code. Article 123 of the Limitation Act, the Court held, specifically applies to applications by a defendant to set aside an ex parte decree and prescribes a thirty-day limitation period from the date of decree (or from knowledge where summons were not duly served). Article 123 therefore speaks of an ex parte decree (or an ex parte order having the force of a decree) that finally determines rights.

The Court concluded that an ex parte order passed on an interlocutory application (such as I.A. No. 283/2001 appointing an Advocate Commissioner for D Schedule property) is not necessarily a decree that finally determines rights and hence Article 123 is not the appropriate provision to fix a thirty-day limitation. Consequently, the Court held that an application under Order IX Rule 7 CPC to set aside an ex parte order is governed by the residuary Clause contained in Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The Court fortified this conclusion by reference to its own earlier finding and to the Full Court decision in AIR 1988 Calcutta 358 which held that miscellaneous applications not specifically provided for in the Limitation Act fall within Article 137 and attract the three-year period.

On the discretionary nature of the appointment of a Receiver, the Court reiterated that such discretion must be exercised only in exceptional cases and with great caution. A Receiver should not be appointed merely for convenience or when no substantial grounds exist; specifically, appointment is inappropriate unless there is a real risk that the property will be dissipated or unless circumstances justify interference with the status quo.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found procedural defects in the way I.A. No. 283/2001 had been processed: respondents were given only two days to file a counter; the petition was allowed because of non-appearance without sufficient opportunity being afforded; and the appointment of an Advocate Receiver for a commercially significant property (T. Nagar) — with powers to take charge and lease the premises — could materially alter the status quo and the parties' rights. Moreover, the Court held that the earlier counter-statement averments relied on by the Subordinate Judge (suggesting that if any receiver were appointed, it should also be for D Schedule) were merely argumentative and did not amount to admissions authorizing the appointment.

For these reasons, and because the trial Court wrongly treated the application as barred by the thirty-day rule under Article 123, the revisional court concluded that the impugned order could not be sustained.

The Court also recorded and placed on record the assistance given by the Amicus Curiae (Mr. Rajendra Kumar) on the question of applicability of Articles of the Limitation Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revisional court allowed the revision and set aside the order and decree made in I.A. No. 540/2001 in I.A. No. 283/2001 in O.S. No. 34/2000 dated 2.11.2001 by the Subordinate Judge, Maduranthakam.

Direct consequences and directions given by the Court:

  • The Subordinate Judge, Maduranthakam is directed to give the second Defendant (Revision Petitioner) an opportunity to file a counter-statement in I.A. No. 238/2001 and, after affording sufficient opportunity to the parties, to dispose of the application in accordance with law.
  • There is no order as to costs.
  • Consequently, CMP No. 4566 of 2003 is closed.

Broader legal implication stated in the opinion:

  • The Court clarified the legal point that Article 123 of the Limitation Act applies to ex parte decrees (or ex parte orders having the force of a decree) and not to interlocutory ex parte orders; applications to set aside ex parte orders (not being decrees) fall under the residuary provision of Article 137 and are not constrained by the thirty-day period of Article 123.

On precedent and novelty: The opinion applies and articulates this interpretation of limitation provisions and cites the Full Court decision in AIR 1988 Calcutta 358 in support. The judgment does not purport to state whether it is intended to lay down a binding new precedent beyond the legal determinations expressly recorded.

VCJ/VCS

    Rajaji Petitioner v. R. Krishnaji

    This revision is preferred against the Fair and Decretal Order made in I.A No. 540/2001 in I.A No. 283/2001 in O.S No. 34/2000 dated 2.11.2001 by the Subordinate Judge, Maduranthakam, dismissing the petition filed under Or. 9, R.7 CPC declining to set aside the exparte order to appointment of Receiver passed in I.A No. 283/2001.

    2. The Plaintiffs/Defendants 1 and 2 -sons of D-3 - Raja Ram Reddiar, claim that the suit properties ‘A to E’ schedule properties are the ancestral properties. The Plaintiff has filed the suit O.S No. 34/2000 for partition and allotment of 1/4th share. The suit property relates to a number of items of immovable properties comprised in A to E Plaint Schedule Properties.

    3. Defendants 1 to 3 have filed Written Statement. D-1 has filed the Written Statement contending that the Preliminary Decree for partition could be passed in respect of the suit properties excepting ‘B’ Schedule Property, which is to be allotted as three equal shares and ‘C’ schedule in four equal shares and that D-1 is entitled to 1/3rd share in ‘B’ Schedule and 1/4th share in ‘C’ Schedule. D-2 has filed Written Statement stating that the suit may be decreed as prayed for and that the second Defendant may be allowed 1/4th share. D-3 has filed Written Statement contending that the suit item numbers 27 to 30 viz., dry S.No 311/6, 311/7, 311/8 and 311/13 are the absolute and self acquired properties of D-3. D-3 has purchased those items under Sale Deeds dated 30.10.1977 and 25.5.1983 Since the date of purchase, D-3 is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of those items and he has also made improvements. Hence the Plaintiff is not entitled to suit items 27 to 30. D-3 is entitled to 1/4th share regarding the other items of properties.

    4. I.A No. 230 of 2000: — As per order in this application, Receiver was appointed to manage the plaint schedule property ‘A’ and ‘B’.

    5. I.A No. 283 of 2001: — This application was filed to appoint an Advocate Commissioner to take charge of ‘D’ Schedule property. ‘D’ Schedule Property relates to Door No. 28, South Bagh Road, T. Nagar Madras-17.

    6. Application was taken up on 19.4.2001 and notice to counsel for R-1 and R-2 was ordered. Application was posted on 24.4.01 For filing counter, the case was adjourned to 26.4.01 Since there was no representation for R-1 and R-2, the application for appointment of Receiver for ‘D’ Schedule Property was allowed by order of the Court dated 26.4.2001

    7. I.A No. 540 of 2001 in I.A No. 283 of 2001 filed on 10.8.2001: — This application was filed under Or. 9 R.7 CPC to set aside the exparte order dated 26.4.2001, passed against the Petitioner/D-2 in appointing the Advocate Commissioner for ‘D’ Schedule property. According to the Revision Petitioner, on 26.4.2001, his father-in-law fell ill and that he has to take his father-in-law to hospital for treatment and that he was unable to appear in the Court on that day and also instruct his counsel to appear and file the counter Statement. Expressing hardship, the second Defendant/Revision Petitioner sought to set aside the exparte order passed in I.A No. 283 of 2001.

    8. The Application was resisted by the first Defendant on the grounds that the application has been belatedly filed and that the Petitioner ought to have filed an application for condoning the delay and that the petition is not maintainable. It has been further said that the Advocate Receiver appointed, has already taken possession of the ‘D’ schedule property and leased the same, against which the Petitioner could have no objection. The Petitioner/D-2 had removed pipes and motor and acted against the interest of other co-owners and committed acts of waste.

    9. Upon consideration of the contentions of both parties, the learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the application inter-alia on the following grounds: —

    (i) the Petitioner has not made out sufficient cause for his non-appearance on 26.4.2004 and that no evidence is produced showing that his father-in-law was ill on 26.4.2004;

    (ii) the petition has been filed beyond thirty days and that no petition to condone the delay has been filed;

    (iii) in the Written Statement filed in I.A No. 238/2000, the Petitioner/D-2 has filed the counter Statement stating that if at all any Receiver is to be appointed, then the Receiver has to be appointed for ‘D’ Schedule property also.

    10. Aggrieved over the same, the Revision Petitioner/D-2 has preferred this revision. The Respondents have remained exparte. Since the question regarding Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is involved, earlier this Court has appointed one Mr. Rajendra Kumar as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.

    11. Assailing the impugned order, the learned counsel for the revision Petitioner has submitted that the finding of the trial Court that the petition ought to have been filed with an application to condone the delay is erroneous. It is contended that Art. 123 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to set aside the exparte order and the application to set aside the exparte order shall be governed only by the Residuary Clause in Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. It is further submitted that when Or. 9 R.7 petition is not governed by Art. 127, the trial Court erred in finding that the application has not been filed within thirty days. Pointing out that the appointment of Receiver for a property in South Bagh Road, T. Nagar, which is of commercial importance has serious implications, the learned counsel has submitted that the trial Court has not taken into consideration the importance of the location and that casual manner of appointing the Advocate Receiver cannot be sustained. It is further submitted that the averments made in the counter statement in I.A No. 238 of 2000 is purely argumentative in nature and that the lower Court erred in allowing the same and appointing an Advocate Receiver.

    12. Upon consideration of the submissions, the only point involved in this revision is whether the learned Subordinate Judge was right in allowing the application and in appointing the Advocate Receiver for ‘D’ Schedule Property, referring to the averments in the counter Statement in I.A No. 238/2000 and whether the finding of the trial Court that the application has been filed beyond thirty days is sustainable?

    13. Earlier in I.A No. 238/2000, Advocate Receiver was appointed relating to ‘A’ and ‘B’ Schedule properties. Later I.A No. 283/2001 was filed to appoint Advocate Commissioner to ‘D’ schedule property which relates to Door No. 28, South Bagh Road, T. Nagar. The order of appointment of Advocate Receiver in I.A No. 238/2001 cannot be said to be consequential, since in I.A No. 283/2001, the order directs the Advocate Commissioner to do certain acts viz., to take charge of ‘D’ Schedule Property and to manage the same by leasing the same to third party and to deposit the rent.

    14. The appointment of Receiver is purely discretionary. It should be exercised in exceptional cases. The discretion is not to be exercised in an unregulated manner, but with great caution and after considering all the entire circumstances of the case. The Receiver is not merely to be appointed simply because it would be convenient or would result in no harm to the Respondents. Unless case has been made out that the property in question would be dissipated, the Advocate Receiver cannot be appointed. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the revision Petitioner, appointment of Receiver for a property in a commercial location like T. Nagar has serious implications. Taking charge of the premises and leasing out to tenants would certainly affect the status quo and the rights of parties. In view of the same, sufficient opportunity ought to have been afforded to the Respondents to file their counter statement. From the records it is seen that the application was filed on 19.4.2001 For filing of the counter, the case was adjourned to 24.4.2001 Only two days time was given to the Respondents 1 and 2 for filing the counter. On 26.4.2001, the petition was allowed on the only ground that there was no representation for the Respondents 1 and 2 and that their counter statement has not been filed. No sufficient opportunity has been afforded to the Defendants to file their counter statement nor was the Court satisfied that there are substantial grounds for appointment of Advocate Receiver.

    15. For allowing the petition and to appoint Receiver, the learned Subordinate Judge has referred to the earlier averments in the counter statement filed in I.A No. 238/2000 in which the revision Petitioner has averred: —

    “It is significant to mention here that Petitioner/1st Defendant has deliberately omitted to include schedule ‘B’ of the suit property. If at all any receiver to be appointed, then he has to be appointed for that ‘D’ schedule property also.”

    The above averments that ‘if at all any receiver to be appointed, then he has to be appointed for that ‘D’ schedule property also’ is purely argumentative. The above averments cannot amount to admission, holding the revision Petitioner/D-2 responsible for such statements. The lower Court was not right in placing reliance upon the above averments in allowing the petition in appointing Advocate Commissioner.

    16. I.A No. 283/2001 was ordered exparte on 26.4.2001 The application to set aside that exparte order was filed on 10.8.2001, only after four months. Yet another reason for dismissing the petition was that the petition was filed on 10.8.2001 beyond thirty days of the order in I.A No. 283/2001. It was also found that the application to set aside the exparte order ought to have been filed within thirty days from the date of order and the application filed beyond thirty days is not maintainable.

    17. Learned counsel Mr. Rajendra Kumar, Amicus Curiae has made his submissions contending that the petition under Or. 9 R.7 would be covered not under Art. 123 but would be governed by the residuary clause contained under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has drawn the attention of the Court to the decision in AIR 1988 Calcutta 358.

    18. The point for consideration is whether the limitation for making application under Or. 9 R.7 CPC is governed by Art. 123 of the Limitation Act or by the Residuary Clause contained in Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. Art. 123 applies to an application by a Defendant to set aside a Decree passed exparte. Thirty days period of limitation is prescribed for such application; commencing from the date of decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served; when the applicant had knowledge of the Decree. Thus Art. 123 speaks of a Decree passed exparte and not an exparte order. It is relevant to note that in some other Articles, reference has been made to both Decrees and Orders. Thus the legislature has maintained the difference between “Decree and Order”. Art. 123 shall apply only to exparte decrees or exparte orders having the force of Decree or Order which finally determines the right of the parties.

    19. Thus an order passed in a suit, finally determining the rights of the parties shall be a decree, while final order passed on an application shall simply be an order and not a Decree. Thus the word ‘Decree’ must be given the meaning assigned to it in the Civil Procedure Code. To put it differently, the prescribed period of limitation for an application under Or. 9, R.13 CPC, for setting aside an exparte Decree is thirty days, but not for an application to set aside an exparte order, with the result that an application for setting aside the exparte order shall be governed by the residuary clause contained in Art. 137 of the Limitation Act.

    20. The learned counsel appointed to assist the Court has drawn the attention of the Court to the decision reported in AIR 1988 Calcutta 358. This Court's finding that petition filed under Or. 9 R.9 would be governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act is fortified by the decision of the Full Court of the Calcutta High Court which reads.

    “As regards the limitation for filing the aforesaid application for restoration there is no specific provision in the Limitation Act 1963 and therefore such application for restoration would be governed by Art. 137 of the Act and be filed within a period of three years as prescribed therein. Although the period of limitation for making an application for restoration of a suit dismissed for default under Or. 9 is thirty days from the date of the order of dismissal, the application for restoration of miscellaneous case arising out of such application under Or. 9, when such Misc. Case is dismissed for default, is not governed by the provisions of Art. 122 of the Limitation Act in view of the fact that expressly in terms of the said Art. 122, the miscellaneous case arising out of an application under Or. 9 is not attracted.”

    21. When Art. 123 applies only to exparte decree, the learned Subordinate Judge was not right in finding that the application filed under Or. 9 R.7 CPC beyond thirty days is not maintainable. Hence the impugned order cannot be sustained.

    22. This Court places on record the valuable assistance of Mr. Rajendra Kumar in assisting the Court, as to the applicability of Art. 123 of the Limitation Act or the Residuary Clause regarding the petitions filed under Or. 9 R.1 CPC.

    23. For the foregoing reasons, the revision is allowed and the order and decree made in I.A No. 540/2001 in I.A No. 283/2001 in O.S No. 34/2000 dated 2.11.2001 made by the Subordinate Judge, Maduranthakam are set aside. The Subordinate Judge, Maduranthakam, (now said to have been transferred to the District Court, Chengalpattu) is directed to give opportunity to the second Defendant to file counter statement in I.A No. 238/2001 and after affording sufficient opportunity dispose of the same in accordance with law. There is no order as to costs. Consequently, CMP No. 4566 of 2003 is closed.

    VCJ/VCS

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Rajaji Petitioner v. R. Krishnaji
    (Jun 14, 2005)