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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • P.Mani
  • M.Jaichandran
  • G.R.Svaminathan
  • A.Thiyagarajan
Judges
  • Mr. Justice S. Sardar Zackria Hussain
Acts
  • Section 25(a) of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act
  • Section 40 of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act
  • Order XIV Rule 2(ii) read with Section 151 C.P.C.
  • SECTION 25 COURT FEES ACT
  • Section 40 of the Court Fees Act
  • Order 14, Rule 2 C.P.C. (3)
  • Order 14 rule 2 C.P.C.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • P.Mani
  • M.Jaichandran
  • G.R.Svaminathan
  • A.Thiyagarajan
Judges
  • Mr. Justice S. Sardar Zackria Hussain
Acts
  • Section 25(a) of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act
  • Section 40 of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act
  • Order XIV Rule 2(ii) read with Section 151 C.P.C.
  • SECTION 25 COURT FEES ACT
  • Section 40 of the Court Fees Act
  • Order 14, Rule 2 C.P.C. (3)
  • Order 14 rule 2 C.P.C.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition was filed by the second defendant in O.S. No. 127 of 2001 (District Munsif Court, Cuddalore) challenging the order dated 8.4.2004 which dismissed I.A. No. 272 of 2004. The interlocutory application had sought to try, as a preliminary issue, the question of the trial court's pecuniary jurisdiction by contending that the suit was not properly valued for court-fee purposes.

The first respondent (plaintiff) sued for declaration of title and possession in respect of certain suit properties, and for declarations that a power of attorney allegedly obtained from the plaintiff on 21.1.1997 by the first defendant was void for fraud and misrepresentation; the plaintiff also sought a declaration that several sale deeds (dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999) executed by the first defendant in favour of defendants 2 and 3 under that power of attorney were null and void.

The plaintiff claimed title as a grant by the Tamil Nadu Government (23.1.1973), had enjoyed the properties until the patta was cancelled on 25.5.1989, and pursued a series of writ petitions and revenue proceedings concerning the patta. The plaintiff had given a power of attorney to the first defendant on 21.1.1997 while ill, and alleged the first defendant misused that power to sell the properties.

The revision petitioner/second defendant filed a written statement and I.A. No. 272 of 2004 contending the suit was incorrectly valued (arguing court-fee payable under Section 40, Court Fees Act, not under Section 25(a)), and therefore the District Munsif Court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the application, holding that (a) trial had already commenced and evidence was recorded, (b) the valuation issue had been raised in the additional written statement and framed as an additional issue, and (c) the correctness of court-fee valuation could only be gone into at trial. This order dated 8.4.2004 was the subject of the present revision, which was heard by the High Court and resulted in dismissal of the revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the question of pecuniary jurisdiction (adequacy/correctness of court fee valuation) can be tried as a preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule 2(ii) read with Section 151 CPC where the trial has already commenced and evidence has been recorded.
  2. Whether the relief sought (a declaration that sale deeds executed by the first defendant are null and void and not binding on the plaintiff) requires the suit to be valued and court-fee paid under Section 40 of the Court Fees Act (because the plaintiff effectively seeks to set aside sale deeds), or whether valuation under Section 25(a) (valuation of suit property on the basis of 30 times kist for ryotwari land) is correct.
  3. Whether the valuation stated in the sale deeds (aggregating Rs.6,00,000/-) is the appropriate basis for court-fee calculation for the plaintiff's claims.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner's (Second Defendant's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff has challenged the sale deeds dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999 as null and void and not binding; therefore, court-fee for setting aside those sale deeds must be paid under Section 40 of the Court Fees Act rather than under Section 25(a).
  • If court-fee is assessed with reference to the value stated in those sale deeds (which comes to Rs.6,00,000/-), the District Munsif Court will lack pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit.
  • The valuation of the suit property at 30 times of kist (under Section 25(a)) is incorrect in the circumstances.
  • Relied on the decision in Solaiammal (died) & Anr. v. Rajarathinam & Ors. for the proposition that pecuniary jurisdiction can be tried as a preliminary issue when valuation is apparent on the face of the plaint and does not require recording of further evidence.

Plaintiff's (First Respondent's) Arguments

  • No specific prayer was made in the plaint to "set aside" the sale deeds; the relief framed was a declaration that those sale deeds are null and void and not binding on the plaintiff.
  • Consequently, valuation and court-fee under Section 25(a) of the Court Fees Act (valuation of the suit property—land—at 30 times kist) is appropriate and the court-fee paid is proper.
  • The value mentioned in the sale deeds (Rs.6,00,000/-) cannot be adopted for the purpose of payment of court-fees in this suit.
  • Because the trial had already commenced and evidence was recorded, the belated application to try pecuniary jurisdiction as a preliminary issue should not be allowed; the preliminary issue, if at all, must be decided along with other issues at trial.
  • Relied on several decisions (Major Ramachandran v. Rema Jayarajan; Laljivora v. Srividya; A. Manivannan v. Sivaraj) for the propositions that belated preliminary applications after trial commencement are impermissible or that valuation issues do not fall under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC and that Order 14 Rule 2 is confined to pure questions of law.

Third Respondent's Arguments

  • Relied on Sundarrajan & Ors. v. Vellai Vinayagar Koil & Ors. (A.I.R. 2001 Madras 110) for the proposition that the High Court cannot ordinarily invoke revisional jurisdiction merely to examine whether adequate court-fee has been paid; and that valuation of ryotwari land at 30 times survey assessment is not open to objection.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Solaiammal (died) & Anr. v. Rajarathinam & Ors. That pecuniary jurisdiction can be tried as a preliminary issue when valuation of the suit is apparent on the face of the plaint and no further evidence recording is required. The Court noted this principle but held it inapplicable on the facts because the present suit required consideration of whether the plaintiff sought to set aside sale deeds and because trial had already commenced; therefore the Solaiammal principle did not support the revision petitioner's case.
Major Ramachandran & Anr. v. Mrs. Rema Jayarajan That a belated application filed after commencement of trial cannot be entertained and that preliminary issues should be decided on the basis of pleadings, documents and oral evidence along with other issues. The Court accepted the principle that belated preliminary applications after trial commencement are impermissible and relied upon it to support dismissal of the revision petition.
Laljivora v. Srividya, 2001 (2) C.T.C. 411 The issue relating to valuation for court-fee purposes does not fall under Order 14 Rule 2 CPC. The Court invoked this holding to support the conclusion that valuation is not a preliminary issue under Order 14 Rule 2 and therefore could not be tried as a preliminary issue after trial commencement.
A. Manivannan & 2 Ors. v. Sivaraj & 6 Ors., 2001 (4) C.T.C. 2 Order 14 Rule 2 CPC is intended to give the Court power to deal with pure questions of law as preliminary issues; after the 1976 amendment to the CPC, courts are directed to decide all issues after trial. The Court relied on this principle to conclude that factual/valuation issues are not appropriate for preliminary determination under Order 14 Rule 2 and that the present petition was therefore not maintainable as a preliminary issue application.
Sundarrajan & Ors. v. Vellai Vinayagar Koil & Ors., A.I.R. 2001 Madras 110 That a revision petitioner cannot invoke High Court revisional jurisdiction merely to question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate court fee; and that valuation of ryotwari land at 30 times survey assessment is not open to objection. The Court referred to this decision to reinforce that the High Court should not exercise revision to re-evaluate adequacy of court-fee and that the 30-times-kist valuation for ryotwari land is acceptable, supporting dismissal of the revision petition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a focused analysis of procedural posture, pleadings, and the nature of the relief sought by the plaintiff. The key reasoning steps, as stated in the opinion, are as follows:

  1. Procedural posture: The suit was filed on 15.3.2001; the second defendant's written statement was filed on 30.11.2001; the trial had commenced and evidence had been recorded before I.A. No. 272 of 2004 (the petition to try pecuniary jurisdiction as a preliminary issue) was filed in 2004. The Court treated the timing as material.
  2. Scope of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC: The Court accepted the cited authorities' distinction that Order 14 Rule 2 is intended for pure questions of law that can be decided as preliminary issues, whereas valuation/court-fee matters normally do not fall within that category—particularly where factual enquiry or trial evidence may be required.
  3. Nature of relief sought: The Court examined the pleadings and noted that the plaintiff did not specifically pray to "set aside" the sale deeds; rather, the plaint sought declarations that the sale deeds were null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. On that basis the Court concluded that the applicable mode of valuation and the corresponding court-fee was under Section 25(a) (valuation of land—here on the basis of 30 times kist) and not under Section 40 (which applies where a decree is sought to set aside documents such as sale deeds).
  4. Appropriateness of preliminary trial on valuation: Given that the trial had already started and evidence was on record, and that valuation for court-fee purposes does not properly fall under Order 14 Rule 2 where factual enquiry is involved, the Court found no necessity to separate the valuation/pecuniary jurisdiction issue as a preliminary issue; it was permissible and appropriate for that matter to be gone into at trial.
  5. Evaluative conclusion: The Court concluded that the plaintiff's choice to value the suit on the basis of 30 times kist under Section 25(a) was correctly made, and that the contention that the lower court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction (if valuation were taken at Rs.6,00,000 as per sale deeds and court-fee under Section 40) was not a correct characterization of the plaintiff's claim or of the applicable law on the facts of this case.
  6. Application of precedents: The Court applied the cited precedents to the facts and found the decisions relied upon by the revision petitioner not applicable; it also relied upon authorities that bar belated applications to sever preliminary issues after commencement of trial and that valuation issues do not ordinarily fall under Order 14 Rule 2.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition fails and is dismissed; the High Court confirmed the order dated 8.4.2004 in I.A. No. 272 of 2004 in O.S. No. 127 of 2001 passed by the District Munsif, Cuddalore. No costs were awarded.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the trial court's dismissal of the second defendant's petition to try pecuniary jurisdiction as a preliminary issue stands and the valuation/court-fee question may be gone into in the ordinary course at trial.
  • The opinion holds on the facts that the plaintiff's valuation under Section 25(a) (30 times kist for ryotwari land) was correct and that Section 40 valuation (based on the sale-deed figures) was not applicable to the plaintiff's pleaded reliefs; consequently the District Munsif Court retains pecuniary jurisdiction.
  • No broader or new precedent was laid down by the Court; the decision applies established principles (as stated in the cited authorities) concerning the limited scope of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC and the inadmissibility of belated applications to sever preliminary issues after trial commencement.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond that text.

Show full summary ...

    V.S. Jagadeesan v. Madar Saheb Others

    1. The second defendant in O.S. No. 127 of 2001 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Cuddalore is the revision petitioner. The revision is filed challenging the order dated 8.4.2004, dismissing the petition I.A. No. 272 of 2004 filed under Order XIV Rule 2(ii) read with Section 151 C.P.C. to try the issue with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction as preliminary issue.

    2. The first respondent/plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title to the suit properties and for possession; for declaration that the power of attorney deed dated 21.1.1999 obtained by the first defendant by fraud and misrepresentation is not binding on the plaintiff and also for declaration that the sale deeds dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999 executed by the first defendant in favour of the defendants 2 and 3 under the invalid power of attorney deed are null and void and not binding on the plaintiff.

    3. The plaintiff claims title to the suit properties as grant made by the Tamil Nadu Government on 23.1.1973 and the plaintiff has been in enjoyment of the suit properties by paying tax till 1988. The patta was cancelled by the Government on 25.5.1989 and challenging the same Writ Petition in W.P. No. 12999 of 1989 was filed, in which the plaintiff was directed to exhaust his remedies before the Revenue Officials. The plaintiff preferred revision in the Revenue Department, in which also he was not successful and ended against him on 5.2.1992. The plaintiff filed another Writ Petition in W.P. No. 13019 of 1992 and as per order dated 8.1.1999, the title of the plaintiff in the suit properties has been confirmed, directing the Revenue Officials to conduct an enquiry and accordingly after enquiry, the patta for the properties were cancelled. Again the plaintiff filed Writ Petition in W.P. No. 22727 of 2000 and got stay against the order of the Revenue Department on 15.9.2000. Since the plaintiff fell sick, he gave the Power of Attorney to the first defendant on 21.1.1997 to look after the properties. By misusing the same, the first defendant sold the properties to the defendants 2 and 3 and therefore, challenging the said sale deeds executed by the first defendant in favour of the defendants 2 and 3 and seeking the above stated reliefs, the suit was filed.

    4. The revision petitioner/second defendant filed the written statement and resisted the suit. The second defendant filed I.A. No. 272 of 2004 that the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of Court fees and jurisdiction and so this issue is to be tried as preliminary issue. Further it is stated that for the relief to set aside the sale deeds, it is to be valued under Section 40 of the Court Fees Act and not under Section 25(a) of the Court Fees Act and so the plaintiff is to value the suit as per the value stated in the documents, which comes to Rs.6,00,000/- and the valuation of the suit property at 30 times of kist is not correct and if the suit is properly valued, the District Munsif Court will not have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit.

    5. The plaintiff opposed the petition in the counter by stating that no prayer is sought to set aside the sale deeds dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999 and as such, the Court fees paid valuing the suit under Section 25(a)of the Court Fees Act being proper, the said Court has got pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. Further, it is also stated in the counter that the value mentioned in the documents which comes to Rs.6,00,000/- cannot be adopted for the purpose of payment of Court Fees.

    6. The trial Court in not accepting the case of the revision petitioner/second defendant and finding that already trial of the suit was commenced and such issue has been raised in the additional written statement and accordingly additional issue has been framed as to whether the Court fees paid is correct and since that can be gone into only at the time of the trial of the suit, there is no necessity to try the issue as a preliminary issue and accordingly dismissed the said petition. The order is challenged in this revision.

    7. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents.

    8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/second defendant vehemently contended that inasmuch as the plaintiff/first respondent has challenged the sale deeds dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999 in favour of the defendants 2 and 3 executed by the first defendant on the strength of the power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in his favour as null and void and not binding on the plaintiff and seeks to set aside the said sale deeds, the Court fee is payable only under Section 40 of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act and not under Section 25(a) of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act and as such the valuation of the suit property at 30 times of kist is not correct and if the suit is valued properly with reference to the value mentioned in the sale deeds dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999 which comes to Rs.6,00,000/-, then the said District Munsif Court will not have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit. In support of such contention, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/second defendant relied on the decision of this Court in Solaiammal(died) and Anr. v. Rajarathinam and five Ors. , in which this Court has held that pecuniary jurisdiction can be tried as preliminary issue when valuation of the suit is apparent on the face of plaint averments and no further recording of evidence is to be required. But, where factual enquiry about the market value of the suit property is to be made, it cannot be tried as preliminary issue.

    9. The learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff submitted that inasmuch as the plaintiff has not prayed to set aside the sale deeds 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999 executed by the first defendant/second respondent in favour of the defendants 2 and 3 and since it is only stated in the plaint that since the above sale deeds have been executed by the first defendant to the defendants 2 and 3 on the strength of the Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff to look after the suit properties and as such, sought the relief to declare the said sale deeds as null and void and not binding on the plaintiff and therefore, according to the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff, the valuation made under Section 25(a) of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act is correct. The learned counsel also contended that inasmuch as the trial of the suit has already commenced and evidence recorded, the petition, subject matter of this revision, filed to try issue with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction as preliminary issue, cannot be allowed to decide the issue as preliminary issue. In support of such contention, the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff relied on the following decisions:-

    (1) Major Ramachandran and Anr. v. Mrs. Rema Jayarajan, represented by power agent , in which, this Court held that the belated application filed after commencement of trial cannot be entertained and the preliminary issue had to be decided on the basis of pleadings, documents and oral evidence along with other issues as well.

    (2) Laljivora v. Srividya reported in 2001(2) C.T.C. 411, in which, this Court held that the issue relating to valuation of Court fees does not fall under Order 14, Rule 2 C.P.C.

    (3) A. Manivannan and 2 Ors. v. - Sivaraj and 6 Ors. reported in 2001(4) C.T.C. 2, in which, this Court held that Order 14 rule 2 C.P.C. gives Court power to deal with issues of pure question of law as preliminary issues and after 1976 amendment of Civil Procedure Code, Court is directed to decide all issues after trial.

    10. The learned counsel for the third respondent relied on the decision in Sundarrajan and Ors. v. Vellai Vinayagar Koil and Ors. reported in A.I.R. 2001 Madras 110, in which, this Court held that the revision petitioner cannot invoke revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate court fee on the plaint or not. It is also held that the valuation of ryotwari land at 30 times survey assessment is not open to objection.

    11. The suit was filed on 15.3.2001 and the second defendant filed the written statement on 30.11.2001 and the trial of the suit was commenced and only thereafter, the second defendant has filed I.A. No. 272 of 2004, subject matter of this revision to try the issue regarding pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court as preliminary issue by stating that the Court fee is payable only under Section 40 of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act and the valuation of the suit under Section 25(a) of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act is incorrect, in that the plaintiff seeks to set aside the sale deeds dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999.

    12. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff, the trial of the suit was already commenced and the issue relating to the valuation of the Court fees does not fall under Order 14 rule 2 C.P.C. Further, the plaintiff only seeks that the sale deeds dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999 executed by the first defendant in favour of the defendants 2 and 3 under the invalid power of attorney deed, are null and void and not binding on the plaintiff and no prayer is sought to set aside the sale deeds and only in which case, the Court fee payable is on the value of the suit property under Section 40 of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act. Therefore, there is no force in the argument advanced for the revision petitioner/second defendant that the Court fees paid is incorrect and that the suit is to be valued under Section 40 of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, taking into consideration, the valuation of the suit property is to the tune of Rs.6,00,000/- as mentioned in the sale deeds. In that view, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/second defendant is not applicable to the facts of the case.

    13. The suit property being a landed property, the suit valuation on the basis of 30 times of kist and under Section 25(a) of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act has been correctly made and there is no need for the first respondent/plaintiff to pay Court fees under Section 40 of the Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, since no declaration is sought to set aside the sale deeds dated 27.1.1997, 29.1.1997 and 16.9.1999 executed by the first defendant in favour of the defendants 2 and 3 on the strength of the power of attorney executed by the plaintiff. The trial Court, considering all these aspects has dismissed the petition and there is no reason to interfere with such order.

    14. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition fails and the same is dismissed, confirming the order dated 8.4.2004 in I.A. No. 272 of 2004 in O.S. No. 127 of 2001 passed by the District Munsif, Cuddalore. No costs.

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    Comments

    V.S. Jagadeesan v. Madar Saheb Others
    (Apr 5, 2005)