Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

C.R.P Nos. 2216 and 2217 of 1991

Advocates

Mr. R. Singaravelan for Mr. M. Vijayakumar, Advocate for Appellants.
Mr. M. Venkatachalapathy, Senior Advocate for Mr. Shanmugam in C.R.P No. 2216 and Mr. A. Muthukumar, Advocate in C.R.P No. 2217 of 1991 for Respondents.

Judges

A. Raman, J.

Acts

Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
section 14(2)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. (2)
provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
clause (b) of sub section (1),
Section 14(2) (b) of Act
Rent Control Act
Section 14(1)(b)

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two civil revision petitions were filed by the landlords challenging appellate decisions that set aside eviction orders granted by the Rent Controller. The landlords originally filed two eviction petitions under Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960: RCOP No. 47 of 1982 (door No. 69, Pattamangalam Street — 7,000 sq. ft.) and RCOP No. 48 of 1982 (door No. 69‑B — 240 sq. ft.). Both properties form part of the same building.

Landlords claimed ownership as brothers and alleged the building was very old (stated in various pleadings as about 80–100 years), that portions (especially rear portions) had fallen or become dilapidated, and that they required possession to demolish and reconstruct. The landlords stated they had sufficient funds and gave an undertaking to demolish within a time to be fixed by the Court. Notices to vacate were said to have been issued and (in at least one account) returned as refused.

The respondent tenants resisted, contesting maintainability, the genuineness of power(s) of attorney, the mental soundness of one petitioner, the necessity and bona fides of demolition, the age/condition of the building, the landlords’ financial capacity, and asserting that the petitions were filed to coerce rent enhancement or to facilitate sale. The tenant gave evidence as RW1; the landlords led P.W.1 (and P.W.2 in one petition) and filed documentary evidence including engineer's report(s) (Ex. P.2, etc.).

The Rent Controller conducted enquiries in both matters and ordered eviction. The appellate authority (the lower appellate court) allowed the tenants’ appeals (RCA No. 4 of 1990 and RCA No. 5 of 1990) and set aside the Rent Controller’s orders. The landlords then filed two revision petitions (C.R.P. No. 2216 of 1991 and C.R.P. No. 2217 of 1991). Because the petitions concerned the same building and identical points of law/fact, they were heard together and decided by a common order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the undertaking required by Section 14(2)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was validly furnished and whether an undertaking given in pleadings or in oral testimony satisfies the statutory requirement.
Whether defects or challenges to the power of attorney and the alleged unsoundness of mind of one co‑owner (the fourth petitioner) affected the maintainability of the eviction petitions and the landlords’ locus standi.
Whether the landlords' requirement for possession to demolish and reconstruct the building was bona fide — specifically: (a) the age and condition of the building; (b) the landlords’ financial ability to demolish and reconstruct; and (c) whether the petitions were motivated by ulterior motives (such as extortion of higher rent or sale of the property).
Whether the lower appellate authority applied an incorrect or over‑rigid standard in assessing the evidence and the landlords’ entitlement to eviction under Section 14(1)(b).

Arguments of the Parties

Landlords' (Appellants') Arguments

The properties belong to the petitioners (brothers) and they seek possession to demolish and reconstruct the building.
The building is very old (expressed as 80–100 years) and portions (notably the rear portion) have fallen or become dilapidated.
The landlords have sufficient funds to demolish and reconstruct and undertake to complete demolition/reconstruction within time to be fixed by the Court (expressed in pleadings and oral evidence).
They gave notice to the tenant to vacate; they sought eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
Documentary and oral evidence (including an engineer’s report) was adduced to prove age and condition; the Rent Controller’s order of eviction was thus justified.

Respondent Tenants' Arguments

The eviction petitions are not maintainable in law or fact; power(s) of attorney are not admitted or are alleged to be not genuine.
One of the petitioners (the fourth petitioner) is alleged to be mentally unsound, raising maintainability issues.
The building is not as old or as dilapidated as alleged and does not require demolition; the landlords do not genuinely require it for demolition and reconstruction.
The landlords lack sufficient funds and are highly indebted; hence they cannot carry out the proposed reconstruction.
The petitions were filed to coerce payment of enhanced rent (specific allegations of demands of Rs. 400 or Rs. 1,000 in different petitions) or to facilitate sale — i.e., the petitions were alleged to be mala fide.
The tenant also challenged service/effect of notice(s), contending no notice was sent or no refusal occurred.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Radhakrishnan v. Rajendran & others, 1990 (II) MLJ 319 ; 1990 TLNJ 204	Holding that an undertaking given by the landlord in the course of his evidence is sufficient to satisfy Section 14(2)(b) — there is no prescribed form and no strict requirement for written form.	The court relied on this authority to hold that the undertakings in the petitions and the evidence of P.W.1 constituted sufficient compliance with Section 14(2)(b).
Jameema Beevi v. Easwarlal Patel, 1979 (II) MLJ 35	Held absence of literal reproduction of statutory wording in an undertaking does not necessarily make it deficient; undertakings given by power of attorney may satisfy Section 14(2)(b).	Cited to support liberal construction of what amounts to an undertaking and to accept the undertaking given in petition/evidence here.
1985 (98) LW 589 (citation as given in text; case name not stated)	Holding that if rent controller grants time to file undertaking and landlord submits it within time, that suffices for Section 14(2)(b).	Used to support the proposition that procedural flexibility (granting time) satisfies undertaking requirement; the court treated the undertake in petition/evidence as adequate.
Thayammal v. K. Subramanian, 1989 (1) LW 228	Undertaking given by landlord in deposition is sufficient to satisfy Section 14(2)(b).	Supported the conclusion that oral or in‑court undertakings are acceptable; applied to the present facts.
Alamelu Ammal v. Visalkshi Ammal, 1978 (91) LW 423	An undertaking given before the appellate authority was held sufficient for Section 14(2)(b) where appellate authority had set aside the rent controller’s order.	Reinforced the view that undertakings need not be strictly in a particular written format and may be accepted when made in the course of proceedings.
Ehasn Bivi & others v. Nagalakshmi Ammal, 1981 TLNJ 17	Eviction petition by one co‑owner is maintainable; written consent of other co‑owners is not necessary.	Applied to sustain the landlords’ locus: even if some powers of attorney were defective, co‑ownership and presence of other co‑owners rendered the petitions maintainable.
Sriram Pasricha v. Jagannate, 1976 (4) SCC 184	Supreme Court holding that a co‑owner is as much an owner and can maintain application for eviction.	Relied upon to show that co‑owners who are before the court can maintain eviction applications even if some co‑owners’ powers are disputed.
Vijay Singh etc. v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, 1996 (II) CTC 586; 1997 (I) MLJ 98 (SC)	Supreme Court rule: for eviction under Section 14(1)(b) (demolition/reconstruction) the building need not be actually dilapidated or dangerous; the rent controller should consider the combined scheme of Section 14(1)(b) and Section 16.	The court treated this Supreme Court decision as laying down the controlling legal proposition that landlords need not prove that the building is dangerously dilapidated; it used this to uphold the Rent Controller’s finding of bona fide requirement.
Lakshman, A & others v. Kanniammal @ Pattammal, 1995 (1) LW 632 (also cited in other passages)	Non‑examination of a commissioner/engineer is not fatal; also supports the proposition that landlords need not produce cash evidence of funds, and that finance may be available from other sources.	Used to reject tenant’s objection to the engineer’s report not being supported by oral evidence and to accept the landlords’ evidence of means.
Mamboob Badsha v. M. Manga Devi & another, 1965 (II) MLJ 209	Listed among decisions supporting that a building need not be very old/decrepit to justify eviction for demolition/reconstruction.	Referenced as part of an established line of cases on the question of "age/condition" when considering bona fide requirement.
Chandrasekara Chettiyer v. Kakumani Adikesavalu Chetty's Charities, 1965 (78) LW 326	Listed as a precedent on the point that the building need not be very old/decrepit for demolition/reconstruction eviction.	Referred to as supporting authority in the catalogue of cases on the subject.
Sha Manakchand v. Sankarji Moolchand, 1965 (2) MLJ 12	Listed among the earlier decisions regarding building age/condition for demolition‑based eviction.	Included in the list of authorities showing an established line of cases on the subject.
Narasinga Konar v. S.A.C Chirtambalam Chettiar, 1966 (79) LW 21 (SN)	Listed among authorities on the question of building age/condition for demolition‑based eviction.	Referred to as part of the supporting case law background.
A. Lakshmanan v. Kanniammal, 1995 (II) MLJ 178	Listed among authorities concerning demolition/reconstruction and the landlord’s entitlement; also cited for the non‑fatal nature of commissioner non‑examination.	Used to support acceptance of documentary/commissioner evidence and the landlords’ position about means.
Sultan Sheriff alias Basha v. Hassan Mohideen & others, 1984 (97) LW 166	Listed as a supporting authority on the same point (age/condition not strictly determinative).	Part of the catalogue of cases indicating established jurisprudence on demolition‑based eviction.
Narayanaswami Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer, 1965 (I) MLJ 78	Earlier decision referenced to show prior approach to landlord requests for demolition/reconstruction and that past proceedings or compromises do not necessarily indicate mala fides.	Quoted to reject tenant’s attempt to use earlier proceedings/compromises as proof of mala fides.
Daniel Parthasarathy v. Manickavasagam, 1965 (78) LW 24 (SN)	Listed among authorities on demolition/reconstruction eviction principles.	Included as part of the supporting jurisprudential background.
Bharath Trading Co. v. Shanmugasundaram, 1982 (I) MLJ 94; 1985 (II) MLJ 151	Listed as one of the decisions construing landlord’s right to recover possession for demolition/reconstruction.	Referred to in the list of cases demonstrating the settled principles on the subject.
Ammal Pillai v. Varadarajulu Complex, 1997 (1) LW 364	Listed among authorities on demolition/reconstruction eviction issues.	Included in the catalogue of supporting cases.
M/s. P. ORR & Sons Ltd. v. M/s. Associated Publishers, 1990 TLNJ 194	Held that initiating earlier proceedings by a landlord does not, by itself, render a subsequent bona fide requirement mala fide.	Relied upon to reject the tenant’s contention that earlier litigation or compromise demonstrated oblique motive.
Thangaswamy v. R. Vinayakamurthy, 1996 (II) MLJ 322	Referenced for the proposition that landlord’s prior initiation of proceedings is not determinative of mala fide motive.	Used in the reasoning dismissing the tenant’s mala fides argument.
S.P. Sabura Begum v. M.K. Thangavelu, 1997 (I) CTC 95; 1997 (I) MLJ 418	Stated principle that the rent controller must consider: (1) bonafide intention of the landlord; (2) age/condition of the building; and (3) the landlord's financial position to demolish and rebuild.	Adopted as a controlling checklist; the court applied these three factors and found in favour of the landlords on all counts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the four principal grounds relied upon by the lower appellate authority in setting aside the Rent Controller’s eviction orders: (1) absence of a proper/valid undertaking under Section 14(2)(b); (2) one petitioner being of unsound mind; (3) the genuineness/validity of power(s) of attorney; and (4) the landlords’ requirement not being bona fide.

Undertaking under Section 14(2)(b): The court analysed the statutory text of Section 14(2)(b) which requires an undertaking that demolition will commence within one month and be substantially completed within three months (or such further period as allowed). The court relied on a line of authorities (notably Radhakrishnan v. Rajendran and Jameema Beevi) establishing that the Act prescribes no particular form for the undertaking and an undertaking given in evidence or recorded in pleadings may suffice. Considering the pleadings (explicit statements in the petitions) and the oral evidence of P.W.1 (and the power agent in the other petition), the court concluded the landlords' statements met the statutory purpose: showing an honest intention to demolish and reconstruct. The court therefore rejected the appellate authority’s finding that there was no proper undertaking.

Power of Attorney / Locus: The court noted the petitions alleged co‑ownership by the petitioners (brothers) and found this allegation was not challenged in the counter. Evidence supported the co‑ownership and no effective cross‑examination undermined that position. Relying on authorities (including Ehasn Bivi and Sriram Pasricha), the court held that a co‑owner can maintain an eviction application; thus, even if some powers of attorney were defective, other co‑owners’ presence made the petitions maintainable. The court also observed that where the power of attorney did not show clear flaws on the record, a stranger’s challenge to its genuineness was not decisive.

Mental Capacity of fourth Petitioner: The allegation that one petitioner was of unsound mind was examined against the evidence. The court found the material insufficient: the tenants' assertions were vague; cross‑examination did not support a finding of insanity; no medical examination was sought; P.W.1’s evidence denied unsoundness. The court concluded the lower appellate authority was not justified in drawing a conclusion of unsoundness on the scant record, and thus the objection to maintainability on this ground failed.

Bona fide requirement — age and condition: The court considered the Supreme Court’s ruling in Vijay Singh v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, which establishes that for eviction under Section 14(1)(b) the building need not be shown to be dangerously dilapidated — mere bona fide requirement to demolish for reconstruction is sufficient. Turning to the facts, the court accepted unchallenged testimony (P.W.1) and the engineer’s inspection report (Ex. P.2) which found the structure to be about 80 years old, mud walls, cracks, white ant damage, damaged rafters and flooring — material the court considered sufficient to demonstrate that the building was old and in a dilapidated state. The absence of objection to the engineer’s report and precedent that non‑examination of a commissioner/engineer is not fatal (Lakshman case) supported the court's reliance on that report.

Bona fide requirement — financial capacity: The tenants argued the landlords lacked funds. The court emphasized established law that landlords need not produce cash in court; financial institutions or third parties can provide finance. The landlords’ oral evidence (P.W.1) that they had funds, the absence of effective challenge in cross‑examination, admissions by the tenant on certain points, and the fact that the landlords had municipal sanctions and plans, led the court to accept the landlords' claim of sufficient means. The court rejected the tenant’s contention of indebtedness as not sufficiently proven.

Bona fide requirement — mala fides/ulterior motive: The court evaluated assertions that prior proceedings, earlier compromises, or alleged demands for enhanced rent showed an oblique motive. Relying on authorities (including M/s. P. ORR & Sons Ltd. and S.P. Sabura Begum), the court held that initiation of earlier proceedings or prior compromises does not, of itself, establish mala fides. The tenant’s evidence was found to be inconsistent and unsupported; the court found no cogent material to hold the applications were filed for any ulterior motive.

Critique of the lower appellate approach: The court criticized the lower appellate authority for adopting an excessively pedantic and quasi‑criminal standard, as if the landlord had to prove matters beyond reasonable doubt. The court emphasised that the Rent Control Act safeguards tenants but also recognizes landlords’ legitimate rights; a rigid, hyper‑technical approach that places undue burdens on landlords is unjustified. Applying the proper standard and the authorities, the court concluded the lower appellate authority erred in setting aside the Rent Controller’s eviction orders.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revisional court allowed both revision petitions. It set aside the order of the lower appellate authority and restored the Rent Controller's eviction orders.

Core Ruling: Both revision petitions are ALLOWED — the appellate authority’s orders are set aside and the Rent Controller’s orders for eviction are restored.

Direct consequences on the parties:

The eviction petitions, as originally ordered by the Rent Controller, will stand allowed in favour of the landlords.
Costs were awarded in favour of the landlords ("cost throughout").
Time for the tenants to vacate was fixed at two months.

Broader implications: The court reiterated existing legal principles rather than announcing a novel doctrine — particularly the propositions that (a) undertakings under Section 14(2)(b) may be satisfied by statements in pleadings or oral evidence; (b) a building need not be proved dangerously dilapidated for demolition/reconstruction eviction claims (following the Supreme Court in Vijay Singh); and (c) the rent controller must assess bonafide intention, age/condition, and financial capacity (following S.P. Sabura Begum). The opinion emphasises a pragmatic and liberal approach to landlord claims under Section 14(1)(b), warning against an overly technical or criminal standard of proof by appellate authorities. The decision restores the Rent Controller’s orders in the facts of these petitions but does not purport to create new law beyond applying and reiterating cited authorities.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly on the basis of the text of the provided opinion. No facts or holdings beyond those expressly contained in the opinion have been added or inferred.

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Akbar Ali And 4 Others v. Donian Rodrigo And Another S

2. These two civil revision petitions are filed by the landlords. The landlords filed two petitions, one in RCOP No. 47 of 1982 and another in RCOP. No. 48 of 1982 against the tenants for eviction under Section 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The property which is the subject matter of the petition for eviction in RCOP No. 47 of 1982 is comprised in Door No. 69, Pattamangalam Street, Mayuram Town, measuring 7000 sq. ft. The petition in RCOP. No. 48 of 1982 related to 240 sq. ft. comprised in Door No. 69-B, Pattamangalam Street, Mayuram Town. In other words, the two properties are part of the same building.

2. The petitioners in RCOP No. 47 of 1982 putforward the case for eviction on these following allegations:— The property belongs to the petitioners who are brothers. It had been rented out to the respondent on monthly rental of Rs. 525. The building is more than 100 years old. The rear portion has fallen down. The petitioners require the said building for demolish and to put up a new construction. They have got the sufficient funds to put up new construction. They undertake to demolish the buildings, within a time to be fixed by this Court. A notice was issued on 17.6.1982 requiring the tenant to vacate the building and hand over the possession. The said notice was returned as refused. Hence the petition.

3. The respondent resisted the claim contending thus:— The petition is not maintainable in law or fact. The power of attorney is not admitted by the respondent the genuine and if the power is true, he has got no locus standi to file this application the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act cannot be applied. One of the petitioners is not mentally sound and the claim of the petitioner is not true. They do not require the building for the purpose of demolition. The building is not 100 years old. It is in good condition and it need not be demolished. Since the respondent has not agreed to pay the huge demand of rent of Rs 1,000 per month, this application is filed to coerce the respondent. It is not true to say that the back portion of the building is damaged. Previously also number of eviction petitions were filed against the respondent to coerce him to pay more rent for the building. The object of filing this application is only to get more rent from the respondent. The petitioners are highly indebted. They do not have funds either jointly or severally to put up any new construction. No notice was sent to this respondent and he has not refused any notice. The respondent is a ceylon repatriate and he has got no other building nor any other resource of income. He is there in the building for the past about 17 years. Number of persons depend upon the respondent and if the respondent is ordered to vacate the building, they will have to stand in the streets. Hence, this application may be dismissed with costs.

4. The case putforward in RCOP No. 48 of 1982 by the petitioner is as follows:— The petitioners are brothers. The property belongs to them, which has been rented out to the respondent on a monthly rent of Rs 200 per month. The building is 100 years old. The back portion of the main building has fallen down. The suit building along with the portion given to Indo-Ceylon Ryon Bakery forms one unit. They want to demolish the entire structure and put up a new building. The petitioners have got sufficient funds to put up a new construction. They undertake to demolish the building within a time to be fixed by this Court. In spite of notice, the respondent did not comply with the same. Hence the petition.

5. The respondent contended as follows:— This petition is not maintainable. It is not admitted that they are represented by power agent. The power is not admitted by the respondent as genuine. One of the petitioners is not mentally sound and he has got on locus standi to file this application. The petitioners do not require the building for the purpose of demolition. The building is not 100 years old. The building is in good condition and it need not be demolished. Since the respondent has not agreed to pay the huge demand of rent of Rs 400 per month this application is filed to coerce the respondent to agree to the terms of the petitioners. It is not true to say that the back portion of the building is damaged. The object if filing this application is only to get more rent from the respondent. The petitioners are highly indebted. They have not made any arrangements to put up any new construction. The respondents has got no other building nor any other resource of income. He is there in the building for the past about 12 years. Therefore, the respondent prays to dismiss the petition with costs.

6. In support of the application in RCOP No. 47 of 1982, the first petitioner examined himself as P.W 1 and the power of attorney agent as P.W 2. The respondent was examined as RW1. Exs. P. 1 to P. 10 and Ex. R1 and R2 were marked. Learned Rent Controller after holding the enquiry found that the requirement of the landlords to be bona fide and ordered eviction. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent preferred an appeal before the appellate authority in RCA. No. 4 of 1990 and the appellate authority allowed the appeal and dismissed the petition. Therefore, the landlords have preferred the petition in C.R.P No. 2216 of 1991.

7. In support of the application in RCOP No. 48 of 1982, before the Rent Controller, the power agent of the petitioners was examined as P.W 1 and the respondent was examined as RW1. Exs. P. 1 to P. 10 and Exs. R1 to R3 were marked. The Rent Controller, after the enquiry, ordered eviction whereupon the tenant has preferred an appeal before the appellate authority in RCA. No. 5 of 1990 and the appellate authority allowed the appeal and set aside the order of eviction. Hence, the landlords have preferred the revision in C.R.P No. 2217 of 1991.

8. The landlords/appellants are the same. The building in question in both the proceedings is the same. The points that arise for consideration are the same. Therefore, these two revision petitions are heard together and are disposed of by a common order as under;

9. The lower appellate authority has rejected the request of the landlords on four main grounds.

(1) There is no proper or valid undertaking as required under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. (2) One of the petitioners is not of sound mind. (3) The truth of the power of attorney has not been established and therefore, the petition is not maintainable. (4) the requirement of the landlords is not bona fide.

10. To facilitate easy analysis and a discussion free of confusion, I would take up the above points for consideration is seriatim.

11. Now while on the question of undertaking, I will refer to section 14(2)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which reads as follows:—

“No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed on the ground specifies in clause (b) of sub section (1), unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the work of demolishing any material portion of the building shall be substantially commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of three months from the date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the controller may, for reasons to be recorded in writing allow”.

Therefore, it is contented on behalf of the respondent that there is no undertaking as contemplated under section 14(2)(b) of the Act, furnished by the landlords in this case, and therefore, in the absence of compliance of such requirement, the petition for eviction is bound to fail. With regard to the above submission, I would refer to the pleadings in RCOP No. 47 of 1982. In paragraph 4 of the petition, it is stated as follows:—

“They undertaken to demolish the building, within a time to be fixed by this Honourable Court.”

The pleadings in RCOP No. 48 of 1982 in paragraph 5 of the petition, on this aspect is as follows:—

“They undertake to demolish the building within a time to be fixed by this Honourable Court”.

When P.W 1, the first petitioner was examined in RCOP. No. 47 of 1982, in the course of chief examination he has stated as follows:—

In RCOP No. 48 of 1982, the power of attorney agent has stated as follows:—

Now in the context of the pleadings and the evidence of P.W 1 in the above eviction petition. We have to now see, whether there is an undertaking as contemplated under the Act and whether the undertaking furnished will be enough for the purpose of the petition.

12. It is held in the decision in Radhakrishnan v. Rajendran and others, 1990 (II) MLJ 319: 1990 TLNJ 204, that landlord giving undertaking in the course of his evidence, is sufficient and it would satisfy requirements of the Act for there is no form of undertaking mentioned in Section 14(2) (b) of Act and therefore, there need not be any undertaking in writing. In an earlier judgment of this Court in Jameema Beevi v. Easwarlal Patel, 1979 (II) MLJ 35. It was held that mere absence of a reference in the undertaking if the fact that they would demolish the building within a month and complete the reconstruction within three months would not detract from the same being necessarily understood as an undertaking to demolish as per the provisions. It was also held in that case that the undertaking given by the power of attorney was one which satisfied the requirements of Section 14(2)(b) of the Act and such an undertaking binds the principal in view of the express recitals in the power of attorney and no more undertaking was necessary from the landladies themselves and it was held that there was sufficient compliance with the provisions of the Act. It is also held in the decision reported in 1985 (98) LW 589 that the granting time by the rent controller to the party namely, to the landlord to file undertaking and if the landlord submit an undertaking in time, it would amount to sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 14(2)(b) of the Act. In the decision reported in Thayammal v. K. Subramanian, 1989 (1) LW 228 it was held that the undertaking given by the landlord in the deposition would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement under Section 14(2)(b) of the Act. In a case where the appellate authority set aside the order of the rent controller dismissing the application filed under Section 14(2)(b) of the Act, when the landlord gave an undertakIng before the appellate authority it was held sufficient to satisfy the requirement under Section 14(2)(b) of the Act. Alamelu Ammal v. Visalkshi Ammal, 1978 (91) LW 423. The idea behind the provision is to see that the landlord is honest about his decision to demolish and reconstruct the building. When he seeks eviction of the tenant on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, it is necessary for him to show that he would take up the work of demolition as expediously as possible. Here in this case on hand, we find an undertaking given in the petition ofcourse. The exact reproduction of the section is not there. But there is an undertaking by the landlord to the effect that he would carry out the work of demolition and reconstruction within the time prescribed by the court. It is to be pointed out that this Act does not contain any format or prescribe any particular form of undertaking. Therefore, one cannot take a too narrow view of the matter. The same can be expressed in any terms by the landlord. Therefore, in such circumstances, it cannot be stated that the averments made in the petition, would not amount to undertaking. The Court has to see broadly, if there is a compliance. In the absence of any specific format, one has to interpret it and construe it liberally. Any strained interpretation or too narrow construction would only have the effect of nullifying the benefit provided to a landlord to recover possession under Section 14(2)(b) of the Act. The benefit conferred cannot be whittled down or made illusory by placing a spartan view of the matter. Then that would be denying the legitimate right of the landlord. Therefore, it is matter necessary not obligatory on the part of the landlord of file any separate affidavit of undertaking or faithfully reproduce the wording employed in the Section. A statement to that effect in the petition itself would taken care of the same and any statement that contains the essence of Section 14(2)(b) of the Act or broadly indicate the compliance should be construed as an undertaking sufficient for the purpose of the application. Hence, a peripheral compliance would suffice, I am unable to accept the arguments that the undertaking in this case is deficient. It is in, conformity with the provisions of the Act.

13. Much ado has been made about the validity of the power of attorney and this argument has weighed with the lower appellate court it is the specific allegation made in the petition that the petitioners/landlord 1 to 4 are brothers entitled to equal share in the property. This definite and positive allegation is not challenged in the counter. There is also evidence to the effect that the property belongs to all the petitioners, who are thus entitled to equal share in the property. This aspect is also not disputed. Nor any cross examination has been done of P.W 1 on that aspect. It is the undisputed proposition of law that a co-owner or even a life estate holder is entitled to file an application for eviction and here it is on the ground of demolition and reconstruction. It was held in the decision reported in Ehasn Bivi and others v. Nagalakshmi ammal, 1981 TLNJ 17 that eviction petition by one co-owner is maintainable in law and written consent of other co-owners is not necessary. The Supreme Court has held in the decision reported in Sriram Pasricha v. Jagannate, 1976 (4) SCC 184 that a co-owner is asmuch an owner of the property and therefore, he can maintain the application for eviction of the tenant. Therefore, even assuming for the purpose of argument that the power of attorney executed by the petitioners 2 and 3 is not valid in law and it does not matter since there are other two co-owners on record as petitioners, who are entitled to proceed with the application. In RCOP No. 47 of 1982, the first petitioner/Akbar Ali, who has been examined as P.W 1 has stated that the petitioners 2 and 4 are his brothers. In RCOP No. 48 of 1982, one Mohamed Saleem has been examined as P.W 1 and as the power of attorney agent of the petitioners. The petition was presented by the brothers namely, Akbar Ali, Abduali, Zafrullah and Mujubudin. The petitioners 2 and 3 were represented by the power of attorney agent. A.H Saleem it is with deference to the power of attorney executed in favour of Aziz Ahamed. It is stated that it is invalid and inoperative. In RCOP No. 47 of 1982, the first petitioner/Akbar ali was examined as witness and he was not represented by power of attorney. In RCOP. No. 48 of 1982, Akbar Ali is also a petitioner. The forth petitioner-Mujubudeen was not represented by any power agent. The other petitioners were represented by the power agent. As regards the power executed in favour of P.W 1, it was not pointed out that there is any flaw in the same. The person, who executed the power of attorney would accept it the person, who has been appointed as power of attorney agent has also stated that he was also appointed by the said person. It may not open to a stranger in such circumstances to dispute the truth and validity of the power of attorney. Further we find that subsequently, necessary applications were filed and the defect if any has been rectified that apart, one of the co-owners can maintain the application, even without impleading the other co-owners. Here all the co-owners are before the court and even if it is construed that the power is defective in any manner with regard to one or two of the co-owners that does not matter. The other co-owners can in law, maintain the application.

14. One another contention incidentally that was raised is that the fourth petitioner is of unsound mind. Therefore, the application is not maintainable because he is not represented by a suitable guardian. The act being a self contained. It does not provide the procedure to be adopted, in case one of the parties is on unsound mind. Assuming it to be true, the other petitioners, who are thus, competent to file a petition either in their own right individually or jointly. Further there is nothing to show that the fourth petitioner is of really unsound mind. In this connection, what all is stated by the respondent in RCOP No. 47 of 1982 is that it is learned that one of the petitioner is to mentally sound. In RCOP No. 48 of 1982, it is stated that one of the petitioner is not mentally sound. P.W 1 in RCOP No. 47 of 1982 has state that the fourth petitioner suffered paralyses and he cannot move about and hence, he cannot come to court. When he was cross examined, no suggestion was made to P.W 1 that he is insane or of unsound mind. P.W 1 has denied the suggestion that the fourth petitioner is unsound mind. He has stated that he can understand the things. When the tenant in RCOP No. 47 of 1982 was examined, he would say that the fourth petitioner is of unsound mind for the past 12 years, prior to the date of petition what is stated in the cross examination by him is that whenever he visited the house of the petitioners, the fourth petitioner used to smile at him and used to ask money from him. That does not amount to insanity. Therefore, the evidence of RW. 1 would not support the contention that the fourth petitioner is a person of unsound mind or insane. Moreover, there was no application filed by the respondent for the medical examination of the fourth petitioner. As regards RCOP No. 48 of 1982 PW 1 has stated in course of chief examination that the fourth petitioner is suffering from paralysis and therefore, he is not a fit witness. In the course of cross examination, he has stated that the fourth petitioner is of sound mind. No other suggestion was made to P.W 1 in that regard. The respondent in RCOP No. 48 of 1982 when examined, he would only stated that the fourth petitioner is of unsound mind. In his cross examination he would say that the fourth petitioner used to run about and abuse and run muck in the house. This, according to him happened once when he visited the house of the petitioners on one occasion. Therefore, on this ground he would say that the fourth petitioner is mentally unsound. This evidence of the tenant is only stated to be rejected. It is only artificial. When P.W 1 in the box, it was not suggested to him that the fourth petitioner was in the habit of running a muck in the house. In the counter it is not so stated. When did it take place no detail is given. Therefore, in such circumstances it cannot be stated that there is some basis to hold that the fourth petitioner is of unsound mind. Therefore, as a question of fact on the basis of the scanty materials, the lower court was not justified in drawing any conclusion with regard to the mental capacity of the fourth petitioner. Therefore, objection regarding the maintainability of the petitioner on the ground of defect in the power of attorney or on the ground of unsoundness mind of the fourth petitioner are untenable and deserve to be rejected.

15. Now we have to take up for consideration the question ofbonafide requirement of the building for demolition and reconstruction. It has been held in numerous decisions that the building need not be very old and decrefit. We have long catena of cases on this point. The decisions of this Court on this point can be listed as under:—

Mamboob Badsha v. M. Manga Devi and another, 1965 (II) MLJ 209, (2) Chandrasekara Chettiyer v. Kakumani Adikesavalu Chetty's Charities, 1965 (78) LW 326, (3) Sha Manakchand v. Sankarji Moolchand, 1965 (2)MLJ 12, (4) Narasinga Konar v. S.A.C Chirtambalam Chettiar, 1966 (79) LW 21 (SN), (5) A. Lakshmanan v. Kanniammal, 1995 (II) MLJ 178, (6) Sultan Sheriff alias Basha v. Hassan Mohideen and others, 1984 (97) LW 166, (7) Narayanaswami Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer 1965 (I) MLJ 78, (8) Daniel Parthasarathy v. Manickavasagam, 1965 (78) LW 24 (SN), (9) Bharath Trading Co., v. Shanmugasundaram, 1982 (I) MLJ 94, (10) 1985 (II) MLJ 151 and (11) Ammal Pillai v. Varadarajulu Complex, 1997 (1) LW 364.

I do not think it, necessary to refer to all those decisions in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Singh etc., v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, 1996 (II) CTC 586: 1997 (I) MLJ 98 (SC), where their Lordships of the Supreme Court have laid down the law as follows:—

“On reading Section 14(1)(b) of the Act along with Section 16, it can be said that eviction of a tenant on the ground of demolition of the building for erection of a new building, the building need not be dilapidated or dangerous for human habitation. If that was the requirement there is no occasion to put a condition to demolish within a specified time and to erect a new building on the same site.”

…. In the background, it has to be held that neither of the extreme positions taken by the respondent/landlord or the appellants/tenants can be accepted. Permission under Section 14(1)(b) cannot be granted on mere asking by the landlord, that he proposes to immediately demolish the building in question to erect a new building, at this same time, it is difficult to accept the stand of the tenants that the building must be dilapidated, dangerous and unfit for human habitation. Therefore, as a question of law, it is clear that it is not necessary that the building must be actually in a dilapidated and dangerous condition. Now let us see in this case, what is the evidence adduced with regard to the nature and condition of the building. Therefore in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court it is to be pointed out that it is not necessary for the landlords to prove that the condition of the building is such that it is dilapidated and dangerous and has to be demolished immediately. But even otherwise, as a question of fact in this case, it has to be held that there is evidence to show that the condition of the building is not sound. The specific stand of the landlords is that the building is more than 100 years old. But the tenants would contend that it is not 100 years old, and that the building is strong than any other new building and it is in good condition. When the first petitioner in RCOP No. 48 of 1982 as P.W 1 has stated that in the course of chief examination that the building was 100 years old and the rear portion of the building has become dilapidated. It is to be pointed out that notice was also given by the landlords to the tenants. In the course of cross examination, there is no specific suggestion made to the witness suggesting that the building is in good condition. The front portion of the buildings is terraced while the back portion is tiled. This fact has brought out by P.W 1. It is also stated by P.W 1 in the course of cross examination that the walls are made up of mud. Thus in RCOP No. 47 of 1982 the evidence of P.W 1 with regard to the condition of the building and the age of the building stand unchallenged. P.W 1 in RCOP No. 48 of 1982, the power agent has stated in the course of chief examination that the building is 80 years old and a portion of the rear portion is in a dilapidated condition. It was not suggested to him that the rear portion has not fallen down and it is not dilapidated condition, nor any question has been put to suggesting that the building is not an old one. In this connection, an engineer was appointed as commissioner to inspect the building and note the condition of the building. The engineer has submitted in his report, which has been marked as Ex. P. 2 in RCOP No. 48 of 1982. Ofcourse the report filed in RCOP No. 48 of 1982 considers the entire structure. It is to be pointed out that both the petitions related to same building and what is the subject matter in RCOP No. 48 of 1982 is nothing but a part of the same building. The engineer has inspected the property on 27.8.1988 in the presence of the parties. He has stated that the building is about 80 years old and the walls of the building are of mud and there are cracks in the front and rear walls. He has also stated that some of the portions have been eaten by white ants. He has also noted that in some places rafters have become damaged and they have been supported by concrete pillars. Some wooden rafters and other beams were all damaged due to white ants. The tiles have been damaged in several places. The flooring in considerably damaged. Ofcourse, he has not mentioned in the report that the rear or front portion had fallen down. The report of the engineer shows that the building is 80 years old on the date of his inspection, which was in the year 1988. It is made of mud walls. Beams and rafters have become damaged. Flooring is also damaged in many places. Therefore, there is sufficient material available to show that the building is a very old building and is in a dilapidated condition. The word ‘dilapidated’ according to the dictionary meaning is, “state of bad repair”. “to fall” or “cause to fall into partial ruin or decay”. The section does not require that the building should be actually in a dilapidated condition. What all it says that the landlord can ask for possession of the building, if requires it bona fide for the purpose of demolition and construction. We have the evidence forthcoming from the side of the landlords that they require the building bona fide for the purpose of demolition and the said demolition is for the purpose of erecting a new building. The age and condition of the building further show that the requirement of the landlords is genuine and the building is in a dilapidated condition.

16. Learned counsel for the tenants would contend that there is no proof to show that the landlords have sufficient financial capacity to undertake the work of demolition and reconstruction. Before ever, I take up that aspect of the matter, I would answer one other contention raised on behalf of the tenants. It is that the engineer, who filed the report has not been examined and therefore, the report of the engineer cannot be based for arriving at finding, with regard to the age and condition of the building. I do not find any material on record to show that when the report of the engineer was marked, any objection was raised to the same on that ground. The records also do not disclose that any objection has been filed to the report of the engineer. It is also to be pointed out that the view has been taken by this court in decision reported in Lakshman, A and others v. Kanniammal @ Pattammal, 1995 (1) LW 632 that the non-examination of the commissioner or engineer is not fatal to the case of the landlord. Therefore, in such circumstances, the contention putforward by the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard has to be reject.

17. It is not the requirement of law that the landlord should jingle the coins before court. In fact it has been held that it is not even necessary that the landlords would alone invest the amount and facilities from financial institutions can be availed of or from other persons. We find support for the position in the ruling reported in Vijay Singh etc., v. Vijayalakshmi Ammal, 1996 (II) CTC 586 and Lakshman, A and others v. Kanniammal @ Pattammal 1995 (1) LW 632. It is alleged in the petition that the petitioners have got sufficient means to put up new construction. The tenant in the counter have stated that the petitioners are highly indebted and they do not have funds jointly and severally to put up new construction. Whileso, the first petitioner/Akbar Ali has stated in the course of his chief examination that they have sufficient means to demolish and reconstruct. In the course of his cross examination, it was not suggested to him that he has no means on the other hand it was only suggested that he has debts P.W 1 replied it stating that he sold a house belonging to him situate in a different part of the Town, two years prior to the date of filing of the petition and discharged the debts. He has also stated that he has bank deposit. Ofcourse he has not produced the bank passbook. That does not mean that he has no bank account. The suggestion made to him that the petitioners have no means and that the petitioners are in debt is denied by him. When the tenant was examined as RW1, he has admitted in the course of his chief examination that the petitioners 2 and 3 are employed in a reputed concern. He would say that it would cost about Rs. 6 lakhs to demolish and construct and the petitioners do not have the funds to the extent. In the course of the cross examination he had made the statement that all the three petitioners are living abroad. He admitted that he does not know whether they had debts. In the RCOP No. 48 of 1982 it is specifically urged in the petition that the petitioners have sufficient funds to put up new construction. It is only stated in the counter that the petitioners are indebted. PW1 has stated in his evidence that the petitioners have the necessary funds to demolish and reconstruct. It is admitted that the petitioners have no other building, excepting the petition mentioned building. In the cross examination, P.W 1 has stated definitely that they have got funds in the bank. The suggestion that they are indebted is denied by him. The only suggestion made to him was that as the petitioners are attempting to sell away the property to get possession of the property, they have filed this petition on the ground that they require the same for demolition and reconstruction. The tenant in RCOP No. 48 of 1982 has only stated that the petitioners 1 to 3 have no means to demolish and reconstruct. In the course of cross examination, he admits that he does not know to whom all they are indebted. Therefore, in the above circumstances, I am unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners have failed to prove that they got sufficient means. From the evidence adduced, it is clear that on the date of petition, they are not possessed any other building of their own in Miladuthurai. Three of the petitioners are employed abroad. The definite evidence on the side of the petitioners is that they are not indebted and they have got sufficient means. Merely because the tenant disputes the same, it does not follow that the landlords have no means. It is not necessary that the landlords should produce the currencies before the court to show their means. In the circumstances, I find no reason to ignore the evidence adduced on the side of the landlords, with regard to means. They have submitted plans and obtained necessary sanctions from the Municipality. The other point that is urged by the learned counsel for the respondent is that this application is filed with ulterior motive and there is lack of bonafide in these applications. Presently I would advert to the said contention. The tenants in both the applications would say that the landlords are attempting to sell away the property and therefore, with that view they have filed applications to get possession of the building. This is emphatically denied by the landlords. It is not stated by the respondent as to the person in whose favour the petitioners are negotiating to sell the property. Admittedly the property is situate in the important locality in the Town of Mailadudurai. It is also the case that they are not possessed of any other property in Mailadudurai. Therefore, in such circumstances, it is rather unnatural to contend that the petitioners are attempting to sell away the property. In the same breadth it is also alleged by them that the landlords demanded higher rent from the tenants and as the tenants were not agreeable, the present application is filed.

18. On the materials placed before court it is not possible to hold that there is some oblique motive in filing this application. In this connection, it was suggested that already some applications were filed and after accepting higher rent, the landlord did not pursue the said application. Hence, it is argued that it would show that this application is filed with a view to extract more rent and as the tenants were not prepared to comply with the demand for enhancement of rent. In the counter filed in RCOP No. 47 of 1982 it is stated that the respondent did not agree to pay huge demanded rent of Rs. 1,000 and therefore, the present application has been filed. It is also stated that previously number of applications were filed against the respondent to coerce the respondent to pay more rent and the respondent was thus compelled to pay more rent for building. While that is the stand taken in the counter, when P.W 1 was in the witness box, it was not suggested that any rent much less at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per month was demanded and the same was refused by the tenant. On the other hand the suggestion was that excess rent was demanded. Further the suggestion was that the landlords want to sellaway the property and therefore, they have filed this application. In the counter filed in RCOP No. 48 of 1982 it was stated that there was a demand for Rs. 400, since it was not complied with, the present application has been filed. But when P.W 1 was in the box, a suggestion was made that there was a demand for higher rent. When RW1, the tenant was examined, he has mentioned about the demand for rent at the rate of Rs. 400 per month. He has also stated that the landlords' plan to sell away the building. He has admitted that there was no prior eviction petition filed against him. According to him, the demand was made orally in the year 1982. As regards the tenant, in RCOP No. 47 of 1982, when he was examined as RW1, he has stated that a demand was made by the petitioners 1 to 3 as rent of Rs. 1,000 and he refused to comply with the request. It is stated by him that only Akbar Ali demanded a sum of Rs. 1,000 as rent, whereas in the course of chief examination, it is stated that the petitioners 1 to 3 demanded the said amount. He further admitted that in the reply to the notice issued by the petitioners, he did not make mention of any demand. It is no doubt true that with reference to the subject matter of RCOP No. 47 of 1982, the petitioners 1 to 3 filed petitions for eviction. The petitions were dismissed and an appeal was preferred against the same and when the appeal was pending, a compromise memo was entered into between the parties, whereunder the landlords agreed to receive the rent at the rate of Rs. 300 per month and did not pursue the appeal. Merely, from the above circumstances, it would not transpire that the request of the landlords is mala fide. In pursuance of the compromise, the appeals were not pursued further by the landlord and the matter was settled. In such circumstances, it cannot be contended that this application has been filed with a view to use it as a lever for getting higher rent. It has been held by this Court in the decision reported in M/s. P.ORR & Sons Limited v. M/s. Associated Publishers, 1990 TLNJ 194 that merely because, the landlord on an earlier occasion, initiated proceedings, that by itself will not render the requirement of the landlords as one activated by oblique motive. The motive of the landlords is irrelevant. If there is an intention, and if there is no suspicion about the requirement, the landlords will be entitled to an order of eviction. Thus, the motive is not the criteria or a relevant factor to be taken into consideration 1978 TLNJ 108, Lakshman, A and others v. Kanniammal @ Pattammal 1995 (1) LW 632 and Thangaswamy v. R. Vinayakamurthy, 1996 (II) MLJ 322. Now with regard to the report of the engineer to which the tenants have not filed any objection, in the absence of any suggestion to show that the engineer adopted a partisan attitude, the report of the engineer has to be accepted as providing satisfactory evidence with regard to the condition and nature of the building. Here, in this case, the engineer had noted the age of the building and the condition of the building. It is also clear that it is not necessary that the landlords should have made all the necessary arrangements for demolition and reconstruction on the date when they filed the application. Even assuming that there were some earlier proceedings with regard to the building initiated by the landlords and those proceedings ended in compromise between the parties, whereby landlords agreed to accept higher rent, on that account, no stigma can be attached to the request of the landlords. As pointed out by this Court in the decision reported in Narayanaswami Iyer v. Ramakrishna Iyer, 1965 (I) MLJ 78, it cannot make any difference at all. As held by the Supreme Court in its decision reported in S.P. Sabura Begum v. M.K. Thangavelu, 1997 (I) CTC 95: 1997 (I) MLJ 418, the rent controller has to take into account (1) bonafide intention of the landlord. It should not be solely to get rid of the tenant; (2) the age and condition of the building; and (3) the financial position of the landlord to demolish and erect a new building. As to the age and condition of the building, there is sufficient materials to which I have already referred to and which show that the age and condition is such it requires to be demolished and reconstructed. With regard to the financial condition of the landlords, I have already held that the landlords have satisfied that they are financially in a portion to undertake the work of demolition and reconstruction. I am unable to hold that there is any material to suggest that this application has been filed by the landlords as a tool to get possession with any oblique motive. On the other hand, from the circumstances, it is clear that the request of the landlords is bonafide and the requirement is genuine.

19. The lower appellate court has proceeded to discuss the case rather putting the odds against the landlords. The Rent Control Act is meant to the benefit both the tenant and the landlord. The idea is to protect the tenant from unjust eviction. It does not mean that the legitimate request of the landlord to recover possession should be turned down. The idea that the tenant is a victimised person, and he is a weaker section of the society no longer holds good. If certain circumstances are established, then the landlord is entitled to get an order of eviction. It is not open to the Rent Controller or the Appellate Authority to place an unwarranted rigidity and construe the request of the landlord too narrowly. As held by the Supreme Court in a recent decision the court must place itself in the armchair of the landlord and construe the request. A fedantic approach is unwarranted. The approach must be to see whether under circumstances, he is entitled to an order of eviction. The approach of the lower appellate court as though it is a criminal proceeding it is trying and that the landlord must prove it beyond reasonable doubt is an approach unjust and uncalled for. The approach and the discussion by the lower appellate authority is as though they are deciding criminal proceedings. It is not a proper approach. By such approach, the appellate authority would be placing the landlord only at a disadvantage. The law does not intend to place such a handicap upon the landlord. Just as a tenant is entitled to be protected from unreasonable eviction, the landlord is equally entitled to get possession on reasonable ground. That benefit should not be deprived by placing a too narrow and to pedantic interpretation. The approach by the lower appellate court is more to pick holes in the case of the landlord, then to consider broadly whether the need is genuine or not. As a result, the lower appellate court has committed a grave error, which has led to miscarriage of justice. In adopting such a rigid stand the lower appellate court has committed grave error. Therefore, in such circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that the order of the lower appellate court has to be set aside, restoring the order of the Rent controller. In other words, I am satisfied that the landlords have established that the requirement is genuine and therefore, they are entitled to an order of eviction.

20. In the result, both the revision petitions are allowed setting aside the order of the lower appellate court namely, the Appellate Authority. The petitions for eviction will stand allowed with cost throughout. Time for vacating two months.

Akbar Ali And 4 Others v. Donian Rodrigo And Another S

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Landlords' (Appellants') Arguments

Respondent Tenants' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Akbar Ali And 4 Others v. Donian Rodrigo And Another S

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