Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mrs. T. Meenakumari, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (appellant) filed C.S. No. 799 of 1996 seeking: a declaration that he is entitled to a preferential right to purchase the interests of defendants 1 to 6; a declaration that the sale deed dated 29.1.1996 executed by defendants 1 to 6 in favour of the seventh defendant is not valid and not binding on the plaintiff; and a direction to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and put him in possession of the shares.

The suit property is described as ground and premises bearing door No. 20, Ravanier Street, Park Town, Chennai, which originally belonged to Subramania Achari (who died intestate on 24.4.1972). The plaintiff and defendants 1 to 6 are alleged co-heirs and each entitled to a 1/7th share; defendant 2 (a son of the first wife) had earlier filed O.S. No. 1933 of 1989 for partition, and a preliminary decree was passed on 9.3.1993 fixing shares as 1/7th each.

While the application for a final decree in the partition suit was pending, defendants 1 to 6 executed a sale deed dated 29.1.1996 conveying their aggregate 6/7th share to the seventh defendant (an alleged stranger). The plaintiff alleged this sale violated Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act and sought to exercise a preferential right to purchase.

Defendant 2 filed Application No. 2458 of 1998 seeking dismissal of the suit on grounds that the plaintiff had notice of the proposed sale, had expressed inability to purchase the entire property (via a letter dated 4.1.1995), that the sale had already been effected, and therefore the suit claiming rights under Section 22 was not maintainable.

The learned single judge framed the issue of maintainability and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff appealed; the Division Bench (authored by Mrs. T. Meenakumari, J.) set aside the single judge's dismissal and remanded the matter for consideration on merits. The appeals were allowed and no costs were awarded; C.M.P. No. 4302 of 1999 was closed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit claiming enforcement of preferential/preeemptive rights under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act is maintainable when the alleged transfer (sale deed) to a stranger has already been executed.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's alleged failure to exercise his preferential right (including the effect of the letter dated 4.1.1995 and a notice said to have been sent on 5.9.1994) barred him from seeking relief under Section 22.
  3. Whether the remedy for enforcement of preferential rights under Section 22 is by an application under Section 22(2) or by a regular civil suit before a competent Civil Court (i.e., the appropriate procedure for enforcing the right).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant asserted he had a preferential right under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act to acquire the interests of defendants 1 to 6 and that the sale deed of 29.1.1996 was invalid insofar as it ignored his right.
  • The appellant denied receiving the notice said to have been posted on 5.9.1994 and contested the single judge's reliance on his letter dated 4.1.1995 (arguing the letter did not amount to an expression of inability to exercise his Section 22 rights in the manner found by the single judge).
  • The appellant contended the suit was for a declaration of his preferential right and for consequential relief that the sale to the seventh defendant was invalid, and that the single judge erred in dismissing the suit as not maintainable.

Respondents' / Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants/respondents argued that the plaintiff had notice of the proposed sale (a notice dated 5.9.1994 sent by registered post) and had expressed inability to purchase the entire property (letter of 4.1.1995), so he had failed to exercise his preferential right when the transfer was proposed.
  • They submitted that once the sale had been effected in favour of the seventh defendant, the plaintiff could not challenge it by invoking Section 22(1) and that the suit was not maintainable. They relied on authorities supporting the proposition that a completed transfer may preclude certain remedies under Section 22(2).
  • More specifically, respondents contended the remedy available where sale has been completed is limited and/or the plaintiff should have exercised the right prior to the sale becoming a concluded transaction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vallivil (Valliyil) Sreedevi Amma v. Subhadra Devi (A.I.R. 1976 Kerala 19) Held that enforcement of preferential right under Section 22(1) is by way of regular civil suit; alienation in violation of Section 22(1) is voidable (not void) and remedy lies to seek enforcement of the limited right of purchase. The court cited this decision for the proposition that where property is alienated to strangers a full civil suit is the appropriate remedy and that the invalidity of such transfers is an incidental question in that suit. This supported remanding the matter for adjudication on merits rather than dismissing as not maintainable.
Tarak Das Ghosh v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh (A.I.R 1980 Calcutta 53) The opinion lists this case as relied upon by respondents; no detailed principle from the case is articulated in the text. The case was cited by the defendants before the single judge and on appeal; the present opinion records it among authorities relied upon by respondents but does not extract or apply a specific rule from it in the written reasons.
Ghewarwala Jain v. Hanuman Prasad (A.I.R. 1981 M.P. 250) Stated, as recorded in the opinion, that once a transfer has been concluded the co-sharer cannot exercise the preferential right under Section 22(1), and an application under Section 22(2) to determine price would not be maintainable. The respondents relied upon this decision to support the proposition that a completed transfer limits the remedies available under Section 22; the court recorded the reliance but ultimately proceeded to set aside the single judge's dismissal and remand for merits.
Muralidhar Das v. Bansidhar Das (A.I.R. 1986 Orissa 119) Held that Section 22(2) does not lay down the procedure to enforce the right of pre-emption under Section 22(1); Section 22(2) applies where co-heir is agreeable to transfer but parties cannot agree on consideration. It does not apply where transfer is made to a stranger or where the transferring co-heir is not agreeable to transfer to the co-heir exercising the right. The court relied on this authority for the principle that an aggrieved co-heir's remedy to enforce preferential rights when transfer is to strangers is by a suit before a civil court, not by an application under Section 22(2). This supported the view that the matter requires full adjudication on merits.
Sachindra Nath Banerjee v. Hari Bhushan Banerjee (67 C.W.N. 792) Recorded in the opinion for the proposition that the law of pre-emption (in a comparative context) refers to sale already effected under Section 4 of the Partition Act; noted contrast with Section 22 which provides a right when there is a proposal for transfer and even before transfer is effected. The court discussed this case to illustrate that Section 22 creates a right on a proposal for transfer (not only post-transfer) and that a proposal merging into a transaction should not extinguish the right; used to analyse timing of rights and remedies under Section 22.
Nagammal and others v. Nanjammal and another (1970 (1) M.L.J. 358) Held that burden lies on purchaser to establish that other co-heirs waived or declared their preferential right; absence of such reference means co-heirs have not lost their preferential right by sale. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that the purchaser must show that co-heirs waived or declared their rights; used in the broader discussion of whether the plaintiff's rights were lost.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with a textual recitation of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act (subsections (1), (2) and (3)), and noted its purpose: when an intestate's interest devolves upon two or more Class I heirs, any heir proposing to transfer his/her interest gives other heirs a preferential right to acquire that interest.

Applying the statute to the facts as pleaded and recorded, the court observed:

  • The preliminary decree in O.S. No. 1933 of 1989 (9.3.1993) adjudicated each co-heir's share at 1/7th.
  • While the final-decree application was pending, defendants 1 to 6 executed a sale deed dated 29.1.1996 conveying their 6/7th undivided share to a stranger (seventh defendant).
  • The plaintiff had addressed a letter dated 4.1.1995 proposing a division of the house into front and back portions and expressing a desire to take the front portion; the court quoted the relevant passage in which the plaintiff said he was "not in a position or having money to give all of you."
  • The defendants asserted they had sent a registered notice on 5.9.1994 asking if the plaintiff wished to purchase and to state the price; the notice was said to have been returned undelivered. The single judge had found the plaintiff had avoided the notice and had admitted inability to purchase.

The Division Bench then examined the authorities put forward by both sides. It summarized the leading principles from the cited cases: (a) Section 22(1) confers an incidental right of preferential purchase; (b) Section 22(2) is mainly concerned with determination of consideration when co-heirs agree to transfer to another co-heir but cannot agree on price; (c) where a transfer is effected in violation of Section 22(1), the non-alienating co-heirs have a remedy, ordinarily by a civil suit before a competent court, and the invalidity of the transfer is a matter to be incidentally determined in such suit; and (d) a completed transfer to a stranger raises factual questions necessitating full adjudication.

On these grounds the Division Bench concluded that the learned single judge's dismissal (on maintainability) was premature. Because factual issues (delivery of notice, content and effect of the plaintiff's letter, whether the plaintiff had in fact waived or abandoned his rights, and whether the co-heirs considered the plaintiff's suggestion before finalizing the sale) were bound to arise, the proper course was to allow the suit to be adjudicated on its merits in a regular civil trial rather than summarily dismissing it as not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are allowed; the judgment of the learned single judge dismissing the suit as not maintainable is set aside, and the matter is remanded to the learned single judge for consideration of all issues on merits.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff's suit (C.S. No. 799 of 1996) will be tried on the merits to determine whether the preferential right under Section 22(1) was available, whether it was validly exercised or waived, and whether the sale deed dated 29.1.1996 can be set aside or remedies granted.
  • No costs were awarded and C.M.P. No. 4302 of 1999 was closed, as recorded by the court.
  • The opinion does not record the setting of a new binding precedent; rather it applies and reconciles existing authorities and directs full adjudication of factual and legal issues in a trial court.
GS/VCS.

    P. Srinivasamurthy v. P. Leelavathy And 6 Others

    Judgment: Mrs. T. Meenakumari, J.

    These appeals have been filed against the orders of the learned single judge in C.S No. 799 of 1996 and Application No. 2458 of 1998. The appellant is the plaintiff in C.S No. 799 of 1996. The suit was filed seeking a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to the preferential right to purchase and acquire the interest of the defendants 1 to 6 and also for declaration that the sale deed dated 29.1.1996 executed by the defendants 1 to 6 in favour of the seventh defendant is not valid and not binding upon the plaintiff, and also for a direction to the defendants to execute the sale deed in respect of the suit property in favour of the plaintiff and put the plaintiff in possession of the shares of defendants 1 to 7 in the suit property.

    2. The main allegations in the plaint are: the suit property consisting of ground and premises bearing door No. 20, Ravanier Street, Park Town Chennai, originally belonged to one Subramania Achari, The said Subramania Achari died intestate on 24.4.1972 leaving behind him, his wife, a son born through his first wife and children born to him and the second wife. The first defendant is the second wife of Subramania Achari and the defendant 3 to 6 and the plaintiff are all children born to said Subramania Achari and the first defendant. The second defendant is the son bom to the first wife. The suit property has devolved upon the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 6 and each of them is entitled to 1/7th share. Whileso, the second defendant filed the suit O.S No. 1933 of 1989 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, for partition and separate possession of his share and a preliminary decree was passed in the suit on 9.3.1993 holding that the second defendant is entitled to 1/7th share and other legal heirs are entitled to the balance of 6/7th share. The second defendant has filed an application for final decree in pursuance of the preliminary decree and he is taking steps to have division of his share effected. The plaintiff is entitled to 1/7th share which has been upheld by the preliminary decree in the partition suit. The defendants 1 to 6 have joined together to deprive the plaintiff of the suit property and sold their snares in the suit property to the seventh defendant, who is an utter stranger to the family, by a sale deed dated 29.1.1996 The sale deed is contrary to the provisions of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. The plaintiff has got a preferential right to acquire the interest of the defendants 1 to 6 and 7th defendant cannot get title to the property disregarding the rights of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is ready and willing to purchase the share of the defendants 1 to 6 for the consideration to be fixed by this court. Hence the suit.

    3. The second defendant has filed an application No. 2458 of 1998 praying for dismissal of the suit contending that the plaintiff has got 1/7th share in the suit property, the defendants have got remaining 6/7th share in the suit property, which have been declared in O.S No. 1933 of 1989, that the defendants 1 to 6 found it difficult to reside in the property on account of large number of members of the family and therefore, the defendants 1 to 6 decided to sell the property and requested the plaintiff to join and sell the property in its entirety to the seventh defendant, that the plaintiff was unwilling to vacate the portion in his occupation, that the plaintiff wanted to retain that portion of the property and suggested that the other portion may be sold and proceeds divided among the defendants 1 to 6. The plaintiff was put on notice of the proposed sale of the shares of these defendants before effecting sale in favour of the seventh defendant, that the plaintiff sent a letter dated 4.1.1995 expressing his inability to purchase and retain the entire property and suggested the sale of back portion of the property, that the proposed sale was informed to the plaintiff on 5.9.1994 by registered post, that the proposal was notified to the plaintiff after preliminary decree for partition was granted on 9.3.1993, that the sale of 6/7th shares by the defendants 1 to 6 in favour of the seventh defendant was effected as early as 29.1.1996, that the present suit has been filed claiming preferential right under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, after a long delay, that the plaintiff has also filed O.S No. 1053 of 1996 in the City Civil Court, Madras, for injunction, that the plaintiff ought to have exercised right of preferential purchase before the contemplated transfer, that once the sale has been effected the plaintiff is not entitled to challenge the same and the suit itself is not maintainable.

    4. The plaintiff opposed the application by filing a counter stating that the suit is maintainable, that there was no suggestion or discussion by the plaintiff with the defendants, that the sale in favour of the seventh defendant was made behind the back of the plaintiff, that he has not stated anything in the letter dated 4/.1.1995 and that he has not received any notice from the defendants.

    5. The learned single judge after going through the averments made in the plaint and the application filed by the second defendant, has framed the issue as to the maintainability of the suit. The learned single judge has come to the conclusion that a reading of Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act makes it clear that if any persondies intestate leaving behind more than one heir specified in class 1 of the schedule and if one such heirs wants to transferd proposes to transfer his or her interest in the property, the other heirs shall have a preferential right to acquire the interest which is proposed to be transferred. It is not in dispute that the wife and children are specified in Class I of the Schedule and they are entitled to the property in equal shares. According to Section 22(1) of the Act, if any one heir proposes to sell his or her share, the other sharers have got preferential right to purchase the same. The right given to the Class I legal heir mentioned in the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act is a right of pre-emption or preferential right to claim sale proposed to be made by other heir or heirs. The right is to be exercised at the time when one of the heir or more than one heir propose to deal with his their share. As per Section 22(2) one can file an application and ask the court to adjudicate upon the consideration to be paid to the sharer by the other sharer who wants to purchase the shares of others by excising his preferential claim.

    6. After discussing the provisions of law, learned single judge has come to the conclusion that the sale deed has already been effected and the defendants 1 to 6 have executed a sale deed in respect of their 6/7th share in the suit property in favour of the seventh defendant. Learned single judge has agreed with the contentions of the defendants that the plaintiff failed to exercise his right when they proposed to effect transfer in spite of his knowledge about the proposed transfer, and, therefore the suit for setting aside the sale deed or for declaration of his rights under Section 22 is misconceived. According to the defendants, the plaintiff ought to have exercised his rights under Section 22 prior to the proposed sale deed by, the defendants 1 to 6 in favour of the seventh defendant. As the plaintiff has failed to do so, no purpose would be served in the plaintiff filing a suit for declaration of his rights under Section 22(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, when the sale has been completed in favour of the seventh defendant.

    7. Before the learned single judge, as also before us, the argument of the defendants was that the plaintiff having failed to exercise his right for preferential purchase granted under Section 22(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, he cannot file a suit for setting aside the alienation already made in favour of the seventh defendant. Learned counsel for the defendants relied upon the following decisions:

    1. Vallivil Sreedevi Amma v. Subhadra Devi (A.I.R 1976 Kerala 19)

    2. Tarak Das Ghosh v. Sunil Kumar Ghosh (A.I.R 1980 Calcutta 53)

    3. Ghewarwalajain v. Hanuman Prasand and another (A.I.R 1981 M.P 250).

    4. Muralidhar Das v. Bansidhar Das and others (A.I.R 1986 Orissa 119).

    8. Learned single judge agreed with the contention of the defendants that they have sent a notice on 5.9.1994 to the plaintiff wherein it has been clearly stated that the defendants were intending to sell their 6/7th undivided share and asked the plaintiff as to whether he is interested in purchasing their undivided share and the plaintiff has been asked to inform his willingness about the Same and the price which he would be agreeable to pay within seven days of the notice. Learned Judge has given a finding that the plaintiff has purposely avoided the notice which was sent by registered post with acknowledgement due and it has been returned by the postal authorities. The learned Judge has also discussed about the letter addressed by the plaintiff to the defendants on 4.1.1995 in Telugu which has been translated in English. Learned Judge has come to the' conclusion that in the beginning itself the plaintiff has admitted that he has come to know that the defendants including his mother were contemplating to sell the house and after expressing his anguish that the family house where they lived from their childhood may go to a outsider, stated that he was not able to purchase the shares of other co-owners. The relevant sentence of the said letter is as follows:

    “I am not in a position or having money to give all of you. So I think of an idea. That is our house may be divided into two portions lengthwise, then back portion may be sold to the marvadi temple authorities then I will take front portion. From the sale proceeds of back portion, all of you six partners share that amount. This is my idea.”

    The plaintiff has requested the other sharers to drop the idea of selling the house and consider his idea. On going through the said letter, learned Judge was of the view that the plaintiff was not willing to purchase the entire share belonging to the defendants. He has expressed his inability to purchase the share of the other co-sharers for want of funds. On the basis of the above points, learned Judge has held that there was no merit in the contention of the plaintiff that he was not given option to purchase the shares of other co-owners and that the defendants have executed the sale deed to a stranger ignoring his right of preferential purchase conferred under Section 22(1) of the Hindu-Succession Act. Learned Judge—has also observed that the plaintiff not only had the notice but also has expressed his inability to exercise the right of pre-emption or preferential right to purchase and, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff seeking to exercise his right has no substance and the suit has been filed only for the purpose of harassing his co-sharers and also third party purchaser, namely the seventh defendant who has already taken the sale deed. The co-sharers of the plaintiff namely the defendants 1 to 6, have offered to sell their share to the plaintiff which he has declined to accept and therefore, he cannot claim preferential, right conferred under Section 22(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The learned Judge has dismissed the suit.

    9. The findings of the learned single Judge have been assailed by the plaintiff/appellant on the ground that the suit should not have been dismissed when there is no documentary evidence to show that the appellant had purposely avoided the notice sent by the respondents 1 to 6 regarding their intention to sell 6/7th undivided share in the suit property. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned Judge ought not to have relied on the letter addressed by the plaintiff/defendants on 4.1.1995 He has also argued that the appellant, has only suggested the mode of division and it would not bar the appellant from exercising his right under Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act. He has further argued that there is no basis for the finding of the learned Judge that the appellant has expressed his inability to exercise the right of pre-emption in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant has preferential right to acquire the interests of the other sharers as they have not given notice of their intention of selling their shares after the passing of preliminary decree in O.S No. 1933 of 1989. He has further argued that the learned Judge has committed an error in dismissing the suit as not maintainable and failed to see that the suit is only for a declaration that the appellant is entitled to the preferential right to acquire the interests of the other sharers as well as for the consequential declaration that the sale by other sharers to the seventh defendant is not valid as no final decree has been passed in the suit O.S No. 1933 of 1989. Learned counsel has also argued that the learned Judge has ignored the provisions of Section 22(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. He has further argued that the dismissal of the suit as not maintainable is misconceived and the suit is maintainable in all aspects..

    10. Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the findings of the learned Judge on the ground that as the appellant has expressed his inability to exercise his right of pre-emption as per Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act and as the transaction has already materialised into the sale deed, the, appellant is not entitled to have a preferential right to acquire the interests of the other sharers. Learned counsel has further argued that the respondents have expressed their intention to sell the property and in their letter dated 4.1.1995 The plaintiff/appellant has expressed his inability to exercise the right of pre-emption, learned Judge relying upon the above letter, has rightly come to the conclusion that the suit filed by the appellant is not maintainable.

    11. It is necessary to extract Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act, which reads thus:

    22.(1). where, after the commencement of this Act, an interest in any immovable property of an intestate, or in any business carried on by him or her, whether solely or in conjunction with others, devolves upon two or more heirs specified in class I of the schedule, and any one of such heirs proposes to transfer his or her interests in the property or business, the other heirs shall have a preferential right to acquire the interest proposed to be transferred.

    (2). The consideration for which any interest in the property of the deceased maybe transferred under this section shall, in the absence of any agreement between the parties, be determined by the court on application being made to it in this behalf, and if any person proposing to acquire the interest is not willing to acquire it for the consideration so determined, such person shall be liable to pay all costs of or incidental to the application.

    (3). If there are two or more heirs specified in class I of the schedule proposing to acquire any interest under this section, that heir who offers the highest consideration for the transfer shall be preferred.”.

    A reading of Section 22 makes it clear that if any person dies intestate leaving behind more than one heir specified in Class I of the Schedule and if one such heir wants to transfer or proposes to transfer his or her interest in the property, the other heirs shall have a preferential right to acquire the interest which is proposed to be transferred. It is not in dispute that the said Subramania Achari died intestate leaving behind his wife, a son born through his first wife and children born to him and the second wife. It is also not in dispute that the second defendant filed O.S No. 1933 of 1989 on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, for partition and separate possession and a preliminary decree was passed on 9.3.1993 holding that the plaintiff and the defendants 1 to 6 were each entitled to 1/7th share in the suit property. The second defendant filed an application for final decree for partition by actual division of shares in accordance with the adjudication made as per the preliminary decree. While the final decree application was pending, defendants 1 to 6 have executed a sale deed in respect of their 6/7th shares in favour of the seventh defendant who is a stranger to the family by a sale deed dated 29.1.1996 In the letter dated 4.1.1995 addressed to his brother, the appellant herein has stated that he had completed 25 years of service and only 8 years of service is left. He has further stated that he never anticipated the sale of the house. The appellant seems to have proposed that the house can be divided into two portions, the back portion can be sold to the marvadi who is residing back to their house. He has expressed his desire to have the front portion. He has further suggested that the amount received out of the sale of the back portion of the house can be divided among six. He had further expressed that by this way, they will be able to retain half portion of the house. He has further suggested that before selling the house, his suggestion has to be taken into consideration. There is no material to show that the respondents have acted upon the suggestions made by the appellant. In turn, they seem to have addressed a letter to the known address of the appellant about their intention to sell 6/7th undivided share and the plaintiff was asked whether he was interested in purchasing his undivided share and he was further asked to express his willingness. But the letter seems to have not been delivered on the ground that addressee was not found. However it is also not denied that the appellant has also addressed a letter on 4.1.1995 to the defendants informing his willingness to have the front portion of the house.

    12. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the following decisions:

    (1). Sachindra Nath Banerjee v. Hari Bhushan Banerjee (67 C.W.N 792).

    (2). Nagammal and others v. Nanjammal and another (1970 (1) M.L.J 358).

    (3). Valliyil Sreedevi Amma v. Subhadra Devi and others (A.I.R 1976 Kerala 19).

    (4). Muralidhar Das v. Bansidhar Das (A.I.R 1986 Orissa 119).

    In Sachindra Nath's case (67 C.W.N 792), a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court has held that the law of pre-emption refers to sale already effected under Section 4 of the Partition Act or under any other law. Before the transfer actually takes place there is no right to make any application for pre-emption. Section 22 of the Hindu Succession Act provides that there will be a right to pre-empt as soon as there is a proposal for transfer and even before any transfer is effected. The right of pre-emption will not, however, be extinguished because the proposal has merged into a transaction. If by a proposal there is a right of pre-emption, by transaction it is proved. Any other construction would defeat the purpose of the Act. In the above case, the order of the trial court was set aside and the matter was sent back to the trial court to consider the petition on merits.

    In Nagammal's case (1970 (1)ML.J 358), a learned Judge of this court has held that the existence of the right is patent and the burden is upon the purchaser to establish that the other co-heirs declared or waived their preferential right when occasion arose. It is not pretended that the purchaser made any reference to the non-alienating co-heirs before his purchase. It follows that the plaintiffs have not lost their preferential right of purchase by the sale.

    In V. Sreedevi Amma's case (A.I.R 1976 Kerala 19), a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has held that where one of the co-heirs transfers his interest in immovable property in violation of Section 22(1) the remedy of the other co-heirs to enforce their preferential right under Section 22(1) to acquire the transferred interest, is by way of a regular civil suit before a competent Civil Court and not by way of an application under S. 22(2). It has been further held that the alienation of his interest by a co-heir in violation of Section 22(1) is not void but is voidable at the instance of the other non-alienating co-heirs. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have made it clear that the remedy lies only to file a suit for enforcement of the limited right of purchase conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 22 and in such a suit, the question of invalidity of the sale already effected by the co-sharer will be incidentally investigated and decided.

    In Muralidhar's case (AIR 1986 Orissa 119), while interpreting Section 22(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, the learned Judge has observed that Section 22(2) does not lay down the procedure for the enforcement of the right of pre-emption conferred under Section 22(1). S. 22(1) embraces only the situation where the co-heir proposing to transfer his interest is agreeable to transfer the same in favour of the other co-heir exercising his right of pre-emption but the parties cannot reach on agreement as to the consideration for the transfer. In such case, the consideration can be determined by the court on an application being made to it in this behalf. S. 22(2) does not apply to a situation where one co-heir has transferred his interest to a stranger or is not agreeable to transfer his interest to the other co-heir exercising his right of pre-emption. Therefore, an application by the aggrieved co-heir seeking to enforce his right of pre-emption conferred by S. 22(1) is not maintainable under S. 22. His remedy to enforce his right lies in the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The learned Judge has further held that if the party is not without a remedy, he may move the court for realisation of his preferential right in cases where the other co-shares are proposing to transfer or where transfer has already been made in favour of strangers.

    13. Learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 6 has relied on the decision of the Madhya Pradesh in Ghewarwala Jain v. Hanuman Prasad (A.I.R 1981 M.P 250) to substantiate his contention that once the transfer has been concluded, the co-sharer cannot exercise preferential right under Section 22(1) and therefore, application by him under Section 22(2) for determining price of property would not be maintainable.

    14. A reading of the letter dated 4.1.1995 shows the appellant, who happened to be the co-heir of the property expressing his desire to purchase a portion of the building. No evidence is placed before this court that the co-heirs before finalising the sale, have taken into consideration the option exercised by the appellant herein. The object of sub-section (1) of Section 22 is that in cases where by virtue of intestate succession under the Act any interest in immovable property has devolved upon two or more heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule and any one of such heirs proposes to transfer his interest in the property, the other heirs should have a preferential right to acquire the interest which is so proposed to be transferred. It has to be construed that Section 22(1) confers an incidental right on the heirs other than the one who proposed to transfer his interest. It is no doubt, true that sub-section (1) of Section 22 confers on such co-heirs a preferential right to acquire the interest which is proposed to be transferred by the other co-heir. When the transfer is in violation of the provisions of Section 22(1) of the Act, it goes without saying that the other co-sharer cannot certainly be without a remedy because every legal right must necessarily carry with it a remedy for enforcing the same. The remedy of the non-alienating co-heirs, in such circumstances, will be to seek the intervention of the court to enable them to acquire the right which has been transferred away by the other co-heir in violation of sub-section (1) of Section 22. As the section does not provide for any special procedure for seeking said remedy, a co-sharer has to seek enforcement of such right under Section 22(1) by way of a regular civil suit before the competent court. Where the property has been alienated in favour of strangers, there is all the more reason why there should be a full and fair adjudication of the entire matter in a suit tried before a competent Civil Court because various factual questions are bound to arise for determination in such a suit wherein the principal issue would be whether the transfer complained of was effected in violation of sub-section (1) of Section 22. The main purpose of such a suit instituted by the co-heir will necessarily be the enforcement of the right conferred by Section 22(1) of the Act. The question by invalidity of the transfer effected by the other co-heir in favour of strangers becomes relevant in such an action as an incidental matter which has necessarily to be gone into for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought by him against his co heirs in enforcement of the right conferred by Section 22(1) of the Act. The judment of the learned single judge dismissing the suit as not maintainable is set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned single judge for considering all the issues arising in the suit on merits. The appeals are allowed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No 4302 of 1999 is closed.

    GS/VCS.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    P. Srinivasamurthy v. P. Leelavathy And 6 Others
    (Mar 7, 2000)